The Need for Maritime Forces in the 'New' South Africa

Rear-Admiral Chris Bennett SAN (RTD)
President of the Defence Institute of Southern Africa (DISA

Published in South African Defence Review Issue No 3, 1992



"From time immemorial, the purpose of a navy has been to influence, and sometimes decide, issues on land. ..... The sea has always given man inexpensive transport and ease of communication over long distances. It has also provided concealment, because being over the horizon meant being out of sight and effectively beyond reach. The sea has supplied mobility, capability, and support throughout Western history, and those failing in the sea-power test - notably Alexander, Napoleon and Hitler - also failed the longevity one."
Edward L Beach in Keepers of the Sea

INTRODUCTION

South Africans from across the full spectrum of race, creed and age group seem unwilling to accept that South Africa is a maritime nation. This could well be a result of the distance that the bulk of our population live from the sea and an unwillingness to admit that they are dependent on some one else!

Without in any way denigrating the ancient history of our continent, we must accept that the modern history of South Africa, and thereby also that of the whole sub continent, has been dominated by the sea.

The modern history of Southern Africa as we know it today can be said to have started in 1488, when Bartholomew Diaz rounded the Cape of Good Hope and landed in Mossel Bay. The growth industry of traders between east and west who followed in his wake, led initially to the development of a harbour in Cape Town and, as the trade using the Cape Sea Route continued to increase, additional harbours in Durban, Port Elizabeth and East London. It was through these harbours that the equipment to mine the diamonds at Kimberley and the gold on the Reef was brought, and the resultant products of these mines exported. Also through these harbours came the steel railway lines and rolling stock, the manufactured goods and the people, that opened up the whole sub continent to the twentieth century. This is not to say that the diamonds and gold did not play their part, but too many South Africans seem to assume that the infrastructure to exploit our mineral wealth, just "happened to be there," and that the products of the mines also just "happened to find" its own way into the world markets.

During the last few decades South Africa has increased its maritime investment quite considerably with the construction of Richards Bay Harbour and the iron ore terminal in Saldanha Bay, not to mention the Mossgas platform and refinery.

This investment was most timely since at much the same time gold and diamonds have come to play a smaller role in South Africa's foreign trade, and the importance of other exports, such as manufactured goods and technology, as well as the more bulky minerals like iron, coal and chrome has increased. Once again these exports, high in bulk and mass have highlighted the sub-continents' dependence on the sea.

Today most of our industrial capability retains some link or connection to the sea. For example, of what use would South Africa's complex railway and road system be if it did not eventually link the industrial heartland to the harbours through which our products are exported and our needs imported, not to mention the exports and imports of our neighbours!

It is also in this context that South Africa stands out as the regional power in southern Africa. For example the 6 main South African ports (excluding Walvis Bay), in an average year, handle 103,7 million tons of cargo (excluding petrol oil and lubricants) which is 55,4% of the 187,1 million tons handled by a total of 32 ports in Sub-Saharan Africa.1

THE SEA AREA WHICH RIGHTFULLY BELONGS TO SOUTH AFRICA

All nations with a coast line have, by international agreement, certain rights and responsibilities. These rights and responsibilities can be found in the seven important principles set out in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III of 10 December 1982);
... off-shore zones with varying degrees of jurisdiction ranging from the exercise of sovereignty up to 12 miles from the coast (territorial sea) to a 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) with the right to manage living and non-living resources of the sea while giving other states the freedom of navigation and over flight, pipe and cable laying; freedom of transit passage through straits and archipelagic waters' freedom of the high sea; the 'Area' outside national jurisdiction zones was 'the common heritage of mankind'; preservation of the maritime environment; control of maritime scientific research; and settlement of disputes.2
Even though UNCLOS III has not yet been ratified by a sufficient number of nations to ensure international legality, so many nations have adopted its precepts on zones of coastal state jurisdiction that the Convention has become de facto international law.3

When it comes to the management of the living and non-living resources of the sea, exploitation of the sea and sea bottom, South Africa clearly shows its lack of interest and ignorance on maritime affairs. At the 1991 National Maritime Conference in Cape Town, it was pointed out that
South African national legislation reflects that many of the Articles of LOSC [UNCLOS] dealing with maritime zones have been adopted as State practice by the RSA but errors and omissions in this legislation seriously affect the delineation of all of the maritime zones.4
In terms of UNCLOS the RSA is entitled to lay claim to an EEZ of at least 200 nautical miles (370 kms), excluding any extension due to the continental shelf. This 370 kilometer wide band of ocean stretches from the Natal/Mozambique border in the east to the mouth of the Orange River in the west. A similar circle also exists around the Prince Edward and Marion Islands. These two areas, which are South Africa's heritage and responsibility, total well over a million square kilometers, which from any viewpoint is an enormous area!

THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF A COASTAL STATE

Within this vast area South Africa has three main responsibilities to its own citizens and to other nations:
  • The first being to protect the national assets from over exploitation, misuse and abuse, on behalf of its citizens and the future generations.
  • The second is to protect the innocent passer-by from the predacious attention of the less honest (taking into account that this could imply nations, groups or individuals), it is of interest to note in this context that UNCLOS III assumes that the 'owner' state will ensure the right of innocent passage for all users of the sea.5
  • The third responsibility is to provide accurate maps (charts) showing all dangers to safe navigation and to provide these charts at a reasonable cost to all who need them.
In order to be able to execute its responsibilities for the sea areas under its jurisdiction the state, apart from the normal services in support of users of the sea such as the provision of harbours and navigation aids, also has to fulfill four basic protection functions which can be derived from the first two responsibilities listed previously:
  • Protect the area and all who are entitled to use it from piracy or actions by other antagonistic states, ie the military function. 'Gunboat Diplomacy' or the use of navies to project power beyond their own borders through either the use of, or the threat of using, naval force, has throughout recorded history played its part in inter-state relations.6
  • Protect all users of the sea from miscreants, ie policing.
  • Protect the natural resources as well as the products of the sea from over exploitation and misuse, ie resource protection.
  • Protect the sea against pollution, ie environmental protection.
In the local situation there is also one further factor to be kept in mind, which arises from the fact that South Africa is in reality the only coastal state in southern Africa with a viable navy. Therefore unless we, or for that matter the other states of the subcontinent, wish to see some naval power from outside the region dominating our seas, then it is incumbent on South Africa, with the agreement of the other states to assist these states to fulfill their responsibilities. It is inherently to our own advantage to ensure that the resources of the seas are not over-exploited or polluted. Unlike terra firma the waters that form the oceans move from region to region beyond the puny ability of man to control them.

HOW DOES THE STATE FULFIL THESE RESPONSIBILITIES?

The first prerequisite to fulfill these responsibilities is for the state to be able to continuously monitor what is happening in its area of jurisdiction. The second requirement is to be able to get a physical presence, capable of taking the desired action, to any area where it may be required, that is:
to be able to enforce their sovereignty when challenged. It is not enough in International Law to have embodied the state's claim in legislation, but the state must be seen to enforce them in practice.7
Considering the vast areas we are talking about, and the total lack of permanent inhabitants other than fish, birds and some aquatic mammals, these requirements can only be achieved by sending men out to sea in ships and aircraft.

Furthermore in order to be effective, these ships and aircraft have to conduct regular patrols which have to cover enormous areas. Traditionally three types of vehicle could be considered suitable for this task; ships, fixed wing aircraft and helicopters. All three have inherent limitations making it unproductive to rely on any one on its own, in simplified terms some of these limitations are:
  • Ships have a limitation on how fast they can go, for example a sustained speed of 22 knots (40 kmh) is considered high. On the other hand a ship can remain on task continuously for days or weeks and sometimes even months on end. A ship is also very flexible in terms of its inherent capabilities and characteristics.
  • Fixed wing aircraft can patrol at high speeds of between 100 and 200 knots (180 and 370 kmh), but have a limited endurance. Their time on task (as it is known) is measured in hours rather than days. Since they can not physically board a transgressing vessel it is also extremely difficult, if not impossible, for them to effect an arrest at sea, especially at long distances from an airfield when their time on task is very limited. (There is admittedly one celebrated case in World War II where a U-boat was captured by an aircraft.)
  • Helicopters have an even more limited endurance than do fixed wing aircraft. Their time on task is normally measured in minutes rather than in hours. Although far more versatile than a fixed wing aircraft, the range at which they can operate is thus severely limited, and they are at their best when operating from a ship.
Obviously the most effective way to conduct maritime surveillance is to use a combination of long range maritime patrol aircraft working in close co-operation with ships carrying their own helicopter. As can be expected such a capability does not come cheaply and is not readily motivated except in times of actual threat from a hostile naval power.

Nevertheless most countries accept the need to provide for their own defence, and if they have a coast line and harbours, accept the need for a navy. South Africa is no exception. Most coastal states also accept the need for an organization, or organizations, to fulfill the other protection tasks expected of them within their maritime area. Big and powerful nations such as the United States thus have a Navy and a Coast Guard, smaller nations must perforce restrict themselves to one organization, if for no other reason than cost. South Africa falls into this last category if it wishes to fulfill its responsibilities with any credibility.

A COMBINED NAVY AND COAST GUARD

A strong case can therefore be made for the consolidation of all the state's maritime protection services into one organization. South Africa simply can not afford the proliferation of organizations each with its own support system and logistics that is developing at the moment. The limited funds that can and are made available for this function of the state must clearly be utilized as effectively as possible.

For a number of reasons any such combined organization should make use of the existing SA Navy structures as its foundation:
  • Firstly. Over the years initially the British Navy and latterly the SA Navy have developed the necessary infrastructure to support maritime forces at sea and exercise operational control over them. This infrastructure is sufficiently large and complex to handle all possible requirements of a joint maritime service without costly expansion.
  • Secondly. The South African Air Force has worked closely with the Navy over the years and has a competent and effective maritime organization which could also cope with all such requirements.
  • Thirdly. The South African Navy, like its alma mater the British Royal Navy, has always had Hydrographic surveying as a branch. The senior South African Naval Officer in this branch is also the South African Hydrographer who is responsible for, and held accountable for, all local surveys. He also represents South Africa at the International Hydrographic Organisation.
  • Finally. "The acid test of sovereignty at sea is the ability to exclude others." 8 For this purpose warships are the most flexible form of defence as they can identify challenge, warn and if necessary attack with minimum use of force.9
Should the Navy form the basis of such a combined organization then we must naturally also assume that transfer of certain resources would have to occur. Such a task will of necessity require the attention of experts and a study all of its own. As such it is beyond the scope of this paper. However it would appear that one implication is self evident, that such small navies should then not be
... lured into shoal waters at full throttle by the dash and dazzle of high speed patrol craft ... designed primarily to take on larger warships and survive - when they really need to buy something stodgier for law-enforcement and internal-security missions.10

VESSEL REQUIREMENTS

Existing South African Navy force levels are sufficient to cope with most of the traditional naval tasks of protecting the nation from any hostile maritime force during the short and medium term. Especially as no threat either from seaward or landward, is likely to occur in that time frame. This can be seen in the following context:
  • Firstly a credible deterrent exists in the two offensive capabilities of the SA Navy. Primarily in the Submarine Flotilla - probably the most effective possible deterrent to any hostile navy, even that of one of the major powers. Much more visibly and thus better known, is the Strike Craft Flotilla which acts as short range quick reaction forces. All these vessels are, however, rapidly approaching the end of their effective operational lives and will need to be replaced within the next 10 to 15 years if we wish to retain this capability.
  • Secondly these deterrent forces together with the two logistic support vessels (TAFELBERG and RAKENSBERG) provide a limited mobility either in support of Army or Air Force operations outside our borders, or in the conduct of relief operations in cases of natural disasters.
  • Thirdly with the Mine Countermeasures Flotilla we retain the ability to ensure that our harbours remain open to trade against any possible mine threat.
  • Finally all these vessels can be used in support of diplomatic initiatives in the sub-continent with a limited ability further afield.
The major weakness of the existing SA Navy is its lack of surface warships of sufficient size and endurance to fill the role of ocean patrol required not only for the traditional naval role but also for the coast guard role. This weakness is exacerbated by the lack of suitable maritime patrol aircraft in the SAAF.

Along these lines therefore, the most urgent requirement by the Navy/Coast Guard is a vessel capable of fulfilling both the naval surface protection/patrol function and the coast guard environmental/resources protection/police function. Although the pooling of all available resources will enable the 'new' Navy to cope in the immediate short term, it must not be forgotten that it takes some 8 or 10 years to design and build a new class of ship. Furthermore, even though at first appraisal "... one navy's junk may be another fleet's treasure," after a while one finds out that "... more often than not junk is junk anywhere."11

We should therefore already be planning for the future requirements and should be looking for a class of vessel as the mainstay of the future fleet which is designed to fit our requirements and not those of another navy. The concept of a class of vessels, rather than a single ship, is stressed because firstly, more than one vessel will be required to be effective. In fact, as a rough guesstimate, South Africa would eventually need at least 9 surface vessels to carry out these tasks effectively. Secondly, the cost of ownership per vessel (that is the total cost of building, supporting and operating the vessel over its whole life cycle) reduces considerably with 6 or more vessels of the same class.

Some suggestions with regard to the design parameters of such a vessel are as follows:
  1. The first hurdle to cross is the size of the proposed vessel. Keeping in mind the local sea conditions, the vast distances and the need to comply with the requirements given earlier, we have to accept that we are NOT looking at some type of fast missile craft of between 400 and 750 tons displacement. We must rather look at a ship of between 1200 and 1800 tons which is capable of remaining on patrol in most weathers, for a reasonable period, say two weeks, without exhausting its crew or needing a major overhaul on return to harbour.
  2. Secondly we are NOT looking for an 'all singing all dancing' warship capable of engaging the most modern ships of the major naval powers, but something 'stodgier', a work horse not a race horse. Thus although maximum sustained speed should be at least in the order of 24/25 knots, this should not be used as an excuse to move into the 30 knot plus range. The hull construction could well be to commercial rather than naval standards and overall length should be somewhere in the region of 85 metres. Good sea-keeping qualities are of critical importance. Main propulsion should be diesel thus allowing a range at economic speed of at least 5 000 nautical miles, with the ability to extend endurance by replenishment at sea.
  3. Linked to this 'stodgier' image the ships company should be as small as possible, probably somewhere in the order of 50 to 60. Additional accommodation to carry a limited number of passengers (scientists, officials from other state departments), men under training, or troops should be provided.
  4. Inherent in the operational requirement for a combined surface and air capability, is the need for the ship to be able to carry and operate a helicopter. This implies not merely a land on capability, but the ability to carry the helicopter for the full period of a patrol. It also implies the need to have sufficient communications and command information equipment to co-ordinate searches with other vessels and/or aircraft. Once again however this must not be used as an excuse to move into the 'race horse' category!
  5. The weapons/electronic fit could initially be the same as the present strike craft, in fact in order to save costs, much of the equipment could be transferred from the strike craft as they are phased out of service. This combination of 76mm and 20mm guns and anti-ship missiles, together with the associated detection equipment, would give the capability to apply minimum force when arresting transgressors, as well as the ability to escalate the level of force sufficiently in order to prevent escape, if necessary.

CONCLUSION

South Africa is a maritime nation and this makes it imperative for the country to maintain some sort of effective maritime organization to look after its interests. To be effective such organization needs ships not only to patrol, but also to enforce the states authority, both within the territorial waters and the EEZ. In South Africa's case this organization must also be ready and able to assist our neighbouring states who do not yet have the industrial and technological capacity to run their own maritime services.

If we wish to survive as a nation with maritime interests, then we must, as a matter of urgency, pay some attention to the needs of the maritime forces which preserve and protect this heritage.

REFERENCES

  1. Denis Fair and Trevor Jones. The ports of sub-Saharan Africa and their hinterlands: an overview. Africa Institute of SA, 1991.
  2. Paper by P.D. Forrest, BSc., F.R.N.A., C.Eng. at the 1990 RINA International Symposium, Warship '90.
  3. Lt Cdr. S.W. Heins. The Maritime Domain: Security, Law Enforcement and Control Requirements in Off-shore Zones, Naval Forces, Volume X, No. IV/89, October 1989.
  4. Paper by Cdre. N.R. Guy at National Maritime Conference 1991. Possible Continental Shelf Claims of the RSA in accordance with the Law of the Sea Convention, 1982.
  5. Forrest.
  6. Sir James Cable. Gunboat Diplomacy 1900 1979 and Navies in violent Peace.
  7. Forrest.
  8. Cable.
  9. Forrest.
  10. Paper by Lt Cdr Christopher A. Abel, U.S. Coast Guard. United States Naval Institute Proceedings, March 1991.
  11. Ibid