Table of contents

Background

Session 1:
Understanding the current context in the DR Congo

Session 2:
Peace agreements past and present

Session 3:
Identifying actors in the DR Congo

Session 4:
Analysing the Great Lakes region – the role of resource exploitation

Session 5:
Role of the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)

Session 6:
Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in the DR Congo

Session 7:
The Kivus – An inherently unstable region

Session 8:
Identifying priorities for the DR Congo

Annex A:
List of participants

Annex B:
Workshop agenda

This report was compiled and edited by Jakkie Cilliers, Richard Cornwell, Sarah Meek and Gladwell Otieno based on rapporteur’s reports prepared by Jenny Clover, Chris Maroleng and Thokozani Thusi. Please send any comments or questions about the report to Sarah Meek

Background

On 18 and 19 November 2002 the Arms Management and African Security Analysis Programmes of the Institute for Security Studies hosted a closed workshop on the prospects for achieving a lasting peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo)¹. The workshop was attended by a group of people who have been analysing the situation in the DR Congo and the wider Great Lakes region for many years.

The purpose of the workshop was to analyse the political, military and logistical challenges facing the government of the DR Congo and the international community in moving the peace process for the country forward. Each session of the workshop addressed a specific issue, with speakers asked to provide short introductory remarks that led to a lively and informative discussion on each theme.

This workshop report is a summary of those presentations and discussions. Each thematic area is briefly presented and the final section of the report presents some of the key findings and conclusions of the workshop. These are not ‘recommendations’ to certain groups. Rather they are areas where the workshop participants strongly felt more attention and better analysis was needed to understand and respond to the evolving situation in the Great Lakes region.

The workshop was held in mid-November and since that time three significant events have occurred: a peace agreement was signed in Burundi, the United Nations Security Council significantly strengthened the UN Mission in the DR Congo (MONUC) to prepare it for implementing the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration (DDRRR) process and, most recently, a peace accord was signed in Pretoria, South Africa by the key parties to the conflict in the DR Congo. These events signal a positive step forward for peace in the DR Congo, although large challenges still remain.

Session 1: Understanding the current context in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

It is useful to regard the conflict in the DR Congo as three overlapping wars, rather than one single sequence of conflict. The first began in 1996 when an armed rebellion against Mobutu’s regime started in eastern Congo with the support of Ugandan, Rwandan and Burundian forces tired of Kinshasa’s support for insurgent groups infiltrating their territories. It ended in May 1997 with Laurent Kabila’s self-proclamation as president of the renamed Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The second war began in August 1998, as Kabila moved to terminate his dependence on Rwanda and Uganda, and gradually came to an end following the conclusion of the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement of July 1999, which was reconfirmed by another summit in Lusaka in February 2001. What is referred to here as Congo’s third civil war has been running concomitantly with the other two and continues to this day. This is the conflict to the north and east of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) cease-fire line, involving various members of the anti-Kabila coalition, rebel groups aiming at the overthrow of the governments of Rwanda and Burundi, and local militias, some of which are associated with the Kinshasa regime.

Despite numerous attempts to end the second Congo war, this conflict continued until a military stalemate had been reached. The achievement of the cease-fire was also to an extent the result of the intervention and pressure of Western powers. The strength of the Lusaka Agreement was that it recognised overlapping layers of interstate and internal conflict. It also identified the need for a national dialogue to address serious domestic political issues in the DR Congo in addition to the security concerns of Rwanda and Burundi. What it omitted, however, were the concerns of the Mai-Mai, a significant, albeit disparate group that was determined to expel the Rwandan occupiers. This omission planted the seeds for the third Congo war.

Kinshasa and Zimbabwe had supported the Mai-Mai insurgency both materially and morally, partly because they saw it as a way of weakening Rwanda through the Mai-Mai’s association with the Rwandan Liberation Army (Armée pour la Libération du Rwanda - AliR). In this third Congo war, as in the second, Kinshasa’s allies, including the Mai-Mai, were never strong enough to expel the Rwandans. The international community’s decision to ignore this particular conflict was to prove significant. External diplomatic intervention at this juncture could have helped prevent some of the atrocities committed and might also have achieved a clear separation of the Mai-Mai from AliR.

In the balance of power, Kinshasa has enjoyed two advantages: none of the rebel movements opposed to it could duplicate the legitimacy of the state, however precarious; and as a government recognised in the international arena Kinshasa drew advantage from its relations with the wider community of states.

Session 2: Peace agreements past and present

The Lusaka Agreement failed to pave the way to a lasting solution to the Congolese conflict not only because of a lack of international support. Although the agreement went a long way to addressing internal and external concerns and identifying real issues and the interconnectedness of various agendas, it was weak in that it left implementation to the belligerents themselves, making it possible for those who wanted to check or sabotage the process to do so. At the beginning, the most significant was Laurent Kabila’s obstructionism. This was manifested most clearly in his treatment of ex-President Masire of Botswana, who had been nominated by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the position of facilitator of the agreement. It was perverse that Laurent Kabila chose to carry on waging war to seize full control of the Congo when his true advantage lay along the diplomatic road, where he could deploy all the advantages of internationally recognised incumbency. Though politically relatively strong, Kabila was militarily weak, as the effective forces in his alliance, from Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia, were not his own. Indeed, had it not been for the murder of Laurent Kabila in January 2001 and the succession to the presidency of his son, Joseph, who swiftly adopted a more diplomatic tone, Jean-Pierre Bemba’s Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (MLC) could well have seized Mbandaka and the Rwandans would have moved on Lubumbashi and possibly Mbuji-Mayi.

When major negotiations reopened in April 2002 at Sun City, South Africa, these failed to achieve a comprehensive agreement because the balance achieved at Lusaka was ignored. Discussions centred solely upon who was to get which position in an administration charged with preparing for a democratic transition. The pact that was eventually reached between Kinshasa and the MLC in April 2002 was doomed to failure because of the lop-sided nature of the power balance. Only later did Bemba realise that he had lost a great deal by entering into this unequal transaction, while Kabila thought he had gained by having his role recognised as president during the transition.

The Pretoria Agreement of August 2002 constitutes a return to the principles of the Lusaka Agreement but adds the benefit of introducing those components essential to implementation. In brief, the Pretoria Agreement committed the Rwandans to withdraw their forces from DR Congo and for the Congolese government to support the disarmament, demobilisation and repatriation of ALiR I and ALiR II (those groups identified in the Lusaka Agreement as ‘the negative forces’). An extremely ambitious time frame of ninety days was set, in an effort to move the peace process forwards. To the surprise of many, Rwanda appeared to keep to its side of the bargain, rapidly withdrawing more than 20,000 soldiers to its own soil. This left the awkward question of what other surrogate forces might have been left in place in eastern Congo by either Rwanda or Burundi, to serve their interests. Whether Joseph Kabila could fulfil his undertakings remained doubtful. Nevertheless, the introduction of the Third Party, South Africa to assist the United Nations (UN) in promoting and encouraging the peace process was an important step.

To date, the role of the UN has been that of a passive, subordinate observer – the worst possible position to be in. Without political and military support from the members of the UN Security Council (UNSC), the UN has no mechanism for doing more than cajoling the various parties and monitoring the unfolding situation. In this role, the UN remains largely impotent to influence political events and is not in a position to enforce the disarmament of the negative forces.

Although the UNSC recognised the weakness of the Lusaka Agreement, it was unable to press for a revision to the Agreement to create the international conditions necessary to put pressure on the parties. Instead, the UNSC has adopted resolutions that attempt to amend the Agreement in a piecemeal manner. South Africa is seeking a substantive revision, starting with the Lusaka Agreement and building on documents developed at Sun City, which continue to serve as important points of reference for the peace process.

There is considerable debate as to whether the efforts to achieve a cease-fire in the third war will succeed. Certainly more comprehensive agreements are required than simply a cease-fire if the conflict is to be ended. In so many of the past agreements on the Great Lakes region, the absentees have returned to haunt the process. A major question is whether the situation in the Kivu region (i.e. North and South Kivu) within the Great Lakes conflict system is being addressed sufficiently by the currently applicable Pretoria Agreement. The objective that could have been achieved, namely the separation of the Mai-Mai from the Rwandan and Burundian Hutu rebels could have contributed to greater progress. The Lusaka Agreement grouped all these people as the ‘negative forces’, but did not reflect how they relate to each other. Recent weeks have seen an uneasy cease-fire in the Kivus, but there has been no attempt to convert this into a political agreement to end hostilities between the groups.

In peace processes there is a tendency for the focus to be on ending the violent conflict leaving the causes of the conflict to be dealt with once there is a cease-fire. This was the reason why Sun City failed – it did not deal with Rwanda’s problem, which is far more important than is generally recognised. If the Rwandan problem is not addressed, it will continue to bedevil the prospects for a regional peace settlement. Unfortunately many myths have gathered around this issue, leading to the conviction of some leaders, including the late Laurent Kabila and Zimbabwean President Mugabe, that they were countering a non-Bantu attempt to establish a Tutsi-dominated empire in east-central Africa. The issue of the Kivus per se has not been addressed yet and is not integrated in current agreements. The Mai-Mai are connected with the main belligerents to the extent that they must fall in with any agreement that is reached. The ethnic dimension has been underestimated and has the potential to affect the whole region.

The current substantive neglect of the Kivus is critical: this is a bloodbath that could continue to worsen even if the current negotiations are successful. At worst we could see the emergence of a pan-Hutu alliance seeking to make a concerted effort to overthrow the governments of Burundi and Rwanda in succession.

There are other ways in which oversimplification is harming the search for solutions. Generalisations about the eastern Congo are rife. For example, Ituri is different from Kivu, and South Kivu is different from North Kivu and these regions must have tailored approaches. In addition, the Mai-Mai groups vary vastly – and there is little evidence to suggest that this is widely understood. A great deal more detailed information is required about the politics and economics of this localised conflict if sensible interventions are to be attempted.

Similarly, although the Hutu/Tutsi conflict is the source of many of the problems in the Congo, a sharp distinction should be made between the ways this manifests itself in Rwanda and Burundi. Thus, a solution to the Burundian dilemma would have a very positive effect on DR Congo’s third war as it would take the Burundian rebel Forces for the Defence of Democracy (FDD) out of the equation. But in Rwanda the same consideration does not apply: President Kagame is not prepared to accept power sharing. A substantial number of Rwandan Hutus have accepted a modus vivendi inside Rwanda. Demands for political liberalisation there as a prerequisite for a regional settlement would be tantamount to expecting the DR Congo to pay an undefined price for the relatively poor prospect of solving the Hutu problem in Rwanda.

In many respects, little progress is being made on the much-vaunted ‘regional approach’ to the wars in the Great Lakes region. The region is as divided as ever and most players appear to be pursuing narrow survival interests. Neighbouring countries are implicated as interested parties and have therefore sacrificed their credibility as mediators. Despite the efforts by South Africa and others, the situation in the DR Congo and the neighbouring countries to the east demands an expanded role for the United Nations and MONUC.

Session 3: Identifying the actors in the DR Congo

The Congolese political arena has been deeply fractured since before independence. The Belgian colonial power actively discouraged the emergence of nationwide political parties, and elected local councils were introduced only shortly before the hasty departure of the Belgians. The provincialisation and, by extension, ethnicisation of politics were further encouraged by Katanga’s abortive attempt at secession and were perpetuated and reinforced during Mobutu’s rule as he played one group off against another in a complex game of shifting patronage. The end of the Cold War eroded his value as an ally of the West and exposed him to new demands for a democratic transition. Mobutu reacted cynically, encouraging the formation of a plethora of political movements, whose numbers eventually ran into the hundreds.

As a result, there are a large number of individuals and groupings that have played a role in the past, and many more are waiting for their chance to do so, for prominence in the political arena can pave the way to material success. The jostling for position also manifests itself within groupings, which fracture and re-align with scant regard for ideological or policy considerations. Neighbouring countries, such as Rwanda, benefit from the weak leadership in the DR Congo, which allows them to play a role without necessarily engaging local support. Other foreign and external actors also exploit a situation in which they are able to exert influence in what remains to some extent a political vacuum.

In these circumstances, the identification of political players with lasting qualities becomes something of a lottery, especially as the focus shifts over time. For instance, Masunzu formerly of the RCD defected in January 2002. He is now an important, if local, actor in his own right in the security of the High Plateau and thus becomes significant in resolving the issue of Banyamulenge citizenship.

Joseph Kabila’s suspension of several key figures in the heart of his administration following the release of the third report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (the Kassem Report) also demonstrates how people once regarded as untouchable can find their positions in jeopardy at short notice. This has left a dangerous vacuum in Kinshasa and has also altered the relationships between Kabila and the ‘negative forces’ in the east. It also suggests a shift from his dependency on the Zimbabweans, and a growing reliance on Western financial assistance with all the alterations in patronage networks this entails, given the weakness of Congolese Armed Forces (FAC) – itself largely an unknown quantity. More information is necessary on FAC, its ethnic composition, its numbers and so on. More information is also required on the way the personal security of the president is handled, given his father's fate. It would seem unlikely that he will place too much trust in the FAC as indicated by the fact that foreign experts are dealing with this sensitive issue for him.

The relevance of political players fluctuates, especially when a peace process is exclusively leadership driven, as is the case here. How facilitators accommodate the shifting sands of frequent personnel changes when often the leadership has no real mandate remains a key concern, raising questions around whom they represent and whether can they take binding decisions. This is a problem for all the players in DR Congo at a time when few resources, if any, are devoted to building the capacity of local leadership.

The Lusaka negotiations included civil society, but this approach is not without risk. Opening the door may simply admit to the process ‘leaders’ who are without any real following - there are players who are able to sell themselves well in international circles and thereby gain funding, but they are often not much more than ambitious and gifted individuals. This has been aggravated by foreign actors who continue to play an important role in supporting certain local players to the detriment of others. This situation is also one prone to frequent changes.

In this environment the whole idea of legitimacy becomes one of contestation, so while armed groups are easier to identify, it is the un-armed – the largest group - which can lay claim to represent the interests of the inhabitants of the DR Congo. Being capable of using armed force may appear to be a necessary requirement for being treated as a serious actor, but without any guarantee of commanding a large following it is not sufficient.

Essentially the DR Congo had a non-violent political culture, which rejected mobilisation for violence in the period after the upheavals of the mid-1960s. The final decade of Mobutu’s rule is linked to that culture. It is not necessarily fixed or permanent, but is a specific response reflected in the different culture in the Kinshasa-controlled areas where power is relatively easily achieved with the use of little muscle. In the east, a culture of violent political action finds acceptance because of the influence of neighbouring countries. It is also easier to analyse power in the east where there is a culture of support for certain groups and opposition towards others; thus the Mai-Mai have broad support as defenders against Rwandan occupation. The RCD-Goma has little popular support and is in dire straits following the departure of the Rwandan army.

In Bemba’s area the Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution (MPR), the ruling party under Mobutu, remains a factor. In Equatoria the memory of Mobutu is warmly held, although Bemba has in part managed to capture this mantle. In other parts of the country, the MPR has questionable structures in place. It also has links with army officers and some MPR members in exile still have links as an officer corps and have in common a great resentment against the generals, the baron thieves of the Mobutu regime.

There is an enormous problem of legitimacy of leaders, the absence of which creates problems for real transition. The difficulty at present is that there is a risk that there will be a political stitch-up between the principal armed groups and the international community; Congolese civil society will then have to fall in behind those arrangements. This begs the question of what is meant by inter-Congolese dialogue.

Session 4: Analysing the Great Lakes region – the role of resource exploitation

The third report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (the Kassem Report) has shed new light on aspects of the dynamics of the conflict in the region. The panel was established by the UN Secretary-General in response to a resolution of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and is unique in UN history in that it investigates economic malfeasance inside a member state. Predictably, the ambassadors to the UN from Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Zimbabwe rejected the report on its publication. Most interesting was the Congolese government's response, which was to suspend a number of ministers as well as the ambassador to Zimbabwe, a move that if taken seriously lends credibility to the report's conclusions. The broader implications of the report may stimulate more concerted pressure against Uganda, Rwanda and Zimbabwe, and concomitantly increase resistance to its findings.

The identification in the report of major Western companies’ involvement in the networks engaged in looting the Congo suggest that there is much more that can be done to halt the crisis and stabilise the peace process. Targeting Western resource extraction companies would, however, require the active support and engagement of members of the UNSC and others. The Congolese government and its people have finite control over the disposal of national assets, which is more a function of clever lawyers acting for people in uniform with guns. Although the illegal exploitation of the Congo's resources has prolonged the conflict, it did not cause it. This being said, the tangled web of legal (and not so legal) contracts in the Congo will have to be untangled as a first step in returning at least some of that country’s wealth to its citizens.

Recent reshuffles in local commands and in local government structures would suggest that the principals to the conflict are reconfiguring their presence in Dr Congo to make their economic interests less obvious. For example adjustments are being made to the joint venture companies through which individuals engaged in the economy of DR Congo, to disguise and to ensure their continued involvement.

Elsewhere, in Uganda, the extension of the life of the Porter Commission of Inquiry, which is investigating the exploitation of natural resources in the DR Congo by Ugandans, is not an adequate response. The Porter Commission’s cooperation with the UN Panel was inconsistent and its staff lack investigative powers. Within DR Congo, at the apparent insistence of international financial institutions, Kabila has appointed a Prosecutor-General to take forward the issues raised in the report. A new mining code now emphasizes that all mining contracts must go through parliament and that, by implication, all wartime contracts will have to be reviewed.

Time will tell if this confrontation with deeply vested interests will be successful and whether these actions reflect a principled commitment to redress the inequalities of the past, or only a more expedient and opportune action against his political rivals and competing sources of patronage. For its part, Rwanda released a 15-page rebuttal within two days of the publication of the report, which essentially rejected every aspect advanced by the UN Panel.

What the latest Kassem Report has demonstrated quite clearly is the need for a regional approach to the DR Congo peace process, though exactly how this should be sequenced remains a conundrum. Creating different solutions to the internal problems of Burundi on the one hand and Rwanda on the other, or seeking a solution in one but not the other will also not work in the long term. Obviously simultaneous solutions are unlikely, however, and the Kivus should not have their future held hostage indefinitely against the day when all-inclusive regional arrangements are agreed.

At the root of many observers’ difficulties, and of the international community and local actors alike, is the continuing lack of reliable and disinterested information and analysis of what is happening. Since nobody is being seen as truly neutral, this compounds the problem.

Session 5: The role of the United Nations Mission – MONUC

The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) is currently implementing phase III of its activities. Phase III focuses on the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration (DDRRR) component of the mission. Arguably it is one of the most challenging DDR programmes ever coordinated by a UN peacekeeping mission. The DDRRR process consists of developing and coordinating the implementation of the programme by the various governments, UN agencies and NGOs involved. The United Nations Security Council on 4 December strengthened MONUC’s force strength to 8,700 from its current level of 4,250 (with an authorized force strength of 5,537 set in January 2002), which allows the mission to expand its presence to the eastern reaches of the country.

It must be borne in mind constantly that this mission is essentially an observer mission and not a peace enforcement mission. Phase I, involving the deployment of military observers (MilObs) and liaison officers, was completed by the end of 2000. In Phase II new cease-fire lines were drawn and completed. During this phase the mission has been monitoring and verifying the cease-fire lines, using 90 MILOB teams at 50 sites. Phase III concerns the process of DDRRR. Finally, Phase IV is intended as the transition to peace-building, which, at best, may not be completed before the end of 2004.

A major concern is that the planning process appears to be essentially military, and takes no account of the changing political situation as a result of the disparate division of roles that has developed in recent months.

Some important observations are relevant at this juncture. It is very significant that the Lusaka Agreement termed ‘foreign forces’ have accepted the principles of DDRRR. This process will depend on voluntary repatriation, and some disarmed fighters will have to be accompanied by dependants. MONUC has to coordinate DDRRR based this principle and has no coercive authority. In addition, MONUC can undertake the voluntary disarmament of armed groups, such as the Mai-Mai. Military observers will be used in Phase III to gather information from villages and communities about whether demobilisation is desired; they will then establish reception centres in appropriate locations. After the sites have fulfilled their purpose, they will be closed and MilObs will move on to others with an interest in DDRRR. Operations will be small-scale and mobile. It is planned that even if only 20 people show an interest in demobilisation, the MONUC team will go to them. This presents a new set of logistical problems for the UN , which is more familiar with operating larger, more static disarmament and demobilisation reception centres.

The greatest logistical problems are access to the eastern Congo region as a whole (the 120 km rail line from Kisangani to Ubundu could take up to two years to repair). The UN has also had to factor in the increased costs of moving disarmed foreign forces by air, either aircraft or helicopters. Already logistical difficulties mean that roughly 60 per cent of the MONUC budget is dedicated to air transport.

Currently MONUC is starting to implement Phase III activities while it continues to monitor the cease-fire lines to verify the disengagement of forces. With the UNSC resolution of 4 December, the new mandate shifts the emphasis to the east of DR Congo and creates two ‘forward forces’ task forces in Kindu and Kisangani. Current planning is that the first Task Force will be deployed in early 2003. South Africa will supply a battalion to Kindu as the first Task Force. The establishment of forward headquarters in Kindu was determined by logistical considerations, despite its obvious isolation from the main area of operations in the far east of DR Congo. It remains to be seen if this approach will work, given difficulties of travel and logistical access.

There are bound to be problems with the concept of voluntary disarmament, but these are unavoidable given the nature of the war in the DR Congo, MONUC’s mandate and the difficulty of securing adequate numbers of troops and funding for a more robust operation. Success for the DDRRR phase of the mission largely will be contingent on skilful negotiation and the unfolding peace process.

The continuing challenge for MONUC is its reliance on factors and issues over which it has little control. For example, the unfolding peace process in Burundi affects the repatriation of the FDD. The reception of repatriated Rwandese in Rwanda will influence the future success of MONUC Phase III and, obviously, the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement is being watched closely by all involved.

Session 6: Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration in the DR Congo

The disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration process involves many more actors than MONUC itself. Some observers have said that the successful implementation of the DDRRR process is critical to building a more peaceful region in the Great Lakes. The United Nations mission in DR Congo maintains a coordination unit based in Kinshasa. This unit is responsible for coordinating with the non-MONUC organisations involved in the DDRRR process, namely the World Bank, UN agencies and NGOs. For those areas that fall outside MONUC’s mandate, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank are currently discussing the process of coordination, primarily to avoid the competitiveness inherent in other recent DDR efforts.

General difficulties are foreseen in the process of DDRRR. Recent events in Kamina, where news of the forced repatriation to Rwanda of ex-FAR/Interahamwe leaders sparked off a mutiny by Interahamwe forces cantoned under the supervision of MONUC, demonstrate some of the challenges faced by the DDR process. The mutineers plundered the local armoury and a large-scale flight of demobilised combatants towards the eastern DR Congo occurred.

There are three identifiable groups who are expected to be part of the DDRRR process: 1) Masterminds of the 1994 genocide wanted for appearances before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR); 2) Those of lower rank who may have committed crimes during the Rwandan genocide and have to be found a third country in which to resettle; 3) The third and largest group are the refugees who should be returned to Rwanda.

The second group poses the larger challenge, as the UN Secretary-General has to find a third country willing to accept the people involved, although the number of people to be resettled appears small. For the third group, good communications, adequate logistical arrangements and a conducive environment in Rwanda are key to facilitating their repatriation.

The DDRRR process will be confronted with groups with widely differing agendas:

Those groups willing to be part of the disarmament and peace process who will need to be distinguished from;



Those with a regional and ethnic agenda who will not be willing to disarm and will want to continue to fighting; and



The many groups in the Kivus who are using arms to maintain their control over resources. They are not rebels, but they will not generally be willing to disarm.

It is very difficult to implement a process of disarmament with an enshrined mandate of voluntarism. The willingness of the leaders of the various armed groups to continue fighting should not be underestimated. An additional logistical challenge for MONUC will be the physical disposal of weapons and ammunition in difficult circumstances.

Repatriation is a key component of maintaining peace in the region and there is a need to take a clear line on this issue. It is important to deal with the groupings of Rwandese combatants and not to ignore them. MONUC must go to where they are and not leave the problem for Rwanda to solve. In addition, community-based reintegration and recovery programmes are needed to increase the absorptive capacity of communities.

There are two main problem areas with respect to implementing the DDRRR process in the Kivu region of eastern DR Congo. These are firstly with regard to the Interahamwe and whether they will remain or be repatriated. Living conditions for Interahamwe are far worse then they were a few years ago and there are tensions between them and Mai-Mai, so this might help the DDRRR process. In fact, it is conceivable that the Mai-Mai would turn on the Interahamwe and ex-FAR as soon as the Government of National Unity (GNU) is established, given their historical role of opposing all foreign opponents. In the Kivus there are organised Interahamwe units who want to return to Rwanda: the challenge is to separate them from those who want to continue to fight so as to ensure that those who do not wish to return do not have an influence over those who do.

In addition to the UN-led DDRRR process, the DR Congo government must create a body with international support to encourage the Congolese under its area of control to disarm, demobilise and be reintegrated into a new Congolese armed force (a DDR programme that parallels the DDRRR process). This process is complicated as it is politically charged.

A substantive challenge lies in determining the formation of the new army. This will involve deciding on the appropriate size of the armed forces. It is also necessary to identify those to be demobilized and how they should best be reintegrated into army and society in order to optimise available capacities and resources.

A larger concern is how to sustain the demobilised troops in the critical period between demobilisation and their finding employment. The suggestion of the Mozambique experience was put forward: in that case ex-combatants were given a two-year salary in the form of a ‘cheque book’ against which they could draw a monthly income. The application of such an idea in DR Congo would be costly but the benefits could be considerable and cost less in terms of peace-building and preventing future conflict.

The World Bank has established a multi-donor trust fund for the Great Lakes and developed procedures to apply for funding for DDRRR/DDR projects. The need for a coordinated approach to DDRRR has meant that UN agencies and international NGOs are working together based on areas of competency. A key concern remains the need to develop and sustain the coordination of the DDRRR process and ensuring funding for the entire effort.

In the Great Lakes region, UNDP has realised that it cannot achieve its role as a development agency in a region with excessive weapons availability. Small arms reduction has therefore become a key component of its development work in post conflict situations and the Small Arms Reduction Programme, based in Nairobi, Kenya, will take care of small arms reduction activities within a broader UNDP community recovery programme for eastern DR Congo. Like the DDRRR process, the lack of infrastructure makes projects on small arms in communities in the DR Congo very expensive to implement. The United Nations Development Programme is conscious that voluntary disarmament cannot work without the creation of alternative livelihoods. However identifying appropriate tools or incentives that will provide sustainable incomes is a key challenge when many participants have few, if any, business or micro-enterprise skills.

The UNDP supports the DDRRR process through:

Inter-agency coordination of DDRRR through the UN resident coordinator system,



Capacity building support to the government on DDRRR,



Community based reintegration of ex-combatants and recovery, by increasing the absorptive capacity of communities through increased economic opportunities, infrastructure and productivity, providing short and long term employment generating options for ex-combatants,



Small arms reduction through its regional programme which links small arms reduction to community recovery, breaking the link between localised armed violence and impoverishment.

It will be necessary to include and cooperate with civil society and national NGOs in both the DDRRR and the reintegration process. NGOs, who often work at grass-roots level in DR Congo, provide valuable information on arms possession and those interested in participating in the parallel DDRRR/DDR processes. Furthermore, civil society groups in DR Congo have succeeded in building good relations with NGOs in the entire Great Lakes region with the purpose of increasing dialogue and finding constructive approaches to conflict management. For long-term success in the DR Congo, these groups should be capacitated so that they can assist in implementing reconstruction programmes, in particular so that local bodies will sustain these following the eventual withdrawal of the UN and other agencies.

Session 7: The Kivus: An inherently unstable region?

All three of Congo’s wars started in the Kivus, especially the first, partly because of the Banyamulenge and disputes about their Congolese citizenship. Rights were denied, granted, and again withdrawn, and remain contested to this day. Caught in the space between the ‘hammer’ of other issues affecting the Kivus and the ‘anvil’ of Rwanda, the Banyamulenge are in an unenviable position. Following the withdrawal of the Rwandan troops, it will be interesting to observe the reaction of other Congolese groups to these people.

One cannot separate the fortunes of the Kivus from those of Rwanda and Burundi, given the population movements and economic links built up over decades. Until 1996, the Kivus were barely governed from Kinshasa, leading to the development of a sense of autonomy and the creation of fiefdoms, complete with taxes. This now raises the question of how the conclusion of the war and attempts to establish sovereign control will be perceived both by local actors and by those neighbouring states that have developed strong interests in the Congo. They may not want to forfeit this sense of autonomy.

To some extent, this is true of many regions of the DR Congo, as the exercise of state power has manifested itself largely in the operations of the security forces and secret police. Local leaders with political aspirations sought to make their careers in Kinshasa, where the governors were appointed. This all affects the balance between centralised and devolved government, which is proving a key challenge for the Kinshasa-based government at present.

Over the past two-and-a-half years the principal expression of power in the Kivus has emanated from Kigali. Prior to that Kinshasa exercised sporadic control. There must be recognition of the inevitability of the continued interests of Rwanda and Burundi in the Kivu provinces – especially in the realm of security. In addition, those small eastern neighbours must have border arrangements that are sufficiently fluid to continue allowing the migration of labour. Given the agricultural economic base of Rwanda and Burundi that labour force has to find space to subsist. But that neighbourly relationship has not been constructed in a positive way, and there is a need to restore more normal relationships between the three core constituencies: Kinshasa, Kigali and Bujumbura.

Given the void of governmental involvement, legitimacy in the region exists at local/village level but is not present hierarchically. There is a vibrant civil society built by groups that have filled the void left by the neglect of central government and state provision. The hope for the region lies in their capacity.

Session 8: Identifying priorities for the DR Congo

Throughout the workshop issues were highlighted that participants believed were in need of further exploration. These were discussed in the final session of the workshop and are presented below.
The drive to reach a peace agreement

Workshop participants identified a series of issues that are relevant to the on-going peace negotiations. These include the following:

The root causes of conflict must be identified and addressed, in particular conflicting regional ethnic agendas. This may require intensive analysis and consultation, through conferences and workshops to identify these causes and provide guidance to local and external actors.



Inclusiveness in the search for peace is important and should be maintained. More clarity is needed in identifying relevant groups, their location and alliances and linkages to other groups. Assistance should be provided to help parties to develop their negotiating capacity so that they can play a positive and constructive role in negotiations.



The tendency towards a pro-government bias should be addressed. This bias places a disadvantage on non-state actors and risks failing to engage them in the peace process.



There is a need to find agreement on the final structure of the Congolese state – in particular the balance between centralized and decentralized government. Sovereignty, including that over resources and taxation should be restored to the state. The authority of the state should be re-established and thought given to the rebuilding of those institutions that are mandated to provide individual and community security, such as the police force, criminal justice system and local authorities.



The government of the DR Congo must demonstrate tangible efforts to respond to the challenges posed by the ex-FAR/Interahamwe and should receive support to undertake this.



There is a need for agreement on the size and configuration of a future Congolese army.

DDRRR and the maintenance of peace in the Great Lakes

An effective DDRRR process was continually highlighted as one of the key factors in stabilising the situation in the Great Lakes region. In addition to focusing on the present situation however, participants also looked forward to the steps that will be necessary to maintain peace in the DR Congo and wider Great Lakes region. Observations and suggested steps identified during the workshop include the following:

An international contact group, consisting perhaps of Belgium, France, the UK and other interested parties should be established to give MONUC and the Congolese peace process consistent international political backing.



The potential of the unresolved crises in Burundi and Rwanda to destabilise the region need to be recognised and acted upon. It is necessary to adopt a differentiated approach, which takes cognisance of the varying internal situations in Rwanda and Burundi to avoid making peace in the DR Congo contingent on the achievement of, for example, democratisation in Rwanda, while at the same time maintaining the latter goal as a necessary condition for sustainable peace in the region.



There should be formal recognition of the regional linkages of the peace processes in the Great Lakes, especially to prevent the worst-case scenario of the war in the eastern DR Congo shifting to Burundi.



A person of international stature and acceptance should be appointed to drive and monitor implementation of the peace agreements and lead teams of mediators in the areas of violence in the country.



The deployment of MONUC must be reoriented eastwards, prioritising deployment of troops closer to the border where rebel forces are located. Redeploying the headquarters of MONUC itself eastwards would have greater impact than moving the logistics base forward.



The relative roles and interaction between South Africa and MONUC and South Africa’s role in MONUC must be clear to avoid duplication and confusion.



There is an apparent lack of coordination between the programmes of different UN organizations whose role in the DDR process is vital. A lead agency should be defined with responsibility for demobilisation and resettlement, or MONUC’s mandate expanded to incorporate this function.



It must be ensured that those who do not wish to participate in the DDRRR process do not have an influence on those who do.



The good offices of the UN Secretary General should be sought to identify potential third countries that are ready to accept demobilised combatants who are unwilling to return to their home countries.



Current agreements have focussed on political and security aspects to the neglect of economic issues. The innovative developmental approach initially adopted by MONUC, which sought to open up economic space, should be revived.



The recommendations of the Kassem Report should be implemented in a concrete form. The issue of the continuity of the UN Panel should be addressed and diplomatic pressure should be exercised to secure follow up on the results of the Kassem Report in the region. Illicit exploitation of resources should be ended and the mineral wealth of the DR Congo redirected towards the development of its people. Over-exploitative contracts should be re-negotiated and the role of organised cross-border criminality in prolonging the conflict should be addressed.



Practical developmental measures on a small scale at the community level should be undertaken to reinforce the achievements of peace.



In general there remains a low level of international commitment, especially with regard to funding, which needs to be increased. There is a need for aid that can be disbursed quickly to deal with the humanitarian crisis and provide an incentive for peace.



Economic assistance should be given to ex-combatants to fill the gap between demobilisation and reintegration to discourage the temptation to return to arms.

Note

The workshop was funded by the donors of the Arms Management Programme, whose continued support is greatly appreciated. They are: the Federal Republic of Germany, the government of Norway, the government of Switzerland, the government of Sweden and the Embassy of Finland, South Africa.

This report was compiled and edited by Jakkie Cilliers, Richard Cornwell, Sarah Meek and Gladwell Otieno based on repporteur's reports prepared by Jenny Clover, Chris Maroleng and Thokozani Thusi.

ANNEX A

Workshop participants