the right to display the UN flag on headquarters, other premises, and vehicles;



the right to contract, and to acquire and dispose of property;



the right to unrestricted communication;



freedom of movement and access as deemed necessary for the fulfilment of the mandate of the peacekeeping operation;



the right to carry arms while on duty;



inviolability of premises;



immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the host state for peacekeepers;



immunity from the civil jurisdiction of the host state in matters related to official duty for peacekeepers;



the duty to respect the laws and regulations of the host state; and



the duty to restrain from engaging in activities incompatible with the international character of the peacekeeping operation.

The signing of the SOFA should be an easy and straight-forward matter, given the provisions of articles 104 and 105 of the UN Charter. As pointed out earlier, it has not been always so. In the case of Mozambique, from the outset of the peace negotiations, the Government delayed the participation of the UN as much as possible, and later regarded the UN's involvement in the supervision of the General Peace Agreement (GPA) as a necessary evil, which threatened to undermine the Government's sovereign status. The decision by the Security Council to deploy 7 500 armed troops, instead of 300 unarmed military observers (as the Government had somehow assumed), further irritated the Mozambican authorities. To make matters worse, the UN had intended to use the SOFA for Mozambique as a blueprint for its peacekeeping operation in Cambodia, where no recognised central government was in place. The SOFA for ONUMOZ therefore took five months of negotiation before it was signed.

Even today, Mozambican officials still argue in private that the SOFA between the Mozambican Government and the UN regarding ONUMOZ gave too many privileges to the peacekeepers. They further argue that the agreement was only signed by the Government because of international pressure for a swift implementation of the peace process.2

Political Aspects

The deployment of a peacekeeping operation on the ground marks the beginning of a more delicate and critical relationship with the host government and other parties to the conflict. A peacekeeping operation generally consists of a military force deployed in a foreign country and accorded prerogatives that make it look like a second government in that territory. Some would go so far as to argue that the peacekeepers become the de facto ruling force in the country. In states with functioning governments, this situation may hurt political pride and create perceptions of foreign imposed limitations on national sovereignty.

In the case of Mozambique, apart from the SOFA problem, the reduction of sovereignty was felt by the Government also in its (in)ability to draft and pass laws according to the stipulations of the General Peace Agreement. The GPA explicitly stated that the Government would refrain from adopting laws or measures, or applying existing laws, which might be inconsistent with the Agreement's protocols. Furthermore, it determined that the whole agreement would be incorporated into Mozambican Law, forcing Parliament to approve a number of constitutional amendments, even against its will.

This situation can obviously not be blamed on ONUMOZ, as it resulted from the kind of political settlement reached in the Mozambican conflict. Nonetheless, many local analysts and government officials tend to 'bundle it all up together', as it were, and point the finger at the UN and ONUMOZ as the ultimate culprits in the situation.

Often neither side wins in civil wars, and conflicts are terminated with peace agreements granting both parties equal political status. When a peacekeeping operation is called in to assist in the implementation of the peace agreement, it has to give impartial and fair treatment to both former belligerent parties, even if this occasionally means that peacekeepers will be seen to be supporting one side against the other. This may further hurt the feelings of the existing government, which may see its position being challenged by its erstwhile enemy under what it perceives to be the 'protection' of a foreign power.

Being part of an international force, peacekeepers should not serve the interests of the parties to a conflict, nor should they use their powers in competition or collusion with these parties, particularly the host government. On the other hand, in order to fulfil its objective of keeping the peace, the peacekeeping operation has to develop a dynamic and constructive relationship with both parties to the conflict. However, such a relationship will often be mistaken for too much friendliness with one party, lack of impartiality, or hostility towards the other party.

The key words for a successful relationship are trust and, above all, flexibility. Flexibility means that rules, procedures and interactions should adapt to reality, not the other way around. According to Aldo Ajello, the SRSG for Mozambique, "when you have a tall person and a small blanket, you can only cut the man shorter or get a larger blanket. I chose to change the blanket..."3 This means that either you allow the pre established limits to your actions to determine your ability to manoeuvre, or you expand those limits and enlarge your room for manoeuvre.

According to the GPA, both the Government and RENAMO had the same status in the peace process – they were equal partners. However, ONUMOZ felt that special assistance to RENAMO to transform it from a guerrilla movement into a political party was an absolute prerequisite for the swift implementation and success of the peace process. ONUMOZ reasoned that, at the beginning of the peace process, RENAMO had nothing to lose, and it was therefore necessary to raise RENAMO's stake in the peace process. The UN and the international community found an innovative instrument to support such transformation: a trust fund of some US$15 million. As expected, the Government interpreted this assistance as a biased attitude on the part of ONUMOZ and the international community. Consequently, the relationship between them suffered a great deal.

One of the main characteristics of ONUMOZ was the postponement of deadlines in the peace process calendar whenever it was realised that one of the parties was not ready to proceed. On the other hand, whenever ONUMOZ felt that the parties were stalling and undue delays were occurring in the implementation of the GPA, it applied pressure to move the process forward. These situations also caused tensions between ONUMOZ and the parties to the conflict.

The political relationship between peacekeepers and host governments is indeed a tight-rope, where both sides will attempt to use mixed tactics of the carrot-and-stick type. For instance, Aldo Ajello often tried to go subtly (not so subtly in the eyes of the Mozambican Government) beyond the operation's and his own mandate, with the tacit support of the ambassadors of member states of the Security Council in Maputo. On the other hand, the Mozambican Government often attempted to influence those countries' representatives in the UN, and to use Ajello's interim status as SRSG to limit his room for manoeuvre.

The principle of consent is always a powerful weapon in the hands of the host government. Peacekeeping operations fall under Chapter VI of the UN Charter (Pacific Settlement of Disputes), and article 38 explicitly states that such actions by the Security Council need the consent of the parties to the dispute. Therefore, the continued presence of a peacekeeping operation in a given territory depends upon its continued acceptability to the parties. During the Mozambican peace process, the Mozambican Government often reminded Ajello of this principle.4

PEACEKEEPERS AND THE LOCAL POPULATION

The relationship between peacekeepers and local populations is influenced by a variety of factors, including individual and collective attitudes, culturally and socially influenced behaviour, actions and interactions. The primary rule in this relationship should always be respect. An emphasis on respect is essential for a number of reasons:

The members of a peacekeeping operation are predominantly soldiers. Soldiers are seldom trained to deal with civilians on a daily basis. However, during a peacekeeping operation, the Blue Helmets will frequently be in contact with the local population of the host state. They will be called upon to perform non-military duties in a non-military environment. A great deal of caution and restraint is therefore called for to avoid unnecessary misunderstandings, tension or even collusion.



Peacekeepers come from various countries with diverse cultures and attitudes. Most probably, their cultural backgrounds will be very different from the host country's culture(s). They will be regarded by the local population as outsiders, and powerful ones (because of their weapons, their means and their privileges). Dealing with this requires a great deal of sensitivity towards the local culture and customs (in terms of language, attitudes and behaviour).



It is very easy for peacekeepers, because of their status, to develop an image of themselves as saviours, a superiority complex, and an above-the-law attitude. All this may hurt the purpose for which the peacekeepers have been deployed in the first place, and make their job more difficult. Modesty and respect for the laws of the country are imperative in the relationship between Blue Helmets and the population.

In Mozambique, there were several incidents of sexual child-abuse, rape and physical aggression by members of ONUMOZ against civilians. This was particularly true in urban areas, where the Blue Helmets mingled frequently with the local population. All the reported cases were duly investigated and dealt with. On the other hand, in many instances in the rural areas, ONUMOZ soldiers often contributed to the local economy by purchasing home-made foods from local households, and established a good rapport with the local youth by promoting sports events for them.

In deeply ravaged societies (which are the norm rather than the exception in war-torn countries), large peacekeeping operations – both in terms of people and duration – involve a substantial injection of resources (especially foreign currency), and the creation of jobs and business opportunities for local companies. Private citizens may benefit, especially from job opportunities (secretaries, administrative clerks, translators, drivers) and through the renting of accommodation to UN personnel. Although this is a short term, non-sustainable source of income in investment starved countries, such an influx of money helps many people start new lives or even small businesses.

In Mozambique, the presence of ONUMOZ coincided with a government decision to sell government-owned housing to its inhabitants.5 Many people took advantage of the sudden demand for housing on the part of the UN personnel. They rented out their houses and moved in with relatives or into smaller houses vacated by people who could no longer afford to live in the cities and who were returning to the countryside. With the rental income, they managed to save enough money to buy their houses from the Government, refurbish them and, in some cases, build new ones.

Obviously, some economic and social distortions may be caused by the monetary impact of a peacekeeping operation in a country. Inflation rates tend to go up, the black market for foreign currency flourishes, the 'dollarisation' of the economy worsens, people benefiting from extra income create non-sustainable lifestyles, and prostitution may increase. Also, businesses that have been especially created to cater to the needs of the peacekeeping operation may be unable to survive the withdrawal of the operation. However, countries with a large expatriate community, a 'tradition' of foreign currency black market, and which are engaged in a post-war economic revival, may not suffer intensely both the 'intoxication' and the 'hangover' caused by the arrival and the departure of a peacekeeping operation.

Humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, as part of the mandate or as a side-effect of the operation, can also play a major role in ensuring a positive relationship with the local population. Participation in food distribution or roadbuilding are types of non military tasks that peacekeepers may perform during their mission as part of their mandate. These undoubtedly improve the peacekeepers' image in the eyes of the people. Providing basic services that are not included in the mandate can further contribute to put a human and friendly face on the operation. During ONUMOZ, for instance, the hospital of the Italian battalion, stationed in central Mozambique, was often used to provide emergency medical care to local civilians. This included delicate, highly-specialised surgery procedures, which were not available at the local Mozambican hospitals. Some members of ONUMOZ also used their civilian skills to teach at local schools.

CONCLUSION

The main conclusion which can be drawn is that there are no pre-set rules to govern the political relationship between a peacekeeping operation and the parties to the conflict. For the government, the presence of peacekeepers on its territory will always represent a certain loss of, or at least a temporary reduction of sovereignty. For the non-government party to the conflict, the UN is usually regarded as the entity that will keep the government in check.

A great deal of flexibility and goodwill is the key to a fruitful relationship. Peacekeeping is not about 'love affairs' between the UN and the parties. It is about successfully resolving conflicts. For that, all that is necessary is a constructive, working relationship. While it takes two willing dancers to tango (perhaps three, in the case of peacekeeping), the dancers also need to know the right steps. Although passion