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A New Maritime Force for South Africa
I believe it is essential to debate this matter because the following developments have drastically altered the scenario within which such a maritime force exists:
- The sudden and spectacular collapse of the USSR.
- The resulting world disorder.
- The termination of South African military involvement in Angola/Namibia.
- South Africa's emergence from isolation and her future leadership role in southern Africa.
- Increasing public awareness and concern over environmental issues, particularly those relating to the sea.
- The need to devote maximum national resources to social upliftment and welfare and stimulation of economic growth.
- The resurgence of piracy and world-wide increases in smuggling of arms, drugs and other contraband.
- The prospect, in the next century, of having to turn to the sea as the last major source of food and energy, as population growths outstrip the ability of the land to provide.
As if that were not enough, there remains the reality of our dependance on the sea for 90% of our foreign trade, our nearly 1 000 000 square kilometers of territorial waters and fishing zones, and our 2 500 km maritime borders. Despite these factors South Africa has never adopted a coherent maritime policy, much less formulated a maritime strategy nor defined the part which her maritime forces would be called upon to play.
Lastly, resulting from the lack of a maritime policy, we have a situation in which several government departments and maritime affairs, and operate vessels in the execution of those responsibilities. This results in a less than optimum utilisation of resources.
DISCUSSION
Throughout this paper I distinguish quite deliberately, between a maritime force and a navy. The Navy would be the main component of a maritime force, but by no means the only one. In my view the maritime force should consist of the total assets availabel for the execution of the maritime strategy. These include aircraft and ships of agencies other than the Navy.
TYPES OF MARITIME FORCES
Maritime forces take various forms. At one end of the spectrum are the ocean-going navies such as the USN, while at the other end are the little groups of motor boats which are euphemistically referred to as navies or coastguards. The latter are able to operate only in comparatively sheltered inshore waters, and are irrelevant to this discussion.
Between these extremes are the contiguous sea navies, such as our own, capable of operations in neighbouring waters, and even the deep sea under certain conditions, and the coastal navy which is essentially confined to its own coastal waters. Our own Navy is in the Contiguous category at present.
THE NEED
Do we need a maritime force? I believe that taking into consideration the factors listed earlier, there can be no doubt that some form of maritime force is indeed required. The question is rather, 'What should the size and shape of that force be?'.
THE ROLES
Prof. Ken Booth in his book Navies and Foreign Policy argues that navies have three fundamental roles, namely:
- Military
- Policing
- Diplomatic
The Military Role: This is the classic role of the defence of the Homeland and the national maritime interests. By the nature of things it is the most demanding role, in terms of technology, quality of ships and equipment and standards of training and maintenance.
The Policing Role: This role is often viewed in a very simplistic way. The functions inherent in this concept go further than what is generally viewed as policing. I believe that a better description is 'Service Rendering', or, as R Adm J.R. Hill puts it in his book Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers, the 'Constabulary Role'. Countering pollution, salvage, search and rescue fall under this heading.
The Diplomatic Role: This refers to the unique ability of maritime forces to exert pressure, manipulate, support and project prestige, all without crossing borders, or violating airspace.
Lastly, when considering these roles, it must be understood that when planning maritime force levels, the military role is the primary consideration. However, in peace time the priority of the roles may change quite frequently, with the diplomatic and policing roles tending to dominate the actual employment of the operational units. This is perfectly legitimate and indeed desirable, provided that the fundamental war-fighting skills and capabilities are maintained by means of adequate training and equipment.
THE PRIMARY ROLE OF SOUTH AFRICAN MARTIMIME FORCES
The military role must continue to form the basis of our planning for the maritime forces. Do I hear the inevitable cry, 'What is the threat?'. Let us get our thinking straight on the 'Threat'.
THE THREAT
R Adm Hill, whom I referred to above, puts into words what I have felt for some time, 'Starting with the threat, is a staff college short cut of dubious validity. Its effect on strategic thought is to invite numerous assumptions about the identity, nature and objectives of the opposition, when analysis would be more beneficial. Applied to tactics, it is inclined to instil defensive and reactive ideas. All to often it is unrelated... to the interests being protected or the national objectives being pursued.' I have also observed that it frequently results in forces finding themselves ill prepared for the nature of the conflict which they eventually find themselves fighting.
I am not denying that the threat must be addressed, especially if there is a clearly identifiable threat developing or already on you doorstep. Indeed, the more imminent that threat is, the more permissible it becomes to tailor your strategy and your force planning to meet it.
Thus it was that in the South African context, because the Angola/Namibia conflict was perceived as overwhelmingly land based, the Navy's share of the defence budget was steadily reduced, from a high of about 17% in 1977, to its present 7%.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the resulting disappearance of the comfortable and predictable rationale of counting Soviet expansion, many nations are in the position of having to go back to the drawing board. As always occurs after a conflict has been resolved, cries go up from political opportunists to cut back, dismantle, or otherwise emasculate the armed forces., If taken to the point where basic capabilities are sacrificed on the altar of expediency, this is seriously misguided.
It is my contention that since the end of the cold war, and the diappearnce of the spectre of nuclear Armageddon, the world has become a significantly more dangerous and unpredictable place, especially for the smaller nations. The news media shows us a world in turmoil and disorder.
Adm Sir John Woodward, who you will remember commanded the British forces during the Falklands war, summed it up: 'Lesser wars seem more likely in the absence of the Superpower confrontation, and our experience tells us that a major threat can emerge from virtually nowhere in under three years.'
In the absence of a clearly identifiable threat we have to plan for maximum flexibility, so that when a threat does eventuate, as it inevitalby will, we will be well placed to deal with it. We should bear in mind that under the most favourable scenario, at least five years are needed from inception to the availability for battle for a new naval unit. Under conditions where the basic capability has been lost, and has to be reactivated from scratch, we are talking about seven to ten years.
Adm Sir Julian Oswald has this to say in Maritime Power - The Indispensable Dimension: 'Of the many occasions since WW II when British armed forces were committed outside the NATO area, in support of our national interests, most were unexpected, but were met successfully by drawing from a balanced overall force structure.'
THE BALANCED FORCE
Balance is the key. A balanced force at National level is one which incorporates, as far as possible, the full spectrum of military capabilities, so that no matter what type of conflict arises, you are able to responmd appropriately. Alternatively, the limited, basic capability you possess can be expanded relatively quickly to meet the threat.
Interestingly enough the SADF has always proclaimed the principle of the balanced force. However, in practice it has never paid more than lip service to the concept. I do not believe that a force structure where two of the fighting services absorb some 80% of the defence budget, while the third receives 7%, can by any stretch of the imagination, be called 'balanced.'
If the SADF is to become a truly balanced force, the maritime component therof must be liberated from its Cinderella status, and given the wherewithal to take its proper place, alongside its sister services, as an equal partner.
A BALANCED MARITIME FORCE
The concept of balance does not end at the defence force level. It must also be reflected in the composition of the maritime force itself.
This implies that in terms of basic capabilities it must incorporate the following: (Figures in brackets indicate present order of battle)
- Surface warfare. (9)
- Sub-surface warfare. (3)
- Mine warfare - including both minelaying and mine countermeasure capabilities. (4+4)
- Anti-submarine warfare. (-)
- Amphibious warfare. (-)
- Maritime Air patrol. (?)
- Replenishment at sea/Logistic support. (2)
IMBALANCES
Anti-Submarine Warfare: South Africa's anti-submarine capabilities were lost with the withdrawal form service of the last of the Type 12 frigates in the mid 1980's. Not long after, the Shackelton long range maritime patrol aircraft were also withdrawn, leaving the maritime force with no ability whatsoever to locate, track or counter submarines. This represented the loss of a basic capability which must be restored. The only practical way to achieve this is for the new surface combatants to be ASW capable
Maritime Air Patrol: In order to redress the lack of maritime air capabilities, the SAAF's upgraded DC-3s must be made available as quickly as possible and at a minimum provided with search radar and sonar-buoy launching and monitoring equipment. They should be given an ASW weapon delivery capability, no matter how crude it may have to be.
Eventually, when finances permit, there is no doubt that we will have to acquire aircraft capable of true long range maritime patrol. Due to costs these aircraft will probably have to be a suitably modified version of, e.g. the ubiquitous C-130. Failing this we will not be able to fulfil our search and rescue obligations to mariners and aviators in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, nor will we be able to adequately monitor activities in our EEZ.
Amphibious Warfare: This capability was established during the short existence of the Marine Branch. Because it was realised that it would have to be limited in scope, it was based on acquiring only the basic doctrines and expertise. For this purpose the replenishment vessel, SAS Tafelberg, was given the facilities to launch small landing craft, and selected marines were trained in beach landing techniques, beach master functions and securing beach heads.
It was foreseen that the bulk of the troops in any landing would be from Army units. The cross-training of a suitable unit such as a parachute battalion was not expected to be problematic.
Obviously we are not talking about Iwo Jima, or even Falkland Sound. Any landing attemted would have to be unopposed, and the employment of this capability was seen as essentially to enable the Army to outflank strong points, carry out surprise Amphibious Demonstrations. It was felt that the prospect of large scale coastal raids would be most unwelcome and for a small price, would exact a disproportionate response from an already overextended opponent. I remain of the opinion that this basic capability can be maintained at little cost, and that it should not be allowed to disintegrate.
Order of Battle: The remainder for the order of battle is as much as we can hope for, given the limitations of funds. If the ships and submarines are well maintained and given life extension programs, we will be adequately served for the short to medium term. However, it is essential that replacement programs for the ageing surface combatants and submarines be implemented without delay.
I have made no reference to Hydrographic Survey. This is quite deliberate. I do not consider this function to be part of the Military Role of our maritime forces.
THE SECONDARY ROLES OF THE MARITIME FORCE
These are the Diplomatic and Service Rendering (Policing) roles.
The Diplomatic Role: Is a national public relations function executed by naval means. In this context a warship is like a window on a nation. It demonstrates the technological status of the nation, and the quality, educational levels and proficiency of the population. Through the contacts with her personnel ashore, a degree of trust , respect and rapport is established with the local population.
One cannot visit another nation by driving a mechanized column across its border, nor would a visit by a squadron of aircraft be appropriate. Given the inevitability of South Africa's leadership position in southern Africa, this is a role which it would be extremely shortsighted to shortchange.
One should also bear in mind the turmoil and chaos which has much of Africa in its grip. South Africa could well find itself facing the same challenge as that with which Nigeria, as the leading power in West Africa, was recently confronted. Nigeria found herself virtually obliged to take the initiative in assembling, deploying and supporting the joint military operation in Liberia, to restore law and order, and quell the civil war in that country.
This role does not require any special additions to the present order of battle, which is seen as adequate for the task.
The Service Rendering Role (Policing/Constabulary): This role deserves careful attention, since it is the one for which, for the foreseeable future, the maritime force is best placed to be a major player. As I have emphasised earlier, this role does not supplant the military role as the PRIMARY role, but in peace time can certainly become the PRIORITY role.
There are many areas in which the maritime force can make a major, and in some cases indispensable contribution. To mention a few:
- Law enforcement - countering piracy, hijacking, smuggling, illegal immigration, illegal practices such as gill netting, and discharge of pollutants.
- Post-pollution clean up operations.
- Fisheries control.
- Hydrography.
- Search and rescue.
- Monitoring mineral prospecting and exploitation.
In my opinion the Maritime forces of South Africa could render and even greater public service, by assuming responsibility for the execution of all these functions. This country is not in a position to afford less than optimum usage of the limited seagoing assets which it has at its disposal.
The dozen or so vessels presently operated by other departments and Provincial authorities, should be placed under the operational control of the Navy. In this way we could begin to create the next best thing to a full-blooded coastguard organization.
Under the Naval umbrella, utilizing the extensive 24 hour-a-day command, control and communications facilities available to the maritime forces, the needs could be continuously reviewed and priorities reallocated. This would result in a much more effective service being rendered to all interested parties, while the policy-making responsibilities of the departments concerned remain untouched.
Ultimately, the logical way to achieve real economies and optimum performance, in this area, would be for the Navy to absorb the maintenance, administration and operation of these craft. However, in order that no over-hasty decisions are taken, we should limit ourselves firstly to the initial step.
At the National Maritime Conference held during April 1991 Professor D.J. Devine, in his paper Law enforcement in maritime zones, had this to say on this specific subject: 'What is missing however, in my view, is an agency which would have an overall or umbrella power to enforce all South African laws at sea. The individual law enforcers would then have the possibility of requesting help from the umbrella agency when they experience difficulty with their own law enforcement. The umbrella agency would in effect act like a kind of coastguard - though of course it would not be necessary to designate it as such. It would appear to me that the South African Navy would perhaps be the ideal agency fulfilling an umbrella role in law enforcement across the board.'
CONCLUSION
South Africa does need a maritime force.
- Its design should be based on the military role.
- It should be a balanced, flexible force.
- For the immediate future the policing and diplomatic roles should enjoy priority in execution.
- In order to capitalize on the existing sea-going assets of the state, they should all be placed under the operational control of the maritime forces.
RECOMMENDATIONS
- In designing the future capabilities of our maritime forces, balance and flexibility be the watchwords, rather than seeking nebulous threats.
- The present absurd disparity between the budgetary allocations of the Navy and the other fighting services be corrected without delay.
- The lack of ASW assets be addressed by the incorporation of this capability in surface combatant replacement programs.
- The number of upgraded DC-3s allocated to the maritime forces be expanded, and that a means to equip them with sonar-buoy monitoring equipment and means of delivering an ASW weapon, be pursued.
- The hard-won amphibious expertise of the Navy be maintained.
- The maritime forces elevate the secondary role of service rendering to first priority.
- All the deverse sea-going assets of the state be placed under the operational control of the South African Navy for maximum effectivity.
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