A Response to Simpson-Anderson


In his paper Chief of the Navy has given us a very clear background on the factual situation regarding the SA Navy both present and historical. Naturally by virtue of his position he is limited in what he can say about the political/emotional aspects. I would like to touch on a few of these aspects that can affect the future of our navy.

First is the fact that the navy, of all the Arms of Service in the SADF, has been hit by far the hardest by defence cuts. The result has been to bring the navy back to roughly where it was 25 years ago, at a stage where its function, unlike that of, for example, the army and the general staff, is arguably increasing in importance rather than declining. This raises the question why the navy has been hit so hard.

In his opening remarks Chief of the Navy stated that, notwithstanding these cuts the navy had managed to maintain 'short term operational efficiency'. Although this is most commendable, it needs to be stressed that this has only been achieved by placing the long term operational efficiency, if not the sheer survival of the navy, at risk. For this we cannot blame the navy, since as I well know, the situation was forced upon them.

Chief of the Navy has also shown how the navy has recently developed its perceived roles in terms of the needs of the new South Africa. I support the conclusions but would like to place a slightly different perspective on how these roles have developed. The true value of sea power was ably demonstrated in our waters during the Anglo Boer War, when the Royal Navy, without firing a shot in anger at sea but merely by its presence in our waters, played a major strategic role. Without this dominance of the seas the British could not have landed the large land forces they needed in South Africa, nor could they have so effectively discouraged other nations from giving support to the Boer forces.

One result of this was that our political and military leaders, encouraged by Britain, accepted that we could not compete with them, and as the British Royal Navy would always be there, we did not really need a Navy of our own.

This attitude remained very prevalent in the minds of South Africa's political and military leaders until as late as the 1950s, by which stage the British were going out of their way to encourage the development of a local navy.

Naturally in doing this they ensured that their own requirements were met. Thus, although there were the advantages which Chief of the Navy has pointed out, there were also very distinct disadvantages.

For example, until the 1970s the role of our navy remained largely that of a small anti-submarine/mine clearance force structured to fit in with a larger fleet as part of any wartime naval force required by NATO in the South Atlantic area. It was thus also that the well known Silvermine communications and command and control complex was built in the Cape Peninsular, Durban and Walvis Bay. This whole system was designed to support a large NATO fleet rather than the very small maritime (naval and air) forces available to South Africa.

All this was motivated by our wish to retain our 'window into NATO' and to protect the 'Cape Sea Route', both of which aims, everyone seemed to forget (in the general euphoria of 'friendship'), were in NATO's rather than South Africa's interests. One of the few things which we did achieve in our own interests during this period was the introduction of a Submarine Service.

Nevertheless, sanctions and South Africa's isolation ended this 'window into NATO' rather abruptly in the 1970s, leaving the SA Navy with ships and infra-structure not really suited to their own requirements. At the same time two of the psychological hang-ups from our long association with the RN were:
  • South Africans, with the exception of the small number of people in the maritime community, still retained the belief that we did not really need a navy.
  • In the navy, as a result of our training and experiences, the belief remained that we needed to be able to compete technologically and in individual ship weapons with the best in the Russian Navy, when in reality we needed hard-working, durable patrol vessels.
When we add to this the fact that during the 'Border War', all budgets were based on the threat perceptions of land oriented senior staff, and that no compliant enemy was prepared to set up a credible local naval opposition near enough at hand for it to be perceived as a direct threat to South Africa, the navy struggled for survival. During this period the SADF staff divisions grew in both strength and power. They, rather than Chiefs of the Arms of Service, began to decide on what could and what could not be bought. This had further implications for the navy, where senior members of this staff, with limited naval background, perceived themselves to be the arbiters of what the navy needed, rather than the navy itself.

Typical of this aspect is the recent controversy regarding an alleged statement by a senior staff officer implying that a decision on whether or not we need a navy would be made at SADF staff level. Although the content of this statement was immediately repudiated by the Minister of Defence himself, and has been widely commented on in the press, I am concerned that we all seem to accept the implied suggestion that decisions of this nature be made behind closed doors by the general staff. It is time that we as the public of South Africa insist that such decisions be made in parliament after full and open debate. Is it not also time that the defence budget actually be debated in parliament, rather than be presented by the defence staff?

If we believe that South Africa DOES need a navy, and we support Chief of the Navy in the need to fulfill the roles he has spelt out today, then let us not remain silent on these matters.