Chapter 2

RESPONSES TO ORGANISED CRIME IN SADC:
INTERPOL AND SARPCCO

Frank Msutu
Head, Harare Interpol Subregional Bureau and SARPCCO Secretariat

Published in Monograph No 56, June 2001
Organised Crime in Southern Africa
Assessing Legislation
Edited by Charles Goredema


Introduction

The term ‘organised crime’ is derived from the ability of criminals to organise themselves and their activities along the lines of a properly organised and well-managed business entity. These groups sometimes organise their criminal activities in such a way that they are disguised under legitimate business activities. To this end, an organisational structure may be in place with each division of the structure carrying a specific responsibility. The organisation may consist of a number of loosely connected substructures with complementary expertise. The organised group may be involved in one or in several types of crime, depending on their speciality. In the Southern African region, there are several organised groups specialising in a variety of crimes, including armed robberies, motor vehicle thefts, drug-trafficking, stock theft, firearms-smuggling, illegal immigrants and trafficking in people, diamond-smuggling and others. The groups may work together in certain situations when there is a need to link their activities or exchange commodities.

In discussing trends and patterns of organised crime, this chapter will be restricted to practical issues from a regional policing point of view. It will look at what the Southern Africa’s police forces and services are trying to do to combat crime in its organised form.

Interpol in Southern Africa

The Interpol Subregional Bureau for Southern Africa started operating on 3 February 1997. This was made possible by Resolution AGN/63/P.Res/24 of the 63rd General Assembly of Interpol in Rome. Prior to this resolution, all Interpol activities were centralised at the Interpol headquarters in Lyons, France.

Upon commencing operations, the Subregional Bureau put in place a strategic plan with, over and above the general objectives of Interpol, the following objectives:
  • to study and evaluate regional and international crime trends, perceived by the chiefs of police of the region as priority crimes in order to advise the police organisations of the region on crime trends and their effects, thus enabling them to take the necessary steps to counter the incidence of crime either as individual countries or jointly as a region, through the exchange of criminal intelligence, joint operations or joint training exercises;
  • to promote and co-ordinate the objectives and initiatives of Interpol in the region in a bid to facilitate regional and international police co-operation in the investigation of criminal matters;
  • to encourage and maintain mutual trust between and among the police organisations of the region in order to maximise co-operation against crime;
  • to co-ordinate regional training activities in order to assist in raising the general performance of specialised police units to acceptable standards according to the requirements of the police chiefs of the region, and to prepare and facilitate any training initiatives that may be required by the General Secretariat of Interpol from time to time;
  • to facilitate co-operation and meetings to resolve legal issues which may inhibit police co-operation and other joint activities in the region;
  • to act as the Secretariat of the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation (SARPCCO), to ensure and enhance proper communication links and co-operation between SARPCCO and the General Secretariat of Interpol, and to ensure a free flow of crime-related information and intelligence between national co-ordinating structures and the General Secretariat;
  • to co-ordinate and facilitate sport and cultural exchanges by police forces or services in the region; and
  • to evaluate all regional projects, to provide feedback to the Secretary-General of Interpol, and to advise the contracting states of results.
In studying regional and international trends of the priority crimes within the context of these objectives, it was imperative to look at the possibility of linkages between these crimes. Questionnaires were sent to the countries in the region, and officers at the Bureau also studied crime reports that came through formal and informal channels.

At the time, there was very little focus by the General Secretariat on the development of criminal activities in Africa, especially in Africa south of the Sahara. The criminal world, however, was aware that countermeasures were concentrated in other parts of the world, leaving Africa wide open for criminal exploitation, the cultivation of new trafficking routes, the recruiting of contacts and the creation of new cells. For instance, Interpol’s drug-trafficking analysis indicated mostly that heroin, hashish and other hard drugs were going into Europe from Asia through the ‘Golden Triangle’, a route linking Asia with Western Europe through Eastern Europe and North Africa. International policing attention and efforts were therefore naturally concentrated on countering international drug traffic on this route.

It was only later that it was realised that other trafficking routes had been created through South Africa, Nigeria, Angola and Tanzania. New routes are continuously being discovered in Africa that were not known before. It is a fact that the trafficking transit points normally establish themselves as the epicentre of local and regional abuse of the trafficked contraband as residual particles will find their way to local communities. In this case, a new consumer base is created and this means a new market for the commodity. The proceeds are then laundered and transferred to offshore banks and the country where the market is situated obviously loses hard currency in the process.

The above is only a scenario meant to explain why Interpol saw the need for regionalising its activities, hence six subregional bureaux have been established throughout the world.

The Southern African Subregional Bureau covers 12 countries, all of them members of SADC: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The only two SADC countries not directly linked to the Subregional Bureau are the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Seychelles.

SARPCCO

The twelve countries mentioned above came together at the end of August 1995 and formed SARPCCO. The Interpol Subregional Bureau acts as the Secretariat for SARPCCO. The objectives of SARPCCO, according to its constitution, are subject to the provisions of domestic laws and include the following:
  • to promote, strengthen and perpetuate co-operation and foster joint strategies for the management of all forms of crossborder and related crimes with regional implications;
  • to prepare and disseminate relevant information on criminal activities as may be necessary to benefit members in their attempts to contain crime in the region;
  • to carry out regular reviews of joint crime management strategies in the light of changing national and regional needs and priorities;
  • to ensure the efficient operation and management of criminal records and the efficient joint monitoring of crossborder crime, taking full advantage of the relevant facilities available through Interpol;
  • to make relevant recommendations to governments of member countries in relation to matters affecting effective policing in the Southern Africa region;
  • to formulate systematic regional police training policies and strategies, taking into account the needs and performance requirements of the regional police services or forces; and
  • to carry out any relevant and appropriate acts and strategies for purposes of promoting regional police co-operation and collaboration as dictated by regional circumstances.

SARPCCO co-operation agreement

An Agreement in respect of Co-operation and Mutual Assistance in the Field of Crime Combating was signed by SARPCCO members in Harare on 1 October 1997. The Agreement allows police officers of the region to enter countries of other parties with the authority to do so, for the purpose of police investigations, seizure of exhibits, tracing and questioning of witnesses. The actual seizures, tracing, questioning of witnesses and arrest of criminals, however, are to be carried out by police officers of the host country.

This agreement has opened a new chapter to policing in Southern Africa as it removes all suspicions about whether one police force or service could act on information from another. The agreement also allows for the exchange of criminal intelligence as the police in the region recognised the fact that criminals are not controlled by political boundaries.

Police forces have traditionally been taught to be guardians of information. Because of legislation guarding official secrets, there was previously no scope for providing information to a foreign police organisation. As a result, criminal intelligence was jealously guarded and would never be disclosed. The SARPCCO constitution and agreement have assisted in breaking barriers in the Southern African region, and information is being exchanged more freely for the purposes of combating criminal activities in the region.

Through the regionalisation of Interpol and the SARPCCO grouping, it has become possible to conduct joint police operations that are intelligence-driven. The intelligence that is supplied is stored on the Interpol database for use by SARPCCO.

Crime statistics

The trends and patterns of organised crime outlined in this chapter emerged as a result of information gathered from questionnaires or from intelligence gathered during joint operations in Southern African countries. The gathering of the information was basically intended to support one of the objectives of the SARPCCO constitution to promote, strengthen and perpetuate co-operation and foster joint strategies for the management of all forms of crossborder and related crimes with regional implications.

Joint operations

The Southern African region has conducted nine joint operations since 1997, directly as a result of having identified definite crime trends emerging through criminal intelligence, questionnaires and other sources.

The joint operations targeted motor vehicle thefts, drug cultivation and trafficking, firearms-trafficking, wanted criminals, diamond-smuggling, illegal immigrants and other crimes. As a deliberate strategy, the crime of motor vehicle theft was focused upon especially during joint Operation V4, which was conducted between February and March 1997, and involved Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. During these operations, 1 576 stolen vehicles were recovered over a period of 12 days. Of these, 1 464 were South African vehicles recovered from all the countries.

Other regional operations that followed this strategy included:
  • Operation Atlantic, July 1998, covering Botswana, South Africa and Namibia.
  • Operation Midas, June 1998, covering Lesotho, Mauritius, South Africa and Swaziland.
  • Operation Stone, April 1998, covering Angola, Botswana and Namibia.
  • Operation Sesani, April 1999, covering Botswana, Tanzania, Malawi, South Africa and Zimbabwe.
  • Operation Makhulu, July to August 2000, covering Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland and Zimbabwe.
Although these joint operations were also designed to control and seek further intelligence on drugs, firearms, diamonds and illegal immigration, the planning sessions had noted that motor vehicles were the common denominator in all the targeted crimes. Effective control of the transborder movement of stolen vehicles would therefore go a long way in controlling the other crimes.

The regional joint crossborder operations were very successful, albeit temporarily, with the impact manifesting itself in a reduction in motor vehicle theft to zero in certain countries. A few weeks after the operations, one evaluation of a joint operation indicated that, two weeks after Operation V4, motor vehicle thefts had been reduced as follows:

Zimbabwe — 47.8%
Mozambique — 60%
South Africa — 22.8%
Zambia — 75%

But this was only a temporary setback to criminal activities, as this crime gradually increased to the original levels once criminals realised that the operations were of a temporary nature.

In a region of 12 countries with a population of approximately 140 million people, South Africa has the largest population accounting for no less that 26% of the region’s total figure. Being the great economy it is, South Africa naturally presents itself as a great market base for all good entrepreneurs, including criminal syndicates. It is also a great source of stolen goods and other contraband.

It is not surprising that South Africa has a greater number of motor vehicles stolen per year than any other country in the region. Statistics presented to Interpol show that the rest of Southern Africa together loses between 1.3% and 4% of the total number of vehicles lost to theft per year by South Africa alone.

Much work has been done in trying to identify crime syndicates operating in the region. All countries in the region have supplied intelligence that has been analysed by Interpol and by the countries themselves. There are very clear relationships and interlinking factors between crime syndicates operating in Southern Africa. It is not a secret to law enforcement agencies in the region that the criminals in the region have better co-operation links than the police officers.

They seem to know who to contact at all times and budgetary constraints, foreign currency shortages, visa problems or governmental authority to travel do not control their movements.

For instance, during the V4 operation, the operatives of the four countries dealt with two very clearly structured syndicates. Both syndicates had ascertainable links in Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Zambia, South Africa and Botswana. Many of the leading figures were arrested during and after the operation, but there is nothing to suggest that their operations were effectively curtailed. Many of the operations are run as family businesses. Thus, when one top operative is arrested, the remaining members continue with the business until they have been arrested as well. In many instances, the different syndicates help one another or share business, although there may be conflict at times. Inter or intrasyndicate conflicts greatly benefit the police in as far as they enable the use of one group against the other to gain information and/or convictions.

Motor vehicle theft syndicates

Crime syndicate connections have caused problems for the police in the region in many ways. Those operating from South Africa seem to be the busiest. South Africa loses an average of 100 000 vehicles to theft per year. Many of the vehicles, especially those with a low mileage, are driven across borders to the north. Trends have shown that, while some of the vehicles will remain to be registered in the more tranquil SARPCCO countries, many have found their way to Angola, the DRC and further afield. Fewer vehicles, especially 4x4s, are stolen from countries north of the Limpopo and taken further north. There are instances, however, where vehicles are stolen from countries north of the Limpopo that are driven to South Africa. Vehicles from Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe have been recovered from Bloemfontein in South Africa.

The syndicates use forged registration books and travel documents, false number plates and clearance certificates, as well as corruption and anything else in their power to pass through the borders. On 1 January 2000, SARPCCO introduced a SARPCCO Motor Vehicle Clearance Certificate to counter crossborder motor vehicle theft.

This took criminals aback for a while. However, during January 2001, it emerged that criminals had developed a new strategy to get around the SARPCCO clearance certificate. During 2000, they tried to forge the certificate, but due to the security features on the certificate and training given to the police, the forgeries were easily discovered. The latest trick was to have a reproduction of a registration book and licence plate from a foreign country for the kind of vehicle they intend to steal. A suitable vehicle is then stolen and its particulars are substituted with those on the registration book. This means that, for example, a stolen South African vehicle will bear a Zambian registration plate, complete with a Zambian registration book. No South African police officers will bother to stop a foreign registered car unless their suspicions are raised by something else. Vehicles have been exported in this fashion recently. There is no need to produce a SARPCCO clearance certificate at the border as the vehicle is passed off as that of a returning resident.

It would also seem that the vehicles stolen from the north going to South Africa are intended for the market in Angola and the DRC, as some of these vehicles, after being registered in South Africa, have been intercepted while going north through Namibia and Kazungula in Botswana.

Drugs

There is a clear route for hard drugs that come from South America and Asia into Southern Africa. There is no doubt that the hard drugs destined for Europe from these regions come through South Africa for re-routing to the European region and sometimes to Canada. Some of the drugs are routed to South Africa through Luanda and Dar es Salaam. This is an indication of a strong base of organised crime in the region as money-laundering is undoubtedly a factor in drug-trafficking. Heroin, hashish and mandrax from the east and cocaine from the west are seen to be converging in South Africa before moving north to Europe.

An Interpol World Cocaine Report, produced by the Drug Sub-Directorate, states:
"The Southern cone of Africa has become one of the hottest spots of cocaine trafficking in the world. Its part in the trafficking equation has developed into a serious issue both in consumption and transit. West African traffickers increased their influence and distribution networks in the region and developed a consumer market that is seen by national authorities as a serious problem. Transit points for cocaine heading to Europe continue to surface throughout the year. The source of the drugs from South America is principally Brazil. Hundreds of couriers on board commercial flights brought cocaine into South Africa either directly or through Angola, Namibia, Swaziland and other neighbouring state."
Between 1996 and 1997, the main cocaine-trafficking groups in Africa were identified as Ghanaians, Moroccans, Nigerians, South Africans and Liberians. The interest in this survey is mainly in the involvement of Nigerians, South Africans and other nationals from the region. In 1995, 130 Nigerians were caught smuggling more than 296 kg of cocaine. In 1996, 144 Nigerians were caught smuggling nearly 310 kg and in 1997, 125 Nigerians were caught smuggling nearly 206 kg of cocaine. The number of individuals involved is clearly decreasing.

On the other hand, in 1995, 15 South Africans were found smuggling close to 72 kg of cocaine. In 1996, 36 South Africans were found smuggling about 55 kg and in 1997, 75 South African were found smuggling nearly 90 kg. In this case, the number of individuals involved is increasing.

Table: Seizures of cocaine in Southern African countries, 1995-1997
Country 1995 1996 1997
. .
Kilogram
Angola 8.902 – –
Botswana 0. 350 3 –
Lesotho – – 1.004
Namibia – 5 33.34
South Africa 187.615 123.102 76.92
Swaziland 2.766 5.048 + 100 slabs 0.425
Tanzania – – 0.1
Zambia 0.088 – 5.093
Zimbabwe 0.088 – 5.093

The presence of Nigerian syndicates in the region also means the expansion of activities. They seem to be taking a management role as more people in the region are being used as couriers. In the majority of seizures, there is a Nigerian connection. As this is seen more and more as a lucrative business, more nationals in the region will eventually be enticed to create their own syndicates and start their own operations.

The expansion of syndicate activities in respect of drug matters has been made clearer through the dismantling of drug-manufacturing laboratories by law enforcement agencies in South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia in recent years.

Cannabis

The cultivation and trafficking of cannabis continue in Southern region countries. The main trafficking direction is towards South Africa. The main suppliers of cannabis have been Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The cultivation in Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland occurs on a commercial scale. Very little surveying has been done in Mozambique as no major regional drug operation has been undertaken in the country.

Most of the cannabis is intended for the European market. Drugs have been packed, sealed and shipped to London, the Netherlands and other European destinations. A number of operations have been dismantled in Southern Africa. Recently, the preoccupation of SARPCCO has been to locate and destroy all cannabis crops under cultivation. A regional joint operation, codenamed Motokwane, has been conducted in Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland and South Africa. More than 6 000 tons of cannabis were destroyed during the joint operations. The region believes if this operation is repeated regularly, there could be a general reduction in cannabis trafficking.

The strength of cannabis syndicates was tested during some of these operations when gunfire was exchanged with criminals.

Diamond-smuggling

This is an area that has caused much concern due to its link to some of the armed conflicts in the region.

The United Nations Security Council Committee on Sanctions Against Unita produced a report that was circulated on 10 March 2000. Part of its investigations were conducted in Southern African and the investigations indicate, to an extent, the links of the syndicates in the region.

Intelligence indicates that some of the stolen vehicles that go into the conflict areas are exchanged either for US dollars or for diamonds. The diamonds are smuggled back and are introduced into the diamond market. Organised syndicate structures have been identified and some of the leaders’ names have been circulated for monitoring and further action by the countries involved. Some of the syndicates involved with diamond trade are suspected to be involved with firearms-smuggling as well.

Nigerian letter scams

Syndicates specialising in sending fraudulent letters that seemingly introduce opportunities to make money quickly are now also based in Southern Africa. Many people have already lost money to these syndicates. Hundreds of thousands of letters have been sent to business people and ordinary citizens in the region, some of whom responded and lost money. While the origins of this scam can be traced to Nigeria, many of the letters are being posted locally with local phone numbers and addresses. This type of crime is highly organised in that operators are interlinked with other groups or individuals in other countries who will talk to the targets and convince them to part with their money. They are also involved in kidnapping, extortion and even murder.

Links between crime and conflict

It is quite clear that conflict presents the perfect opportunity for crime. For example, the end of the war in Mozambique found the subregion flooded with firearms. Substantial trafficking moved through Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe and into South Africa. The weapons that remained in these countries have been used to commit crimes involving firearms.

Of late, the smuggling of stolen motor vehicles into Angola and the DRC has increased because the conflicts there give the opportunity to criminals to move in and out without detection. The authorities in these countries are concentrating on conflict-related issues and pay little attention to crime being perpetrated. By the end of the hostilities, the criminals will have entrenched themselves to such an extent that the organised crime structure will be difficult to dismantle.

There is growing apprehension that, as they become economically stronger, criminal syndicates will start sponsoring political parties to influence the direction of politics in countries. Some of them may sponsor conflict in order to create or expand opportunities to make money.

The subregion is still monitoring crime trends to allow future operations to be focused regionally and internationally.

SARPCCO’s structure offers significant capacity for the region to respond effectively to organised crime, if sufficiently funded and enabled through enhanced crime research:
  • Within SARPCCO, the Council of Police Chiefs is the main policymaking body.
  • The Permanent Co-ordinating Committee is the operational wing of SARPCCO, tasked with the planning, strategy development and execution of operations throughout the region after studying criminal intelligence and trends.
  • The Training Subcommittee is tasked with identifying training needs and putting together relevant curricula for the training of police officers throughout the region.
  • The Legal Subcommittee continuously studies legislation and its applicability to the intended objectives and operations of SARPCCO. The committee makes recommendations to governments for changes or the introduction of new laws where necessary.
These structures have a potential to assist the region substantially in combating all forms of crime.