Economic Sanctions and the Enforcement of Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Raimo Väyrynen,

Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame

Paper prepared for the conference on Bombs, Carrots and Sticks. Economic Sanctions and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, University of Notre Dame, April 8-10, 1994. Revised on June 6 and August 10, 1994

Published in African Defence Review Issue No 19, 1994



NPT AND ITS CRITICS


The idea that economic sanctions could and should be applied to stem the spread of nuclear weapons is based on the presumption that there is a norm of non-proliferation in international relations with which governments are expected to comply. In practical terms, the compliance with this norm requires membership of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or, at a minimum, adherence to its key provisions. In the case of non-compliance by a member state, the international community faces the task of forcing it to obey the norm.

Ever since its promulgation in 1967, the NPT has been a controversial agreement which has been both ignored and violated. This underlines the point that "if issues of non-compliance and enforcement are endemic, the real problem is likely to be that the original bargain did not adequately reflect the interests of those that would be living under it, rather than mere disobedience". The criticism of and non-compliance with the NPT have primarily come from the threshold countries, which have made efforts to acquire nuclear weapons to ward off threats to their security and/or aspire to regional dominance.

Sometimes a distinction is made between the de facto nuclear-weapon countries outside the NPT and the threshold countries which are involved in the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The de facto nuclear states; Israel, India and Pakistan, Belarus, Kazahkstan, South Africa and Ukraine have either given up nuclear weapons or are committed to do so. States which are generally supposed to have plans for, and at least an initial capability to acquire nuclear weapons, should they so decide, include Argentina, Brazil, Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea, South Korea and Taiwan.

However, Argentina and Brazil have made a mutual pledge not to produce nuclear weapons and also otherwise strengthened confidence pertaining to nuclear issues, in their mutual relations. Most experts seem to agree that the South Korean and Taiwanese nuclear-weapon programmes have not been very active since the 1970s. This has been attributed to U.S. threats implying that the acquisition of nuclear weapons would jeopardize their security agreements with the United States. Obviously all these countries will be able to make rapid progress in the development of nuclear explosives, should they so decide.

Despite the rather limited spread of nuclear weapon capabilities, especially if compared with the gloomy predictions in the 1960s, some authors are arguing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons is out of control. The increased availability of relevant technologies on a global basis, economic incentives and political ambitions all fuel the dissemination of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles. This jeopardizes, in turn, the stability of international relations and threatens to spread nuclear explosives to the hands of non-governmental actors.

Politically, most threshold countries are medium-size powers, while their economic structure is semi-peripheral. In such a structure capital- and labour-intensive economic processes are mixed providing a material basis for capital-goods industry and technology projects, such as the nuclear industry. Medium-size semi-peripheral powers tend to challenge both economically and politically the core states of the international system. The acquisition of nuclear weapons is part of that challenge. Therefore the international dimension of the efforts to acquire nuclear weapons cannot only be defined as the need to protect national security against regional adversaries. In addition, they also contain an anti-hegemonic political element.

This element has been most visible in the case of India, and, among the established nuclear-weapon powers, in the Chinese and French policies. The basic argument is that the granting of nuclear privileges to any country is inadmissible; either all the countries are entitled to nuclear weapons or none. The uneven implementation of this principle fosters criticism of the inequity, discrimination and legitimacy of the non-proliferation regime. This criticism is primarily expressed by the South against the North. As a consequence, nuclear proliferation is a political issue and has to be addressed as such in the forthcoming NPT review conference in 1995.

A main reason for threshold states not joining the NPT has been their determination to keep the nuclear-weapon option open in regional military rivalries. It may be argued that many a threshold country would not have joined the NPT no matter how balanced its provisions would have been. The arguments for not joining the Treaty have been propped up, however, by several structural flaws in it. No doubt, the NPT is asymmetric as it imposes more demanding obligations on the non-nuclear than on the five nuclear-weapon powers.

During most of the Cold War, nuclear-weapon powers did not really pursue "negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control" (Art VI). However, in recent years their record has significantly improved with the conclusion of the INF and START agreements and with the declaration of a moratorium on nuclear testing. Nevertheless, this does not satisfy the most outspoken critics of the NPT who demand a schedule in which all nuclear weapons should be dismantled.

Globally, it can be agreed, the compliance with the NPT has been rather good and it has encouraged most industrialized states, with a capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, to remain non-nuclear. Very few countries ratifying the Treaty have really violated its provisions. It should also be remembered that the NPT membership has been constantly growing and now includes 163 states. Some resistant countries, most significantly Argentina, Brazil and South Africa, have in recent years given up their nuclear-weapons programmes. China has joined the Treaty and Taiwan, though not a member, is considered to be bound by it.

However, the NPT is not a perfect treaty and its inadequacies provide the basis for threshold countries to stay outside it. The nature of nuclear devices as weapons of mass destruction means that even limited violations of the non-proliferation norm can have massive political and military consequences. Imperfections of the NPT stimulate different schools of thought which, in turn, inform the policy makers who face the task of extending and renegotiating the NPT in 1995. The non-proliferation school considers international stability as its main objective, while those approving proliferation emphasize the need for equity in obligations and commitments. The non-proliferation approach is conservative, while the proliferation school is revisionist in its attitudes towards change. It is revisionism that is under scrutiny here.
ENDOGENOUS ENFORCEMENT

The enforcement of norms embedded in the nuclear non-proliferation regime can occur in several ways. Enforcement actions can be either endogenous or exogenous to the regime. I use the concept of endogenous enforcement to refer to measures specified in the NPT and other relevant non-proliferation documents by which the compliance of its member states is assured. The importance of these measures derives from the fact that, being included in an international treaty, they are legally binding. Ideally, the enforcement mechanisms should be internal to the regime.

The mechanisms for endogenous enforcement in the NPT are weak. Art. III contains provisions on the safeguards which are applied to all "fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities" by the non-nuclear members. Safeguards operated by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are a verification rather than an enforcement mechanism. In reality, the IAEA has very limited means for ensuring that a recalcitrant member state complies with the provisions of the NPT. Nor does the Agency have the capacity to punish those who are involved in illegal or dubious shipments of sensitive equipment and materials.

In the efforts to strengthen the IAEA's role problems arise concerning, for example, the political feasibility of challenge inspections, the increasing use of satellite verification and a greater focus on safeguard activities on 'rogue' nations. After all, the IAEA was not originally established to detect clandestine nuclear-weapon programmes but rather to safeguard the commercial applications of nuclear energy and technology in order to avoid their military use. These applications may be more valuable in deterring potential proliferators than the efforts of international inspectors, whose success is dependent on the level of resources at their disposal and the political willingness of the target countries to cooperate with the IAEA.

The influence of the IAEA is also restricted by its limited role in monitoring the nuclear activities of the non-member states. Neither has the Agency much to say on the nuclear programmes of the five statutory nuclear-weapon powers, even though they are gradually opening their civilian activities for inspection. While the IAEA has achieved a lot, its resources and technical and political efficacy have been limited in stemming nuclear proliferation. It works, however, as a kind of tripwire and can sound an alarm if a member state violates the Treaty provisions.

The NPT itself contains few sticks and is expected to rely on carrots instead. Articles IV and V stress the right of non-nuclear weapon states to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to receive inexpensive nuclear materials and equipment on a non-discriminatory basis. The right to share the results of nuclear research and technology development was in fact a compensation given to non-nuclear-weapon members for forgoing their weapon option. The promises given in the NPT were unrealistic, however, and reflected the contemporary mood that nuclear energy will gradually become the dominant source of energy worldwide. While there are carrots in the NPT, they have not been as attractive as originally envisaged.

If the concept of endogenous enforcement is stretched somewhat, one can include limitations or bans on the delivery of nuclear equipment, materials and information by the nuclear states to those states outside the NPT. This aspect of the endogenous enforcement is closely related to various supply-side controls. Among them, the NPT Exports Committee (The 'Zangger Committee'), and its trigger list, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG, The 'London Group'), are the most significant. However, the NSG has neither its own institutional structure nor the mandate to employ sanctions against violators. It has to rely on the IAEA which is not empowered to apply such measures either.

The cases of Iraq, Israel and Pakistan show how easily export controls can be circumvented by governments and corporations willing to do so. Problems of supply controls are created by dual-use technologies, different degrees of commitment to restrictions by the suppliers and the spread of indigenous national capacities to produce the necessary equipment and materials. Recently, efforts to improve such controls have started and, as a result, non-proliferation objectives may be gaining in strength at the expense of the export interests. However, export controls can provide only a partial solution to the proliferation problem.

EXOGENOUS ENFORCEMENT


Another avenue for securing compliance with the NPT is to rely on exogenous enforcement. This refers to the use of political, economic and military countermeasures outside the framework of the non-proliferation regime. Peter van Ham uses the concept of external linkage to refer to the same set of positive and negative means which can be used to arrest the trend towards nuclear proliferation. In his terminology, cross-regime linkages are arrangements which make the admission of a state to various international economic and political institutions and their services conditional on its membership in the NPT.

Exogenous enforcement of the non-proliferation norms rely on such measures as diplomatic recognition and its withdrawal, positive and economic instruments and, in the extreme case, military operations to destroy the emerging nuclear-weapon capabilities. Critical issues in the strategy of exogenous enforcement are the mandate on which it is based, the actors which are carrying it out and the means used in its implementation.

Enforcement may rely on the unilateral use of force as Israel did in destroying the Osirak reactor in Iraq in 1981, or it may be based on a multilateral decision carried out either by individual states or an international organization. In unilateral actions the mandate is derived from the 'self-help' doctrine, while multilateral operations have a collective legitimacy. In both cases the enforcing actor needs updated intelligence, appropriate military technologies and guidelines for the pre-emptive employment of military force. In the multilateral option there is also a need to build the necessary intergovernmental coalition to carry out the enforcement actions. These needs are difficult to meet, and together with their political sensitivity, make the military enforcement, especially by multilateral actions of the non-proliferation norm, unlikely.

After the IAEA or a member state has sounded an alarm on the danger of nuclear proliferation, the UN Security Council should step to the forefront. It has to deliberate and possibly to take decisions on what kinds of measures the international community should use to ensure compliance with the non-proliferation norms. The legitimacy of such measures would be enhanced by the commitment of the nuclear-weapon powers to continue to dismantle their own nuclear arsenals and to conclude a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Otherwise, the enforcement of non-proliferation norms would only be regarded as yet another expression of Western arrogance and the desire to dominate.

One important initiative would be to bring the authority of the UN Security Council to bear to prevent violations of non-proliferation norms. This could be achieved by declaring the rejection of safeguards and the acquisition of nuclear weapons as a threat to international peace and security. Such a decision, which is within in the power of the Security Council, would justify the resort to enforcement mechanisms as spelled out in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In the implementation of the Security Council Resolution 687 of April 3, 1991 sanctions were used to enforce the destruction of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. While the implementation of this resolution has been marred by problems, it provides an important precedent that enforcement actions can be launched to undo weapons proliferation.

The enforcement approach to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was enhanced by the statement by the President of the Security Council on 31 January, 1992. In this declaration the spread of these weapons was defined as a threat to international peace and security that opened the possibility to using the tools of enforcement specified in Chapter VII. In reality, the possiblity of using the UN enforcement mechanism would probably require that the de facto nuclear capabilities of India, Israel and Pakistan are admitted and accepted. This would exempt them from the list of countries which face punishment by sanctions for their violations of non-proliferation norms.

The success of the enforcement approach would require firm commitment and coalition-building by the members of the Security Council to use the available means of enforcement. This suggestion is consistent with research findings that the credibility of commitments by key senders of sanctions is an important precondition for their efficacy. It is, in turn, dependent on cooperation which the leading state can elicit from other states in implementing the sanctions. The higher the costs of sanctions, the more likely it is that the leading state will resort to multilateral as opposed to bilateral sanctions.

Recently, debate has started on different means of enforcing the non-proliferation norms. It is often felt that even though enforcement cannot stop nuclear proliferation by recalcitrant states, it is an important part of an effective regime. The threat of enforcement can deter 'fainthearted' proliferators from taking the last steps to acquire the bomb. Coercive measures, such as economic sanctions and the military interdiction of sensitive nuclear supplies require, however, advance planning, identification of potential countermeasures and careful planning.

The ensuing analysis is limited to a consideration of the efficiency and legitimacy of economic instruments to prevent or slow down nuclear proliferation by threshold countries. These instruments include economic rewards and punishments which can be targeted at both the threshold countries and the suppliers of sensitive equipment and materials to them in contravention of the NPT provisions. In addition, sanctions can be applied against both the producers and traders of military nuclear explosives and their delivery systems.

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND BOMBS


The economic means of foreign policy refer to a heterogenous category of material instruments which are used to change policy objectives and priorities of the target country. There is consensus neither on the concepts nor on the instruments of what David Baldwin calls the 'economic statecraft'. In his usage the concept refers to means rather than ends and to policy instruments as property rather than as relational concepts. This approach suits my analysis as it emphasizes levers, a property concept, by which nuclear proliferation can be prevented or slowed down. However, the stress should be at least equally on the objectives of non-proliferation than on the means to attain them.

The efficiency of economic sanctions is a difficult issue to decide. Rather than dealing with it generally, I will focus briefly on the cases in which threshold countries have been subjected to external economic punishments. The relevant countries are Argentina, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Libya, Pakistan and South Africa. Of the present or past threshold countries Brazil, India, North Korea and South Korea have never been subjected to any significant economic reprisals by other powers or international organizations. Such measures have, of course, been currently contemplated against North Korea.

Economic sanctions may not have been applied against threshold countries because of their efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. In fact, sanctions often have multiple motives and targets. Their application is not necessarily based on the effort to wield direct influence, but also taking into account the relative costs and benefits of other potential means of influence. It may even be that economic sanctions are not primarily used to punish the offender for a particular action, but as a signal of something else. The complexity of sanctions as an instrument of policy is largely due to the multidimensionality of power and the unpredictability of their consequences.

THE SOUTHERN CONE


Argentina was punished economically because of its attack on the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, Israel has been boycotted by Arab countries as a part of their political conflict, Libya has been isolated to discourage its support for transnational terrorism, and South Africa to end its apartheid policy. As two of these countries, i.e. Argentina and South Africa, have relinquished their nuclear-weapon plans, it is relevant to ask whether economic sanctions might have indirectly influenced these decisions.

Economic sanctions isolated both Argentina and South Africa quite effectively; diplomatically they became pariah states and the sources of foreign capital largely dried up. This persuaded the political elite of both countries that internal democratic reforms and the change of tack in economic policy were needed. Otherwise their reintegration with the world economy and the restoration of economic growth might have faced insurmountable obstacles. The decision to give up the nuclear-weapon programmes was a part of the broader political reorientation.

Argentina and Brazil


Argentina and Brazil were subjected to economic sanctions in the 1970s because of their human rights abuses. This curtailed especially the United States delivery of military equipment and advanced technology to these countries and forced them to draw political conclusions. Economic sanctions by the European Community and the United States during the Malvinas War were short-lived but prevented the delivery of arms and spare parts.

There is evidence that the first round of sanctions in the 1970s was instrumental in pushing Argentina and Brazil towards bilateral military and nuclear cooperation. It was started by the visit of General Figueiredo to the Argentine Junta in 1980. This visit resulted in the increased transparency of nuclear programmes. Such openness was a precondition for closer overall relations between the military industries of Argentina and Brazil. This cooperation was, in turn, intended to shield the industries against external pressures and enhance regional autarky.

Similarly, the expansion of international economic cooperation by Argentina and Brazil resulted from the development of their bilateral relations. This effort was institutionalized in the Argentine-Brazilian Integration and Cooperation Program (PICAB) in 1985. It has paved the way to more symmetric and active collaboration between the countries. Later on, the bilateral cooperation was expanded into regional economic integration through the establishment together with Paraguay and Uruguay of the Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosul).

While in the early 1980s there were efforts by Argentina and Brazil to cooperate on nuclear issues, they started to deal with each other seriously only after the conclusion of the PICAB. The result was a series of political commitments and measures to build mutual confidence, deepen technical cooperation and become jointly involved in the multilateral nuclear diplomacy. The process of democratization has increased the civilian influence in decision-making, although, especially in Brazil, the role of the military in the nuclear industry has remained strong.

As a result of these developments, the race by Argentina and Brazil to acquire nuclear weapons has almost stopped, although the spectre of the bomb has not entirely disappeared. For this to occur, technical safeguards and mutual confidence have to be built and the military potential of the Argentinian and Brazilian peaceful nuclear activities has to be scrutinized. However, their nuclear cooperation has not necessarily been aimed at getting rid of the threat of the bomb. Rather, Argentina and Brazil may have wanted to weaken the grounds on which the United States pressured them in the first place to join the NPT, and to subordinate them to IAEA safeguards. This view is consistent with the original motivation in 1980 to start nuclear cooperation between the countries. By assuring the world that their intentions are peaceful, Argentina and Brazil have, in reality, gained a greater autonomy for their nuclear industries. Now they can benefit mutually from the expanded civilian nuclear cooperation, i.e. it was in the interest of both governments to work together. These interests were, in part, technologically based as both Argentina and Brazil had developed their own independent uranium enrichment cycles.

Economic sanctions against Argentina played only an indirect role in this development as their general economic impact was limited. It was clear, however, that the continued diplomatic and economic isolation of Argentina after the Malvinas War was a serious obstacle to economic modernization and democratization of the country. John R. Redick concludes that President Carlos Saul Menem and his advisers understood that the "acceptance of the non-proliferation norms, including full-scope IAEA safeguards, was necessary if Argentina was to gain access to advanced technology in all fields and end its economic and political isolation". In Brazil, President Fernando Collor de Mello believed that "continued rejection of the non-proliferation regime would result in unacceptable penalties, thwarting ambitious development objectives".

Thus, the old idea that Argentina and Brazil could stay outside the IAEA safeguards was gradually eroded. Their acceptance became an entrance ticket to full political and economic participation in the international community. As a result, in 1991 a combined subregional and international nuclear safeguards agreement with the IAEA was concluded by Argentina and Brazil. It led to the application of its full-scope safeguards on all nuclear facilities and materials in the two countries. This change of policy was due to the recognition by Argentinian and Brazilian leaders that "while a bilateral inspection agreement could provide mutual confidence and security, only a complete coverage of all nuclear material and installations under IAEA safeguards would prove acceptable to key supplier states, especially the United States and Germany".

Direct economic costs of the nuclear programmes cannot explain the Argentinian and Brazilian decisions in the Southern Cone to first reject the unilateral nuclear option and then to convert the bilateral nuclear agreement into a multilateral one. These decisions were motivated rather by their economic and political opportunity costs. The continuation of programmes would have become economically too costly and politically too burdensome in comparison to the alternative courses of action.

South Africa


Also in South Africa the costs of a nuclear-weapon programme remained bearable, especially if compared to the huge expenses of the Iraqi programme (in connection with which the figure of $ 10 billion is often mentioned). It is alleged that the costs of the South African nuclear weapon programme amounted to 700-800 million Rand and were, over its ten-year life, less than 0,5 per cent of the defence budget. Another estimate suggests that the capital costs of the uranium enrichment plant were $ 60 million at the present exchange rates, while the direct operating costs were $ 14 million per annum.

The Iraqi case, and to a lesser degree the North Korean example, suggests that the development of nuclear weapons is possible even in the absence of a domestic technology base. Then, however, it may become prohibitively expensive. In South Africa as well as in the Southern Cone the domestic capacity, especially in uranium enrichment, existed and undergirded the nuclear programmes.

In the 1970s, South Africa was in an ambivalent position. Pretoria was a member of the IAEA, and its nuclear facilities were partially safeguarded, but it had not joined the NPT. Sensing, correctly, South Africa's nuclear-weapon plans, the United States started both unilateral and multilateral organized pressures against Pretoria. This convinced the South African Government that it had little to gain from a partial commitment to international cooperation in nuclear issues and it gave vent to the isolationist impulse. This also speeded up the production of nuclear devices whose number was capped at six by a decision made in 1985.

In South Africa, the domestic costs of international economic and political isolation started to accumulate from 1987 on. The United States, the European Community and the Commonwealth all intensified their financial and other sanctions against the apartheid regime. They contributed to the stagnation in economic development, due to the scarcity of financial capital and various uneconomical public energy and other projects designed to shield the economy from the impact of sanctions.

The effects of financial sanctions were reinforced from 1982 by denying South Africa access to the IMF facilities and the launching of divestment campaigns in the United States a few years later. The drying up of the sources of foreign capital had devastating consequences on the economy in which the balance of payments had traditionally constrained economic growth. The collapse of the Rand in 1985 worsened the situation and by the late 1980s the South African economic crisis had become acute.

Yet the South African decision to give up its nuclear weapons cannot be traced directly to the economic impact of sanctions. Political conditions and considerations were more important. South African dilemmas called for a political rather than a military solution. It was very difficult to imagine any practical military way of using nuclear weapons, passively or actively, to enhance the security of South Africa. Thus the nuclear deterrent became a political liability rather than an advantage. On the other hand, the membership of the NPT held a promise of improved political reputation for South Africa in the West.

By about 1987 the demands for ousting South Africa from the IAEA had become more vocal. Its exclusion from the Agency would have further marginalized the country as an outcast nuclear-weapon power. Such a reputation would also have denied access to the international market for nuclear technology from which South Africa could expect to gain commercial benefits. The costs of further economic isolation and military setbacks suffered through the destabilization of neighbouring countries, motivated the South African apartheid Government elite to redefine its policies.

Yet, the Government would probably have held out for some time had not both the global and local political parameters changed substantially in the late 1980s. The collapse of the Soviet Union deprived the conservative groups in the National Party of their established threat image which was based on the fear that South Africa had specifically been selected for a Communist onslaught. Such a threat could be only countered by a total national strategy which necessitated the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

A concomitant change was P.W. Botha's replacement by F.W. de Klerk both as the chairman of the National Party and as the State President. De Klerk redefined the political orientation and set out to end the international isolation of the country. The effects of economic sanctions were mediated through these political changes.

As a part of this broad reorientation, de Klerk reassessed South African nuclear policy in September 1989. Two months later the decision was taken to destroy the six nuclear devices and to decommission the pilot enrichment plant (the Y plant) producing fissile material. The responsibility for denuclearization was given to Armscor and the Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC). The process was completed by July 1991 when South Africa also joined the NPT. A few months later it concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. While the story has an happy ending, there are unresolved policy issues left, including the future of the South African reserves of highly enriched uranium.

Both the Menem Government in Argentina and the de Klerk Government in South Africa understood that compliance with the non-proliferation norms was necessary in order to gain access to multilateral economic and political cooperation. It promised material rewards by which domestic political reforms could be financed. Domestic political obstacles to denuclearization were also reduced. Simultaneously with Argentina, its rival, Brazil, gave up its nuclear-weapon option and diluted claims for regional hegemony. South Africans realized that the nuclear deterrent, especially if based on a tactical offensive deployment, provided few if any benefits in their efforts to solve the country's internal and external security problems.

In the South African case, there is some circumstantial evidence that the decision to dismantle its nuclear weapons was speeded up by United States pressures. Washington was worried about the prospects that nuclear weapons would fall into the hands of an ANC-led government. The official U.S. calculations hardly overlooked the fact that the ANC had political and military cooperation with countries like Cuba and Libya. Moreover, there was no way for de Klerk and the National Party to hide the nuclear weapons from the incoming ANC Government.

While economic sanctions did not directly engender the reorientation of nuclear-weapon policy, they isolated Argentina and South Africa in general. This in turn, convinced their governments of the need to revise their basic political orientation. The decisions of Buenos Aires and Pretoria to give up the nuclear-weapon option and to comply with the non-proliferation norms sent, in turn, a clear signal to the international community that they were serious in the efforts to start playing by the commonly accepted rules of nuclear non-proliferation.

Iraq and Pakistan


The cases of Iraq and Pakistan provide direct evidence on the efficacy of economic sanctions in preventing threshold countries from acquiring nuclear weapons. The Iraqi case is exceptional in that the effective inspection and dismantling of its nuclear-weapon program became possible only after the successful military action of the multinational coalition forces. Its dogged, and rather successful pursuit of nuclear-weapon status shows that there are loopholes in the IAEA fullscope safeguards. It also shows that external political and economic pressures alone are inadequate to convince a threshold power, determined to acquire nuclear weapons, to give up its bombs. In the absence of domestic commitment to political reorientation, only overwhelming power can help to accomplish the non-proliferation objective. Finally, the Iraqi case shows that the United Nations is in practice able to create an effective monitoring system and to dismantle nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction acquired by a member state.

Pakistan launched its nuclear-weapon programme in 1972 and started manufacturing weapons-grade uranium in 1986. The programme is closely controlled by the top echelon of the Pakistani military. At present the country is estimated to have 6-10 operational nuclear weapons, about one-tenth of the number of bombs possessed by India. Pakistan's motivation to acquire nuclear weapons has been traced to its efforts to enhance its sovereignty and equality in the South Asian region. India helped, by relying on its conventional military superiority, to divide and defeat Pakistan in the 1971 war between the countries. Ever since, Pakistan has sought to avoid the reccurrence of such a situation and tries to multiply its military capabilities by nuclear weapons.

Pakistan has received foreign assistance to its nuclear-weapons programme, primarily from China, France and the United States. Although Pakistan stresses the indigenous nature of its nuclear devices, their development would hardly have been possible without external assistance and the diversion of nuclear technology and materials from the international market.

The United States has used both carrots and sticks to steer Pakistan away from the nuclear-weapon path. This dualist approach reflects the ambiguity of the U.S. policy. On the one hand, Washington has been critical of Pakistan's violation of non-proliferation norms, while its value as a strategic asset has, on the other, been recognized. During the Cold War, Pakistan was used both as a counterweight to Indo-Soviet cooperation and a conduit for U.S. military assistance to the mujaheddin fighting in Afghanistan against the Soviet Red Army. These strategic interests dissuaded Washington from taking any early and decisive measures against the Pakistani bomb plans.

Rather, the United States tried a carrot. In the early 1970s Henry Kissinger offered large amounts of conventional weapons to Pakistan, and also to Iran for that matter, in the hope that their security interests could be satisfied in this way. The Carter Administration continued to provide extensive military assistance to Islamabad. It waived the Symington Amendment which prohibited aid to non-nuclear countries possessing unsafeguarded enrichment technologies as did Pakistan in the Kahuta plan. These carrots had, however, only a minimal impact on Pakistan's moves to acquire nuclear weapons. This shows that economic and military incentives cannot convince the potential proliferator to change its course if it is firmly committed to enter the nuclear-weapon club.

Another question is, then, whether sticks can help to attain the non-proliferation goal. Again, the Pakistani case provides relevant evidence. In 1985 the United States Congress passed the Pressler Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act requiring the President to certify that Pakistan does "not possess a nuclear explosive device and that the proposed United States assistance programme will reduce significantly the risk that the recipient country will possess a nuclear explosive device". The Reagan and Bush Administrations circumvented this provision until 1990 when it became clear that Pakistan had been able to successfully develop nuclear explosives (and the Soviet Union had started its withdrawal from Afghanistan). The President could not certify any more that Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons and, as a consequence, the aid had to be cut off.

However, there are few if any signs that the discontinuation of assistance has persuaded Pakistan to give up is nuclear-weapon programme. It is justified by the overriding concerns fostered by the Indian bomb program and conventional military superiority. Simply, the Pressler Amendment has failed to convince Pakistan that it should give up its nuclear weapons. It may even become counterproductive as considerations of national prestige and domestic policy in Pakistan complicate the making of concessions, as they could be interpreted as yielding to external pressures. The Clinton Administration has come to a similar conclusion and has started to develop a more flexible and multifaceted approach to the problems of nuclear proliferation in South Asia.

The United States has sought to combine unilateral incentives with bilateral and multilateral arms control to mitigate the risk of nuclear proliferation in South Asia. Washington has offered to unblock the delivery of F-16 jet fighters and P-3 ASW planes to Pakistan, on the condition that it stops producing enriched uranium and agrees to international inspections to verify this pledge. Pakistan may be willing to move in this direction provided that India accepts the capping of its nuclear arsenals in a reciprocal deal. In reality, this would mean that the United States seems now to accept small national nuclear arsenals in South Asia, but tries to prevent their activation and expansion.

However, India has rejected the United States policy which aims to build military confidence in the region and slow down the process of nuclear proliferation. The main reason for India's rejectionist stance is that the U.S. proposals do not address its main concerns. These concerns are the Chinese nuclear weapons, perceived as a security risk, and the discriminatory regime created by the international approval of the arsenals of established nuclear-weapon powers. Ultimately, these problems can be solved only by a global ban on nuclear weapons.

The denuclearization of South Asia would require the breaking of regional proliferation chains. Standard suggestions on reaching this goal include the strengthening of existing alliances guarantees, the reaffirmation of international security assurances and the tactical theatre defences against ballistic missiles. The problem in South Asia is that, with the partial exception of multilateral security guarantees, these means of breaking the China-India-Pakistan proliferation chain are largely irrelevant. This suggests that the only feasible way is to follow a global strategy which would have regional implications in South Asia, capping the Indian and Pakistani nuclear programmes. Global measures would include the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) and a verifiable cut-off of fissile material production.

The Pakistani case also suggests that a strong domestic commitment to the development of nuclear weapons and the external threats imposed by regional military rivalries make both carrots and sticks ineffective as instruments of a non-proliferation policy. Another lesson of the Pakistani case is that if economic sanctions are applied, the sender must carefully specify when the required concessions are met by the target. In the relations between Islamabad and Washington there has been disagreement on what is meant by the 'nuclear explosive device' which Islamabad is not permitted to produce. In addition, it has to be realized that both positive and negative sanctions have bearing on the policies of the third parties. For instance, India has supported the Pressler Amendment and has opposed the waiver permitting the delivery of aircraft to Pakistan.

North Korea


The conclusion from the foregoing analysis is that the reversal of the proliferation policy by a threshold country requires either a profound internal reassessment of its national strategy or a military defeat in war. Obviously, the latter solution to the proliferation dilemma is rare. For example, few, if any countries are ready to bomb North Korean nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and they are even less willing to initiate an all out war against it; provided, of course, that it does not initiate aggression outside its own borders as did Iraq.

North Korea's relationship with the international community in matters concerning nuclear weapons has been evasive and obstructive. After having become a member of the NPT it delayed the conclusion of the safeguards agreement with the IAEA and has systematically obstructed their work. In January 1993, North Korea withdrew from discussions with South Korea involving the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the peninsula, agreed to in principle in December 1991. In March 1993 it decided to withdraw from the NPT, although this announcement was cancelled later on. Since then, North Korea has modified its stance and participated in bilateral talks with the United States.

So far, and in spite of the continued evasion of IAEA inspections by North Korea, the international community has been reluctant to punish it. The use of economic sanctions has been debated, but no concrete measures have been taken so far. It is clear that without the compliance of China, Japan and South Korea with the decisions by the UN Security Council on sanctions, their impact on the already isolated North Korea would be minimal. In fact, it seems that all these pivotal countries are not anxious to use sanctions against North Korea. More likely they would be interpreted as yet another effort by the Western powers to meddle in Asian affairs. China has already joined Pakistan in criticizing U.S. sanctions directed at them on non-proliferation grounds.

In addition to China, Japan and South Korea also prefer to deal with the North Korean nuclear weapons as a regional East Asian problem, which calls for a solution by negotiation rather than coercion. Applying Lisa L. Martin's argument, the United States should, if it wants to make its sanctions policy credible and gain cooperation by Asian countries, itself start visible, high-cost sanctions against North Korea. This is hardly a valid scenario; the Clinton Administration is reluctant to resort to such unilateral, high-profile measures in foreign policy. Rather, it has been willing to negotiate with North Korea

On the other hand, the credibility of the international nuclear non-proliferation policy is at stake if North Korea is permitted to systematically violate non-proliferation norms. No doubt, several other threshold states are culprits for similar violations. They are saved, however, from punishments either because they have a strategic alignment with a great power (Israel) or they are large enough to make the use of sanctions counterproductive (India). North Korea, as a weak outcast nation, is an easier target for punitive actions.

The Chinese, and in particular the Japanese and South Korean policies for avoiding the imposition of economic sanctions against North Korea are not so much due to their inherent reluctance to use a stick than to their, in a sense paradoxical, fear that sanctions might be successful. This would lead to the collapse of the North Korean economy and perhaps also to political and military turmoil spreading instability throughout East Asia. The net result might be the unification of Korea by default.

Such a forced unification of the Korean peninsula would impose heavy and perhaps unbearable economic and political costs on South Korea which therefore prefers to move cautiously. This shows that the proliferation of nuclear weapons is not the sole or even the primary concern of governments in the region. In fact, they may prefer economic and political stability, which could be endangered by the imposition of sanctions, even if this would mean a limited proliferation of nuclear weapons.

An important motivation for the North Korean nuclear weapon plans may be its effort to acquire bargaining chips for negotiations to attract foreign aid and investment. As its economic and political leverage is otherwise very limited, North Korea has resorted for this purpose to rather extreme measures, such as vowing to attack South Korea or threatening Japan with nuclear strikes, to gain attention. In addition, North Korean missile programmes may well be intended to gain foreign currency; it reportedly earned $ 500 million from the delivery of Scud missiles to Syria.

The most plausible interpretation of the North Korean efforts to acquire nuclear weapons is that their chief function is to assure the survival of the Kim family government and to provide a lever to open relations with the industrialized countries. In a backward country like North Korea, nuclear weapons may be the only achievement which the ruling group is able to show to its people and the outside world. The penchant for nuclear weapons becomes thus a part of the efforts by the outcast state to overcome its inherent domestic weaknesses and thus survive. In North Korea, the importance of this motivation has hardly diminished, and may have increased instead, in the post-Kim IL Sung era. On the other hand, Kim IL Sung announced, before his death, a temporary freeze of the North Korean nuclear programme.

If this conclusion is correct, then the most effective strategy to dissuade Pyongyang from acquiring nuclear weapons would be to cooperate with it on the condition that it accepts full obligations of the NPT member and permits complete IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities. On the other hand, it should be made clear to North Korea that failure to comply with the international non-proliferation norms would lead to its further punishment and isolation. The cooperative strategy could include the diplomatic recognition of North Korea and the extension of economic support to projects, such as the development of the Tumen River area, that would gradually integrate it into the world economy.

In effect, the strategy of economic integration is, at least over a long term, a more effective antidote to the proliferation of nuclear weapons than the isolation of a threshold country. In the North Korean case, a collaborative strategy has been initiated by the bilateral discussions with the United States in Geneva and by a potential summit between the leaders of the two Koreas. One element in the package deal under consideration is the replacement, in cooperation with Russia, of North Korea's plutonium-producing fuel cycle, starting with the replacement of a graphite reactor by a light-water reactor which has a lesser proliferation potential.

While a cooperative solution defusing the nuclear crisis in the Korean peninsula, which may have been overblown in any case, is to be preferred, one cannot exclude a more pessimistic forecast. Time seems to be running out, however. The determination of the North Korean Government to sabotage the IAEA inspections makes it difficult to avoid the impression that Pyongyang has really something to hide and that it, in effect, pursues the nuclear-weapon option in a relentless way. If the Geneva talks fail and an international consensus on this interpretation emerges, the probability that the UN Security Council will impose economic sanctions on North Korea increases. A sanctions decision and its implementation would be a major test of the ability of the international community to stand against the spectre of nuclear proliferation. At the same time it should be able to alleviate the fears of North Korea which are due to the military activities of other powers in the region and the expanding plutonium economy in South Korea and especially Japan.

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND MISSILES


Another anti-proliferation strategy, apart from targeting threshold countries trying to acquire nuclear weapons, is to apply economic sanctions against countries which develop, produce and export long- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Such missiles can also be equipped with conventional and chemical warheads, but their use for the delivery of nuclear explosives is the most worrisome prospect. While nuclear weapons can also be delivered by aircraft, the acquisition of ballistic missile capabilities should especially raise red flags.It is estimated that by the end of the 1990s some 25 states will possess ballistic missiles.

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), established in 1987, is responsible for the prevention of the sale of ballistic missiles and the spread of equipment and technologies which can be used to construct them. The MTCR is, however, a weak regime as it has neither an executive body nor the capacity to verify and endogenously enforce compliance with its norms. It can do little to prevent the rise of indigenous missile industries and its work is undermined by the ease with which scientific and technical expertise travels across the borders. The MTCR is not a fair regime as it permits the member states to transfer ballistic missile technology if proper assurances are given. Fairness would be enhanced if the sellers of ballistic missile technologies, instead of their buyers, were punished for the violation of the norms.

In spite of its deficiencies, the MTCR has been increasingly successful in slowing down the proliferation of ballistic missiles and raising the costs of their acquisition. Its future success is possible, however, only if the major states party to it also act decisively and in cooperation, against each other, to prevent the dispersion of ballistic missiles. The international and more particularly United States pressures to successfully break the alliance between Argentina, Egypt and Iraq, established to produce the Condor II missile, provide an example of the effects of a sanctions approach. In all these countries the programme was closely guarded secret, nurtured by a network of clandestine deals and transactions. In Argentina, the Menem Government discontinued it as detrimental to the country's international interests. In effect, the demise of the Condor II programme there can be explained pretty much in the same way as the decision to give up the nuclear-weapon option.

Co-operation by China and Russia, and other successors of the Soviet Union, is of great importance for the effective operation of the MTCR. The regime has not stopped the Chinese involvement in cross-border transfer of ballistic missiles, but it has persuaded Beijing, which since 1991 has been unilaterally committed to respect its norms, to transfer information and technology rather than equipment and missiles to interested customers. The bottom line here is that the transfer of information and components is harder to track than the fully developed missiles. The Chinese policy seems to have been altered, at least in a limited way, by U.S. economic sanctions, applied since 1991 as a result of Beijing's transfer of ballistic missile technology to the Near East and Pakistan. There is little if any hope, though, that economic measures can persuade such countries as India, Iran, Israel and Pakistan to dismantle their missile programmes.

The development and production of ballistic missiles is increasingly based on transnational strategic alliances in which governments and corporations from several countries pool their resources to produce missiles. These alliances operate at the interface of international markets and intergovernmental relations and are cemented by a variety of economic and political objectives. Thus, any effort to prevent the spread of ballistic missiles requires, in addition to political determination, practical approaches that address the transnational dimensions of their production and transfer.

CONCLUDING REMARKS


The practical experience seems to support a strategy in which economic sanctions should not be the primary and certainly not the sole means to avert nuclear proliferation. An early resort to sanctions may push the target country into a political corner from which it has difficulties in exctricating itself. In such a situation, desperate political and military decisions can be made, especially by outcast states of which Iraq and North Korea are the main examples. This risk is compounded by the fact that nuclear proliferation is most rampant in the regions, i.e. the Near East and South Asia, in which the chances of an interstate war are the highest. In fact, these are the only regions of the world, perhaps in addition to East Asia, where a large-scale conventional war between states is still possible. Political negotiations and military confidence-building, in conjunction with more far-reaching measures of arms control, should be the primary means by which to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation. Tangible progress in the global nuclear arms control is a sine qua non of the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime.

However, the role of economic sanctions cannot be discarded altogether. Sanctions have occasionally had tangible results when they have been imposed usually for reasons other than as punishedment for the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The ensuing isolation may force the country to reassess its national strategy. Nuclear weapons or plans to acquire them may be given up as part of this broader re-evaluation because they are assessed to be politically too costly.

The use of sanctions leads, however, to the familiar problem that innocent groups have to suffer because of governmental misbehaviour. These groups include both disadvantaged people within the target country and the neighbouring states faithfully implementing sanctions. To alleviate unnecessary suffering, the sanctions to enforce non-proliferation norms should primarily be endogenous and carried out by the means available within the regime itself. Obviously these means should be strengthened. If exogenous enforcement is resorted to, the emphasis should be on financial and technological transactions which do not include everyday necessities of life such as food and medicine. An international compensation fund to support the neighbouring countries that suffer from the implementation of sanctions should be established.

To ensure the efficacy of sanctions, they should contain both rewards and punishments. On the one hand, sanctions and other enforcement actions can be credible and effective only if the senders are prepared to stand firm against the violations of rules set by the international community. This strategy of firmness could lead to what Alexander L. George has called 'coercive diplomacy'. Such a 'forceful persuasion' relies primarily on non-military coercive measures, but may occasionally have to resort to military means as well.

On other hand incentives, bribes and other rewards can also be effective means of interstate influence. 'Bribery' is an exchange relationship in which the actor and the target both have an interest in the mutual deal. To succeed, such a deal presupposes the capacity and credibility of the actor to deliver its promises, while the target should appreciate the rewards enough to give up in return something valuable. The effects of rewards are naturally dependent on the target's receptivity to them.

Bribery has its limits, though; rewards without punitive measures or their threats do not necessarily have an impact on the decisions of the target country. Thus, a combination of punishments and rewards seems to be the most effective way fo altering the incentive structure of the target country and hence its behaviour.

The Ukrainian case illustrates the potential of bribery in international non-proliferation efforts. In January 1994, Ukraine agreed to give up by 1998 its 1 800 warheads from intercontinental missiles, cruise missiles and bombers. They will be sent for destruction to Russia from which the United States Enrichment Corporation, a quasigovernmental body, will purchase the weapon-grade uranium and sell it. As compensation, the United States will deliver economic and technological assistance to Ukraine to get rid of nuclear weapons and to develop more dependable sources of energy supply. The total value of this deal for Ukraine is in the vicinity of one billion dollars.

It is doubtful, however, how far the Ukrainian example can be generalized. The deal was resisted by nationalist political forces which would hardly have accepted it had not the Ukrainian economy been on the edge of bankruptcy. Even now many a Ukrainian thinks that the warheads and their enriched uranium were given away at too a cheap price. One may also query whether the United States, the only potential briber in such deals, would be willing to conclude a similar deal if the nuclear-weapon arsenals of the target country had been smaller and its delivery vehicles of shorter range and hence less of a direct threat to the United States' own security. Also in that respect, a potential deal with North Korea would be an interesting test case on cooperative enforcement of non-proliferation which can be contrasted with the Iraqi experience on non-proliferation by punitive and monitoring enforcement.

ENDNOTES

  1. See Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, International Organization, vol. 47, no. 2, 1993, p. 183.
  2. See Lewis A. Dunn, Four Decades of Nuclear Nonproliferation: Some Lessons from Wins, Losses, and Draws, The Washington Quarterly, vol. 13, no. 3, 1990, p 14.
  3. This is the thrust of the analysis by William E. Burrows & Robert Windrem, Critical Mass, The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World. Simon & Schuster, New York, 1994.
  4. Chayes & Chayes op. cit. 1993, pp. 198-99 and Dunn op.cit. 1990, pp. 5-9.
  5. For a succinct but informed analysis of the prospects for the NPT, see Lewis A. Dunn, NPT 1995: Time to Shift Gears, Arms Control Today, vol. 23, no. 9, 1993, pp. 14-19.
  6. For an evaluation of the IAEA safeguards along these lines, see David Fischer, Stopping the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, The Past and the Prospects, Routledge, London, 1992, pp. 120-37. Nowadays it is common to advocate the empowerment of the IAEA, both in terms of its actions, resources and mandate, and its work should be better coordinated with other global verification systems and with regional organizations; see Harald Müller, Nukleare Nichtverbreitung: Ein umfassender Strategieentwurf, HSFK Report No.7, Frankfurt am Main, 1993, pp. 24-29 and Fischer op.cit. ,1992, pp. 173-82.
  7. See, e.g., Kathleen B. Bailey, Strengthening Nuclear Nonproliferation, Westview Press, Boulder, 1993, pp. 17-26 and Harald Müller & Lewis A. Dunn, Nuclear Export Controls and Supply Side Restraints: Options for Reform, PPNN Study No. 4, Southampton, 1993.
  8. Peter van Ham, Managing Non-Proliferation Regimes in the 1990s, Power, Politics, and Policies, The Royal Institute of International Relations/Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1994, pp. 78-88.
  9. These issues are discussed in Lewis A. Dunn, Containing Nuclear Proliferation, Adelphi Papers no. 263, London, 1991, pp. 59-63.
  10. See Dunn op.cit. 1991, p. 32.
  11. See Alan Dowty, The Political and Military Implications of the Gulf War in the Emerging New World Order, in Bum-Joon Lee & Sung-Chul Yang (eds.), 1992, The Changing World Order. Prospects for Korea in the Asia Pacific Era. The Korean Association of International Studies: Seoul, pp. 25-27 and Eric Chauvistré, The Implications of IAEA Inspection under Security Council Resolution 687. UNIDIR, New York, 1992.
  12. Lisa L. Martin, Credibility, Costs and Institutions. Cooperation on Economic Sanctions, World Politics, vol. 45, no. 3, 1993, pp. 406-32. See also Lisa L. Martin, Coercive Cooperation, Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J, 1992.
  13. See Müller & Dunn op.cit. 1993, pp. 26-27 and Müller op.cit. 1993, pp. 34-37 and Bailey op.cit. 1993, pp. 79-85.
  14. David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J, 1985, pp. 29-50. See also Laurence Boisson de Chazourness, Les contre-measures dans des relations internationales economiques, Editions A. Pedone, Paris, 1991.
  15. For a sophisticated discussion of these issues, see Baldwin op.cit. 1985, pp. 113-44; see also Martin op.cit. 1992.
  16. The decision to use sanctions against Argentina in 1982 is investigated in detail by Lisa L. Martin, Institutions and Cooperation: Sanctions during the Falklands Islands Conflict, International Security, vol. 16, no. 4, 1992, pp. 143-78.
  17. This interpretation has been shared with me by Dr. Virginia Gamba of MacArthur Foundation, Chicago, in private communication on June 23, 1994.
  18. Monica Hirst & Hector Eduardo Bocco, Nuclear Cooperation in the Context of the Programme for Argentine-Brazilian Integration and Cooperation, in Paul L. Leventhal & Sharon Tanzer (eds.), Averting a Latin American Nuclear Arms Race, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1992, pp. 214-29. Different phases of the nuclear cooperation between Argentina and Brazil since 1980 has been described in Héctor Eduardo Bocco, La cooperacion nuclear Argentina-Brasil, Nota para una evaluación política, FLACSO, Buenos Aires, 1989, pp. 20-31.
  19. Oliveiros S. Ferrera, Response, in Paul L. Leventhal & Sharon Tanzer (eds.), Averting a Nuclear Arms Race in Latin America, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1992, pp. 62-71 and Virginia Gamba, private communication on June 23, 1994.
  20. John R. Redick, Latin America's Emerging Non-Proliferation Consensus, Arms Control Today, vol. 24, no. 2, 1994, p. 6.
  21. Redick op.cit. 1994, p. 7. See also John R. Redick, Argentina-Brazil Nuclear Non-Proliferation Initiatives, University of Southampton, PPNN Issue Review No. 3, 1994.
  22. Jeremy Shearer, Denuclearization of Africa: The South African Dimension, Disarmament, vol. 16, no. 2, 1993, p. 177. Shearer is the Deputy Director General of the South African Department of Foreign Affairs.
  23. Waldo Stumpf, South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program, Atomic Energy Corporation of South Africa (unpublished paper), 1994, p. 5 and 18-19. Stumpf is the Chief Executive of the South African Atomic Energy Corporation.
  24. Stumpf op.cit. 1994, pp. 7-10.
  25. David Fischer concludes that the devices were most likely intended as free-fall bombs rather than calibrated to artillery or missiles; see David Fischer, Reversing Nuclear Proliferation: South Africa, Security Dialogue, vol. 24, no. 3, 1993, pp. 275-76.
  26. See Alan Hirsch, Sanctions, Loans and the South African Economy, in Mark Orkin (ed.), Sanctions Against Apartheid, St Martin's Press, New York, 1990, pp. 270-84 and B. Kahn, Foreign Exchange Policy, Capital Flight, and Economic Growth, in Iraj Abedian & Barry Standish (ed.), Economic Growth in South Africa. Oxford University Press: Cape Town, 1992, pp. 74-98.
  27. J.W. de Williers, Roger Jardine & Mitchell Reiss, 1993, Why South Africa Gave up the Bomb. Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 5, pp. 102-103. See also Fischer op.cit. 1992, pp. 213-18.
  28. This interpretation relies on penetrating comments by Dr. JK Cilliers, Executive Director of the Institute for Defence Policy, South Africa (private communication on May 17, 1994). See also Stumpf op.cit. 1994, pp. 14-16.
  29. de Williers, Jardine & Reiss op.cit. 1993, pp. 104-107 and Darryl Howlett & Simpson, 1993, Nuclearization and Denuclearization in South Africa. Survival, vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 154-73. See also Shearer op.cit. 1993, pp. 171-85 and Fischer op.cit. 1993, pp. 282-83. Stumpf (op.cit. 1994, pp. 21-22) assures that South Africa's highly-enriched uranium is fully safeguarded by the IAEA and that the government has no plans to sell it.
  30. Rolf Ekéus, 1994, Iraq: The Future of Arms Control Security Dialogue, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 7-16 and Alan Dowty, 1994, Sanctioning Iraq: The Limits of the New World Order. Washington Quarterly, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 179-98.
  31. For more details on Pakistan's nuclear-weapons program, see Brahma Chellaney, 1991, South Asia's Passage to Nuclear Powers. International Security, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 43-72 and Brahma Chellaney, 1993, The Challenge of Nuclear Arms Control in South Asia. Survival, vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 121-36.
  32. For details, see Chellaney op.cit. 1993, pp. 122-24 and Burrows & Windrem op.cit. 1994, pp. 359-74.
  33. Georg Perkovich, 1993, A Nuclear Third Way in South Asia, Foreign Policy, no. 91, pp. 91-92.
  34. This policy is advocated by Perkovich op.cit. 1993, pp. 85-104.
  35. For information on recent non-proliferation efforts in South Asia, see New York Times, November 27, 1993, March 23, 1994 and March 26, 1994.
  36. Dunn op.cit. 1991, pp. 41-45 and Müller op.cit. 1993, pp. 31-33.
  37. See, e.g., John Hawes, 1994, A Global Answer to South Asia's Nuclear Question. Arms Control Brief, vol. 2, no. 7. Center for International and Security Studies. University of Maryland.
  38. Burrows & Windrem op.cit. 1994, p. 80.
  39. For a succinct account of North Korea's policy, see Harald Müller, David Fischer & Wolfgang Kötter, 1994, Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Order. Oxford University Press/SIPRI: Oxford, pp. 140-44.
  40. Christian Science Monitor, December 30, 1993.
  41. Cf. Martin op.cit. 1993.
  42. This is emphasized strongly by Ronald F. Lehman II, 1993, A North Korean Nuclear-Weapons Program. International Implications, Security Dialogue, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 257-72.
  43. See, e.g., Business Week, April 4, 1994 and New York Times, March 23, 1994.
  44. This aspect has been stressed by Paul Bracken, 1993, Nuclear Weapons and State Survival in North Korea. Survival, vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 137-53.
  45. A similar approach has been suggested by Donald P. Gregg, 1994, Offer Korea a Carrot, New York Times, May 19, 1994. Gregg was in 1989-93 U.S. Ambassador to South Korea. See also North Korea's Nuclear Program: Challenge and Opportunity for American Policy, 1994, The United States Institute of Peace: Washington, D.C., pp. 19-23. The USIP report does not emphasize, however, the cooperative element in its "package proposal".
  46. Wall Street Journal, May 31, 1994.
  47. Aaron Karp, 1994, The Maturation of Ballistic Missile Proliferation, in William C. Potter & Harlan W. Jencks (eds.), The International Missile Bazaar. The New Suppliers' Network. Westview Press: Boulder, pp. 13-16.
  48. van Ham op.cit. 1994, pp. 24-27 and Scott D. Tollefson, 1994, El Condor Pasa: The Demise of Argentina's Ballistic Missile Program, in William C. Potter & Harlan W. Jencks (eds.), The International Missile Bazaar. pp. 255-77.
  49. Burrows and Windrem op.cit. 1994, pp. 387-89 and Hua Di, 1994, China's Case: Ballistic Missile Proliferation, in William C. Potter & Harlan W. Jencks (eds.), The International Missile Bazaar. op. cit. pp. 176-77.
  50. See Martin van Creveld, 1993, Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict. The Free Press: New York.
  51. This is emphasized by Müller, Fischer & Kötter op.cit. 1994, pp. 162-77.
  52. Political and humanitarian problems associated with the targeting and effects of economic sanctions are discussed by Patrick Clawson, 1993, Sanctions as Punishment, Enforcement, and Pre;ude to Further Action, Ethics and International Affairs, vol. 7, pp. 17-37 and Lori Fisler Damrosch, 1993, The Civilian Impact of Economic Sanctions, in Lori Fisler Damrosch (ed.), Enforcing Restraint. Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts. Council on Foreign Relations Press: New York, pp. 274-315.
  53. Alexander L. George, 1991, Forceful Persuasion. Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War. United States Institute of Peace Press: Washington, D.C.
  54. For a theory of international bribes, see John M. Rothgeb, Jr., 1993, Defining Power. Influence and Force in the Contemporary International System. St. Martin's Press: New York, pp. 110-17.
  55. For literature to support this contention, see Baldwin op.cit. 1985 and Rothgeb op.cit. 1993, pp. 96-98.