European Security and Co-operation:

Lessons for Southern Africa?

Leslie Gumbi
Researcher Regional Relations, Institute for Defence Policy

Information for this article was largely obtained from discussion with experts during a study tour of Denmark, NATO Headquarters and the Vienna based Conflict Prevention Centre

Published in African Defence Review Issue No 18, 1994



INTRODUCTION


The fall of the Berlin Wall, the unification of Germany, the demise of the Soviet Union and other political changes in Central and East Europe are hallmark events that altered the political scenario of Europe and the world. These changes played a significant role in the transformation of international politics in terms of both its structure and conduct. For the first time since the last World War, qualitative change occurred in the study of the security and strategic environment of Europe.

AIM


The objective of the article is to contribute to current discussions on issues of security and co-operation by looking at recent changes in Europe. Furthemore, it is hoped that it will stimulate comparative research, the security architecture dimension of which will be relevant to the requirements of the region. In the field of co-operation, the objective of the article is the realistic reduction of ambitions in favour of a focus on feasible forms of co-operation. In this regard, the focus will be on causes of changes in Europe, effects of change and lessons for other regions including southern Africa.

CAUSES OF CHANGE


The root causes of the hallmark events which changed Europe's political scenario are largely attributable to the rejection of socialism and the collapse of the Soviet Union as a state and as a bastion of communism. The people of Central and Eastern Europe rejected socialism as a system of values and as a socio-economic model for development for various reasons. In essence, the socialist system proved to be totalitarian as evidenced by its systematic violation of human rights and basic freedoms. Its bad governance created inefficiency, unaccountability and corruption. Its central planning and control of the economy failed to create incentives and stifled initiative and economic growth.

The perestroika and glasnost of the Gorbachev era that were widely implemented in Central and Eastern Europe, brought about changes in the relations of these countries with the international community. They replaced the confrontation, polemics and stagnation of the Cold War with dialogue. These reforms were, however, frustrated by the fact that they created new demands and challenges that undermined socialist principles. Hence there was an attempt at leadership level to control the process of change. The ensuing dissatisfaction and anger of the people led to the dispossession from power of the socialist regimes. This led to the collapse of socialism, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, giving rise to new assertions of nationalism.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union also had a ripple effect on the cohesion of the socialist system of alliances and co-operation. New sovereignty acquired by the breakaway republics of the former Soviet Union and the erosion of the nation state of Czechoslovakia reflected new aspirations and national interests which were not in tandem with socialist systems of alliances and co-operation. This invalidated the continued existence of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) as a fulcrum for socialist common defence and security architecture.

WHAT HAS CHANGED IN EUROPE?

Positive changes


The changes in Central and Eastern Europe created a new system of values and approaches which, in turn, soon presented new initiatives that will enhance European stability and co-operation.

The distribution of power in the new order is perhaps the most profound and positive prevailing change. This new order ended the previous bipolar international order by changing both the system and conduct of international relations. It tilted the détente process beyond the east/west axis. It also played a role in diffusing regional tensions - tensions often created by contention over spheres of influence.

Shifts in the analysis of power represent another change that has transformed the nature of problems relating to security and co-operation. The shift is marked by a reduction in the importance of issues relating to the nature of power, national interests and politico-military alliances in security policy architecture. Alongside the instrument of collective security policy1, the shift added an impetus and prominence to the instrument of co-operative security policy. Co-operative security policy refrains from the confrontational enforcement of stability. It is aimed at promoting co-operation in order to prevent the emergence of conflicts in the political sphere, and reducing the risk of armed confrontation. In essence it aims at preventing emerging conflicts from escalating, spreading or intensifying.

After the Second World War, international politics eschewed the use of force in the conduct of international relations. The sacrosanctity of this norm was, however, undermined by the nature of conflicts in the conduct of the Cold War. The ending of the Cold War has reduced and, in some cases, defused conflicts and antagonisms. It renewed opportunities for the use of peaceful means in the conduct of international relations. Much emphasis is placed on dialogue, consultation, exchange of information and transparency to increase trust. These factors have increased predictability in the security enviroment. They have also enhanced stability and have opened new avenues for increased co-operation.

In strenghtening the principle of the use of peaceful means in the conduct of international relations, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) embarked on preventive diplomacy. Preventive diplomacy has played a significant role in enhancing peaceful means in the resolution of disputes in international relations. It has become a typical instrument in the framework of the CSCE process. The missions of the CSCE differ from those of traditional military peacekeeping in that their role is not confined to observing and reporting, but include negotiation and intervention2. The roles of negotiation and intervention are also decentralised to include the participation of local authorities and representatives of local communities. This is a bold attempt at the effective isolation of force in conflict resolution and management.

Negative Changes


Although many claim that the ending of the Cold War ushered in changes for the better in Europe and elsewhere, threats to security have not been completely eliminated.

The unpredictability of events in the former Soviet Union is a cause for concern. Lack of authority and bad governance has incapacitated the government in its ability to deal with new threats presented by organised cross-border crime, arms proliferation and lack of environmental control. The possibility of the future strengthening of the military-industrial complex of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) will soon affect the present balance of forces in Europe3. This could result in the re-emergence of the arms race.

The emergence and spreading of localised conflicts is a negative change of great concern. The creation of boundaries in Central and Eastern Europe at the end of the Second World War did not take into account the ethnic diversities of the region. The victors arbitrarily carved up Europe to reflect their military and geopolitical preferences. Force and coercion were used to place previously independent nationalities in the Soviet federation. The collapse of the Soviet Union was an occasion for these nationalities to reverse the status quo. Soon struggles erupted, aiming at the creation of nation states that would reflect new assertions of nationalism.

The complexities of these developments and the difficulties of achieving amicable solutions are a serious threat to stability and sovereignty in Europe. At present, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the CSCE process are seeking solutions that will curtail or contain the spill-over effects of these localised conflicts.

Threatening Changes


There are certain changes which, if they were to occur, would destabilise the security environment in Europe. NATO 'won' the Cold War and still has a highly organised and adaptable military capability. On the other hand, the CSCE process has increased its legitimacy and created within its framework institutions to mediate conflict. These developments can lead to the imposition of diktat in the conduct of international relations. Such diktat could impact on the freedom of choice available to other actors. Admittedly, interdependence and the collective approach to security are factors that will reduce the likelihood of such an eventuality, yet positions of advantage do create possibilities for limited domination. It is hoped that the victors would not decide for the vanquished over the spoils of a war.

The end of the Cold War has compounded the challenge to improve the effectiveness of international organisations like the United Nations (UN). The UN has yet to reflect the new conditions and the new distribution of prevailing power following the end of the Cold War. The composition of the Security Council still reflects the outcome of the Second World War. Reforming the Organisation will be the responsibility of America and the Western European nations because other actors in international relations do not have the necessary influence to reform international organisations. Apart from Third World countries being entangled in serious problems affecting their very survival, Third World security has '... fallen victim to uncertainties of contemporary international relations'4 and it is finding itself more on the periphery of these relations. Central and Eastern Europe, like the Third World, are faced with an acute shortage of resources to play such a reforming role. The problem is that American and Western European participation in reforming the UN could lead to those powers dominating and thus limiting the freedom of choice of the actors on the periphery. They may be compelled to realign themselves with the choices of those central actors.

The steady reduction of American participation in European security affairs is yet another cause for concern. America is faced with economic problems which limit the pivotal role it previously played in European security architecture. The US is experiencing a persistent budget deficit, serious competition as a world leader in production, and is depending more on foreign capital and investment than before. The implication of these impediments is the reduction of (already overstretched) resources available for US involvement in European security. This could be the reason why NATO '...created a new headquarters, the combined joint Task Force, that could control European NATO forces acting independently of the US perhaps under the WEU.' 5The nature of changes in the security environment will determine levels of American participation.

EFFECTS OF CHANGE


The changes we have observed have transformed the security enviroment in Europe and elsewhere. Qualitative changes reflecting the New World Order have occurred in bodies dealing with security and co-operation. The present character and functioning of NATO is a reflection of the sum total of changes that have occurred in Europe. These changes have affected the European strategic environment and, through them, arms control measures were enhanced and avenues for co-operation with former adversaries opened up. On the other hand, the CSCE was strengthened by the creation of permanent institutions. Its focus was broadened beyond the Euro-Transatlatic axis.

The Conventional Armed Forces (CFE) Treaty and the Alliances Strategic Concept are major arms control instruments which are a cornerstone of future European security and stability6. Their emphasis is on the reduction of forces (conventional and nuclear) and equipment.

The aim of reductions in the size of armed forces is to restrict them to levels which would not permit domination. Such reductions also include changes in the levels of readiness and flexibility. Under present circumstances, these forces are being reorganised and their mobility increased in preparation for possible participation in crisis management and other defence-related activities. The retention of large forces by the Alliance on the pretext that these will come in handy in dealing with any spill-over of localised conflicts is not convincing.7 Future reduction of force levels would be difficult to achieve given that threats to security and stability still exist, despite the fact that NATO no longer has a determined enemy. Reductions in nuclear forces were concluded in 1992 and mainly dealt with the withdrawal of short-range land-based nuclear weapons. At present levels, NATO argues that its forces are maintained for the preservation of peace and the prevention of war and coercion. The total eradication of nuclear weapons remains, however, an elusive goal.

In terms of equipment, emphasis is on those categories which will actively constitute offensive military capability. These include tanks, artillery, armoured combat vehicles and helicopters. Present force and equipment levels represent a military capability sufficient to prevent war and provide for effective defence. Changes in the security enviroment that will enhance stability will facilitate further reductions.

NATO countries are incorporating training for peacekeeping missions in their military training doctrines. This is done to assist with general peacekeeping on one hand and, on the other, it will assist in reducing the spill-over effects of localised conflict. The general preference is for peacekeeping forces to be deployed under the auspices of the United Nations. Peacekeeping is, however, fraught with problems.

Presently, America is a major role player in peacekeeping missions because the US has unmatched financial resources and '... it is the only international power currently capable of projecting and sustaining large scale military forces in any theater of the world'8 . Failures of UN peacekeeping missions are attributed to America because it is thought that 'President Bill Clinton is uninterested in the imperial aspects of his job.'9 This ignores the fact that peacekeeping should be a collective responsibility and that its costs, which are stretching America's already limited resources, should be shared by the collective. In spite of this, it is unlikely that America will renege on its international peacekeeping responsibilities. The US will continue playing a role provided it can be part of combined or coalition forces and is not forced to bear the burden of such operations on its own.10

The establishment of co-operation between NATO and its former adversaries in Central and Eastern Europe is one effect of change which is of crucial importance. It has the potential to add impetus to the transformation of the security environment, promoting increased stability and co-operation but, if not properly handled, it may create new threats which will increase instability.

The Alliance's initiatives for dialogue, partnership and co-operation with former adversaries in Central and Eastern Europe resumed in July 1990 at the London Summit Meeting. The Meeting established regular diplomatic liaison with former adversaries. In November 1990 the Alliance and former adversaries signed a Joint Declaration stating that they no longer considered each other as adversaries. The Alliance's Strategic Concept, adopted in 1991, sanctioned the exchange of views and information on security policy issues as a factor that will enhance understanding, transparency and predictability in security affairs.11 Following this, the North Atlantic Co-operation Council was established as a framework for consultation and co-operation with former adversaries, to focus on security and related issues. Through this forum the Alliance will share its experience and expertise on issues such as defence planning, democratic concepts on civilian-military relations, the conversion of defence industries and so on. In March 1992 the North Atlantic Co-operation Council adopted a Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and Co-operation which paved the way for joint planning, participation in study courses12, restructuring of armed forces13, peacekeeping issues14 and consultation on other issues.

Co-operation with former adversaries characterises a relationship in evolution that is fraught with problems, as will be seen. Firstly, NATO's treaty commitments, for example, to defend Poland against Russian invasion, is a cause for concern for Russia, that could deepen should other former WTO countries follow the Polish example. Due to political entanglements and changed relationships amongst former allies and adversaries, this could spread conflict in the event of an intervention, and deepen the economic crisis.

In the second instance, recent NATO expansion eastward is a problematic area in the framework of co-operation with former adversaries. Eastern European nations would like to be defended by NATO should Russia revive its military leverage. Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia look forward to speedy membership of NATO, since such membership would guarantee them defence: 'Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Ukraine and Lithuania all immediately applied for partnership status, insisting that it was a step towards membership.'15 Financial, technical and other considerations are instrumental in NATO's decision-making. With regard to Russia, although originally of the opinion that she and NATO should '...jointly provide for the security of the Eastern Europeans.'16 the country has since signed the Partnership for Peace Agreement.

The conclusion of the Cold War played a significant role in enhancing the status and centrality of the CSCE process on issues of security and co-operation. The Charter of Paris for a New Europe, adopted in November 1990, brought structural changes in the functioning of the CSCE process and established CSCE institutions. The Charter created a Council of the participating states' Foreign Affairs Ministers. It serves as the central forum for regular political consultations within the CSCE process. It meets at least once a year and has decision making powers. Its work is prepared by a Committee of Senior Officials also created by the Charter. The Committee reviews current issues and carries out decisions of the Council of Foreign Ministers and permanent institutions. Within it there is a Consultative Committee which is the decision-making body.

Permanent institutions created by the Charter of Paris started work in 1991. These include a Secretariat in Prague, a Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, formerly the Office for Free Elections, in Warsaw. The latter two institutions do not have a decision-making body but depend on the Committee of Senior Officials.

The Forum for Security Co-operation set up by the Helsinki Summit Meeting held in July 1992, established two committees. Its Special Committee meets to negotiate on arms control, disarmament, confidence- and security-building or proposals enhancing security and co-operation. Its Consultative Committee focuses on existing and future tasks of the Conflict Prevention Centre.

A major achievement alongside the creation of permanent institutions has been the creation of CSCE mechanisms and procedures, inter alia for crisis management and the peaceful settlement of disputes. The management of crisis is guided by the following instruments:
  • Mechanism for Consultation and Co-operation as regards Unsual Military Activities;
  • Basis for Co-operation as regards Hazardous Incidents of a Military Nature; and
  • Mechanism for Consultation and Co-operation with regard to Emergency Situations.
The peaceful settlement of disputes is guided by the following instruments:
  • The Valleta Mechanism;
  • Provisions for a CSCE Conciliation Commission;
  • Provision for Directed Conciliation; and
  • A Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration for the CSCE will, upon ratification, play a supportive role to activities in the peaceful settlement of disputes.
Other mechanisms include the Moscow and Vienna Mechanisms also referred to as the Human Dimension Mechanism.

The primary focus of CSCE institutions and mechanisms is the enhancement of confidence- and security-building, the maximising of security and co-operation and the prevention of conflict for stability. In this process of transformation, the CSCE has, however, not abnegated its major traditional character i.e., the rule of consensus in decision-making, largely achievable through negotiation and primacy of co-operation.

Though initially intended to be a pan-European/Transatlantic framework for negotiation and co-operation in the field of security, its credibility and success are attracting attention from beyond this axis. Its reach extends from Vancouver in the west to Vladivostok and Japan in the East. It now has 53 participating states, including countries from North Africa and the Mediterranean region, as associates. Japan, important as it may be, does not take part in the decision-making mechanisms of the CSCE process. The universality of the CSCE's system of values, its mission statement and conditions of functioning will continue to attract other nations. Obviously its experiences cannot be simply transferred to situations in other parts of the world with different geopolitical constellations.

LESSONS


The adoption of an inclusive approach to security is perhaps one of the major advances that will safeguard lasting peace and stability: 'This new concept of security... takes into consideration the economic, political, military and social dimensions of the individual, the family, communities, local and national life, and the international community'.17 With regard to the economy, it concerns itself with growth, in politics, it advocates the creation of good governance and the enhancement of democracy. Other than reducing military threats, the new approach supports the establishment of small, legitimate, accountable and civilian-controlled armed forces. Social dimensions of the individual, family and communities can be safeguarded best through a respect for human rights, empowerment of disadvantaged groups, and so on. Threat analysis in the realm of this approach is not confined to military menaces but may include ethnic conflict, mass migration, international terrorism, population growth, trans-border environmental hazards, arms proliferation, etc. This has led to an inter-disciplinary approach in the study of security and stability since many elements are interdependent. Of particular importance in this new approach is reduced emphasis on the deployment of military means for the achievement of goals. Political and peaceful means have once more gained the upper hand. The active pursuit of dialogue and co-operation are instrumental factors in security architecture.

The spill-over effects of localised conflicts are serious destabilising forces. These often lead to the emergence of new threats to security, such as cross-border crime, massive migration, small arms proliferation and terrorism. Peacekeeping missions are constituted in an effort to contain or end such conflicts. The rub here lies in the fact that peace missions without a clear mandate are hastily deployed prior to the exhaustion of peaceful means that could end conflicts. Misunderstandings of the mandate often aggravate these conflicts, leading to more losses of life, and to chaos. The spill-over effect of localised conflicts and the manner in which we deal with them represent a serious challenge that will require different regional approaches to the problem.

The design of a modus operandi for an organisation always determines the effectiveness of the body in relation to its mandate. Beaureaucracy and tension are the major problems which undermine the effectiveness of structures. They have an adverse effect on decision-making and often rely on structured relations and mechanisms.

The CSCE's major strength lies in that it is a process. Participating states (not member states) co-operate in finding a solution as opposed to the adoption of a prescription drawn up by a qualified majority. Negotiation is a crucial instrument deployed for the achievement of maximum agreement, which leads to the adaptation of decisions by consensus rule.

The sharing of common values, parity in levels of development and similarity of geopolitical constellations are some of the factors which ease communication and foster good relations among participating states. These relations can be likened to a marriage where mutuality plays a significant role. In the case of a misunderstanding in a marriage, parties do not refer to the marriage contract in an attempt to solve the problem. Rather, they discuss the matter. In this way amicable solutions and agreement are reached.

CONCLUSION


Southern Africa is in the process of transition to democracy. Apartheid destabilisation created tensions and confrontation. Newly emerging relations are, however, cloaked by mistrust as marked for example, by the retention of large armed forces. The deployment of confidence- and security-building measures is of the utmost importance in the reduction of mistrust. Transparency and increased predictability in the security enviroment should be enhanced through increased dialogue, exchanges of information and consultation on issues of mutual interest. This would create a basis for the establishment of common values and approach. A profound step in this direction could be the establishment of an intra-parliamentary information exchange framework as a means of increasing predictability. Academic, cultural and scientific exchange programmes would decentralise dialogue but increase specialist consultation which is oriented towards problem solving.

Co-operation plays an important supportive role in creating stability. Co-operation is easily achievable amongst partners sharing a common system of values and the same level of development. Liberalisation and democratisation are components of our regional value system. Political developments are in pursuit of these goals, which will not prevail at once throughout the region due to historical conditions and the political will. Parity in levels of development is difficult to achieve, given the complexity of factors related to it and the enormity of these problems. Its absence often leads to the establishment of hierarchy and domination amongst co-operating partners. Economic leverage tends to determine decision-making and the ability to execute a mandate. In the light of the above, it would be appropriate to opt for sub-regional sectional co-operation as opposed to continental co-operation. In this regard co-operation would be in those areas where partners have an equal stake and ability and this would lay the necessary building blocks for future co-operation at a continental level. Purpose, orientation and manageability are important guidelines in the process.

REFERENCES

  1. Collective security policy was widely used by the UN and is directed against any potential aggressor within the system. It has at its core a confrontational strategy - it threatens to use the united force of all participants in the system against the one would be aggressor.
  2. Preventive diplomacy missions, depending on the nature of the conflict, are either for short- or long-term duration. Three missions of long duration were sent to the former Yugoslavia. Spill-over monitor missions were also sent to Skopje in the former Yugoslavia. Other missions include the CSCE mission of the Personal Representative of the Chairman in Office for Georgia, CSCE mission in Estonia and CSCE mission in Moldavia.
  3. Afanasyev, Y N, Russian Reform is Dead, Foreign Affairs, vol 73. no. 2, p 22.
  4. Prof Barry Buzan, National Security in the Post Cold War Third World, Strategic Review for Southern Africa, vol XVI, no 1 March 1994, University of Pretoria, p 1.
  5. For Your Eyes Only, - An Open Intelligence Summary of Current Military Affairs, NATO Summit: Reluctant Partners, Issue No 335, 24 January 1994.
  6. The CFE Treaty was signed by 22 of the 34 participating states in the CSCE framework. It was signed on 19/11/90 in Paris and it is perhaps particularly reflective of the security enviroment in Europe because its design took into consideration political changes in Central and Eastern Europe. Negotiations on the Treaty started in 1989 between NATO and WTO. The Alliances Strategic Concept was adopted in Rome by NATO in 1991.
  7. Garnett, J, Armed Forces and Foreign Policy, African Defence Review No 16, p 18.
  8. Becker, J D, Combined and Coalition War Fighting: The American Experience, reprinted from Military Review, November 1993, as a special feature for USIS, p 1.
  9. Bishop, P, Shades of Impotence behind the UN's Neutral Sky Blue, Sunday Times,15 May 1994.
  10. Becker, J D, op. cit.
  11. See clauses 29, The Alliances Strategic Concept Agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting in the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7-8 November 1991.
  12. NATO and former WTO members have joint study courses at the NATO Defence College in Rome, NATO (SHAPE) School at Oberammergau.
  13. See proceedings of 10 April 1992 Military Committee Cooperation Session which was held at Chiefs of Staff level.
  14. These were discussed extensively at the October 1992 NATO Defence Ministers' Meeting in Gleneagles.
  15. For Your Eyes Only, op.cit.
  16. For Your Eyes Only, op.cit. See also Pushkov, A, Russia and the West: An Endangered Relationship?, Armed Forces April 1994, p 26. He gives reasons as to why Moscow reacts negatively to NATO's expansion eastward.
  17. Cilliers, J, National and Regional Stability: Expectations versus Reality, in Venter, M, (ed) Prosposals for Progress: Critical Choices for Southern Africa, Maskew Miller Longman, Cape Town, 1994, p 41.