The Changing Role of the South African Navy

Vice Admiral R C Simpson-Anderson, SD
Chief of the South African Navy

Published in South African Defence Review Issue No 10, 1993



INTRODUCTION

It is observed with considerable satisfaction that the state of the South African Navy has recently become a matter of wider debate. This can only bode well for the future of the Navy.

The picture is somewhat clouded by some of the misconceptions that seem to exist. The perception that the Navy is in a state of decline and about to become irrelevant, with whatever good intentions it is voiced, is bad for the image of the Navy and for the morale of its members.

When discussing the changing role of the Navy, it should be borne in mind that it is changing within a South Africa that is undergoing significant and rapid change. Planning for the future is therefore very complex.

The aim of this paper is to present the current state of the Navy and its role in future. I trust that at the end of my presentation, at the very least, you will:
  • have confidence in the capabilities of the Navy;
  • understand more clearly that the Navy has been hard hit by the prolonged reduction in its budget, but, despite this, has managed to maintain its short-term operational efficiency;
  • show some understanding for and insight into the track the Navy has been put on for the future; and
  • support all efforts with regard to the timeous replacement of those elements of the fleet that are ageing.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN NAVY

EARLY HISTORY


A brief look at the history of the Navy will show that the acquisition of the survey vessel CROZIER and the two trawlers EDEN and FOYLE by the Union Government during January 1922 presaged its birth. The 'Union Navy' was to become known as the South African Naval Services (SANS)

The South African Government undertook responsibility for the hydrographic survey of Union waters (the first role of the Navy), and furthermore that it would
  • create the nucleus of a seagoing naval Permanent Force; and
  • expand the South African Division of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (RNVR (SA)) to provide for local defence flotillas.
With the onset of the depression in 1929/30, the Defence Vote, and particularly that of the Naval Service, was subjected to severe pruning. In 1934 the SANS was forced to disappear as a seagoing force when the only remaining ships, IMMORTELLE and SONNEBLOM (formerly FOYLE and EDEN) were paid off, handed back to the Royal Navy and their crews discharged. All that remained was a small organisation comprising a staff officer and a civilian staff of six.

When South Africa entered World War II this embryo organisation was still in existence alongside the South African Division of the RNVR (SA). The South African government decided to establish a seagoing force of its own. The Seaward Defence Force (SDF) was to be raised largely from RNVR (SA) trained personnel. In January 1940 the SDF formally took over the responsibility for operating mine sweepers and anti-submarine vessels.

Difficult and humble as its beginnings may have been, the SDF made a significant contribution to the war effort. It ultimately comprised some 96 vessels of various descriptions, participated as a full ally and rendered excellent service in the southern Atlantic and Indian Oceans as well as in the Mediterranean.

DEVELOPMENTS SUBSEQUENT TO WORLD WAR II


After the war a number of frigates, destroyers and mine sweepers were acquired from Britain. This put the Navy on the map and gave it surface, anti-submarine and mine sweeping capabilities.

During the sixties the Navy acquired the President Class frigates. These were very capable anti-submarine vessels with impressive seakeeping qualities. They also introduced new technology into the Navy with their computerised fire control systems. The addition of helicopters to the frigates and to the W class destroyers to extend their ASW ability, introduced helicopter operations into the Navy for the first time.

Together with the Shackleton long range maritime patrol aircraft (operated by the Air Force) the Navy was now well equipped for its role as a de facto anti-submarine and mine sweeping squadron in support of the Royal Navy, guarding the Cape Sea Route - as agreed to under the Simon's Town Agreement.

An advantage of the link with the Royal Navy was the extensive specialised training it provided, laying the foundation for our emphasis on expertise which continues to this day.

The Simon's Town Agreement was revoked in 1977. This brought about a change in the role of the Navy. It would henceforth protect the country's own interests in a regional context.

Growth continued with the acquisition of the Daphne class submarines during the early seventies, giving the Navy an underwater capability. The Minister Class strike craft followed soon after, an acquisition which introduced surface-to-surface missiles into the Navy's arsenal.

In brief then, the post-war period saw the Navy change from an extension of the force design of the Royal Navy with the purpose of protecting the Cape Sea route, to a navy playing its proper role in attending to the country's own interests. The emphasis shifted from ASW to surface combat while a strong MCM capability as well as the hydrographic service were maintained. The naval base in Durban was developed to establish a stronger naval presence in our primary port of trade and on our north-eastern trade routes.

During the eighties four state-of-the-art mine hunters, which represented a significant boost to the Navy's MCM ability, were acquired. They were the last acquisition which added a new capability. At the same time there was a serious reduction in capability with the loss of vessels with ASW ability, the frigates, and the long range maritime patrol aircraft, the Shackletons.

The ASW capability was not deliberately phased out. It disappeared by default, due to lack of funds. Existing vessels could not be modernised, nor could new ASW vessels or aircraft be acquired.

RATIONALISATIONS IMPLEMENTED SINCE 1985


The eighties were also a period of rationalisation. A major project was launched during 1985/86 to reduce running costs by disposing of redundant vessels and reducing personnel by natural attrition. The savings were to be transferred to capital projects, specifically the acquisition of larger surface combat vessels. Significant savings were achieved and eventually a replacement programme for the frigates was approved.

In 1989 a severe cutback was imposed. This left the Navy no further option but to retrench personnel. About 2 400 uniform and civilian members out of a total strength of 13 000 were retrenched by April 1990. This necessitated the disbandment of the Marine Branch which had been established in 1979.

The decision to go ahead with such a large scale retrenchment was made specifically to allow major acquisition projects to continue. In other words, the future of the Navy would be secured by reducing infrastructure. During 1991, however, further cuts forced the Navy's hand and all major capital acquisition projects were lost. In addition, a further 570 members were retrenched during 1992/93. The nett result was that over the period 1985 to 1993 the Navy saw its numbers reduced from about 15 000 to about 9 900. All efforts to complete a ship replacement programme had failed.

Despite the cuts the operational availability of the Navy (measured by the types and numbers of ships operationally available) has remained unaffected. This was done
  • by improving productivity; and
  • at the expense of support services and the Navy's capital budget, i.e. at the expense of the future.
The Navy has now, however, reached the point where further major cuts would inevitably alter its character. More importantly, it is absolutely vital that the problem of renewing its ships be addressed.

WHY A NAVY?

WARTIME TASKS OF A NAVY


In South Africa, more than anywhere else it seems, the question is asked 'Why do we have a Navy?' or 'Could we not make do with a coast guard?'. To answer this, a basic understanding of the unhappy state known as armed conflict or war, is necessary.

The following remarks about war need to be prefaced by saying that it is the responsibility of senior naval and military officers to:
  • contemplate the unsure world around them over a strategic time horizon from the present to about 30 years ahead and plan for the security of the State during that period; and in doing so
  • assume that many states which are currently friendly could become unfriendly. In this regard it should be noted that most wars are between neighbours.
This does not make these officers bellicose or aggressive - it is simply their responsibility.

Armed force is a single concept. For practical reasons the exercise of force in the various arenas has been divided into the Army, Navy and Air force. Success in war depends on their combined efforts as well as those of the other instruments of the state. Therefore, if the sea is an arena from where the outcome of war can be significantly influenced, a navy is a necessity. It is true that the final defeat of an enemy is usually decided by land warfare. However, the contribution of naval and air forces is significant.

Outcome of a war is seldom the result of a single battle. Wars are usually extended struggles which pit the economic, industrial, demographic, political and military strengths of the countries involved. The overall objective of war is usually to change the political mind of the enemy. The military purpose is usually to destroy or drastically weaken the enemy's ability and will to fight. This includes disrupting the enemy's logistic support, weakening its industrial capability and denying it the benefits of foreign exchange derived from trade.

This brings to light the fundamental tasks of a navy during war. (The peacetime functions of a navy will be dealt with later - they are also very important). The wartime tasks of a navy are divided into offensive and defensive tasks:

Defensive Tasks

  • Defending own maritime communications (i.e. access to markets and materials).
  • Defending own territory and offshore assets from attack or invasion.

Offensive tasks

  • Attacking enemy maritime communications (i.e. undermining its industrial capability, economy and morale).
  • Attacking enemy territory and offshore assets (by bombardment, raiding or invasion).

THE PEACETIME ROLES OF A NAVY

The peacetime roles of a navy are numerous. They are also expanding as economic (and therefore strategic) interest focuses increasingly on the so-called 'off-shore estate'. They divide into two categories: diplomatic and policing - policing in the broadest sense, i.e. the enforcement of state authority. It is important to understand that the peacetime roles are fulfilled by utilising the potential and flexibility inherent in the assets provided for the wartime tasks of a navy.

Typical peacetime tasks of a navy such as the South African Navy, are:

  • Support of diplomatic initiatives through 'showing the flag'.
  • Disaster relief.
  • Search and rescue.
  • Fishery protection.
  • Pollution control.
  • Customs and excise tasks.
  • Combating of piracy.
  • Support of scientific programmes.
Most of these tasks could be grouped under the heading COAST GUARD. However, coast guards are frequently involved in further activities, such as the licensing of vessels and their crew, provision and maintenance of navigation aids, and policing of inland waters. Also, although a navy can carry out most of the tasks of a coast guard due to its inherent flexibility, a coast guard cannot suddenly be called upon to fight. A Navy is therefore essential.

THE ROLE OF THE SA NAVY IN THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA


Considering the role of the Navy in the new South Africa one must take a viewpoint rooted in a classical approach to a 'normalised' strategic situation. South Africa's maritime strategic situation is largely governed by the following factors:
  • It dominates a massive maritime area in the South Atlantic, the Indian Ocean and the Southern Ocean right down to Antarctica.
  • It has a coastline of about 3 000 km and its continental shelf and potential EEZ generate an enormous 'off-shore estate' (about one million square kilometers).
  • Its economy is extremely open and largely dependent on sea-borne trade. The preponderance of trade passes through Durban and Richards Bay.
  • It has a well developed fishing industry on which 100 000 people rely for a living.
  • Its neighbours are either land-locked, or are coastal states with limited internal communication and considerable dependence on sea-borne trade.
  • It has the only significant Navy in the region.
South Africa clearly has valuable maritime assets and interests whose defence and protection cannot be neglected. The means to ensure that this does not happen must be maintained and in order to allow for all eventualities, a balanced navy is called for.

The present Navy consists of the following:
  • A headquarters in Pretoria; main naval bases in Durban and Simon's Town; CF units in the other major ports (excluding Richards Bay and Walvis Bay) and a transportable logistic support system.
  • Two out of three submarines in commission. This is a deterrent force and it provides an offensive capability against enemy warships and trade.
  • Six out of nine strike craft in commission. This is an offensive capability against enemy warships, trade and territory.
  • Four out of eight mine countermeasure vessels in commission. This is a defensive capability to keep own harbours clear.
  • Two combat support vessels in commission. These are multi-role vessels.
  • One hydrographic survey vessel in commission.
  • There is a more than adequate reserve in the form of the Navy's CF and PF Reserve personnel.
Although small and lacking in certain important features, there is no doubt that the Navy is relatively well-balanced and has an operational reach well beyond its own waters. There are shortcomings, but they will be addressed later.

The Navy, with the forces at its disposal and with the assistance of the Air Force, has the ability to play an important peacetime role in support of the seaward functions of other state departments, notably the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Environmental Affairs, the Department of Transport and the Department of Justice. This includes most of what could be termed seaward COAST GUARD functions. This ability has repeatedly been proved, as a survey of the Navy's activities related to peacetime tasks over the past three years proves:*
  • Showing the Flag

    The Navy has called at 30 ports in 21 countries around the world.
  • Disaster relief

    Missions to 4 countries were carried out: Turkey, Bangladesh, Kenya and Mozambique.
  • Search and Rescue

    Five operations (assisting with the saving of more than 500 lives; this includes the OCEANOS rescue).
  • Fishery Protection

    Nine trawlers arrested. The Navy has also assisted the Namibian Government in apprehending fishing offenders in their waters.
  • Pollution Control

    None.
  • Customs and Excise

    One suspected narcotics carrier apprehended and handed over to the SA Police.
  • Combating of Piracy

    None.
  • Support of Scientific Programmes

    Two international operations.
  • Other

    Various missions, such as three to Antarctica, the upgrading of naval facilities in Zaire and the survey of historical wrecks off Robben Island.
The Navy is clearly heavily involved in a wide range of peacetime tasks. In fact, it is more active than ever before. In the first two months of 1993 alone, the Navy's survey vessel has undertaken a mission to Antarctica, a strike craft has been on a mercy mission to uplift an ill weather man from Gough Island and a fishing offender has been arrested off Richards Bay, while a task force consisting of a submarine, three strike craft and a combat support ship, has been showing the flag and conducting exercises in South America. There can be no doubt that the South African Navy is a very valuable asset and a most useful role-player in more than just the maritime sphere of the country's interests and activities.

It must be emphasised, however, that the Navy's primary role remains a military one, and its composition and capabilities must reflect that. While its basic role cannot change, its flexibility allows it to carry out whatever tasks it is presented with, including a wide range of peacetime tasks. Such tasks have the added advantage that they contribute to operational readiness: They are executed using the same command, control and communications systems and operational doctrines applied in wartime operations.

The design of the force structure must, therefore, always be aimed at the defence of the country and its maritime assets. In this regard the shortcomings in the current defensive force posture are:
  • An ASW capability.
  • A surface combat capability with greater sea-keeping qualities than the strike craft.
  • Maritime air reconnaissance and strike capability.
  • Multi-purpose maritime helicopters.
Some of these shortcomings are being addressed by current upgrade projects. They are:
  • Strike Craft Life Extension Programme

    This programme entails the replacement of the existing Action Information and Communications systems by new and improved systems, as well as extensive replacement at the subsystem level, to improve logistic supportability until 2005/2010.
  • Mine Sweeper Hull Rebuilding Programme

    The mine sweepers are being rebuilt from the keel up by replacing the planking. This is done at 10% of the cost of a new vessel and should give these reliable old maids of all work a new lease on life for up to 20 years.
  • Submarine Life Extension Programme

    Due to meticulous maintenance, their solid construction and good design, the submarine hulls are still in excellent condition. The life extension programme is aimed mainly at onboard systems. It entails the upgrading of the Action Information, the weapons and the communications systems. These vessels should remain operational until at least 2005.
  • New Surface Combat Ship

    The definition and acquisition of a new surface combat ship remains our most urgent requirement.
    • It is imperative that we obtain the necessary funding to launch this project as soon as possible because it can take as long as five to eight years before first delivery.
    • Because of the cost of new ships we will of necessity keep our requirement modest. Our aim is to utilise existing systems as well as systems presently under development, to keep costs down.
  • Maritime Patrol Aircraft

    The Air Force is currently upgrading a limited number of their Dakotas to maritime patrol configuration. This will certainly improve our position with regard to maritime air patrol but will still only be a limited ability considering the area that we are dealing with.
  • Expertise

    Expertise is the sum total of people, knowledge, skills and experience. It has been one of the Navy's strong points over the years. The Navy has maintained and developed expertise in order to ensure operational readiness, good upkeep and safety. Expertise makes the Navy the valuable asset that it is. Training capabilities have been improved over many years and are aimed and directed at particular vessels and systems in service, in other words, unique to the South African Navy. It cannot be emphasised strongly enough that there is no such thing as general naval training when aiming to be professional. People sent to foreign institutions for training, by organisations other than the SADF, to fill positions of responsibility within the Navy, would still be required to undergo local training, i.e. training directed at our unique situation and requirements. They will have to sit every exam and board in force in the Navy, just as everyone else has. There are no short cuts.

THE NAVY AND POLITICS

The Navy is proud of its neutral political stance and its reputation for racial tolerance. The Navy is also proud of the fact that it started preparing for the new South Africa as long as 25 years ago, in 1968, when the recruiting of Whites only ceased. A political decision continued barring Blacks from the Navy until 1990. The first two Black officers graduated from the Naval College last year. As elsewhere in the SADF, the Navy's policy is equal treatment as far as appointment and promotion are concerned. Discrimination is frowned upon and should it become apparent, steps are taken to counter it.

It is the intention to keep the Navy politically neutral - to serve the country and its people. The Navy will strive to rectify the imbalance in racial composition, but the support of the entire South African society is needed.

What is required from politicians is an interest in the Navy and an understanding of naval/maritime issues as well as their active support of efforts to ensure the long-term survival of the Navy.

CONCLUSION


The final design of the Navy depends on the value South Africa places on its interests, objectives and ambitions. South Africa's maritime interests are extensive and revolve mainly around the vital role trade plays in the open South African economy. It revolves around the degree to which South Africa sees itself as a regional power - in all respects - economically, industrially, politically and militarily.

South Africa has a small but reasonably structured, well prepared Navy with an operational reach well beyond its own waters. It is an asset not only as a deterrent, but also as an instrument for rendering assistance during peace time.

Through the Navy, South Africa has the ability to:
  • maintain its sovereignty and territorial integrity;
  • maintain maritime communications to a reasonable degree (ASW and long-range efforts excluded);
  • protect its marine resources;
  • help maintain maritime communications and protect the marine resources of neighbouring countries; and
  • represent the countries of Southern Africa in their regional claims (present or future) to the resources in the South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, Southern Ocean and Antarctica.
In the Navy, South Africa has a multi-faceted jewel. It can contribute enormously to the security, stability and prosperity of South and Southern Africa. During peace time it has an invaluable multi-role capability. It alone can ensure that the vast ocean reaches to the east, west and south do not become a strategic vacuum. It is an instrument of strategy which the State would neglect only at its long-term peril. To quote Michael Howard:
Ships and their armament have to be serviced, deployed and fought by highly trained, highly skilled and highly disciplined officers and men. The building-up of an efficient, reliable and operational navy is a very hard slog.
The role of the Navy does not change because South Africa is changing. It remains essentially a military force which has as its raison d'etre the protection of our maritime assets. The emphasis, however, changes as circumstances change. In these times of peace the Navy has to:
  • train to remain operationally prepared; and
  • help promote all possible interests of the state.
The fact that there is no immediate conventional threat, implies that the emphasis in the Navy's role has changed to assistance operations in support of other state departments, such as Foreign Affairs, Environmental Affairs and Transport, while maintaining its military readiness. In this regard the Navy has proved time and again its usefulness as a flexible, ready and economical role player in the country's portfolio of maritime assets.

In a new South Africa the Navy can and should play a major role in Nation Building. The Navy has the training infrastructure, the discipline and a universal tradition within which large numbers of the youth of South Africa could be moulded and educated.

The Navy has a further responsibility to plan for and ensure its continued existence as a credible naval force. To this end more funds are required to ensure its survival. It is vital that a programme be launched to replace its ageing hulls, particularly those of the surface combat ships.

Finally, I would like to use this opportunity to extend an invitation to all movements, groups and organisations that are training people overseas to fill posts in the Navy in the new South Africa. Those people are welcome in the Navy now, but the Navy requires that they be politically neutral, that they be willing to undergo its training and that they meet its requirements.

Let us all make a contribution towards a common aim: to provide our country with a fine, well structured, operationally prepared, technologically up-to-date and politically neutral, professional Navy.

ENDNOTE

* Notable peace time operations in recent times are as follows:
  1. International Assistance

    i) Assisting the Zaire government in upgrading naval base facilities on the Zaire river (August/September 1990).

    ii) Participating in international research on the extent of global warming (January/February 1991).

    iii) Delivering food, goods and medical supplies to Kurdish refugees in Turkey and to flood victims in Bangladesh on behalf of the Islamic Relief Agency of South Africa in July/September 1991.

    iv) Shipping 700 tons of emergency relief aid to Mombassa on behalf of the Africa Muslim Agency (AMA) at the request of the Department of Foreign Affairs (September 1992).
  2. Other Assistance Operations

    i) Retrieving a Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) helicopter stranded on the ice in Antarctica. At the same time a stranded German helicopter was retrieved and nine German scientists were returned from Bouvet Island (January/February 1991).

    ii) Assisting the SA AGULHAS which had damaged her rudder in Antarctica. In this operation SAS DRAKENSBERG became the first Navy vessel to proceed further south than 54 degrees South latitude (February 1992).

    iii) Assisting the DEA to erect a new weather station on Marion Island whilst simultaneously exchanging scientific teams (March 1992).

    iv) Surveying historical wrecks off Robben Island - a continuing operation.
  3. Search and Rescue Operations.

    Search and rescue is very much a part of life at sea. The most noteworthy rescue operation in recent years is of course the OCEANOS rescue. Six Navy divers were awarded the Honoris Crux medal for bravery for their participation in this operation.
  4. Operations to Enforce the Authority of the State

    Operations of this nature are constantly carried out. Most of them involve Fishing Zone transgressions. Examples are the eight operations to apprehend fishing offenders in our own waters since June 1990, as well as the operation to assist the Namibian Government in apprehending three Spanish trawlers fishing illegally in their waters (March 1991).
  5. Hydrographic Operations

    The survey vessel, SAS PROTEA, attended the Biennial Conference of the International Hydrographic Organisation (IHO) in Monaco during 1992. An agreement has also been reached with the Mozambican Government whereby she will survey their seaward borders.