Southern Africa's Prospects - Stability or Chaos?


Maj Maynard Marais
Centre for Military Studies (CEMIS), Military Academy, University of Stellenbosch

Published in African Defence Review Issue No 16, 1994



COLD WAR AND SOUTHERN AFRICA - SUPERPOWER COMPETITION AND INDIGENOUS CONFLICT


Inter-state power relations in the political and economic sub-system of southern Africa, from the start of decolonisation in the sixties to the end of the Cold War, was determined by the interplay between East-West rivalry and indigenous conflict in the region.

The regional sub-system was to a large extent the voluntary victim of superpower expansionism. The embroilment of southern Africa in superpower rivalry was to have a decisive impact upon regional development and stability. However, it has become evident that in the states of southern Africa - notably South Africa, Zimbabwe, Angola, Mozambique and Lesotho - instability, whether actual or vicarious, has its root causes in indigenous phenomena, independent of external interference.

The perception of insecurity1 in the states of southern Africa was exacerbated by the presence of white dominated South Africa as the dominant regional power. While South Africa presented itself to the western powers as a stabilising force, the Frontline states (FLS), (especially the southern Africa Development Co-ordination Conference or SADCC grouping) contended that the Republic of South Africa (RSA), intent upon expanding its power at the expense of neighbouring countries, was the major source of regional instability. Regardless of the validity of these opposing claims, the fact that they set the tone of southern African diplomacy in the Cold War era meant that the regional order would be characterised by tension and conflict, rather than conciliation and co-operation.

Apart from the external interference generated by the Cold War, African scholars2 have identified two essentially incompatible objectives as the major source of conflict, which led to the socio-economic deterioration of the regional sub-system and consequently to instability and insecurity: 'white domination' and African liberation. The conflict between these two objectives, especially in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and South Africa, dominated political life in the region.

As a result, by the end of the 1980s, two distinct opposing blocs were locked in escalating conflict in southern Africa: the Frontline states on the one side (organised in the SADCC grouping) and actively supporting the South African liberation movements, the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), and on the other side the RSA, with its aggressive counter-offensive in terms of total strategy, 'forward defence' and 'destabilisation'.

OPPOSING BLOCS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: SADCC AND SA


At the beginning of the 1990s, analysis revealed a stalemate situation in terms of political and socio-economic capabilities needed for one bloc to outmanoeuvre the other and emerge as victor. This stalemate was precipitated by the strategic situation which prevailed in the region at the end of the 1980s.

The SADCC was formed in 1980 in terms of the Lusaka Declaration by the six Frontline states - Botswana, Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Angola, together with Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland, with one main political-economic objective: 'to progressively reduce their inherited economic dependence on (and mounting military vulnerability to) their powerful neighbour South Africa'.3 Several SADCC members created and joined the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) in 1982. This was essentially a free trade area for promoting greater trade in eastern and southern Africa.

According to Patel and Weimer4, the SADCC's results in terms of their set goal to lessen dependence on the South African economy, have been a failure: intra-SADCC trade continues to be much smaller than SADCC-non-SADCC trade. Although the trade relationship between South Africa and the SADCC states is generally regarded as one of interdependence, intra-SADCC trade is substantially lower than SADCC-South Africa trade.

At the same time, the SADCC's dependence upon foreign funding has reached a critical threshold. The available statistics reveal that, up until the present time, more than 90 percent of the finance required for SADCC projects has come from foreign sources, and that much of this was in the form of aid from donors for the purpose of opposing 'apartheid'. Regardless of sources and motives, overall funding has fallen far short of the SADCC's developmental needs, with a current funding gap amounting to 50 percent of projected requirement for finances.

The relative failure of SADCC led Weimer5 to an appraisal of the external and internal circumstances under which the group operated during the first ten years of existence. As far as causality is concerned, four basic points emerged.

First, the SADCC economies were plagued by such factors as drought, the worsening of terms of trade, the effects of the recession in the industrialised world, the debt problem, declining per capita GNP and de-industrialisation, all of which factors militated against a strong economic performance. Secondly (and linked to some of the aforementioned difficulties), most of the SADCC members (Angola, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwe) undertook structural reform programmes during the 1980s, some of them backed by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and bilateral donations. While these adjustment programmes generally contributed to a better macro-economic performance of the economies concerned, they have, according to Weimer6:

... considerably worsened or even 'destabilised' the social situation (especially that of the urban population in member countries, thus creating new political and economic problems and sources of conflict). Other problems include, for example, the project-based rather than macro-economic approach by the SADCC, conflict between the planned trade approach of the SADCC and the PTA's free trade approach, and so on.

Thirdly, protracted civil wars devastated the economies of Angola and Mozambique, and their spill-over effects had a negative impact upon neighbouring countries. Finally, although the origins of the conflicts in these newly independent and heterogeneous states may be ascribed to domestic political and ethnic causes, these wars '... were used and manipulated by the South African state and its security establishment in pursuit of its Total National Strategy during the 1980s'.7

The validity of Weimer's indictment may be assessed against an analysis of the justifications and rationale of the South African government in its handling of security matters in the 1980s, within the broader context of international and regional affairs.

SOUTH AFRICA'S TOTAL STRATEGY AND 'DESTABILIsATION' IN THE 1980s


The mounting political, economic and security problems that confronted South Africa in terms of 'total strategy' threat perception led analysts within the national security establishment to conclude that, towards the end of the 1980s, the state was confronted by escalating challenges and threats.

Domestically, the ruling National Party's reform process, which granted political rights to the so-called Coloured and Indian minorities whilst excluding the disenfranchised black majority, gave rise to renewed internal revolt and mass mobilisation during the mid-1980s.

The South African government's regional policy was guided by a preventative, rather than a curative, strategy.8 The strategic logic behind this policy of 'forward defence' was simple: it is preferable to eliminate your enemy outside South Africa through pro-active cross border operations, rather than to track them down once they have crossed the borders. From the 'African liberation' perspective of the FLS, this was regarded as a blatant attempt to destabilise the region.

The total strategy represented the antithesis of the defensive 'laager' posture, and was a pro-active 'counter-offensive' designed to maintain the internal policy of separate development and capitalism, whilst perpetuating South Africa's regional hegemony.

The strategic motive for the execution of 'forward defence' and 'destabilisation' by the South African security planners, under direction from the politicians, is possibly best illustrated by highlighting the dynamics of the regional transport network. According to Hanlon9, transport and communications have accounted for 64 percent of the amount spent on all SADCC projects since 1980, but despite the best efforts of SADCC and its international donors to reorient the regional transport infrastructure away from South Africa, the country remained dominant in this area. This was puportedly due to the strategy of 'destabilisation' which 'often closed a railway almost as soon as it opened'.10

In the 1980s, the South African government, in addition to the dispute about economic sanctions in response to its domestic racial policies, was embroiled in the Namibian issue. Originally, this assumed a legalistic form, but after the Portuguese withdrawal from Angola in 1975, however, the dispute assumed an increasingly military-political character, through the combined insurgency and semi-conventional tactics of the South West African Peoples' Organisation's (Swapo) armed wing, Cuban surrogates and the Angolan government's forces.

The costs of South Africa's security services increased by 30 percent in 1987-88, by 19 percent in 1988-8911, and accounted for 14,4 percent of the 1990-91 South African budget.

Internationally South Africa suffered increasing isolation from world affairs. More seriously, the effects of isolation were manifested in the absence of new foreign investment, and the active disinvestment campaign waged by the ANC in exile eroded the economic powerbase of the state. Since 1985, the South African economy has been under strain, with the effects of disinvestment exarcerbated by drought, low productivity, declining bullion prices and debt repayment obligations.

The combined effect led to the conclusion that the South African state was locked in a deteriorating strategic situation: history attests to the fear of two types of strategic situations. The first is the fear of fighting on two 'fronts' and the second fear is that of facing domestic revolt while engaged in a war against outsiders. For South Africa these 'fronts' included, at the end of the 1980s: Namibia; international isolation; infiltration along extended borders; limited economic growth; and the lack of any assurance that domestic revolt (whether limited or widespread) was improbable.

On the other hand, the material cost to the SADDC grouping of what is generally referred to as South African 'destablisation' for the period between 1980 and 1988 has been estimated to be as high as US$ 60 billion12. Hanlon's13 estimate of US$ 45 billion is considerably lower. However, according to Weimer14:

...this is more than four times the amount SADCC received as Official Development Assistance (ODA) over the same period. Although this estimate is alleged to be greatly exaggerated (and its calculation methodologically flawed), it nevertheless supports the argument that South Africa, by supporting Unita in Angola and Renamo in Mozambique, inflicted heavy economic and social damage upon these SADCC countries, compelling them to restructure their budgets in favour of unproductive defence spending to the detriment of development.

Towards the end of the 1980s it was clear that a stalemate situation, in terms of the capacity of South Africa or the Frontline states for outmanoeuvring the other had been reached. For southern Africa as a regional sub-system generally and South Africa as the dominant regional power in particular and especially in terms of the emerging global setting, 'destabilisation' proved to be a high-risk regional policy option, for it carried the danger of severely escalating bilateral or intra-regional conflict. Indeed, this jeopardised the entire regional sub-system.

Since 1984, but especially during the last five years, the result has been a growing preference in inter-state relations in southern Africa for a peaceful resolution of conflicts.

DEMISE OF THE COLD WAR AND A REGIONAL PREFERENCE FOR PEACE


Much of the preference for peaceful resolution of conflicts in southern Africa, is a result of the demise of the Cold War. The spin-off for southern Africa, was since the second half of the 1980s, a drastic decline in, and possible cessation of superpower contestation on the sub-continent. Concurrently in the region, there has been a concomitant attenuation of ideology as a source of tension within and among African countries, accompanied by significant movement towards political pluralism throughout the continent.15 Political changes in Africa had led to a doubling of the de jure multiparty states from ten to twenty by the end of 1991 and another two dozen countries have committed themselves to democratic reforms.16

But, as Baynham17 states:

... although these political developments have raised real hopes for the better governance of Africa (which is fundamental to any chance of sustained economic recovery), the surge towards political pluralism, and the metamorphosis of African countries away from authoritarian rule, will inevitably mean a painful and extended period of adjustment - with parallel problems relating to domestic and regional security.

It became clear that developments in the late 1980s, leading to the end of the Cold War, have, in the regional context, created burdens for some states and liberation movements, and ambiguities and opportunities for others.

In the southern African region the characteristics of the post-Cold War era have resulted in, among other things, the loss of material support for liberation movements, such as the ANC, from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and the accentuation of a long-standing concern of the West for the welfare and the rights of the whites in South Africa.

These developments, extremely important in terms of white South Africa's vision of a peaceful settlement process in South Africa itself, combined with the severe effects of the ANC's disinvestment and international isolation campaigns, led to the unbanning of the ANC and the PAC by the South African government in 1990.

In the time juncture of the 1990s, following the collapse of communism in East and Central Europe, the states of southern Africa are confronted with the emergence of a new global setting.

SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THE EW WORLD 'DISORDER': THE IMPLICATIONS


An assessment of the post-cold War world and its driving forces leads one to believe that there is one implication most important for the developing world and specifically for southern Africa: external involvement will be driven mainly by economic considerations. An economic motive will operate in the absence of a single dominant political structure in the post-Cold War world. According to strategists like Barber:18

...three major overlapping structures are now in operation. They are not functionally specific and so they overlap and interact, but each has a different emphasis. They are: a) declining superpower hegemony; b) regional triad; and c) UN globalism.

Paradoxically, despite the collapse of communism, America's international hegemony is in decline: America's resources are diminishing. In 1945 the US accounted for 50 percent of the world's production, now it claims about 20 percent. The US has serious trade and budget deficits and an increasing dependence on foreign capital and investment. With the tendency towards declining US hegemony in mind, the focus shifts towards regions and regional order. Regions vary enormously in their size, activities, organisation and relationships. With the end of the global order, more emphasis and hopes are being placed on them.

Three strong and stable regions have emerged or are emerging: North America (US, Canada and Mexico); Japan and the Pacific Rim; and Western Europe and its European Community (EC). They form what Barber19 describes as a 'regional triad'. The three do not embrace major parts of the globe, including China, the Indian sub-continent, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Africa and South America. The three interact with all these regions, but there is no attempt to emulate a superpower by taking on a variety of roles. The relationships are functional, based on economic, not political or security considerations.

At the same time the position of the United Nations (UN) has been transformed. The UN's vulnerability is illustrated by its opportunities as well as its limits and the problems associated with the tasks it is being asked to perform, including:20
  1. The Charter. In security terms, the Charter emphasises order between states and severely restricts the right to intervene in internal affairs.
  2. Resources. At the end of 1992 the 'peacekeeping' budget was in deficit by $805m, and the 'regular' budget by $1.05bn.
  3. Decision-making and administration. Because UN decision-making depends on reaching agreement between a variety of governments, the process is slow and Byzantine.
  4. Roles. Demands for peacemaking, not simply peacekeeping, have increased. This raises many difficulties. Should the UN act like a superpower seeking to impose global order? Should it take on an 'imperial role', not only imposing order but staying to develop services and create political structures which in time local people can inherit? Should it use force to counter abuses of human rights, even if that implies interfering in a state's internal affairs?
  5. Agendas. The UN is a multi-purpose organisation. Although the Charter's emphasis is on international order, other agendas (such as third-world development) have gained prominence. Now that global security has become such a major concern, the other agendas are receiving less attention. They have not disappeared, but the focus has moved away from third-world concerns and to a lesser extent even from global issues, such as the environment.
A dominant feature of the post-Cold War world is the continued prominence of the governments of states as the major shapers of international structures. In this context, in contrast to the western world, the developing world seems to have much less bargaining power with the ending of the Cold War. Whether in the areas of political economy, security, or ideology, the space on the global agenda for Third World concerns has diminished.21

Together with the global recession, these tendencies and developments have contributed to the marginalisation of Africa in international politics and agendas. With this in mind, a wide spectrum of conventional and unconventional challenges, originating externally and internally, threaten southern African. The greatest of these could be that the focus for addressing the region's political and economic ills is shifting towards the region's inherent ability, without external intervention or even interference. Consequently, the outcome of the South African transition could indeed determine the fate of not only South Africa, but the entire regional sub-system.

SOUTH AFRICAN ATTEMPTS AT SETTLEMENT: REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS


The following rationale of future South African regional policy considerations will depend upon assessments of current trends in South Africa and, pending the outcome, the likely consequences for the southern African region.

Assessment of the outcome of the South African transition is highly speculative. It is extremely difficult to predict whether the preference of the two major role players for a negotiated resolution of the long-standing conflict in South Africa will indeed bring about a reduction in the level of violence and hence an increased internal stability to the regional power.

What can be forecasted with greater certainty is that the nature and intensity of conflict and violence in a post-apartheid South Africa, will depend greatly on the form, content and perceived legitimacy of the negotiated settlement. The experiences of Namibia, Zimbabwe and Angola indicate how widely divergent the outcomes of such settlements can be, ranging from relative peace to outright civil war.

Three broadly defined conflict scenarios for South Africa can be plotted along a continuum.22
  • At one end of the spectrum is the 'Namibian option', where the advent of democracy ushers in a period of stability with a low incidence of violence. There is a general acceptance of the election results, confidence in the political process, and commitment to national unity and reconciliation. These developments stimulate local and international investment, leading to gradual economic recovery.
  • At the opposite end of the spectrum is the 'Savimbi option', where certain actors reject the settlement and seek to destabilise the country through organised violence. Such actors might include, on the one hand, elements of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), the Conservative Party (CP) and right-wing militant groups such as the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), as well as one or two homeland administrations within the Freedom Alliance and, on the other hand, militant blacks within the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and the Azanian Peoples Organisation (Azapo). Under such a scenario the possibility is that South Africa may fracture, as in the case of the former Yugoslavia and the USSR, into different independent states: a majority-ruled state under a minimalist compromise settlement, one or more black states (for example, Bophuthatswana, Zululand), and a white state. This will be taking ethnic ambitions to their extreme conclusion. Even if such a situation is resisted by the majority, as is most likely, it will be a nightmare scenario of chaos and massive civil war and a possible 'Lebanonisation' of South Africa. In such circumstances, according to Baregu23, '... an army coup by the South African Defence Force (SADF) and imposition of the military cannot be ruled out'. Regional instability, capital flight and regional warfare would be possible results. Such an outcome would be disastrous for peace and security, not only in South Africa, but in the region as a whole.
The middle option of negotiated settlement is broadly acceptable to political parties and their constituencies, but socio-economic conditions in black communities and the absence of a democratic culture continue to give rise to violence. The state remains unable to provide effective governance, and institutional means of conflict resolution remain weak. The ongoing strife creates a vicious circle, imposing severe constraints on economic growth and therefore on the government's ability to raise living standards.

The three scenarios would have different implications for a future South African government's regional and foreign policy, and consequently for southern Africa.

At the end of 1993 the indicators were that the South African transition is much more complex than originally anticipated: the acceptance by the National Party-controlled Parliament of the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) Act, sharing power with the ANC as the other major participant and the dispute over whether the interim constitution is leading towards a centralised unitary state or a decentralised federation, have resulted in the withdrawal of parties which have formed a new opposition alliance, the Freedom Alliance. The Freedom Alliance consists of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), the Afrikaner Volksfront (AVF), the Conservative Party (CP) and the Bophutatswana and Ciskei administrations (the latter has subsequently withdrawn and opted to participate in the TEC).

In essence the rift is over the question of how much autonomy regions should have in relation to central government, and more fundamentally, to what extent political self-determination is viable as the dominant criterion for the granting of political rights (like the franchise) to the various ethnic groups, despite geographic distribution and economic interdependence.

This analysis assumes that a federal post-apartheid South African government will be an inclusive one, and that the new politics will include rather than exclude the majority. Nevertheless socio-economic conditions in black communities and the absence of a democratic culture will continue to give rise to violence. The post-apartheid economy will be a mixed one, employing both capitalism and socialism.

If this scenario, the middle option, prevails, the primary domestic and international priority of post-apartheid South Africa will be the social welfare, health, and education of its citizens.

In the early 1980s the employment rate for all South Africans was estimated to be 21 percent.24 Kane-Berman25 has projected general unemployment levels of 35 percent by the year 2000, unless things change dramatically. Illiteracy rates are high with almost 33 percent of blacks judging themselves illiterate in the 1980 census.26

In this context post-apartheid South Africa's regional policy will most likely reflect a balance between internal needs and the realities of the international environment. The foundation of this balance will be the perceived national interest - the priorities - of South African society. It can be assumed that post-apartheid South Africa's regional foreign policy will be guided by perceptions of 'national interest'. The foundation for South Africa's national interest, and hence its foreign policy, will be its most pressing domestic needs as well as its assessment of the international and regional situation.

However, no state is fully sovereign; international capital and class structures, and other forces, undercut sovereign authority and all states are 'penetrated' by others and by numerous 'non-state' economic and political forces. Dependence especially, deprives 'peripheral', or 'semi-peripheral', states like South Africa of full independence in foreign policy decision-making.27 Nonetheless, as long as the international system is comprised of states with structures which are relatively independent of formal control by external powers, the perception of national interest by officials will be significant. This is particularly true for South Africa, since it will be the dominant regional economic power.28

This has led analysts to conclude that whatever happens in the region will depend greatly on the political order that will emerge in South Africa. It is further accepted that, in terms of the emerging global setting, the focus for southern Africa's stability - political, economic and in terms of military security - has shifted towards the region's inherent ability as its own generator and determinant of its fortunes. Projected against this background, what are the prospects politically, economically and in the military-security field, for southern Africa?

STABILITY OR CHAOS?


The world-wide tendency towards political pluralism and the renaissance of ethnic and nationalist sentiment (together with the possibility of internal dissent and repression) - and concurrent economic crises (together with the sacrifices inherent in economic reform programmes) - almost certainly mean that Africa can expect continued high, indeed levels of turmoil during the next decade and beyond.

As the countries of southern Africa move towards democratic pluralism on a continent where free and fair elections were until very recently, few and far between, there is a strong possibility of ongoing instability and low-intensity conflict in many countries. Indeed, as Baynham states:29

... there is a risk that the so-called 'second liberation' will change not just the continent's autocratic regimes but also Africa's inherited international boundaries. The likelihood of state collapse and secessionism in Zaïre, together with the possibility of two or more states emerging in both Angola and Mozambique, suggest that a separation along the lines of the Bangladesh break-away from Pakistan could very well manifest itself in one or more southern African states.

It is clear that the region's prospects are based on complex political and economic factors, but another variable can serve as a point of departure: southern Africa is heavily dependent upon South Africa, despite the efforts of SADCC. This can be seen clearly in the related areas of trade, transport and labour. In essence SADCC was largely a structure for raising money from external donors and allocating that money for development projects. One of the main reasons external donors gave to SADCC was their opposition to apartheid.30 With western donors likely to divert aid funds to eastern Europe, it is probable that SADCC will have a hard time raising money after the demise of apartheid. In fact, a post-apartheid South Africa may actually compete with SADCC for scarce aid. It has been suggested that the SADCC states will be more dependent upon foreign capital and external powers after apartheid than it was when the body was founded in 1980.31

Against the background of the global economy as the independent variable, South Africa's role in southern Africa are postulated in terms of two broad economic scenarios for southern Africa, along with their implications for regional stability and security, development and policy choices.

GLOBAL RECESSION: ISOLATION AND PROTECTIONISM


Under global recessionary conditions, South Africa will likely take the course of isolation and protectionism, as the result of the pressures of a growing domestic demand: social reconstruction and redistribution of wealth and income, including land redistribution and domestic employment creation.

South Africa will probably have neither the capacity, nor the will or incentive to look for markets or for investment opportunities in the region. It will close its borders to unskilled migrant labour, repatriating illegal immigrants. No area clearly illustrates the pattern of regional dependence and the dilemma in which post-apartheid South Africa will find itself than that of migrant labour. Government figures for 198632 indicate that 302 695 citizens of foreign countries worked in South Africa. Neighbouring countries depend upon South Africa as a labour market and as direct source of revenue through remittances. If the post-apartheid South African government adopts a policy of projecting domestic priorities onto the region, meaning that the new leaders will be looking for jobs for the newly enfranchised, then the jobs now held by foreigners would, if filled by South Africans, reduce unemployment rates by 8,6 percent.33 If the estimated one million illegal or seasonal workers from the SADCC states are included, closing the borders could cut unemployment by 37 percent.34 An immediate question arises: what would countries like Lesotho or Swaziland or (to a lesser extent) Botswana do without access to South African labour markets?

Under such a scenario, co-operation schemes, based on the prevailing economic and political structures, will be the dominant regional feature.

A minimalist approach proceeds from the assumptions that the West in most aspects will have a minimal interest in the region.

If it is assumed that, in the short- to medium-term, all the states in the region will be embroiled in insecure environments the root causes of which are primarily historical in nature, issues likely to come to the centre stage are the security threats that will be unleashed by political transitions to multi-party rule and majority rule in South Africa with their attendant political openness. Other important issues could be ethnic nationalism, border liquidations and the impact of economic crises in the wake of insufficient external aid and diminished export receipts with the IMF and the World Bank.

Under this scenario the national security situation in all of the southern African countries, especially if in South Africa certain actors reject the settlement and resort to organised violence, will be characterised by mass riots, civil wars, refugee problems, ethnic nationalism and the breakdown of the presently constituted economies and states. National security in each state will increasingly become regime security accompanied by indiscriminate repressions leading to anarchy in several states, as in the case of Somalia. Zaïre, Mozambique and Angola seem to be imminent candidates, seeing that in all three a considerable proportion of the population has already been internally and externally displaced. These people live in marginal areas in the countryside or in huge squatter camps on the edge of big towns. Following the formal end of armed hostilities, the majority of so-called demobilised troops and rebels are likely not to surrender their weapons for quite some time. These developments, in turn, will impede any positive approach to regional economic and political co-operation and integration.

In the long run, the endemic violence in this part of the world might reach a point of no return, contributing to the process of accumulation of power by driving the emerging nation-states. From the ruins of domestic struggles, political consensus may finally emerge in some countries, as the major political actors agree on how to put an end to their divided and fragmented loyalties, devise commonly - accepted rules and political procedures establish and viable nation-states. After examining political processes of sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe, Huntington35 came to the conclusion that 'war was the great stimulus to state-building'.

RECOVERING AND EXPANDING GLOBAL ECONOMY OPTION


Under conditions of a recovering and expanding world economy, a likely scenario is the consolidation of South Africa's regional hegemony. This could take different forms.

Firstly, under conditions of a recovering and expanding global economy, South Africa certainly has the potential to pursue a NIC (newly industrialised country or 'tiger') strategy. This implies globalism and an export orientation. Apart from the recovery of consumer demand in the G7 countries, this strategy would require a liberal GATT (general agreement on tariffs and trade) arrangement. South African capital would collaborate with international capital in export production under cheap labour conditions.

Under such a scenario there would be little trade in the region from the point of view of the frontline states. Demand for skilled and semi-skilled labour would induce migration to South Africa, imposing a 'brain-drain' on the other countries with rand-seeking elites looking for opportunities in the South African export industries, just as unskilled labour flowed to the mining industry. This would intensify depression in the SADCC economies. A bullish South African hegemony would probably result in minimal levels of economic integration and co-operation. A policy of isolationism combined with some globalism, from the point of view of the frontline states, could place South Africa in the region, but not make it of the region.36

Secondly under this scenario, despite South Africa's regional hegemony, an integrative scenario is possible. South Africa may become a member of an economic or trading arrangement in which it plays a dominant role in some kind of regional economic structure.

The third possibility under this scenario is the dismantling of existing arrangements (SADCC and the PTA), redefinition of the zone and scope of operation and the establishment of new regimes in which unilateral reciprocal arrangements become the modus operandi.37

The adoption of either of the last two hegemonic models will crucially depend on the extent to which international capital is integrated with domestic capital in South Africa. The higher the integration of domestic with foreign capital, the greater the possibility of the second model and vice versa.

Post-apartheid South Africa, if the middle option of negotiated settlement prevails, as the regional power, will have to decide whether to join SADCC, in its present or restructured form. SADCC, as it is presently constructed, has said repeatedly that it will welcome a post-apartheid South Africa into its community and institutions.38

The precondition looks to be that future conflict situations in the region have to be avoided by equitable, mutually beneficial, non-hegemonic and non-dependent economic relations between members of the 'new SADC', the southern African Development Community, so-called after August 1992. This kind of relationship is envisaged by, for example the ANC, but 'only time will tell whether or not national priorities will overtake regional concerns'.39

SADC's defined areas of co-operation include: food, land and agriculture; infrastructure and services; industry, trade, investment and finance; human resources, science and technology; natural resources and the environment; and peace and security.40

This scenario suggests that the modification, restructuring and consolidation of existing arrangements is the likely future course of developments in the region. Given the history of hostility and mutual suspicion, however, a period of confidence-building, while defining mutually beneficial areas of co-operation, will be necessary. It envisages the formation of a comprehensive new regional security based on co-operative principles and is development-oriented with South Africa acting in benevolent hegemony.

Political and economic conditions could present complex national security challenges for southern African countries. The region is already confronted with a number of problems that know no borders and are likely to become more serious in the future: the spread of Aids and other diseases; a large influx of refugees, especially from Mozambique to South Africa; and cross-border trafficking in small arms. Military sources estimate that as many as 1,5 million Kalashnikov rifles (AK 47s) are circulating in Mozambique.41

One problem for southern Africa, closely linked to the availability of weapons, is the status of demobilised troops and rebels following the formal end of hostilities in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa. For example, what will ultimately happen to the 70 000 Fapla troops and 50 000 Unita guerillas, the majority whom should be demobilised? The same uncertainties face Mozambique and, to a lesser extent, Namibia and South Africa. Successful demobilisation will depend on the numbers that could be absorbed by civilian economic activities.

In the regional context, neighbouring states have indicated that they are reluctant to undertake unilateral demobilisation on a large scale while the SADF remains at present force levels. Disarmament in southern Africa would facilitate a broader process of disarmament on the sub-continent, helping to ease external debt and release resources for development. This, in turn, would promote domestic stability of states and inter-state security in the region.

Acceptable political circumstances in southern Africa can, in fact, create the potential for extensive security co-operation. Combined activities could be pursued in a number of areas, including: military training at senior and rank-and-file-levels; patrols of national boundaries; weapons maintenance and procurement; a programme to stem the proliferation of small arms in private hands; operations in response to natural disasters; and as a longer-term goal, regional peacekeeping.

Despite its many limitations and problems, the only existing viable institution for designing and housing common security arrangements in southern Africa, is SADC. The SADC Treaty commits members states to co-operation in a number of areas, including 'politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security'.42 The Treaty's objectives similarly include 'the promotion and defence of peace and security'.43 These issues are regarded as 'critical components of the total environment for regional co-operation and integration'.44

While a new regional security organisation may be created (for example, by enlarging the Frontline states' southern African Inter-State Defence and Security Commission, or an arrangement modelled on the European CSCE), based on the principles of equality and mutual advantage45, South Africa will still be the dominant regional military power and 'could use this position to maintain or enhance its political, diplomatic and economic power'.46

A collective defence arrangement presupposes the overarching of historical animosities, contained within permanent and structured conflict management mechanisms. This would include the establishment of joint military bodies, programmes and exchange of military information and intelligence. However, in the political climate in the sub-region, the sense of a common regional attention seems absent. The second difficult problem inherent in collective security arrangements is identifying and agreeing on the collective enemy. It has been suggested47 that one way of getting around this problem would be

... to follow certain pre-established rules of conduct such as the renunciation of force, submission to compulsory mediation, acceptance of peace-keeping force and the like. Failure to comply with these procedures would be seen as qualifying for the enemy.

The last problem regarding a regional security arrangement is a tendency by some alliance members to pursue parallel national and bilateral agreements. The current arrangement between Botswana and the US points in this direction. It has a potential to threaten a collective regional alliance arrangement described in this scenario.

A recent development in the sub-region has demonstrated the United States' deep continuing concern for the unfolding political processes in southern Africa, to the extent that they collaborated with Botswana in upgrading that country's air defence capability by funding the construction of three airbases sites at a cost of US$ 1 billion and training her airforce. The airbases were scheduled for completion in 1993. The government of Botswana intends to cover the costs of construction by leasing them to the US Airforce and other US agencies. Above all, a joint US-Botswana military field exercise in Gaborone in 1991 confirmed the latest superpower interest in the region.48 Perceived military alliances between a major power and an African state constitute a great source of anxiety for neighbouring states. Undoubtedly these developments have raised security concerns in the sub-region.

CONCLUSION


A wide spectrum of conventional and unconventional challenges, originating externally and internally, threaten southern Africa.

The focus for addressing the region's political and economic ills has shifted towards the region's inherent ability as the prime factor in the determination of its future. Therefore, the outcome of the fragile transition in South Africa, the regional power, could be the critical determinant of the future of the regional sub-system. Scenarios range from a lasting settlement to conflict continuation and, at the end of 1993, it looked like a middle option (negotiated resolution) with majority (but not all-inclusive support) will prevail, with the priority of addressing the social welfare, health, and education of its citizens. As a result South Africa's regional policy will most likely reflect a balance of internal needs and the realities of the international environment.

Against this background and taking the global economy as the independent variable, two broad political and economic scenarios for South Africa's role and the consequent implications for southern Africa, can be postulated, along with their implications for regional stability and policy choices: the course of 'isolation' or 'protectionism' is likely to be taken by South Africa under global recessionary conditions, growing domestic demand and domestic employment creation. Under such conditions, South Africa would close its borders to migrant labour. Minimal levels of co-operation would be the dominant regional feature. Under this scenario, if attended by economic crises (and the sacrifices inherent in economic reform programmes) and ethnic nationalism in its extreme form, the national security posture in all of the southern African countries will be characterised by massive turmoil and the breakdown of the presently constituted economies and states. However, this may be an integral part of the long term process of accumulation of power by driving forces of new nation-states.

The second scenario, under a recovering and expanding world economy, implies the consolidation of the RSA's regional hegemony, which could take different forms. A middle option political settlement in South Africa will leave the country the dominant regional power. South Africa would probably join SADCC but whether that body would remain as present or undergo restructuring is uncertain. The precondition from SADC's point of view is that future conflict situations in the region have to be avoided by equitable, mutually beneficial, non-hegemonic and non-dependent economic relations between members of the new SADC. This kind of relationship is envisaged by, the ANC, but only time will tell whether or not national priorities will overtake regional concerns.

Modification and restructuring of existing arrangements is the likely future course of developments in the region, facilitated by a period of confidence-building. The formation of a comprehensive regional security arrangement, based on co-operative principles and development-orientation, with South Africa acting in benevolent hegemony, is envisaged. This could be the forced result of complex national security challenges and problems that know no borders: Aids, refugees, cross-border trafficking in small arms and the fate of demobilised troops.

However, a collective defence arrangement presupposes the overarching of historical animosities that need to be contained within permanent and structured conflict management and in the political climate in the sub-region, the sense of a common regional attention seems absent. Another difficult problem is identifying and agreeing on the collective enemy or threat. Although this could be overcome by following pre-established rules of conduct and failure to comply would be seen as qualifying for the enemy, this is vague and problematic. Political will, dependent on the perceived national interests of states, will be a chief consideration.

Another problem is a tendency by some alliance members to pursue parallel national and bilateral agreements. The current arrangement between Botswana and the United States, in upgrading the former country's air defence capability, has the potential to threaten a collective regional alliance arrangement.

The intriguing question is what political outcome for southern Africa we are likely to witness in the medium and long run? As already noted, anything is possible, ranging from the disintegration of the current nation-states, the formation of more viable states, to the creation of a formidable regional economic and security bloc. The final outcome will largely depend on how the current conflicts are handled, and whether the perceived solutions will be enduring.

REFERENCES

  1. Patel, H H, Peace and Security in a Changing southern Africa: A Frontline View, Africa Insight, Vol 22, No 2, p 265. Security in this context, is seen in military as well as non-military terms. The conventional approach views security primarily in terms of preserving the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of the state. Threats to security are seen mainly in military terms, and the chief sources of threat are construed as other states. The dominant response to perceived challenges is in turn the threat or use of force, thus adequate deterrence. This approach has both conceptual and practical weaknesses. Its perspective is too narrow, generally ignoring non-military threats to security, the underlying causes of conflict and the security of citizens. (Also see Nathan, L, Towards a Post-Apartheid Threat Analysis, paper delivered at the seminar of the Military Research Group (MRG), 23 March, 1993, pp. 3-4, and a paper prepared for the International Journal of Group Tensions, A New Approach to Security in Africa and southern Africa, 1992).
  2. Ibid, p 265.
  3. Baynham, S, SADCC security issues, African Insight, Vol 19, No 2, 1989, p 88.
  4. Patel, H H, op cit, pp 265-266. Also see Weimer, B, The southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC): Past and future, Africa Insight, Vol 21 No 2, 1991, pp 81-82.
  5. Ibid, pp 79-80.
  6. Ibid, p 79.
  7. Ibid, p 79. Also see Patel, H H, op cit, p 267.
  8. Seegers, A, The Government's perception of SA's security needs in South Africa:  The Challenge of Reform, Human Science Research Council study, 1988, p 416.
  9. Hanlon, J, SADCC in the 1990s: Development on the Front Line, The Economist Intelligence Unit, Special Report No 1158, September, 1989, p 8. Also see Hanlon, J, Beggar Your Neighbours, Catholic Institute for International Relations / David Curry, London, 1986.
  10. Ibid, pp 77-78.
  11. Race Relations Survey 1987-88, South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR), Johannesburg, 1988, p 512. Also see Barron Boyd, J jr, South Africa and its Neighbours, Continuity and Change in the Post Apartheid Era, Politikon, Vol 19, No 2, June, 1992, p 70. Department of Political Science, Le Moyne College, Syracuse, New York.
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  14. Weimer, B, op cit, pp 79-80.
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  17. Ibid, op cit, 1989, p 87.
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  19. Ibid, p 154.
  20. Ibid, pp 155-156.
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  22. Nathan, L, Towards a Post-apartheid Threat Analysis, paper delivered at the seminar of the Military Research Group (MRG), 23 March, 1993, pp 6-7.
  23. Baregu, M, From Confrontation to Co-operation? Revisioning southern Africa, Southern Africa Political and Economic Monthly (SAPEM), April, 1993, p 34.
  24. Simkins, Structural Unemployment Revisited, Saldru Fact Sheet 1, 1982. Race Relations Survey 1987-88, op cit, pp 293-304.
  25. Davies, R and O'Meara, D, The State of Analysis of the southern African Region: Issues Raised by South African Strategy, Review of African Political Economy, No 29, July, 1984, p 73.
  26. Wilson, F and Ramphele, M, Uprooting Poverty: the South African Challenge, Cape Town and David Philip, Johannesburg, 1989, p 138.
  27. See, Kegley C and Witkoph, E, American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1987, pp. 11-12. They adopt J. Rosenau's position that 'all the factors capable of influencing a nation's foreign policy can be placed into five major categories: the external environment, the societal environment of the nation, the governmental setting, the roles played by central decision-makers, and the individual characteristics of foreign policy-making elites'.
  28. Barron Boyd, op cit, p 67.
  29. Baynham, S, The New World Order: Regional and International Implications for southern Africa, Africa Insight, Vol 22, No 2, 1992, pp, pp 87-88.
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  31. Lee, M, SADCC and Post-Apartheid South Africa, Trans Africa Forum, Spring/Summer, 1989, p 109.
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  33. Ibid, pp 294-295.
  34. Lewis, S R, The Economics of Apartheid, Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York, 1990, p 87.
  35. Huntington, S, Political Order in Changing Societies, Centre for International Affairs, Yale University Press, 1968, p 123.
  36. Baregu, op cit, p 34.
  37. See Mhone, G C Z, The Quest for Regional Co-operation In southern Africa, southern Africa Political and Economic Monthly, (SAPEM), April, 1993, pp 36-42 for the importance of unilateral reciprocal arrangements in any future regional structure.
  38. Southern Africa Development Co-ordination Conference, Theme Document, (SADCC), Maputo, 1992, p 20.
  39. Patel, H H, op cit, p 266.
  40. Article 21 (3), Treaty of the southern African Development Community, Windhoek, 1992.
  41. Baynham, S, op cit, 1992, p 87.
  42. Article 21 (3) (g), Treaty of the southern African Development Community, op cit.
  43. Ibid, Article 5 (1) (c).
  44. Towards the southern African Development Community: A Declaration by the Heads of State or Government of southern African States, Windhoek, 1992, p 9.
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  46. Patel, H H, op cit, p 271.
  47. Ragumamu, S M, Post-Cold War Peace and Security Prospects in southern Africa, southern Africa Political and Economic Monthly, (SAPEM), April, 1993, p 60.
  48. Ibid, p 59.