

PEACEKEEPING IN EAST RAND TOWNSHIPS

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INTRODUCTION

To some extent, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) has been involved in peace support operations for many years, using internationally acknowledged principles. This has occurred in Namibia/Angola, Bophuthatswana, Lesotho, and more recently on the East Rand, in KwaZulu-Natal and other township areas.

In particular, during the past two years (1993-1994), the military has been involved in peacebuilding, peace maintenance and humanitarian aid to ensure and maintain stability in support of the South African Police Service.


This paper will focus primarily on what has been done in the field of peace support operations on the East Rand. For this purpose a case study of Operation PROTECTO that took place between 3 February 1994 and December 1994 in the Katorus area is used.

THE NATURE OF VIOLENCE ON THE EAST RAND

To understand the reasoning behind the way in which the Security Forces acted or reacted, as well as the causes for their presence in this area, it is important to understand the nature of violence on the East Rand.

Until 1990, conflict on the East Rand was of low intensity, with the exclusion of Tembisa where high levels of violence occurred during 1986. Revolutionary activities, however, were well organised in underground structures, as the ANC/SACP alliance considered the East Rand to be strategically located. Street committees and unions, aimed at total control of the population, functioned effectively from the start. Almost the entire population of Tembisa was under ANC control. Similar control existed in the Katorus area, with the exclusion of the hostels that were inhabited by seasonal labourers from KwaZulu-Natal. Taxi violence flared up sporadically as a result of fierce competition between taxi operators for control of the lucrative taxi industry. The influx of illegal fire arms was negligible and as few as two AK-47 rifles were confiscated in the Katorus area per annum.

With the unbanning of the ANC/SACP alliance in February 1990, opposition between the alliance and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) became more pronounced. The ANC/SACP alliance believed that it was the only true representative of the African population in South Africa. At the same time, the IFP had the largest number of registered members of all legal African political



movements. Both parties were out to prove their power to the African community at large. During 1990, escalating tension between the parties led to mutual recrimination and threats, particularly in the Katorus area.

The existing tension manifested itself in Thokoza when the Phola Park squatter camp started to develop on land adjoining Hostels 4 and 5. The squatter camp was mainly inhabited by citizens of the Transkei, who supported the ANC/SACP alliance. The hostels were inhabited by IFP supporters, originating from KwaZulu-Natal. Because the camp lacked infrastructure, the squatters started using water and ablution services at the hostels, which further weakened an already inadequate infrastructure. This led to further tension.


In August 1990, the death of a Zulu as a result of a feud between squatters and hostel dwellers drove tension on the East Rand to a peak. It led to a counter-attack on Phola Park that resulted in the death of several inhabitants of the informal settlement. The incident triggered widespread conflict between the two political groupings.

This conflict also had an immediate ripple effect on the whole Katorus area and spread to other townships on the East Rand. During the first week of conflict, almost 300 people were killed. In reaction to this, hostel dwellers from the entire Katorus area either killed or chased out all those sharing their accommodation who did not support the IFP. Simultaneously, inhabitants of Phola Park managed to drive inhabitants from Hostels 5 and 6 and proceeded to raze both hostels to the ground.

The conflict now progressed to attacks between hostels and surrounding areas. By September 1990 approximately 500 people had lost their lives. This number increased to more than a thousand by December 1990. Violence was only curbed at the end of 1990 through massive security force operations and the active intervention of politicians.

Because communities felt threatened, it was possible for the ANC to market self-defence units (SDU's) as a plausible security measure within the community. Thus Phola Park had the first really effective and organised SDU in the country. Several other SDU's were consequently formed in the Katorus area and all over the East Rand. These units were systematically armed with AK-47 rifles and other weapons and regularly patrolled their individual communities. Equipment such as fire arms and relevant training were provided, using money collected from individual households. This money soon became known as 'protection money' and was often allegedly garnered through threats of force.

In reaction to this, the hostels inhabited by IFP supporters formed armed self-protection units (SPU's). SDU power bases were situated in the Phola Park and Mandela View squatter camps and SPU power bases in the hostels. During 1991 and 1992 conflict regularly flared up between the two main power bases, resulting in great loss of lives. Conflict was mainly aimed at destroying the opposing power base and the protection and expansion of 'home turf'. A great deal of the violence was politically motivated, although this was not always obvious. The violence served as a manifestation of the intense power struggle between the ANC and IFP at ground level.




By the end of 1992, both power bases were so effectively entrenched that the opposing groups started to believe that their opponents could not be driven out. Both groups consolidated the situation by means of recruitment, training and large-scale buying of weapons. During this time all activities and actions in the townships were strongly politicised through the use of propaganda and intimidation by both groups. Any conflict or grievance in the population were soon transformed into a political struggle between the ANC/SACP alliance and the IFP. It was not long before paramilitary structures started to join the struggle with even more loss of lives. As an addition to general instability in the area, taxi violence became politicised.

Other factors also contributed to the conflict. Socio-economic circumstances in the townships were poor. Some areas had an unemployment figure of more than fifty per cent. The lack of infrastructure, services, housing, the influx of illegal immigrants and employment grievances contributed to a desperate atmosphere where the survival instinct took over and human life lost its value.

In 1993 the South African election date of 27-28 April 1994 was publicly announced. It had a far-reaching effect on violence on the East Rand. During the period leading up to the election both groups further consolidated their power bases in attempts to expand their support. These attempts were characterised by intimidation and violence from both groups. The conflict moved from the power bases to the surrounding communities that had been neutral up to this point of the struggle. During July 1993, conflict intensified and reached a climax during November and early December 1993. Buffer zones were formed between ANC and IFP power bases. These zones consisted of whole sections and houses that were deserted during the violence and soon became described as 'no-go' areas.

It was within this context that Operation PROTECTO was launched, eventually succeeding in forcing the spiral of violence down by January/February 1994. Tension, however, remained high between the two rival groups. In April 1994, the SANDF contingent was briefly replaced by the National Peacekeeping Force (NPKF). The NPKF was not recognised by the IFP as a-political, with the result that renewed outbreaks of violence occurred, especially in Thokoza. An advanced team of NPKF soldiers was deployed on 11 April 1994 in the East Rand. A report in *The Star* dated 11 April quoted the IFP central committee as saying that "*it was alarmed to hear MK members within the NPKF were moving into the East Rand and warned of grave consequences.*" In the week of 15 and 16 April the rest of the battalion was deployed and promptly came under fire from hostel dwellers. The IFP said they were not welcome and preferred the ISD and SANDF. On the evening news of 17 April reports stated that there was an exchange of fire between the hostel dwellers of Thokoza and the NPKF. Running gun battles developed between hostel dwellers, residents and NPKF soldiers in Thokoza. In three days fifteen people had been killed including a well-known photographer, Ken Oosterbroek.

The SANDF was eventually called in to restore calm - a move which was welcomed by residents. By 20 April, sixteen people including one NPKF soldier had died and forty were injured in unrest-related violence. Later reports put the death toll at nineteen. The ANC called for the dismissal of the head of the NPKF unit on the East Rand after the SANDF had to be called in to end a



bloody battle. On the streets, Self Defence Unit members were calling the force the 'National Party Killing Force' and demanded they leave, while those in the hostels accused it of assisting Umkhonto we Sizwe.

Less than a week after the integrated force replaced the SANDF in the violence-torn region, the NPKF was withdrawn from the East Rand and operationally restricted to certain areas as the SANDF moved back into the area to restore peace.

The hasty removal of the NPKF and the re-deployment of the SANDF contributed to the peaceful way in which elections eventually took place on the East Rand.

Violence decreased sharply after April 1994. Criminal violence, however, escalated markedly. The differences between political and criminal violence became evident for the first time and it was clear that a great deal of criminal violence was perpetrated under the cover of politics in the past.

UNDERLYING CAUSES OF VIOLENCE IN 1993-1994

The SANDF identified seven causes for the high frequency of violence on the East Rand. One of the most obvious causes was the *poor socio-economic conditions*. Approximately 65 per cent of the 1,8 million inhabitants of the Katorus area were unemployed, resulting in increased levels of criminal activity. The infrastructure was demolished or badly damaged during the struggle against apartheid. The size of the population increased as a result of the influx of immigrants. Nearly half of the population had to make use of informal housing.


The *involvement of established organisations and structures* in the orchestration of violence (SDU's, SPU's and Civics) was an important factor. Because these organisations were effectively part of the community, the security forces found it difficult to identify, arrest and bring them to justice.

Furthermore, *new militant organisations* were being established, which led to increased rivalry. An internal power struggle between the SDU's added to the conflict. Organisations were embedded within the area and were not prepared to relinquish their position of power or their income, the 'protection money' which they received from the community.

The area was highly *politicised*. Literally everything was related to a specific political party and even purely criminal activities became political. The political transformation process further fuelled political differences. Due to the relatively high percentage of IFP supporters in the area, every political incident in KwaZulu-Natal had a direct influence on conditions in the East Rand.

A culture of intolerance reigned supreme. Opposing political or other parties, business competitors and community security structures were intimidated, attacked or murdered if they disagreed or competed.

The South African Police Services (SAPS), and the Defence Force in earlier years, came into conflict with the community when they tried to uphold the



previous system. Communities regarded them as illegitimate and apartheid legislation as unjust. Many times incidents between the community and the *security forces* would fuel further violence.

The influx of *illegal immigrants* into the country in general and into the East Rand area in particular also brought an increase in violence. The country's environment is 'illegal immigrant friendly'. People can easily enter the country, settle without being harassed and often fit comfortably into the poor socio-economic conditions. They cannot speak the local languages, are mostly uneducated and unskilled and resort to crime to survive. During the 1993-1994 period, certain political parties turned to these illegal immigrants to further their own agendas and some of them even voted in the April 1994 elections.

DEPLOYMENT OF THE SANDF

SANDF POLICY

Although it is not a primary or secondary task of the SANDF to deploy in any urban area on a permanent basis, it is capable of doing so.

The Defence Act, 1957 (Act No. 44 of 1957) Section 3(2)(a) stipulates that:

"The South African Defence Force or any portion or member thereof may:
(a) *at any time be employed by the State President to be used by the executive military command of the SANDF -*
(i) *on service in defence of the Republic ...*

Service in defence of the Republic" is defined in section 1(1) of the Defence Act to include military service..."


Since Act No. 200, 1993, the Interim Constitution, came into being on 1 May 1994, the SANDF can be empowered in accordance with Sections 224, 227 and 236(8)(a) to undertake specific functions, but have to be authorised to do so by the President in terms of Section 227. Currently, the SANDF is only utilised to support the SAPS in the maintenance of law and order (Section 227(1)(e)).

In terms of the Defence Amendment Act (No. 132 of 1992), Section 2(b)(5)(a), any deployment in terms of Section 138 of the Defence Act, shall be ordered at the request of the Minister of Law and Order, and not the Minister of Defence, as was previously the case.

SANDF ACHIEVEMENTS IN THE EAST RAND

Generally the SANDF deployment in the East Rand since 1989 has been very successful. This being said, the SANDF was not tasked, until recently, to support the police in crime prevention activities. Their deployment was aimed at preventing the occurrence and escalation of political violence. However, the prevention of violence was not without its problems.

In reaction to an escalating situation of lawlessness which was increasingly beyond the capabilities of the SA Police to counter, the Transitional Executive



Council decided with effect 3 February 1994, to make the SANDF responsible for stabilising the East Rand with the SA Police in support. This reversal of roles was a political decision and reflected the urgency of the problem in the area. Yet the TEC did not provide the SANDF with the legal mandate or powers to affect its new responsibilities. As a result, the SANDF could not perform a wide variety of police functions until such time as the President formally empowered the SANDF during June 1994 - some four months later. Thereafter the SANDF could execute cordon and search operations, conduct roadblocks and execute arrests without the SAPS, although this still remained the exception. If it is taken into account that it was important to achieve success early in the process and to make an impact soon after deployment, this lack of powers caused a great deal of frustration. In all honesty it also forced the military commanders to take a number of calculated risks.

The SANDF had been deployed in the East Rand for about two years prior to Operation PROTECTO. As violence had intensified over the months the Police had brought in their Internal Stability Unit to bolster their public order capabilities. The ANC aligned structures, in particular, accused the ISD of being partial to the IFP. As time passed, a crisis of confidence in the ISD and the Police in general developed.

With the commencement of Operation PROTECTO the ±350 ISD members were withdrawn from Katorus and the SANDF force levels increased from one to three battalions. The existing SAPS contingent remained. The SANDF forces that were deployed during Operation PROTECTO came from a number of mostly infantry units scattered around the country such as 44 Parachute Brigade, 61 Mechanised Battalion Group, 121 Battalion, a Composite Battalion from Northern Transvaal, 3 and 9 SA Infantry Battalions and 21 Battalion.

Factors that frustrated the SANDF in their role as peace makers, included a lack of legitimacy. The majority of the people in the area clearly did not trust the SANDF. Poverty and poor socio-economic conditions hampered the SANDF in the execution of its tasks and increased the population's need to trade in illegal weapons and substances. A variety of means of transportation existed to aid the movement of illegal fire-arms on a variety of routes in and out of the area. Confiscating fire arms and other illegal weapons in large crowds was difficult and not always possible. The community also often protected or supported political and other criminals.

One of the main legal hindrances experienced by both the SANDF and SAPS, was the justified local and international perception that policing should not be done from an armour-plated vehicle. Escalating levels of political and criminal violence in the East Rand resulted in the use of automatic fire-arms against both the SAPS and the SANDF, and the situation developed into one where both the SAPS and SANDF had to resort to wearing bullet proof jackets and using armoured protected vehicles.¹

The SANDF's achievements and successes, however, overshadowed its problems. In February 1994, after a month of large-scale deployment, the death toll decreased from 76 persons per month to less than fifteen. Schools were reopened and fully operational after only two months, on request of parent committees and headmasters. Three to four months after deployment, most

churches were again functioning. Given the important role that church-leaders play in the cultural lives of people in the area, this was a significant achievement. Water and emergency services were soon being provided to isolated areas.

The 'hearts and minds' of people were transformed gradually and they started to support the security forces in their fight against crime and violence. Liaison forums were established at all levels of the community, very much the forerunners to the present police community forums. Given the fact that the ANC and IFP did not want to co-operate in the same forum, including the two parties prior to the elections was quite an achievement.

The area was stabilised by means of an absolute minimum use of force. I, as group commander, spent most of my time facilitating negotiations between rival parties, political groupings, community leaders and local government structures. The battalion/company commanders, the police community forums and the safety/security committee of the Katorus Task Group² also fulfilled most of these functions until 31 May 1995.

As part of these activities, co-operation and joint working procedures between the SANDF and the SAPS were developed at all levels of command. Joint procedures were also established between the joint headquarters, company headquarters, police stations, peace monitors and community leaders. From these procedures an integrated effort and a well balanced team with a clear definition of tasks was established including the SANDF and various groups within the community: local government structures; political leaders, local and regional; community leaders; international monitors; the Wits-Vaal Peace Secretariat; local peace structures; law-enforcement agencies; local business and others.


Other successes include the initiation of non-military youth development camps which led to early successes in the bid to unite militant youths. Negotiations with the self-defence units (SDU's) and the self-protection units (SPU's) started before the elections, enhancing mutual trust and understanding. Through a combination of negotiations and military means, the SANDF reopened many commuter routes so that people could move freely once more.

The SANDF, in the development of its specific conceptual approach to the problem at hand, played an important role in establishing greater political tolerance between political rivals in the area.


SANDF STRENGTHS

The successes and problems highlighted above, indicate a series of strengths inherent in the SANDF:

- *Effective leadership:* The commander and his superiors were experienced and able to adapt to the changing situation. Subordinate leaders received practical guidelines and responded with innovation and creativity. Mobility and flexibility of thought and being attuned to the ever-changing conditions, coupled with their experience of the people and their culture, proved to keep leaders in control of the situation.



- Sound *principles of command and control* were applied. The joint tactical headquarters that included political parties and other role-players, were deployed as far forward as possible and were easily accessible to the media and other role-players. Work procedures were clearly defined.
- The *Security Committee* (Seccom) proved invaluable. South Africa had, through many years developed a National Security Management System from national to provincial to local level. This system, which was established by the previous regime, was still maintained under an ANC Government. In Gauteng this consisted of a series of Seccoms down to local level. The Seccom at each level included representatives from the SAPS, SANDF and co-opted members. The main task was to provide guidelines for planning to the various joint operators centres (tactical headquarters). In Katorus the Seccom provided a focal point for planning, guiding the deployment of troops and resources in an effective manner.
- *Adapting* to the tactical situation was simplified as a result of intelligence and the innovation of all those involved.
- *Military psychological services* played an important role in monitoring and changing attitudes of the local population. With the assistance of a psychological team and communication experts, the Katorus military command compiled, and regularly revised, a questionnaire to test the attitude and changes in attitude of the local residents towards the Security Forces, political parties, the provision of services, levels of violence, significant events, etc. Various methods were used to gather responses to these issues, including the community liaison forums, discussions with community leaders, use of troops during their deployment, etc. An attitudinal profile was compiled and revised every two weeks. The results of these studies repeatedly influenced deployment and communication plans.
- Most SANDF members were familiar with *socio-economic conditions* in the area. It resulted in a greater understanding of the situation and what could be done to improve it.
- *Logistic, engineering and medical equipment and skills*, developed over many years in activities in Namibia/Angola, could be put used for humanitarian and other purposes.
- *High-technology equipment*, especially for surveillance, played an important part in curbing the violence. This included the use of low light television equipment (LLTV), passive night vision equipment, etc.
- Both fixed wing *aircraft and helicopters* proved invaluable for detecting criminals, as deterrence, for command and control, surprise, trooping, etc.
- The guidance and initiative that higher headquarters delegated to the *Group Commander* proved valuable and effective. Partly as a result, trust and a good team spirit developed at this level.




- Excellent *investigating capabilities* existed in the form of legal officers, who supported the troops and leaders during deployment. They were eventually present, with the SAPS, at any incident where the SANDF was involved and, when necessary, gave professional evidence in court and made representations to the Goldstone Commission. This boosted the troops' morale and left the SANDF free to proceed with its important tasks of maintaining peace and law and order.

SUCCESS FACTORS

Factors contributing to the successful operations in the East Rand corresponded with the experiences of commanders in KwaZulu-Natal and the Cape.

- It is of great importance that the SANDF, the community and as many role-players and stakeholders as possible, develop as a team together. To achieve this there must be mutual trust, a common objective and control of the situation. After patient mediation, inquiry and conciliation, an effective team was established in the East Rand.
- The success that the SANDF had in gaining the support of the community through a dedicated programme of communication and action was a key success factor.
- Superior intelligence and the integration of all possible sources to create the best possible view of the situation are crucial and must be maintained.
- Effective communication with the forces, the community and the public at large provided, among others, tactical intelligence, enhanced trust, and served as counter-measure for misconceptions. It further supported the rapid deployment of reaction forces and helped to ensure their effectiveness.
- As a preventive measure forces were visible at all hours, more specifically in those areas where intelligence indicated a need for deployment.
- Feedback was given after operations to key participants and the community by means of groundshout, communication patrols, and through community leaders who were drawn into the tactical headquarters.
- A sound working relationship with the media proved valuable. The personal involvement of the Group Commander and his subordinate commanders with the media, the transparent sharing of information, specially developed media training for all soldiers helped the SANDF to achieve its objectives.
- Practical experience proved that the training of SANDF soldiers was effective and of a high standard, contrary to that of soldiers in the NPKF. It includes counter-insurgency training (COIN), retraining in legal aspects, development of communication skills, training in intelligence gathering in urban areas, observation teams, and command and control.
- The audio-visual display of educational programmes in chosen areas proved to be valuable in many instances.



- The contribution of the SANDF in the de-politicisation of the area remains an important contribution to stability. An important factor was the stance of the SANDF as an a-political organisation which was repeatedly reinforced in practice.

In evaluating the above, it is clear that eighty per cent of the SANDF activities were of a non-military nature as opposed to twenty per cent military operations. In theory, non-military activities should be carried out by other government structures, but in practice they were largely facilitated by the SANDF. With effective communication in place, activities were successfully undertaken.


PRINCIPLES OF WAR³

The application of sound principles throughout the operation proved to be another cornerstone for success. Most of the principles guiding conventional war can, with some adaptation, also be applied to peace support operations. These would include the following:

- If military actions are applied in a peace support operation, the element of *surprise* should be achieved. Therefore *security of information* is essential. Operations involving deception are difficult to plan and it is difficult to achieve surprise. As a result of close co-operation between the SANDF and the SAPS, and the police's inherent position as part of a community, problems were experienced. The police had to serve the community, of whom specific policemen were a part. The community, on the other hand, supported the 'struggle' and often 'protected' political activists, who gained access to information vital to the planning of operations based on deception and surprise. As far as non-military actions are concerned, a policy of the greatest possible transparency should be followed. All activities should form part of a negotiated settlement with the community. In most operations in the East Rand this was successfully achieved. The community also needed to understand why the maintenance of security during military operations was important. The establishment of a sound relationship led to greater understanding on the part of the community.
- During all negotiations, *flexibility* must be maintained, without losing sight of the objectives of the operation. Flexibility is imperative at all levels of command in rapidly changing circumstances, both at the level of Group headquarters and at grassroots or tactical level. Opportunities to promote the cause, to take the initiative in negotiations and during the execution of any task, cannot be missed.
- *Manoeuvre* in peace support operations takes on a whole new meaning. The 'battlefield' in this case was a community, consisting of a mixture of people, and interwoven with a variety of socio-economic and welfare difficulties. The commander must be able to adapt and seize opportunities, to be able to 'manoeuvre' through these circumstances.
- Without access to *intelligence*, it is impossible to conduct operations successfully. Intelligence on ordinary criminals, political criminals, the socio-economic and welfare situation, the political situation and other relevant

factors is vital. Knowledge of community involvement, their agendas, culture and perceptions is crucial to the command structure. From intelligence sources, opportunities for change can be identified, communication themes defined, weaknesses and strengths emphasised and non-military tasks determined.

- *Co-operation* between the local police and the defence force must be of a very high standard. This was not always the case, but by means of leadership, the development of special procedures and a joint goal, an above average working relationship was established. Co-operation between community leaders and security forces contributed to success. Without the support of the community, no peace operation can be successful. Co-operation with and support from other role-players or stakeholders cannot be over-emphasised. Through facilitation by the SANDF, co-operation with other relevant parties was successfully established.
- There was complete *unity of command*. The tactical headquarters at group and battalion level was a joint operation centre in the true sense of the word. Political parties, community leaders, local government representatives, international and local monitors, media and other important role-players all formed part of the tactical headquarters.
- Though *offensive action* was seldom applied, it was communicated to everybody that the military would act swiftly, professionally and firmly when necessary. Once this intention was demonstrated in practice, it served to underpin negotiations. Those who continued with further violence, knew not to meddle with the SANDF. However, offensive action must always be with restraint, controlled and disciplined when applied.
- Force capabilities should be as *economical* as possible. The ability must exist to adjust force capabilities to suit military and non-military activities as they apply to the specific situation. Adapting to the functions called for by different roles is also important. This is facilitated by thorough intelligence and by being attuned to the situation.
- Force numbers should be *concentrated*, and force multipliers and their capabilities and impact must be visible. If the military is deployed, it must be in large numbers. Soldiers on the ground should be supported by other military or non-military means, not the other way round. Visibility at all hours of the day and night provides flexibility, tactical intelligence and contact with the community. Concentration of force also includes concentration of all efforts. The stabilising forces and organisations must join in a common co-ordinated effort to achieve a joint objective. This kind of team spirit was not always possible but remains a requirement nevertheless.
- Reserve forces should be maintained as they enhance flexibility. Ground/air reaction forces have proved invaluable. As a result, large-scale search operations could be supported by higher headquarters reserves without affecting operations in the area of influence. The part-time rear-area protection units (commando's) proved their worth in this area. Only about




forty members of the local Alberton Commando were called up at any given time. At the time the commando's were still all-white forces and were not deployed in black townships but at key points outside these areas, as guides and at road-blocks. Non-military reserves were also valuable.

- *Morale* should be maintained at all levels.⁴ The use of black soldiers in townships proved wise. They could endure longer periods of deployment, experienced less psychological stress than white soldiers in black townships and knew the area and its people better. It was therefore easier to maintain a high morale. The morale of the community is of equal importance. To measure this morale and change it to be supportive and positive of law and order and stability was the real challenge, but achieved a great deal of success.
- The *aim* of any operation should be clearly defined. In this case it was 'to stabilise the area'. This aim was known to and accepted by every soldier, all members of the community, role-players and stakeholders. The SANDF ensured that everybody was regularly reminded through the involvement of community leaders and liaison forums. They also tried to avoid involvement in other, non-security related activities, though this was sometimes impossible.


PROVEN PEACEKEEPING PRINCIPLES⁵

- *Negotiation* should precede action, where possible. This principle was applied throughout all incidents where the military was present, not necessarily only during the execution of military activities. The junior leader group was trained and orientated towards such an approach. It was also followed by the liaison forums, community police forums and the international and local peace monitors.
- *Intervention* must take place before violence erupts. Numerous tactical examples exist, especially attempts to separate aggressive ANC and IFP supporters. At the operational level, the preventive deployment of SANDF units serves as example.
- *Peace and law enforcement actions* must be *directed against the violator and not punish or affect the whole society*. It was, therefore, important to have access to accurate and timely intelligence. However, inconveniencing large portions of the community during road blocks and search operations could not be prevented.
- *Peacekeeping operations* must take place with the *consent* of the belligerent parties. This was not the case at the beginning of the SANDF's deployment: The IFP and PAC did not approve of the SANDF deployment. It was only after some months that the IFP became convinced of the SANDF's impartiality. Eventually political developments and the disastrous deployment of the National Peacekeeping Force, however, caused the IFP to request the SANDF to stay.
- Peacekeeping troops must use force only as a last resort in self-defence. *Minimum force* should be the underlying principle of peace support




operations. As it is difficult to generalise, a redefinition of its meaning is called for in each individual case. In operations in the East Rand the use of force was further monitored by the SANDF, police and liaison forums. The community and most of the role-players and criminals also knew that, when necessary, the SANDF would use force and then do so swiftly, effectively, professionally and without hesitation. Once it was demonstrated in practice, force was only used occasionally. Such necessity was further minimised by the selection and repetitive training of the selected shottist section. They were the only ones allowed to shoot on clear instruction, when necessary. The lessons thus learnt have been developed as formal material for future training.

- Peacekeeping forces must be *impartial*. Impartiality is as much a question of perception as of practice. The perceived or real loss of impartiality may result in displacing trust and confidence. It could trigger an uncontrollable escalation of violence to levels where peace has to be enforced. Many measures have been installed to ensure impartiality. Owing to accusations of partiality in the East Rand, the most effective proof was the deployment of ANC and IFP monitors and the use of video cameras on military vehicles. Such 'eye-witness' accounts provided a better view of specific incidents. The careful a-political stance of the SANDF also supported the principle of impartiality.
- If intervention has to take place, it must occur with *overwhelming strength*. Attempts were made in the East Rand and in KwaZulu-Natal to intervene in such a way, but there was never really enough manpower available. In rural areas specifically, this creates a problem. As a result a great many force multipliers have been used to improve the ratio of soldiers versus the community. These included the use of high-technology surveillance equipment. The SAAF also provided surveillance flights at all hours, command and control, rapid deployment elements and deterrence. Sniffer dogs were effectively used to locate weapons and ammunition. Specialised equipment to do body searches saved time and ensured that women could be searched by men. The military police were also used for a wide range of tasks. The use of legal officers at the tactical level saved a lot of time and money. Tactical drills were adapted to suit the specific situation. Liaison forums with the community provided a positive attitude and transparency, both perceived and experienced. The effective way in which international and local monitors were integrated and utilised for the pro-active solution to a variety of problems also contributed to the operation. Local government law enforcement elements and private security companies were utilised. Special orientation and training programmes were held for international and local monitors, and liaison forums. Programmes were conducted to develop communication skills. Job creation projects were undertaken to assist with the employment of those involved in the violence in an attempt to get them off the street. Educational video programmes were shown in selected areas to keep youths productively occupied.
- *Patience* and *tolerance* are prime requisites for peace support operations. Especially during negotiations and when embarking on new projects, results should not be expected too soon. On the other hand, when an



opportunity arises, commanders must have the freedom of action and the resources to take the initiative.

- *Foreign military and paramilitary personnel who are not sanctioned by the UN, and mercenaries, must be removed from the country or area where peace support operations are undertaken.* This being said, if one defines the SDU's and SPU's as paramilitary forces, this principle was not adhered to in the East Rand. They still operate in the area and their future will have to be decided at a political level. For the SANDF, co-operation, specific working procedures and negotiation on certain pre-defined subjects proved to be the most effective.
- One of the critical differences between peacekeeping and peace enforcement is *consent*. Contrary to peace enforcement, peacekeeping relies on the sustained consent of belligerent parties. Impartiality and the use of minimum force will guard against the breakdown of consent.
- *Legitimacy* derives from the perception that the mission and execution are just. Due to the previous political dispensation and the struggle to overthrow it, the Defence Force and Police were discredited over many years. The political rivalry between the ANC and the IFP enhanced the discreditation of security forces as described earlier. Through transparency, goodwill gestures, communication with all role-players, impartiality, an a-political posture and the effective execution of tasks, coupled with changes that took place in the political arena, the military helped to changing these perceptions.
- *Credibility* derives from the perception that a force has the capability to carry out its mission and will be supported by elements such as resources and the thorough planning and conceptualisation of operations. In the East Rand, the mission and capabilities were communicated to all role-players and demonstrated in practice from the beginning. The local and international monitoring teams ensured that SANDF activities were undertaken in a spirit of goodwill, in a disciplined manner, thoroughly and effectively.
- *Mutual respect* is crucial in peace support operations. Because such respect was lacking, the SANDF Group Commander defined it early on as a key factor to the success of operations in the East Rand. Within a short period of time, mostly due to the conceptualisation of the operation and the constructive role that the media played, people's attitude started to change positively towards the SANDF. At present, a great deal of mutual understanding, trust and respect for each other's capabilities and agendas exist between the community and the SANDF.
- It is important that all Security Force actions should be as *transparent* as possible to avoid misinterpretation by the parties to the conflict or the local people especially if legitimacy and credibility is lacking. The media, local leaders, international and regional peace monitors, the community at large and important shareholders in the area were given access to most activities and where possible co-operated in planning or undertaking tasks or operations. Feedback was given to the community on an ongoing basis



through forums and other measures as soon as possible after an incident or operation.

THE SANDF AND INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA

The successes achieved by the SANDF in areas such as the East Rand could serve as useful lessons for peace support operations in sub-Saharan Africa. This being said, the successes were based on the experience, skills and knowledge in a wide range of conventional, counter-insurgency and peace support operations by SANDF commanders in years of involvement in Namibia, Angola, Bophuthatswana, the townships, borders and rural areas of South Africa. Similar experiences, skills and knowledge are not directly applicable, unless they can be applied in the context of the African people, cultures and environments.


The intensive interaction between the local communities and the SANDF allowed commanders to develop appropriate negotiation skills and a thorough understanding of the local culture and environment. Apart from a hands-on training approach to planning, the exposure to a wide variety of socio-economic, welfare and political difficulties also ensured that planning skills and techniques were developed that enabled commanders to solve complex integrated problems. The insight into multidimensional problems proved to be a valuable asset and could allow the SANDF leader corps to play a positive role in international peace support operations. In the short term they could be used as facilitators, monitors, advisors, planning staff and commanders, especially in Africa.

Much of the present SANDF equipment is not suitable for peace support operations in urban areas. For example, flack jackets and webbing are too heavy, ammunition penetration capabilities are too high and weapons too clumsy. Most of the equipment, however, are suitable for rural operations. Equipment developed for highly mobile or manoeuvre operations in Namibia/Angola were utilised for peace support operations with great success in both rural and urban areas. For example, the "vlakvark" was used effectively to clear roads and the "kinekar" for audio visual communication internally and externally. The field canteen system, nightsight equipment, water purification equipment and chemicals are also appropriate.

Medical equipment of the SANDF is of a high quality and has been developed to function in remote areas. Amongst others, field hospitals and operating theatres, used in the bush-war, were successfully used when the SANDF executed a large-scale medical operation in Delmas during 1993 when a tuberculosis epidemic broke out and the SANDF was called in to stabilise the situation. The military refrained from further involvement, partly because local doctors experienced their presence as a potential threat to their market.

In the field of psychology, valuable techniques were developed, amongst others to evaluate and determine attitudes in an area, to influence attitudes and to formulate and communicate messages effectively.

Regarding intelligence, daysight, communication, detection and other technological means were used to detect and monitor illegal activities.



Computer programmes were used extensively to assist with the evaluation of information. This enabled the intelligence staff to provide intelligence at short notice which made pro-active operations possible. The experience of intelligence staff and the application of these techniques and systems will be applicable for the collection of information in urban and rural areas elsewhere in Africa.

The South African Air Force proved an invaluable asset. Their equipment, especially distance controlled aircraft (DCA) and helicopters, proved to be valuable in urban and border areas. It provided flexibility for ground forces and command and control, and enhanced the gathering of information.

CONCLUSION

The vision of the SANDF for the East Rand is the achievement of sustained and sustainable social harmony. It is believed that the stability provided by this organisation's presence in the area will continue to play an important role in reaching this goal. If social harmony can be achieved, economical growth and the consequent improvement of socio-economic conditions will take place. This will be the ultimate proof of success.

In participating successfully in the East Rand, the SANDF also demonstrated the military's potential to contribute to peacekeeping operations elsewhere, should the South African Government decide to do so.

1. Lt. Col. Hennie Luüs, military legal advisor of the Army Command Witwatersrand.
2. The Katorus Task Group was activated by Mr F.W. de Klerk, to manage the upliftment of Katorus. Its mandate was approved by the TEC and thereafter by the GNU. Until 31 May 1995, the Katorus Task Group reported to the Provincial Government of Gauteng.
3. SANDF Doctrines prescribe the Principles of War.
4. The improvement of socio-economic conditions in the area - primarily by role-players other than the security forces, contributed to the improvement of the morale of the community at large.
5. C. Harleman, Training for UN peacekeeping operations, New York, training guide.

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J.K. Cilliers (ed.), The National Peacekeeping Force, Violence on the East Rand and Public Perceptions of the NPKF in Katorus, Report of a joint project between the Human Sciences Research Council and the Institute for Defence Policy, June 1994

