South Africa's porous borders:

A haven for arms smugglers



In a stretch of border covering 80 kilometres between South Africa and Mozambique there are almost 70 uncontrolled crossing points. The terrain and climate along this border make it difficult to patrol. It is through these routes that the illegal smuggling of goods, such as firearms, stolen cars and illegal immigrants, is occurring on a large scale. How effective are current border controls? FIRE, a project within the Arms Management Programme at the ISS, has been evaluating the effectiveness of the current measures to prevent arms smuggling along certain borders.

In January 1997 the Cabinet instructed the NCPS (National Crime Prevention Strategy) ministers’ forum to develop a workable strategy to address the problem of the poor border controls on the South African borders and to implement the strategy with immediate effect. In March 1997, the NCPS ministers’ forum and directors-general of the South African Revenue Service, South African Police Service, and the department of home affairs gave their approval to promote greater co-operation between them in what was to be known as the ‘collective approach’. The National Inter Departmental Structure for Border Control (NIDS) was established to serve as the co-ordinating body.

Although there has been a great deal of concentration on combating the illegal drug trade, the smuggling of motor vehicles and the influx of illegal immigrants into South Africa, very little has been done on the smuggling of firearms into South Africa.

National firearm control debate

In South Africa, a new Firearm Control Bill is being pushed through parliament this year to tighten the control over legal firearms, and to prevent more legal firearms entering the illegal market for use in violent crime. In the approved policy document on the Firearm Control Bill, the government has indicated that improved border controls are responsible for the decline in the smuggling of firearms into South Africa. The SAPS also believes that the huge successes of the combined firearm destruction operations between South Africa and Mozambique, known as Operations Rachel, has been responsible for the decline in the seizures of AK-47s in South Africa.

It may be the case that Operations Rachel has had a small effect on the seizures of AK-47’s in South Africa. Yet it remains unproven that improved border controls have been responsible for the decline in the smuggling of firearms into South Africa. Indeed, a recent evaluation of border controls by FIRE suggests otherwise.

Porous border

One of the problem areas for the smuggling of illegal firearms into South Africa has been the international border between South Africa, Swaziland and Mozambique (Figure 1). This 220 kilometre borderline starts at the Mpumalanga /KwaZulu-Natal provincial border with Swaziland and ends at Kosi Bay on the Indian Ocean. Prior to 1994, this border area was used extensively by the different liberation movements to supply arms to internal freedom fighters. Today this border area is a favoured illegal crossing area for illegal immigrants, stolen vehicles and illegal firearms.

Figure 1 South Africa's border with Swaziland and Mozambique

In February 2000, FIRE selected this stretch of border to conduct its field research to identify illegal crossing points, routes and pipelines used by smugglers for smuggling illegal goods such as firearms. Various illegal crossing points were identified with the help of SAPS border officials stationed in the area. In the Pongola area, numerus points, such as Sivule and Sitilo, were shown where vehicles cross illegally into Swaziland from South Africa. According to one police official, an alarming number of gangs operating from Swaziland commit cross border crimes in South Africa. Some of these gangs are armed.

The biggest area of concern is the South African - Mozambican border. This approximantly 80 kilometre stretch is where, according to officials and local community leaders, some 67 crossing points remain uncontrolled.

Visiting some of these crossing points made it clear that cross border crimes are a common occurance. Anything that can be moved across the border will be moved at anytime without any interference from law enforcement agencies, the defence force or customs officials. This is not to suggest that the working relationship between the police, immigration and custom services is not good. At actual border points, the complimentary nature of their work is effective, but the same cannot be said as one moves away from these border points.

In 1998/99, a mere 49 firearms were seized at the border posts of Onverwacht, Golela and Kosi Bay. The total firearm seizures in 1999 at all the ports of entry for the SAPS border police totaled 266 weapons. Between January and March 2000, only 44 illegal weapons were seized by the SAPS border police across twelve entry points into Kwa-Zulu Natal.

It is clear that only 1% of all seizures are made at the border posts. The vast majority of seizures are made at roadblocks and in areas away from the central border post. This is not because the police is not doing its job. The lack of personnel, limited resources, sharing of intelligence between police units and defence force units, and the hostile terrain that makes patrolling difficult, are important factors in the limited success of securing borders against illegal arms smuggling.

Conclusion

It is difficult to share the confidence of the policy document of the new Firearm Control Bill that the number of illegal arms is declining since the success of Operations Rachel. This confidence is based on the false premise that the current structures and operations of border posts are working effectively. FIRE’s research shows otherwise. However, certain steps can be taken to remedy the situation:
  • Some border posts should be better maintained: proper communication systems, better accommodation, regular supply of electricity, and reliable vehicles.
  • Better intelligence gathering from the surrounding local communities should be a priority.
  • Intelligence and border statistics on seizures and arrests needs to be better understood to identify "hotspots" for concentrated police actions.
  • Greater cross border co-operation is needed between law enforcement agencies.
  • Dedicated personnel at border posts.
Ettienne Hennop
Institute for Security Studies

This article is sponsored by the following funders:

Royal Norwegian Government
Royal Swedish Government
Government of the Netherlands
Government of Switzerland
European Union