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A Response to Till
I am neither a military specialist, nor a strategic analyst, and shall rather confine myself to taking up a couple of the themes raised by Professor Till and floating an idea or two.
For American scholar Francis Fukuyama, the wave of democratization sweeping the globe in the late twentieth century signaled 'the end of history'. That is to say the victory of, broadly speaking, liberal democracy over its ideological and political rivals heralded the apogee of human political development.1 And indeed the tectonic events of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in the late 1980s has left the prescripts of Marxist socialism as a large footnote in the annals of political history.
The political and military corollary of this victory for capitalism/liberalism and western technology, is that for the first time in modern history (or in Fukuyama's terms I suppose post-history) a single nation state, the United States, stands unchallenged militarily, politically and indeed ideologically.
There are, and seem unlikely to be, any significant challenges and challengers to US hegemony for a generation to come.
But as Professor Till mentioned, the paradox of this overwhelming and decisive victory for the West, and the United States in particular is the huge and possibly debilitating uncertainty this has heralded for military planners, and of course, naval planners included.
Politically, the victory won by the West and the United States has given rise to the expectation and indeed the necessitation of a peace dividend. This is the cheque the electorate of western democracies wish to cash in the currency of peace of mind as manifest in the removal of the nuclear threat, renewed optimism about global development, but most obviously has as its most tangible demand a significant reduction in arms expenditure.
The victory of Mr Bill Clinton in November last year had much to do with the American electorate demanding its slice of the peace dividend which it perceived it was unlikely to receive under the foreign and domestic policy orientation of a Bush administration.
The maintenance then of a massively expensive military capacity built up during the Reagan/Bush years is rapidly appearing to be a grotesque monument to a bygone era of Cold War and its attendant strategies and expenditures.
But wait, before we mothball all our Tridents, battleships and carriers, is Fukuyama right in his analysis? My reply to that question echoes that of Mao Zaidong when asked if he felt the French Revolution was a success. 'It's too soon to tell', he replied.
Taking our lead from Brzezinski,2 we can identify four structural dilemmas which have to play themselves out before we can determine with any accuracy the permanency of both Fukuyama's prediction and, more importantly for our purposes, whether or not the end of the Cold War will result in global peace or acute chaos thereby, determining the future of our navies.
The first is how Europe will define itself during the next decade. How inclusive and how deep will European unity become, and what are the implications for global security? Will a unified Europe lead to greater or decreased global security? And what would the US favour?
Second is the worrying question of the outcome of the transformation of the former Soviet Union. Will this be a troubled but progressive trajectory leading to a stable commonwealth of states or will the historical and nascent strains of both the Soviet Union and the Russian empire tear the fragile process apart with all the implications this would have for European security and the nightmare scenario of unchecked nuclear proliferation?
The third question seriously pondered by military planners is how will the pacific region organise itself? Professor Till touched on this and it would seem that a host of countries in this region look certain to acquire the military and, in particular, naval capacity and infrastructure commensurate with an emerging middle order power and then some.
Finally, the fragility of the Middle East peace process seems likely to continue to keep the world to political and military ransom, but is a variable critical to any military planning calculation we may attempt.
Should any one of these scenarios "turn sour" for the West a whole host of political and military contingencies could emerge which could threaten global peace and security.
The conceptual and political problem with these scenarios is that they are just that, scenarios. They are difficult to conceive of and even more difficult to plan for. Politically, the problem of selling military budgetary proposals on the strength of these scenarios to any government is an unenviable task.
The picture for naval planners is opaque and should they be unable to present a coherent (even if flexible) strategic plan to political leaders and decision makers, naval forces could find themselves either militarily or politically redundant, or both, almost by default.
There exist, however, and (Professor Till has identified some of them), emerging areas of global concern which, whilst difficult to sell to political decision-makers, are more certain to occur and factor into naval planning in the future.
There appear to be three global trends we could use with some degree of assuredness upon which to plan.
Firstly, global bloc economic competition. The post cold war world is rapidly crystallising into three economic and trading regions: the European Community which has extended the economic rationale to political propinquity, the proposed North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) region, and the vital and vibrant pacific rim countries, and here China will be the emerging Joker in the pack.
There is no doubt that as global economic competition becomes more acute the role of naval forces in defending, protecting and furthering those interests will become critical. The re-flagging of Kuwaiti tankers by the US and the escort and support role played by the US and Royal Navy is the most obvious manifestation of this role in recent time.
The second critical area unfolding in the post Cold War era, and indeed one which has emerged largely as a result of the dissipation of the tight bi-polar system from which we are emerging, is the phenomenon of acute ethno-national and regional conflict. Whilst such conflicts may well have territorial and economic claims and disputes at root and therefore demand political solution, the peace-keeping role demanded of the international community and the necessity of military intervention therein can only be successfully achieved by the integrated application of a considerable sea-lift, carrier and amphibious capacity.
There are at least two problems attendant on this issue. the only navy with such a capacity is that of the US and this gives rise to questions of both political will on the part of the US and indeed its avowed aversion to playing the role of international policemen. US intervention in the whole panoply of ethno-national and regional disputes would be both practically impossible and politically suicidal. The recent events in war-torn Somalia bear testimony to the tenuous nature of domestic support for even friendly or benign intervention. Somalia is a country which has no state.
The need then exists for regional naval co-operation and alliance-building in order to satisfy the claims of both domestic budgetary thrift and considerations of sustainable collective security.
The final point is again global in nature and is a call for international and regional co-operation, but more importantly in my view, a call for the urgent consideration of the establishment of a comprehensive integrated and multi-disciplinary United Nations Naval Peace Keeping Force.
This proposal holds a number of distinct advantages. Firstly such a formation at the level of planning, hardware, personnel, and task orientation would serve to weld together senior officers of, for example, the aforementioned economic and regional blocs. Such a force would also serve to integrate members of navies from the countries of the "South" who otherwise appear to set to suffer increasing marginalisation from any future network of global security. The interaction with an international peace-keeping force may well have considerable domestic benefits in inculcating responsible and democratic practices within the military from which they are drawn.
Secondly, peace keeping and peace making under such an integrated naval force would grant to such operations a legitimacy which neither the US nor any other single coalition could achieve. The political minefield tread by the US led forces in operation Desert Storm vis-a-vis the Arab world is a case in point. Naval operations carried out under the auspices of UN resolutions would, by definition, carry with them the seal of approval of the international community. This would result in a united and, more importantly, integrated approach to the solution of national and regional conflicts.
The emerging question of global and environmental degradation makes the question of sea-bed resource exploitation, fishing rights and delimitation of the outer limits of national jurisdiction areas which are set to become contested in the 21st century. Whilst not quite challenging historical and conventional claims to sovereignty, a United Nations naval presence, both in terms of conflict avoidance and conflict resolution, should be given very serious consideration.
The structuring of a powerful United National naval peace-making and peace-keeping force could at the same time address the flood of naval hardware to Third World states. It could itself absorb some surplus capacity floating about the oceans and naval dockyards of the world.
A UN naval force would be constructed in such a way as to offer rotating commands as is the practice in committees of the UN and officers with regional expertise would be seconded to command or operate in a particular geo-political environment. This would enhance the prospects of a truly global security network with naval forces playing a central role.
Whilst one accepts the major problems facing the formation of such a UN Naval Force it would seem that the prevailing correlation of forces combined with budgetary limitations and global uncertainty warrant serious consideration.
REFERENCES
- Francis Fukuyama. The End of History and the Last Man, New York, The Free Press, 1922, pp 90-99.
- Zbigniew Brzezinski. The Consequences of the End of the Cold War for International Security. IISS, Adelphi Papers no 265, Part 1, Winter 1991/1992
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