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A Response to Simpson-Anderson
Restructuring the Armed Forces
The demise of the Cold War, a perceptible shift in regional Southern African relations, and the progress of the present transition are all impacting upon the South African military debate in a profound and specific manner.
Issues that will require critical attention during the transition will include the proposed redefinition of the national security terrain; a realistic assessment of the military threats facing a post-settlement South Africa; the organizational culture of a future Defence Force; its mission; strategic doctrine; regional role; a redefinition of its military professionalism to include a strong moral component; the nature of a future manpower procurement policy; and, as this paper attempts to highlight, the relationship between the different arms of a future Defence Force.
The role of the South African Navy will constitute an important variable in any future defence dispensation. For a variety of reasons outlined below, it is suggested that a future Navy assume greater responsibility within the respective spheres of seaward military services, and future coast guard functions. The thrust of my remarkS is to outline certain strategic options which should be considered when determining the changing role of the South African Navy.
NOT LOSING SIGHT OF THE PRIMARY MISSION: THE NATURE OF A FUTURE THREAT SCENARIO
The current mission of the South African Navy is 'To provide seaward military services' (Woodburne, Paratus, June 1991, pp 4-6). This, it is stated, constitutes a broadening of its original defensive function and is realized through 'the development, management and maintenance of an ability to supply the following: Maritime Operations; Assistance and Support Operations: Hydrographic Services' (SADF Review, MIB, 1991, p 295). The pre-1990 mission of the South African Navy, however, stated its primary mission as being 'Firstly, the destruction of enemy naval forces and, secondly, the support of the landward battle' (SADF Review, MIB, 1990, p 121).
Whilst this redefinition of the South African Navy's role is understandable in light of the changing international, regional and domestic threat scenario, it appears that the Navy's primary mission (surely the rationale for its existence) has been sacrificed at the altar of generality. In the absence of a clearly defined threat scenario and the formulation of the primary mission based upon this scenario, it will be difficult to justify the retention of the Navy as a military deterrent rather than as a coast guard function. Forces are designed with their primary missions in mind - secondary missions are, in a sense, either bonuses or liabilities depending on the circumstances pertaining in a particular force employment scenario. What then are the parameters of the present 'negative threat' scenario confronting South Africa, and to what extent can we deduce the primary mission of the Navy from this configuration?
The process of constructing an appropriate force from a consideration of a threat scenario is a highly idealistic exercise. In reality, the determination of force structure, force levels, force development and force planning is deduced from a range of additional, more pragmatic, factors. The final form and mission of the armed forces is, more often than not, determined by a host of contesting political considerations; the institutional interests of the different military actors involved; the impact of personalities on the restructuring process; and sheer economic 'good sense' - the economic impact of suddenly demobilizing large numbers of men and women. Nevertheless the 'threat scenario - force design' route is an appropriate starting point.
At an international level it is clear that South Africa does not face at present and is unlikely to face in the future, a maritime threat. The navies of South America, although mostly larger than the present South African Navy, have neither the capacity nor predisposition to launch a maritime assault against Southern African shores. The Pacific nations, Australia and India in particular, could also be included in this latter category (despite a rather bizarre theory that India has expansionist ambitions within Southern Africa!). As for the remaining Western powers, whose navies certainly do possess the capability of launching an attack on South African sovereignty, such scenarios appear unlikely. The end of the Cold War and the immense logistical costs entailed in such an operation render it remote (and would render such an operation costly, given the considerable guerrilla warfare experience possessed by South Africans themselves!).
The regional threat scenario is effectively non-existent - whether considered in landward or seaward terms. The navies of the Southern African region do not constitute a threat in terms of equipment, force levels or range. Indeed future regional scenarios will tend towards co-operation rather than conflict. Sub-Saharan African powers such as Nigeria would be similarly disinclined towards naval action against South Africa. Possessing a fleet similar in size to South Africa's, but lacking both the range and logistical support infrastructure, such actions would be practically impossible.
Within the scenario outlined above, the question needs to be asked 'Why retain a Navy for military maritime purposes?'. A number of issues need to be problematized before answering this question:
- Despite the absence of an external threat, unexpected contingencies do not yet justify the deconstitution of armed forces or their capabilities in their entirety.
- However, the retention of present force levels, defence postures and doctrines need to be examined critically. A vast conceptual and strategic chasm exists between the recognition, on the one hand, of the need to maintain large, well-equipped and offensive navies because of the 'uncertainty' of present international relations, and the sobering reality, on the other, that no likely seaward threat exists. In essence, whilst naval capacities of some form must be maintained, scant justification exists for their maintenance on an offensive basis.
- Maritime responsibilities in general are not only the preserve of the present South African Navy. Many responsibilities are presently subsumed under other government departments, provincial administrations, local authorities and port authorities. A developing country can scarcely afford the duplication of functions entailed in such an arrangement, and a greater degree of rationalization is desirable. At present, the South African Navy is possibly best placed to co-ordinate most of these functions.
The above-mentioned observations provide us with a very general outline regarding the changing role of the South African Navy. Whilst its primary mission should remain intact, it should adopt a defensive maritime military posture. To provide a cost-effective service, the structures of the South African Navy should be used to co-ordinate coast guard functions in addition to their military maritime responsibilities.
What are the practical implications of this arrangement for the changing role of the South African Navy?
THE ROLE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN NAVY DURING BOTH THE TRANSITION AND IN THE FUTURE
The SA Navy is possibly the best situated of all four SADF arms of service to adapt to the current transition. It has responded in a creative manner to a range of new possibilities presented to it in the post-Cold War era (as testified to by the recent assistance it has provided to the different countries of the continent). A number of possibilities emerge in regard to its role:
- That it confine its mission to a largely defensive posture. With the exception of the submarine flotilla, the present organization of the SA Navy is predominantly defensive anyway. The temptation to procure certain categories of vessel - corvettes and destroyers for instance - may send the wrong signal to the region. Given the likelihood of regional security pacts emerging in the future, it is imperative that the SA Navy (possibly the major player in a naval regional pact) be responsive to and appreciative of regional sensibilities (and past experiences).
- The adoption of a defensive posture does not imply a lessening of the SA Navy's operational manoeuvrability. Tactical and operational flexibility and a defensive military posture are not mutually exclusive and the SA Navy's abilities in this regard should be enhanced.
- That naval military responsibilities and coast guard functions be reconciled and structurally integrated (where possible). This should not imply the militarization of civilian maritime functions, but rather their co-ordination and synthesis with the SA Navy's present command and control patterns. Maritime services that fall under a civilian department, for instance, can retain their civilian character and could possibly constitute a separate flotilla of the SA Navy.
- The retention of the submarine flotilla on its own will be difficult to justify to a region that has, on occasions, borne the brunt of its offensive capabilities (Beira, Luanda, Cabinda etc.). Suggestions that the flotilla be used in fisheries protection should also be critically examined. It is questionable whether the submarine flotilla is the best, or the cheapest, agency to execute this function. However, the prospects of a decommissioning flotilla also require critical examination. Can South Africa, or the region, afford the loss of an asset (which would take more than a decade to re-establish if decommissioned).
- The SA Navy should play a central role in the unfolding diplomatic initiatives that are taking place within the continent.
Considerable debate needs to take place with regard to the likely posture of a future Navy. Sadly, a high level of unilateral restructuring is taking place that does not consider possible future defence arrangements.
AGAINST UNILATERAL RESTRUCTURING: THE IMPROTANCE OF TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE DEFENCE DEBATE
A frequent call made by non-National Party and non-government quarters, is that the present incumbents of the state (or rather the dominant factions therein) desist from attempting to restructure the economic, political and institutional terrain in a unilateral manner. This is particularly applicable to present and future defence arrangements.
WHY ARE ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY DESIRABLE?
The benefits of 'accountability' and 'transparency' in the general sense are that they permit effective control over the activities of the armed forces and prevent an interventionist scenario from arising. However, a series of specific points can be made as to why both 'accountability' and 'transparency' are necessary and desirable in the current transition:
- They prevent small groups of decision-makers from making ill-advised, expensive and bad decisions.
- Lack of transparency prevents the public from making its voice heard on crucial national decisions.
- The concentration of decision-making in the hands of people with a vested interest in defence may witness the continuation of defence policies simply because they benefit these sectors.
- Defence decisions tend to satisfy military criterion. They do not examine the political, social and moral dimensions of force employment.
The pertinence of these points is evident when considered in relationship to the restructuring of the present SADF. Without due consideration of medium and long-term defence prospects, a national asset like the SA Navy is being slaughtered. The sooner some form of joint control and/or oversight is instituted over the restructuring of the armed forces, the greater the chances of a more effective utilization of these resources will be.
WHAT WILL A FUTURE DEFENCE FORCE LOOK LIKE AND WHAT WILL THE ROLE OF THE SA NAVY BE?
It is difficult to predict exactly what institutional form a future Defence Force will assume. However, the following features will almost certainly predominate:
- The SA Army will be withdrawn from its present internal urban counter-insurgency role and be confined to its primary mission - the preservation of the territorial sovereignty of the country. Given the fact that the SA Army's Conventional Forces have always been Citizen Force personnel (and this is certainly an arena where a future SA Army can provide some valuable reservist lessons to the region), the SA Army will (as in the past) remain largely reservist in composition. The reduction in size and responsibilities of the SA Army will therefore allow the other services to lobby more effectively for budgetary allocations.
- A future Defence Force will enter into a variety of regional security arrangements that will involve all arms of the service.
- The Defence Force will become more representative in composition and a synthesis of institutional cultures will emerge.
The SA Navy is well situated to realize the first two points above. With regard to regional security arrangements it has already entered into a series of de facto arrangements with the region and will undoubtedly be able to use its regional, continental and international contacts to develop and further entrench these arrangements. With regard to the third point above, the SA Navy constitutes possibly the most integrated arm of the SADF at present with a high level of social and racial integration existing in its seaward functions.
Certain sectors of the present SA Army can be expected to lobby intensively for the retention of an internal urban counter-insurgency role for the SA Army. Considering the extent to which present SADF operational costs are used to justify the SA Army's present police supportive role, this is not an encouraging prospect. However, a strong argument can be made for the withdrawal of the Army from this role for military, political and practical reasons.
Not only does the continued deployment of the SA Army in a police-supportive role entail its further politicization but it will considerably undermine the legitimacy of a future Defence Force. Secondly, the SA Army should ideally confine itself to its traditional brief - a process that will certainly liberate its funds for the other needy areas of the Defence Force. Furthermore, the country needs uncontentious symbols around which a national identity can be created. What better symbols than the 'lean and clean' image of the Navy and the Air Force? In the initial stages of the transition, could the SA Navy not play this role?
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