issues relating to religious and ethnic differences;



religious fundamentalism;



disputes over traditional boundaries and resource sharing;



inequitable distribution of political and economic power;



struggles for the reform and democratisation of political and economic systems;



negative legacies of colonial rule; and



ethnic competition stemming from the collapse of the old patterns of relationships that provided the framework for collaboration among the many ethnic groups of which African countries are composed.

Desperate situations ensuing from such conflicts have continued to engage the attention of the international community and the United Nations, which has the ultimate responsibility for maintaining peace and security in the world. The lessons learned during peacekeeping operations in Africa are derived from the way such conflicts have been handled, the conditions leading to the establishment of peacekeeping missions, and the way such missions have been finally executed.

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA

When conflicts begin, the increasingly infamous principle of 'non-interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state' is often invoked, particularly in the case of intrastate conflicts. Neighbouring countries, subregional groupings, regional organisations, and the United Nations therefore stand by to see whether the various parties to the conflict can find their own solution. Historically, most African countries would have used traditional rulers and elders in society to solve such problems amicably, but colonial methods of administering justice or solving problems seemed to have eroded confidence in these measures. Instead, there has developed what could be described as a 'mixed-cultural solution to problems', which has proved to be singularly ineffectual. Conflicts now persist until the situation becomes explosive, before an attempt is made to stabilise the situation. The warning signals are never clearly analysed, and the fire truck often arrives when the fire has already scorched the country. If only intensive diplomacy at subregional and regional levels, as well as at the level of the UN, could clearly establish when to intervene, peacekeeping operations may be unnecessary. For example, when the Lesotho uprising was contained by members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the positive results that timely intervention could produce, were clearly witnessed.

A clear example of intervention at the wrong time was in Rwanda. It may be recalled that when the civil war broke out in April 1994, the UN reduced its forces on the ground to an unacceptably low level, and only expanded the force after the genocide had taken place. In the case of Liberia, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) arrived in Monrovia in September 1990, after bitter fighting had assumed uncontrollable dimensions. The case of Somalia was no different. The warlords had been allowed to entrench themselves before the American-led coalition force arrived on the scene. The UN force which was subsequently sent to Somalia, also failed to achieve its aim, partially because the UN operation did not fully appreciate the cultural background of Somalis.

Despite the fact that many conferences continue to discuss early warning signals and systems, the international community has not yet succeeded in identifying the signals that will call for intervention. A case in point is Burundi. The international community has long been aware that Burundi is teetering on the brink of civil war. Many opportunities have been lost in arresting the situation, while regional leaders and the international community have continued with a seemingly endless series of meetings and discussions. When will the world find a lasting solution to the conflicts in that country?

It is clear that most of Africa's conflicts escalated beyond control because of the poor and inadequate manner in which they were handled in the first place. Nipping such conflicts in the bud would save many lives and reduce the cost of eventual intervention. In recent times, delays in reacting to most of Africa's conflicts have meant the loss of the opportunity of stopping them through early warning, preventive action and peacemaking, and have necessitated the injection of peacekeeping forces into conflict-torn countries. According to the International Peace Academy, peacekeeping is a method of conflict management that is employed when a conflict escalates beyond the point where preventive action can be successful.

'Traditional' peacekeeping involves the interposition of lightly armed forces between hostile parties after the cessation of hostilities in order to assist in the implementation of a cease-fire agreement, troop withdrawal or the establishment of a buffer zone as part of a negotiated settlement between the hostile parties. Both (or all) parties would normally have agreed to the presence of a peacekeeping force and to its mandate. Accordingly, traditional peacekeepers play both a diplomatic and a military role. Essential principles of this form of peace support operation are consent of the parties, impartiality of the peacekeeping force, and the non-use of force except in self-defence.

In recent years, a 'second generation' of multidimensional peacekeeping operations has evolved which involves the implementation of complex peace agreements. This form of peacekeeping is often necessary in internal conflicts where a state has failed in many of the functions it would normally perform. 'Second generation' peacekeeping may include, in addition to traditional military observation and confidence-building functions, various civilian tasks such as re-establishing state and civil institutions, and assisting in the processes of demobilisation, demining, disarmament, repatriation of refugees and socio-economic rehabilitation. The consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force remain the fundamental principles of this form of peacekeeping, although in certain circumstances these principles may be challenged, as when a humanitarian convoy being escorted by a peacekeeping force is attacked or its free movement is hampered. In such cases, the reaction of peacekeepers lies in a 'grey zone' and may vary from little or no action (indicating a strictly limited definition of self defence) to more robust responses (which require a more expansive notion of self defence, including actions undertaken in defence of the mandate of the peacekeeping force).

The first attempt to manage conflict in sub-Saharan Africa by using the UN peacekeeping tool was in the Congo (now Zaire). On 12 July 1960, the Congolese Government cabled the UN Secretary-General for the urgent dispatch of military assistance to protect the national territory of the Congo against the Belgians. In this instance, the establishment of a UN peacekeeping force was clearly on request of an established government. This was also the case in Rwanda. Following the signing of the Arusha Peace Accord by the then government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front, both parties approached the UN for assistance with the transition to democratic rule.

In the case of Somalia, on the other hand, the UN force did not have the consent of the parties. The same can be said of ECOMOG in Liberia. The latter force entered the port of Monrovia with neither an invitation nor the consent of all the conflicting parties. However, the subregional organisation could not remain idle when one of its members was in a distress. Whether or not consent was received by the UN or a subregional organisation such as ECOWAS, there were both failures and some degree of success in the above examples.

In the Congo, the UN was able, with much difficulty, to establish a modicum of sanity. In the case of Rwanda, the performance of the UN is still being debated. Was the organisation fully aware of the complexity of the problem before setting up its mission? Was the force level right? Was the UN committed to the success of the mission in terms of administrative and logistics support? Why was the mission thinned out during the beginning of the civil war, only to be expanded after large numbers of Rwandans had been killed? Truthful answers to these and many other questions will certainly unearth some useful lessons.

In the case of Somalia, several thousand UN troops were deployed without significant achievement. Was this because the consent of all the parties was not given, or were there other fundamental errors in the UN's own approach to the problem? Did the Security Council pass its resolutions on Somalia at the appropriate time, and were the terms of reference clear to those who had to execute them?

Even assuming that all preconditions for the passing of resolutions by the UN, regional or subregional organisations have been met, a number of other factors have detracted from the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations as a tool for the management of conflict in Africa. More often than not, member states of the UN or indeed regional or subregional organisations are hesitant in contributing troops to peacekeeping missions. This is especially the case in Africa, where the bodies of American soldiers have been dragged through the streets of Mogadishu in full view of the world's media cameras. Likewise, the murder of ten Belgian soldiers in Kigali on the first day of the Rwandan civil war in 1994 sent a strong signal to potential troop contributors in the international community.

There have also been problems with the administrative and operational control of UN operations. Most UN missions have a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) as head of the mission and a force commander who is responsible for the command of the military component of the mission. Neither of these two top appointees have control over the finances of the mission. It is the chief of Administration, who is controlled by a director in New York, that decides on the priorities of expenditure for the mission. Owing to the complex, multinational nature of UN operations, the force commanders have been constrained by the need for extensive consultation before ordering troops from different countries to execute tasks which are crucial to the success of their missions. Consultations tend to waste vital hours and days, eventually resulting in the loss of lives.

Some problems of control relate directly to inadequate training and linguistic diversity. The military in all the independent countries of the continent have inherited the languages of their formal colonial masters, as well as their different military cultures and standards of training. These diverse backgrounds need to be harmonised for smooth co-ordination during multinational operations. In this regard, it is gratifying to note that many efforts are being made by major Western powers, and some select African countries, in creating joint training institutions, and running workshops, seminars, conferences and map exercises to ensure that some common denominators are established.

Problems of control have also been exacerbated by a lack of meaningful intelligence. It is common knowledge that for any operation to succeed, there is the need for adequate intelligence which will enable cohesive planning. In almost all African peacekeeping operations, troops have been dispatched to the mission area with very little information about the people, their culture, their beliefs, traditions and customs. Basic geographic information has also been scarce, as few African countries have up-to-date maps, especially those of the military variety which are essential to any meaningful planning.

Perhaps the most crucial of all the handicaps has been the inadequate logistic support provided to African peacekeepers. With poor and often failing economies, most African countries can hardly meet their own domestic demands, let alone provide logistic support for a peacekeeping operation. A number of African contingents were deployed to Rwanda in 1994 without the necessary logistic support. More than six months after these contingents arrived in the theatre, they still did not have basic items such as tents, flak jackets, ballistic helmets or ambulances to carry their sick and wounded to the field hospital. The UN Charter correctly assigns the responsibility for peace and security in the world to the Security Council, but the response to Africa's conflicts, in terms of logistics, leaves much to be desired. After six years in Liberia, ECOMOG forces are still in desperate need of logistics support. It is perhaps time to ask whether Africa will keep on waiting until the UN provides essential resources, or whether African countries should begin to contribute more of their own scarce resources in the hope of drawing support from the international community.

Logistics ultimately converts into money, and vice versa. Some member states of the UN and, for that matter, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) have not been honouring their financial obligations to these organisations. There is no other way the UN can support its operations, except from the contributions of member states. Some countries in the developed world appear unwilling to give support to peace support operations, yet when a real tragedy develops due to an inadequate military response, as was the case in 1994 in the Rwandan civil war, enormous resources are put at the disposal of NGOs and UN agencies for humanitarian relief operations. Whether or not these resources serve a useful purpose, or whether it would have been cheaper in both human and material cost if the peacekeeping operation has been given the necessary support to execute its objectives, continues to be an issue for hot debate.

Some UN agencies, notably the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the World Food Programme (WFP), as well as a number of NGOs may indeed be considered valuable partners to the military in the saving of lives. These organisations have financial and material resources that peacekeeping forces do not have. In many UN operations, however, friction has developed between the peacekeeping troops and NGOs. With adequate and co ordinated training, the differences in culture and modus operandi can perhaps be sorted out and the gap between these groups bridged for the benefit of those who are affected by conflicts. After all, the ultimate aim of peace operations is to restore peace and stability which will enable people to return to a normal way of life.

There has also been friction between the military components of peacekeeping missions and the media. It is said that the media portrays a partial and myopic understanding of the nature of possibilities and constraints, successes and failures, which has often resulted in a distorted public perception of the peacekeepers' role. This, in turn, is having a negative effect on the national policies of some Western countries towards peacekeeping operations. Military commanders often choose to ignore the media. This is a dangerous strategy. The duty of the media is to inform and educate. If the correct issues are concealed from them, they will find some information to occupy the space in any case. On the other hand, when handled properly, the media can be a very powerful tool for commanders in a distressful and desperate situation. In a land-locked country like Rwanda, where borders were sealed off and airports closed, the UNAMIR force would have been completely stranded had the media not projected to the world the circumstances under which the operation was taking place. In this regard, Africa's media needs to play a more active role, despite the obvious financial constraints. With proper organisation and determination they can perhaps achieve meaningful results in the realm of accurate reporting.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA

The preceding overview of conflict management and peacekeeping in Africa highlights a number of lessons which may be learned, and prompts a number of recommendations for the improvement of future peacekeeping endeavours. The more pertinent of these are listed briefly below.

Poor governance on the part of African politicians creates fertile grounds for disunity, conflict and coups d'état.



When ethnic and religious identity becomes a basis for the struggle for political power, Africans must realise that, unless all the various factions in a society are willing to share power, peace will continue to elude the peoples of the continent.



Warning signals must be heeded, and traditional African methods of solving disputes should be balanced with whatever useful lessons are available from elsewhere.



In establishing peacekeeping missions, it is necessary to study and analyse the background to the conflict carefully before passing any resolutions to establish such a mission.



Peacekeeping operations must be based on unambiguous resolutions.



Having learned from past operations, the international community and all other regional or subregional groupings must learn to intervene at the right time, before conflicts escalate beyond control.



Conditions that enable successful operations should be carefully weighed. Lack of consent on the part of the various factions could prolong peacekeeping operations, leading to a stalemate in certain cases.



Financial obligations must be honoured by member states of the UN and regional and subregional organisations.



In order to be effective, it is necessary to remove bottlenecks in the organisational structure of UN peacekeeping operations.



Intelligence gathering is a serious business and must be carried out by trained and competent staff in order to achieve coherent planning.



Effective logistics support, as an essential element of UN peacekeeping operations, cannot be over-stressed. Without it, contingents will always feel abandoned and unable to operate at their optimum. In this regard, the proposal for the pre-positioning of essential logistics items in the subregions of Africa is a step in the right direction.



African leaders must show a strong political will in resolving conflicts on the continent. To place every problem at the foot of the UN because it is the world body responsible for peace and security, is not a positive attitude.



The role of the media must be understood, and never be ignored.



The OAU’s Mechanism for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflict must be vigorously supported.



Co-ordinated training for peacekeeping troops and civilian staff alike is necessary for success in future operations.



Periodic conferences, seminars and workshops should bring UN agencies, NGOs and peacekeeping troops together for a common good.

CONCLUSION

The fact that Africa is the continent most afflicted by conflicts is indisputable. Both past and ongoing peacekeeping operations in Africa have exposed some weaknesses in the way conflicts have been and continue to be handled. If only timely intervention could be carried out, the escalation of such conflicts could be prevented and many precious lives saved. The lessons which have been brought to the fore require further careful study, analysis and refinement. This should be aimed at identifying appropriate and feasible measures for the implementation of meaningful recommendations. The lessons briefly enumerated in this chapter are certainly not exhaustive. What is required, is a collaborative effort on the part of the UN, regional and subregional organisations to make effective use of these and the many other lessons which have emerged from a variety of peacekeeping forums in recent years, for the purpose of truly improving attempts to prevent and manage conflicts in Africa. If this is to materialise, the OAU and African leaders must show greater resolve and exhibit much stronger political will in their effort to end the conflicts on the continent. Without this will, Africa cannot develop socially and economically.