INTRODUCTION

If history is to be a guide, then the SANDF is set for a lean period during the next decade or so. The popular perception in South Africa is that our world has become less dangerous, with no threats of war and little need for soldiers; that there will be no need for South Africa to conduct military operations, except to voluntarily send a few permanent force members to help with peace-keeping elsewhere; that we should concentrate resources on reconstruction and development; and that the new South African Police Service will be able to deal with problems relating to security and stability.

The people of South Africa, particularly whites, are eager to end the burden of conscription which they bore for decades, as national servicemen and as compulsory members of the Citizen Force (CF) and Commando Force (Comdo). The defence budget has been dramatically reduced over the past few years (already down by 47% in 1992/93, under a National Party government), and is likely to be cut further.

Integration and affirmative action create their own personnel demands. These and other factors have led to the Minister of Defence and the Chief of the SANDF announcing a rationalisation programme under which about 10 000 full-time members may be retrenched every year. This programme may eventually affect more than 30 000 people.

Consequently, the SANDF's full-time strength is set to shrink to 90 000 full-time members, with the Army bearing the brunt of the cutbacks. Conscription has ended, and while the part-time forces restructure, they must still be ready to respond to any emergency.

The rewards of a service career in terms of prestige, promotion and opportunities for advancement will decline, and a vicious downward spiral will affect volunteers. The ability of the SANDF to react to emergencies as efficiently and professionally as before and of course there will be emergencies, there always are could well be in doubt when its composition is measured against the personnel system of the former SADF. It is against this scenario that the defence planners are preparing for the future.

One thing remains certain, though: the government and therefore the community, will get the defence force they are prepared to fund and staff. Society's present contribution will determine what a future defence force will be capable of. Defence forces, as all security agencies, are expensive in terms of manpower, material and money. Success is achieved when society views the security agencies as the responsibility of and challenge for all the citizens, and not as their burden.

The part-time forces of the SANDF are at a crossroads, and their future needs to be carefully planned and handled by well-informed leaders. The Government of National Unity has accepted a policy of volunteers, non-racialism, affirmative action, gender equality and non-discrimination for the SANDF. These principles still have to be applied to the organising, recruiting, training and structuring of the part-time forces.

Internationally, as countries reduce and professionalise their standing military forces, there has been a similar increase in interest in and dependence upon reserve or `citizen force' units. Such forces provide a means of expansion in the event of a limited or general mobilisation. They prolong the availability of those with military skills who leave the armed forces (because of fulfilled contracts, retirement, retrenchment, resignation, etc). Furthermore, they represent a less expensive way for governments to gain access to specialised civilian skills that they might not be prepared to provide or fund as part of a standing force, but which remain essential to military operations, for example civil engineering, legal, logistics and medical skills.

Countries with multi-ethnic populations, such as Israel and Singapore, have seen the armed forces as a means of `nation building' by imposing a common purpose and standard for all. Where standing forces decline, this is another area in which part-time forces will have an increasing contribution to make.

The dependence of regular forces on reserves has a further, less obvious dimension. Professional forces need a constituency in civilian society to help them state their case in respect of their purpose, relevance, retention and equipping. Through their association with both civil society and the military, part-time personnel effectively encourage all citizens to accept soldiers as their `own' defence force, thereby fostering a positive attitude among voters and parliamentarians. In this regard, regular military personnel are usually not permitted to stand for party office, whereas part-timers can and do.2

Finally, while regular elements may coups-d'etat or help civilian groupings to seize power (as has been experienced in numerous African countries and, closer to home, in several South African `homelands'), this is not the case with part-time forces, which invariably help to counter such tendencies. Further, because they must be called up, mobilised, retrained and so on, part-time forces also seem less threatening to neighbouring countries than do full-time units, which are always ready for action.

THE PRESENT SITUATION

All the sophisticated weaponry in the world will not make up for a fighting force that is poorly trained, organised, motivated and deployed. In fact, the growing complexity of armaments and increasing sophistication of military strategies constantly require better trained and educated personnel. Until recently, South Africa depended on whites-only conscription and its part-time forces to provide the bulk of its fighting forces. The size of the Defence Force swelled dramatically during World Wars 1 and 2 as large numbers of volunteers flocked to join up, yet the traditional part-time CF and Comdo units formed the basis of the war-time organisation. This was also the case during the campaigns in Namibia and Angola. And during the 1994 elections, South Africa experienced the largest call-up of part-time forces since World War 2, which helped to provide the security and stability within which the elections would occur.

Conscription guaranteed approximately 120 000 CF members, 130 000 Comdos and a reserve of 180 000, while at the height of the war in Namibia at least 20 000 recruits reported each year for initial training. A defence force consisting of only volunteers is very different, and South Africa has not experienced anything like that since before World War 2. A crucial aspect which is often overlooked when the system of part-time forces is discussed is that it is a complete system, starting with the recruitment and induction of volunteers; progressing through their service in a CF or Comdo unit (which requires a separate operational organisation, a headquarters and administrative structure, trained leaders, buildings, equipment, uniforms etc), and their final allocation to the reserves. It is common international practice to keep trained personnel involved in the organisation, from their induction to a fairly advanced age. As any personnel manager knows, trained human resources are a valuable commodity, and once people are fully trained they should not easily be discarded.

PROVIDING THE PART-TIME FORCES WITH RECRUITS

Conscription systems differ among countries in terms of the level and length of initial continuous training provided before the soldier is allocated to the mobilisation forces in a part-time capacity, but they are all compulsory. Besides initial training, they also differ in respect of the period of service after such training. Most countries using conscription systems agree that several months of continuous training are needed to turn a raw recruit into a competent modern soldier, ready to participate in combined arms warfare. For the remainder of the conscription period, they may be employed on military operations or on other tasks. Under the previous two-year period of national service, for example, white South African conscripts were available for more than 15 months of operational use after being trained.

South Africa has had considerable experience with legally enforceable conscription-based systems for white males. After World War 2, South Africa first used a volunteer system and then a system of selected ballotees (from 1953 onwards) to staff its part-time forces, until compulsory national service was introduced.

• In line with the recommendations of the Groenewoud Committee, a compulsory national service system for medically fit white males aged 18 was introduced on 1 January 1968.
  
  

• The initial continuous period of training was increased to 12 months from the previous nine months under the ballot system, and service in the CF was increased to 10 years.
  
  

• In January 1978, the initial period of national service was increased to a period not exceeding 24 months.
  
  

• From January 1983 onwards, the part-time service period after the initial period of continuous service was extended to 720 days over 12 years, followed by the possibility of further service in the Comdos for shorter periods.
  
  

• On 7 December 1989, the State President announced that the initial service period would be reduced from 24 to 12 months with effect from 1 January 1990.
  
  

• From January 1994, the new Voluntary Military System (VMS), of one year's initial training followed by eight camps of 30 days each was introduced, and with it, white conscription ended. Only matriculated volunteers are eligible, although the option of balloting has been retained in the amended Defence Act.

The primary purpose of a conscription system is to establish a pool of trained personnel for mobilisation, but it may also feed the full-time force. Doing away with conscription inevitably means reducing these numbers. The key question is: how large should South Africa's mobilisation force be? The abolition of conscription has reduced the strength of the present part-time forces ie, in the short term any conflict, crisis or task will have to be dealt with mainly by the existing full-time forces, while those forces available for mobilisation will be smaller. In 1994, replying to a question in parliament, the Minister of Defence stated that since the announcement of the moratorium on the prosecution of part-time members who failed to respond to their call-ups, those responding had in some instances dropped to 10 percent of the total called up for 21-day camps. This is in sharp contrast with the 1980s, when an 80 percent response to a 90-day call-up was the norm, or even with April 1994 (at the time of the election), where a response of more than 40 percent for a 30-day call-up was recorded.

During the era of white, male conscription the South African military tapped the white population for the manpower to carry out its operations. By the early 1990s, white conscription was providing an intake of roughly 20 000 conscripts a year. Despite the efforts of the small but vocal anti-conscription organisations, the level of reporting for initial service or for CF or Comdo call-ups remained good (80 percent-plus) during the 1980s. Even when conscription was nearing its end, those willing to refuse call-up and face prosecution or avoiding service by going overseas were few, and their actions had no real effect on what was an accepted, if not popular, form of service. The present moratorium on prosecuting members for failing to respond to call-ups, and the use of soldiers to police the townships, has changed this perception.

For several years, South Africa also had a selective draft system. Despite the fact that the Defence Act of 1912 rested on the principle that the defence of the Union was the responsibility of every (white) citizen, the act provided for a ballot system to compel certain white males to undergo periods of military training over a period of four years between their 17th and 25th years.

However, the ballot system was only properly activated in 1953, after World War 2. Prior to this the Active Citizen Force was composed essentially of volunteers. Volunteers who did not serve in the CF became members of Rifle Associations (the predecessors of the present Comdos). This ballot system was aimed at ensuring that the percentage of citizens selected from each magisterial district for three months of full-time training in the first year, and 21 days of training in each of the remaining three years, would as far as possible be the same. The selective draft system remained in place until compulsory national service was introduced in 1968.

The ballot system developed as follows:

• From 1953 onwards the country used a selected ballot system, calling up a limited number of white ballotees for an initial three months' training followed by three camps of 21 days each.
  
  

• In the late 1950s this was reduced to an initial two months and the number of camps to three, spread over alternative years.
  
  

• Eventually, in the early 1960s the ballot system was for an initial nine months and five camps, and by then practically all ballotees were selected for training.

Thereafter, the country switched to a system of national service.

THE NEW SYSTEM (VMS)

Today, the replacement system for feeding new personnel into the part-time forces is the Voluntary Military System (VMS), which requires volunteers to sign on for 12 months' full-time service and annual 30-day training camps thereafter. The first 4 000 recruits for the Army and 200 for the Navy completed their training at the end of 1994.

Annual VMS intakes since then have not exceeded 6 000 (2 000 in 1995), and some members of each intake have switched to full-time service. This system will provide a considerably smaller number of personnel than the approximately 20 000 national servicemen who joined the part-time forces under the old system every year.

At first glance the VMS promises to be easy to administer and monitor, but this may be too simple a response to a complex problem. Only matriculants are eligible, thus already eliminating some potential volunteers. Military service as enshrined in the Defence Act of 1912 was designed to train or partly train people for the part-time force as quickly and painlessly as possible the initial period varying from two to three months before cycling them back into civilian life, after which they had a minor part-time obligation.

As presently structured, the VMS is a volunteer version of the former compulsory national service system, which was aimed at providing a low-cost, full-time force. This being the case, one must ask whether the VMS is the right foundation for the new all-volunteer part-time force. The following should be considered:

• The supply of new recruits for conventional operations (the CF) must now depend on a personnel system that has not yet proved itself capable of providing such personnel in adequate numbers. Not only should the number of new volunteers be increased; the existing force should also be rapidly restructured. There is a real possibility that when a new personnel system for feeding the part-time forces is fully in place, there will be little of the present CF leadership cadre (officers and NCOs) left to receive, administer and train the intakes.
  
  

• Experience with the system in the 1980s indicates that many conscripted national servicemen who volunteered for an extra 12 or 24 months' full-time service (mostly as junior leaders) did so not because of any great interest in military matters, but because they were after the re-enlistment bounty, the better pay, and the prospects of a safe job at a time of high unemployment. Once they had completed their period of extended service, few showed any interest in the part-time unit. If volunteers were to regard the VMS as a `finishing school', or source of short-term employment before starting university or technikon or starting a career instead of a system to feed the CF, the part-time force will once again be disadvantaged.
  
  

• The chances of trained people in the part-time pool re-volunteering for service are now significantly reduced, due to the moratorium on prosecutions as well as opposition from employers, who are always eager to reduce costs. As a result, the VMS may have to train large numbers of volunteers at short notice to restock the part-time force and keep it topped up, even given the stated objective of reducing the size of the part-time forces.
  
  

• International experience indicates that short enlistment systems, aimed at attracting suitable recruits of a high standard (VMS takes only matriculants), operates well in bad economic times, but falters as conditions improve.
  
  

• The VMS might effectively exclude university and technikon students who normally gain bursaries for the year after matriculating, and who might otherwise be expected to supply leaders for the part-time forces. On the other hand, experience in the old system indicated that part-time service beyond the age of about 25 when young people start thinking of marriage and making real progress in their civilian occupations often results in domestic and professional conflicts, except in the case of those keen enough to pursue a dual civilian/military career.
  
  

• Units in rural areas, especially those that have, in the past, been hard hit by the steady depopulation by whites from these areas (but previously fed with trained men by means of white conscription) would require special attention if they are to maintain sufficient personnel.

The SANDF is aware of these implications, but the Minister has little choice but to maintain the moratorium due to the incompatibility of the continued call-up of white-only part-timers with the interim constitution and fundamental rights. The government is committed to volunteerism for all members of the SANDF. The problem is that these changes may have deprived the Army, virtually overnight, of much of its mobilisable operational strength.

There is a belief that all soldiers require at least a year's training to become proficient in handling modern equipment. Many other countries, admittedly with different recruitment pools, train part-timers in much shorter periods, but give them longer refresher training before they are deployed. The crucial factor is not only the length of full-time training (conducted in a full-time unit, and not in the CF), but the way in which part-time training is structured and carried out, since the soldier is called up while in the CF and may then invariably require retraining, even if only to promote teamwork. In the mechanised infantry, for instance, only CF vehicle commanders, drivers and gunners may initially need extra technical training, which could be supplied through one-month training courses or a succession of shorter ones particularly if simple simulators were provided for non-continuous CF training. Then, when the unit is mobilised for war, the whole unit undergoes formal refresher training. Any military training system must fully cater for part-timers, and should not be an adjusted full-time system.

The SANDF has indicated that a variety of alternative methods for volunteer part-time service may be considered. Some suggested courses of action include the following:

• A 12-month VMS with fewer yearly camps, so that servicemen's part-time obligation will end in their mid-20s, with a further volunteer option thereafter.
  
  

• A three-month VMS, particularly for members intended to serve in the Rear Areas Protection Units (RAPU), followed by three or four training camps and weekend training in between.
  
  

• Non-continuous training (on weekends, during short camps and so on) for non-VMS veterans, particularly civilian specialists such as doctors, engineers and mechanics, and personnel who had previously served in the statutory or non-statutory forces. This would be aimed at instilling basic military knowledge, or to sharpen up and expand previously acquired military knowledge.
  
  

• The voluntary training of school cadets by the SANDF (using its CF element where possible) at selected schools, after agreement by the staff and parents, could also assist. This would provide early basic military knowledge, cultivate future recruits, serve the community by providing disciplined extra-mural youth activities among senior scholars, and could be an important source of part-time force volunteers.
  
  

• The transfer of trained part-timers between units and corps and the voluntary re-activation of reservists is to be encouraged.
  
  

• A system similar to the American ROTC (Reserve Officer Training Corps) could be considered. This allows university students to obtain military qualifications during their vacations, thus making them suitable for direct commission as officers when they graduate. It provides a possible alternate career as well as well-paid employment during vacations.

Ideally, each part-time unit would have several layers of expertise, so that it would be of immediate albeit limited use for routine tasks and could soon be trained to adequate operational standards. Its main function would always be as a training nucleus, capable of being expanded into a war-time role.

These arguments are not raised in opposition to the VMS system. But the SANDF and therefore the country will benefit if a variety of problems are tackled as rapidly as possible in an attempt to salvage what is left of the old part-time forces. Not only must the system of initial training, of annual camps, of promotion courses largely composed of distance (correspondence) training and most importantly the facilities for local training be considered; due attention must be also given to the local recruiting and equipping of volunteers, pay for rank, traditional regimental paraphernalia from spurs and kilts to Balmorals, brandy casks and misspelled names, etc. What is needed is a system so attractive that volunteers will choose it above recreation associated with pap, beer and sunny skies during the typical South African weekend.

An important step in the right direction was taken recently when the Minister of Defence agreed to equal pay and other financial inducements for volunteers. Yet actual costs will vary according to the person's role, and the desired readiness level. As the military may also need the skills the part-timer uses in civilian life, training costs could be negligible, while salary will depend on the number of days the person must spend in service.

But most part-timers are employees, and if they are to fulfil their military duties, the ethos of `citizenship' expressed by Churchill will also have to extend to their employees. Defence must be recognised as a matter for all ages and conditions of people. There should be no free rides for the civil community even though there might be many among them who have been all too happy to leave such disruptive and dangerous activities entirely to the PF. Some companies may regard a reserve or part-time training and service commitment as reason enough not to hire a candidate employee; besides this, part-timers may find that they no longer have the same or indeed any job when they return. If the relationship between employers and the Defence Force is such that the former cannot be persuaded to remove obstacles to temporary military duties, then they will have to be removed by legislation or taxation; if the carrot does not work, the stick may be necessary.

Employers' profits might suffer, but they will at least have the comfort of knowing that "they also serve ..." If this protection of the livelihood of members of the part-time forces is not legally guaranteed, there will soon be fewer volunteers. The vexing question of part-timers having to use their annual leave for military service while other part-timers are granted special leave and have their military pay made up to their civilian standards, needs to he discussed by the SANDF, part-time members and employers.

Given the increased use of reserves in peacetime operations, members of Nato are beginning to consider the economic disruptions imposed on both reservists and their employers. This latter problem was the theme at a recent conference held in Ottawa, Canada. While the structures of the part-time forces and related legislation differed widely in the various countries represented (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States), all agreed that co-operation, not confrontation, must prevail. As the American Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Reserve Affairs, Maj-Gen Robert Goodbarry, said: "We view legislation as a last resort, and want employer support groups to work [problems] out earlier, before legal action has to be taken."

According to Goodbarry, unresolved cases that go to court have been rare in the United States. Nonetheless, experiences in the 19901991 Gulf War have led the United Kingdom and United States to introduce laws to ease the way for peacetime call-outs. For example, the United States has two bills pending. The first will provide tax credits of up to US$7 500 a year for employers with reservists on call-out. The second will see reservists paying premiums for involuntary mobilisation insurance, to provide an income coverage of up to US$5 000 per month. Among the Nato countries, the United States probably has the strongest legislation supporting reserves; it is illegal in that country to discriminate against reservists applying for civilian jobs.3

THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE PART-TIME FORCES (PTF)

Defence Headquarters are studying ways of restructuring the part-time forces. Changes to this system will dramatically affect the structure of the Army, the largest user of part-time forces. Once a restructuring plan is implemented, the task of establishing and training the new PTF must be the Army's primary task. The future success of the SANDF depends on how well the Army rebuilds the PTF not on how it helps the police, delivers water or performs on parade. This will require adequate financial provision for call-ups, etc, and the structures necessary for training and administration.

Compared to international standards, or even to the SAAF and SAN, the PTF in the SA Army have been forced to carry an exceptional burden of service for many years; therefore, much of the administrative and personnel strengths expected from the PTF are suspect. The Army badly needs to re-establish its credentials with its PTF. The most obvious steps in this process would be to formally release those who will not or need no longer serve, and by instituting a dedicated programme to rebuild a non-racial, all-volunteer CF. This must be treated as the most important operational element of the SA army, only to be committed when a state of national emergency or state of national defence is declared.

These PTF members are the essential war force, intended to counter a threat to South Africa's sovereignty and territorial integrity. This is the force that must successfully fulfil the primary role of the SANDF. Given South Africa's economic power, its geographical position and its technological and scientific ability, a threat to its sovereignty and territorial integrity will be a major international one. It is currently accepted that such a threat will take at least five years to develop. This will provide ample time for a war force to be developed to the required level. Such preparations might include an increased defence budget, the conscription of large numbers of recruits, and the acquisition of sufficient equipment from local and overseas sources as well as from commandeering.

The main responsibilities of the present SANDF in respect of such a force is to have the trained and organised cadres and facilities available in order to call up, manage and prepare the force, as well as to stay abreast of modern military thinking through scientific and technical studies. The design of such a war force needs to be thoroughly investigated on its own. However, the essence of what we need in the part-time forces in the medium term is an ability to manage, train, prepare and command such a war force with the elements available (composed of the full-time force of the affordable force, the volunteer part-time forces, as well as former members of the full-time force). The plan required is therefore not to create a war force now, but to be ready to create it whenever necessary in the future.

Furthermore, it is accepted that volunteers can provide additional suitable members to bring the core force up to strength. This could provide the capacity to guarantee an expansion to a war force. This core force must be kept intact, even at the cost of further reducing SANDF participation in secondary tasks. It is therefore essential to establish a fixed VMS intake figure so as to adjust the rest of the organisation to form the core force. At the same time, the VMS must be supplemented so as to rebuild the CF. Perhaps all members who volunteer (VMS and CF) should be contractually bound so that they will have to give at least six months' notice if they wish to resign.

In the case of a state of emergency or state of national defence, the six months' notice should be suspended, and members should serve until the end of the emergency. They should then have to give fresh notice of resignation. While the PTF will probably have to assist the civil power, it should, if possible, not be used regularly for police support or border control until reorganisation and retraining have been completed. It should always be regarded as a training nucleus, capable of expansion into a war-time role. The purpose of the part-time force should thus be to provide an active force which will undertake two missions:

• Training establishment: to provide a force that will possess the administrative, command and training skills required for expansion into a war force.
  
  

• Active force: to provide an active force that will be prepared to undertake limited operations during emergencies (particularly national states of emergency) in accordance with the Defence Act and the provisions of the constitution.

Given the moratorium on compulsory service, steps should be taken to reduce the number of persons who are on record but are not serving, or are not subject to call-up. Members who indicate that they wish to end their service commitments should be discharged.

The following are priority groups for discharge; personnel in these categories should be offered the opportunity of leaving if they do not wish to extend their service, and if their period of compulory service has already exceeded the terms of VMS:

• Remaining `buttermilk' personnel (the older volunteers first called up in the early 1980s);
  
  

• Personnel who have been posted to the RAPU after completing the five-year holding period after cycle 6;
  
  

• Personnel who are in the holding period after cycle 6;
  
  

• Personnel in cycles 5 and 6;
  
  

• Personnel in cycles 14 who have already completed 240 days' service in these cycles; and
  
  

• Personnel in cycle 14 who do not wish to volunteer for further service.

All personnel should first be given the option of volunteering for further service. The aim would be to retain only those who volunteer, or have an agreed commitment such as the VMS commitment. It is essential to realistically assess the likely volunteer PTF strength. Only then can the force be properly reorganised and restructured. A committee should therefore be appointed in each territorial command, under the personal chairmanship of the GOC and working in conjunction with all formation, group and unit commanders of the part-time forces, to accurately and realistically assess the possible strength of trained volunteers, the number of part-time volunteer units which can be staffed, the number of volunteers only interested in RAPU duties in their own district, etc. The National Part-Time Forces Council must be involved, and employer bodies consulted. The number of part-time units may also need to be reduced. In anticipation of this, a CF unit with between 200 and 300 members should be entitled to continue to exist and be classified as an independent unit if it has at least:

• a unit headquarters;
  
  

• a support sub-unit at reasonable strength;
  
  

• one reinforced combat sub-unit; and
  
  

• a spare/additional leadership group.

Such units should be grouped together for exercise purposes in order to assemble full-strength regiments or battalions. All volunteers who are older than 30 and/or area-bound should be channeled into the RAPU or the command support units, particularly signals and workshops units, where civilian technical expertise will always be at a premium. Particularly urban volunteers under 30 years and not area-bound should be encouraged to join one of the conventional CF units, while the priority for rural volunteers would probably be the territorial forces or RAPU.

Defence headquarters, but particularly GOC Territorial Commands, will have to make a major effort if the part-time forces are to be rebuilt. This will not only imply recruiting volunteers and channeling them as suggested above to the CF, RAPU or command service units. The provision of adequate local facilities for advanced training is just as important. This local training must not only include intensive classification range work, but also the use of simulators and other advanced training. CF formations may complete their training at Army Battle School or at Corps Schools during continuous service, but it is advanced local training that will prove the success of a volunteer system. Adequate training call-ups dexmust be introduced to rebuild the part-time forces, and their training periods must not be allowed to degenerate into static guard duty as part of semi-police activities. Preparation for conventional war and/or use during a state of emergency must be their primary, and hopefully their only, purpose, unless special volunteers for some other specific task are called for.

There is a tendency for regular and PTF units to deride each other. This inherent sense of rivalry can be further heightened by a competition for funds. There may thus be a drift towards a `first team' mentality, in which regular personnel profess to want to handle all tasks. Defence administrations have sought to overcome this through the promotion of a `one army' or `total force' concept, with close regular and reserve unit affiliations, shared training, and integrated operations. There are limits to the amount of training time available, but an expressed commitment of elements of both the regular and part-time military forces to assist the civil community during emergencies also makes political sense in peacetime. But long-term, regular, semi-permanent deployment as police personnel is best left to the full-time forces, which can afford to be retrained for this specialist role. What is needed is an integrated mix of full-time and part-time units, but they must form one force.

RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING

After the integration of the various armed forces has been completed, the Defence Force should only recruit a limited number of trainees a year (probably about 5 000). The Defence Force must recruit this fixed number of volunteers of both sexes and all races for the full-time force and VMS each year, despite the requirement of democratisation and rationalisation. The continuous provision of young recruits, which should include graduates, is necessary for any organisation to maintain and refresh itself develop.

This fixed figure must include all Full-Time Force (FTF), short-service and VMS volunteers and should be fixed to allow the determination and organisation of units needed to receive and train these members. All recruits who volunteer and are selected should initially only be accepted as short-service FTF or VMS members. Once they have proven their value during the initial 12 months' training, and if there are posts for them, they can be admitted to further full-time service or continue with VMS camps.

There is no point in rationalising unless a carefully controlled recruitment programme is followed thereafter, which will allow development but remain affordable and within personnel limits. This will allow the existing training infrastructure to be centralised and reduced. Such a proposal leads to a redesign and reorganisation of the structures to administer, train, command and control the forces who volunteer for a year's training or who volunteer to start a career in the full-time force.

This will be considerably cheaper than the old system (SADF and TBVC recruit training) which was geared to handle up to 30 000 recruits a year. Some of the savings should be invested in local decentralised training facilities for the CF and RAPU. This should include shortened initial basic training periods. If we are serious about properly training volunteers for the part-time forces, good local training must take place, supervised by adequate training and safety officers and backed up by correspondence (distance) training. Given such a system, the Cape Town units, for instance, could:

• use weekends to recruit, document, equip, medically examine and administer their own single platoon of volunteers;
  
  

• start training them by correspondence and three, three-week training periods conducted at Wingsfield or Youngsfield (ideally over a period of two years);
  
  

• thereafter, the recruit could progress to a three-week camp at the School of Infantry, Oudtshoon.

This may not sound like the basic and individual training that the SA Army is accustomed to, but it should attract recruits in Cape Town and provide single platoons for the RAPU and CF of partially trained recruits who live and train in the area. More importantly, when and if mobilised for war (not for police action), these soldiers might require some intensive retraining, but they would have retained their basic military skills and orientation. Their prior training would also have created an opportunity for leaders to be identified, for the volunteer to decide if the Defence Force is worth the sacrifice required, and for the unit to have shed the `bad eggs'. While the proposed training periods, units selected for training and numbers to be recruited may be adjusted, it remains incontrovertible that, under such a system, the number of members requiring a full year of initial training can be drastically reduced, as can the number of units involved. The training system must be adjusted to really cater for volunteers joining the part-time forces.

A NEW APPROACH TO THE RESERVES

A new approach must be adopted for the use of reserves. For a defence force which is not only retrenching but making use of short- or medium-term contracts, greater use must be made of people on reserve after completing their contracts. As the Defence Force moves into a period of rationalisation, voluntary retrenchment and early retirement as well as short- and medium-term contracts, the services of those men and women with training and experience must be retained where possible.

A system in which all PF reserves, regardless of rank or experience, could be called up for a month every second or third year should be seriously considered. This would not only provide trained personnel to help relieve the fewer FTF members available, but help to retrain reservists and refresh their knowledge.

The present transitional period, which began in January 1994, has demonstrated the valuable contribution that can be made by selected PF pensioners who are recalled for service. Pensioners and short- and medium-term members who have left the force within the previous six to 12 months should be given a first option of volunteering for lengthy periods (three months or longer), as required. Such temporary employment would given special funding significantly expand the ability of the full-time force to deal with an emergency. Calling out the part-time force for overlapping training camps as a cheap method of providing an operational force could be avoided, by forming extended service units of volunteer reservists. These could be used to support the SAPS (at the latter's expense) or even for international peace-keeping operations, which should also not be financed out of the CF training budget.

THE NATURE OF RESERVES

For South African purposes, the reserve forces proposed above may be defined as any personnel who have completed military service (PF, VMS, PTF or NS) and are engaged in civilian occupations but remain available through contractual agreement or provisions in the law for military service under certain circumstances, usually war or a national emergency; are used to fill vacancies in existing formations and units, or to embody forces that exist on the War Establishment Tables; or used to render specific service as required. However, they are not active in the part-time forces.

Reserves are different from the CF and the Comdos which are `active' forces, organised into units and formations, partially equipped, sometimes armed, and always ready to be employed in a conventional role or during a declared emergency.

Reserves are not organised for immediate employment, but may volunteer or be called upon to perform protracted, full-time duty as individuals, organised groups or units. In contrast to active forces, reserves are a pool of trained servicemen who have returned to civilian life but who are fit for re-employment in their military roles, including active service, subject to equipping and a prescribed period of retraining.

The call-up of reserves should not be restricted to 30-day training camps; they should be able to volunteer for several months. At the very least, reservists (particularly pensioners or ex-short service personnel) should be allowed to volunteer for renewed full-time service, when trained personnel are required to fill particular posts for an indeterminate period. Such a reserve system may permit:

• the filling of vacancies in existing full-time formations and units, particularly by recalling those who have left less than 12 months earlier. This should be the main reserve group, recalled at once for any emergency or to support the SAP. They should then be financed out of the police budget or special funds, not the CF training budget;
  
  

• the creation of additional formations and units for which an organised cadre of PF and reserve officers and NCOs would provide staff and unit structures;
  
  

• occasional retraining of the cadre of reserve officers and NCOs, but the other ranks would not normally be recalled except when mobilised; and
  
  

• performing special tasks such as escorting visiting VIPs, special investigations, project management, local training of volunteer recruits, etc.

Although South Africa has had various forms of reserves, the concept has not been applied as described above. This has meant that, in various instances when an expansion of forces has been required, this has not been done by employing reserves, but rather by using the CF's training commitment. The result has been ad hoc arrangements and the haphazard establishment of temporary (composite) units and headquarters as in Namibia which then conducted operations.

If the task is a permanent or long-term one, then an expanded full-time force is required. Yet there has been little regulated and designed employment of ex-FTF manpower, who in many cases end successful permanent careers and are never heard of again. If the SANDF is to be reduced to an affordable size, as is presently being attempted, there is a need to provide for reserve organisations that will absorb trained and experienced personnel in a way that will permit their services to be called upon in times of need. The establishment of a system of reserves can thus provide for an expandable full-time force for future needs by means of a process of first recalling those people whose contract, of whatever sort, has just been completed or who volunteer to be recalled.

To meet the requirements for increasing the size of the full-time SANDF, and also to provide a pool of reservists available for voluntary ad hoc duties, eg with UN forces, an SANDF-controlled reserve could be designated in the categories such as cadre reserves, specialist reserves, all other trained reserves, and retired reserves. These may be further divided into PF and PTF categories.

CONCLUSION

These suggestions are only a few among many possibilities that would allow the maximum utilisation of trained, partly trained and untrained manpower in a cheap and flexible way. The detailed consideration of the building of the part-time forces requires the rapid development of a coherent and specific military personnel recruitment and retention policy. South Africa has always been able to depend upon its part-time forces; now, those who volunteer to remain in them should also be deeply involved in planning their own future.

Finally, it is clear that there should be an ample supply of volunteers of all races to meet the reduced numbers required to staff the likely part-time element of the core force. Bearing in mind the need for specialist musterings and CF members to live fairly close to their headquarters, the fact that whites, the existing trained group, are generally unlikely or unwilling to volunteer in large numbers will mean that an extensive programme of training and reorganising of the part-time force will be necessary. In any case, the political necessity of creating non-racial units and of implementing gender equality and affirmative action means that for the part-time forces also, there is a lengthy period ahead of integration, reorganisation, bridging training, rebuilding of leader groups cadres, unit and formation training, etc.

Clearly, this is not a quick or easy task, and demands specific and direct attention. The reality requires people to actually come forward and sign on as volunteers and start training a direct and demanding commitment. A first step might be to formally release the existing members of the CF and Comdos, and actually determine how many of them then will volunteer. Whatever course is followed, South Africa's part-time forces are at a crossroads, and their future needs to be carefully planned and handled by well-informed leaders.

ENDNOTES

The late Winston Churchill first coined the accolade `twice a citizen' as a measure of the value of military reservists who served the national interest in both civilian and military capacities. R Pengelley, `Twice a Citizen', International Defence Review, Vol 28 no 8, 1995, p 1.



Ibid, p 10.



Ibid.