Preventive diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.



Peacemaking is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the UN Charter.



Peacekeeping is the deployment of a UN presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving UN military. and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.

The text continues as follows: "The present report in addition will address the critically related concept of post-conflict peace-building – action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. Preventive diplomacy seeks to resolve disputes before violence breaks out; peace-making and peace-keeping are required to halt conflicts and preserve peace once it is attained. If successful, they strengthen the opportunity for post conflict peace-building, which can prevent the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples."

In a position paper further detailing some aspects of An Agenda for Peace, the Secretary-General made a more detailed list of the instruments that the UN has developed for controlling and resolving conflicts between and within states. Peacebuilding is an integral part of the list, together with preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, peacekeeping, disarmament, sanctions, and peace enforcement.

Peacebuilding is thus a recently defined concept. It arises out of the recognition that late 20th century conflicts are more totalitarian in nature than classic textbook wars, and that they affect civilians, both materially and psychologically, to a much greater degree. Contemporary conflicts rent the whole fabric of civil societies; above all, they are often related with – if not directly caused by – deep poverty and a lack of human development. Peacebuilding is the bridge between peace support operations and human development; it is the component of a peace support operation that makes it sustainable, that preserves its gains in the medium and long term. A peace support operation that does not incorporate peace-building is, to use a Biblical term, like a house built upon shifting sands.

Peacebuilding, although it is not synonymous with development, is in practice very closely identifiable with development. The reason for this is that the critical elements of peacebuilding (building up local capacities, strengthening civil society, restoring essential infrastructure and commercial relations) are the same elements on which a well-conceived development plan will concentrate in such a post-conflict situation. The only essential addition is that all programmes should issue from the needs and wishes of all parties to the conflict, and be designed in a way that involves all parties (working together towards a common concrete goal is the universally recognised formula for pacifying two opponents) and benefits all affected groups.

In practice, therefore, the peacebuilding component of a peace support operation should be implemented by the affected population itself, with the support chiefly of the development support structures present in the country. While these structures and their co-ordination are discussed in more detail below, it is essential that peacekeeping forces:

are aware of the importance of this component, which has to be launched at the same time as – and not subsequent to – the peace support operation;



are familiar with, and in daily contact with the implementing agents of the peacebuilding component, through an efficient co-ordinating mechanism; and



play their own essential part in peacebuilding, in co-ordination and discussion with the other partners.

There is scope every day, for every troop unit, to undertake initiatives for community involvement; for public information engaging the local population; for politically constructive humanitarian initiatives; for reconstruction of basic infrastructure; for support for the rebuilding of civil society; for the retraining of demobilised military personnel. Much good can be done – as in Croatia and in Angola – through generous and intelligent volunteer activities on the part of the peacekeeping forces.

The rest of this chapter will not focus on the specific actions that a peace support mission should undertake in peacebuilding – except for the few ideas just given – since these should be evolved on a case-by-case basis together with the communities and with the development support structures that operate in the area. Instead, the focus falls on the challenge, indeed the crisis, facing peacekeeping missions and above all their development components. The elements that constitute the essential agenda of peacebuilding will be identified, and some basic principles that would help in the design of more appropriate responses will be suggested. Some recent examples of peacebuilding will be examined in order to describe existing mechanisms and their shortcomings, and the issue of financing peacebuilding components within peace missions will be addressed. Finally, some conclusions and recommendations will be drawn.

THE CHALLENGE

Assistance to rebuild war-torn societies, disintegrated states, and shattered economies, is an essential and integral part of the efforts of the international community and the UN to bring about, maintain and consolidate peace. The many armed conflicts, mostly within states, that have broken out since the end of the Cold War pose a threat to peace at local, regional and global levels, thus justifying an increased involvement of the international community in conflict prevention and resolution. They also cause large scale destruction of economic and social infrastructure, disintegration of societies and political systems and social trauma. Civil wars have been recognised since earliest times as particularly destructive, dehumanising and disruptive of the fabric of society.

The typical international response to contemporary situations of violent conflict will consist of two elements:

attempts at political mediation, resulting in some instances in a UN peace support operation; and



humanitarian assistance, dispatched both through bilateral and through multilateral (UN, European Union (EU), International Red Cross) channels.

In addition – and separately from the first two elements – if the affected country is part of the developing world, there will already be a mechanism in place for development assistance, also funded both bilaterally and multilaterally. The resources of this mechanism will be diverted to a greater or lesser degree to the provision of humanitarian assistance.
The combined costs of peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance and what remains of development co-operation are huge. However, the challenge is not primarily financial and material. It is above all political and conceptual; it lies in the realm of policy, of relations between different actors, and of mechanisms of response and assistance. To be more explicit:

Peacekeeping operations are initiated either by the UN Security Council or by an organisation such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) or the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). As such, they, remain under the influence of a select number of foreign powers, although they are under the daily management of the UN Department of Peace-Keeping Operations (DPKO), or that of another international organisation.



Humanitarian relief is mostly managed by the headquarters of the relevant international and bilateral organisations, and co-ordinated by the UN Department for Humanitarian Affairs (DHA). The mechanism is a complex one, involving large bilateral donors and non-government organisations (NGOs) on an individual basis, plus UN agencies (the World Food Programme (WFP), the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and, to a lesser extent, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the World Health Organisation (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), etc.) and others (the International Committee of the Red Cross/Red Crescent, the International Organisation for Migration, Caritas, the EU, etc.). It is not geared to close co operation with local government and community structures, which are assumed to be non-operational.



Development support structures are, to a far greater degree, locally managed and geared to the wishes and policies of the government and local communities. It is also highly complex, consisting of the UN system, regional (EU, regional development banks) and bilateral donors, and a number of large international NGOs with considerable funds of their own. The UN operational system for development is comprised of a number of independent UN agencies focused around the local office of the UNDP and co-ordinated by the resident co-ordinator, who is normally the UNDP representative. The World Bank group, by far the largest funding source, is nominally part of this mechanism, but works largely independently, since its constituency, its local counterparts and its rules and procedures are quite different. Under normal circumstances, the co-ordination between the UN system and other donors is based on the periodic donors' round-tables (organised by the UN or the EU) or the World Bank-led consultative groups, as well as on an informal level based on daily operational contacts. Contacts with the host government are normally individual.

Given the above, it is not surprising that the integration of different policies and forms of assistance into a coherent unified approach, the effective co-ordination of the actors involved in foreign assistance, and the optimal alignment of external support, have proven difficult in the context of emergency assistance in conflict situations.

A major ongoing action-research project on Problems of International Assistance in Post-Conflict Situations, undertaken jointly by the UN Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) and the Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies of the Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies states that "it is the present incapacity of the international community to live up to this challenge that explains the apparent preponderance of failures over successes [in the search for peace and the return to sustainable development] and that leads to a general uneasiness about current operations and forms of international response."

According to the analysis of the Geneva-based team, lack of clarity exists in at least three fundamental policy areas:

Confusion exists as to the relative policy mix with which the international community should intervene in post-conflict situations: how to integrate into one coherent approach different tools and forms of action (humanitarian, developmental, political, military) so that they reinforce each other rather than operate independently or against each other, and how to simultaneously pursue relief, development, political and security objectives within one coherent and efficient policy approach.



This uncertainty at the policy level leads naturally to, and is compounded by, confusion at the institutional and operational levels. This is particularly true with respect to relative responsibilities and mandates of different actors in international assistance and co-operation, different departments and agencies of the UN, other multilateral bodies, bilateral actors and the NGO community. Who is responsible for and in charge of what? How can there be effective co-ordination? How can operational inefficiency be reduced to acceptable levels?



Finally, there is confusion and much political ambiguity over the relations between external and local actors, that is, between the international community and what remains of state and local authorities, local NGOs, and civil society. What should and can be the relative role, responsibility and authority of external and local actors in defining appropriate policies and measures to sustain peace and rebuild war-torn countries?

The study suggests that over the past few years, this lack of clarity has led to operational practices that have often proven counterproductive and have engendered inefficiency at operational, political and developmental levels.

With respect to the appropriate 'policy mix', international assistance and response to conflicts have increasingly taken the form of a combination of military intervention and massive humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian assistance, in the process, is becoming militarised and politicised, and is losing much of its operational space and efficiency. Political assistance has often been limited to the imposition of standard administrative and political formulas and systems (democratisation), with little regard for local realities and specifics. It has therefore enjoyed limited success. Where political assistance has gone further and attempted to tackle the political root cause of conflicts, it has often failed.

Moreover, development assistance has clearly lost out, with ever more resources being transferred to military and humanitarian operations. Calls for integrating short term relief aid into a longer term development approach have as yet proven difficult to translate into operational practice. In short, the international response to conflict and reconstruction has increasingly veered towards short term and spectacular measures (military and humanitarian) at the expense of assistance in the peacebuilding and development fields. The rapid 'mediatisation' of conflict and humanitarian assistance, which helps put aid on the national political agenda in donor countries, is certainly partly responsible for these developments.

However, it is probably in the field of relations between external and local actors and their respective efforts that the present practice of international assistance to post conflict situations is most problematic and may have the most serious and lasting political implications. Indeed, present forms and practice of international response and assistance tend to move from co-operation to interference with, at best, paternalistic (in the eyes of many recipients) overtones and, at worst, imperialistic overtones. This is most visible in the field of humanitarian assistance which, in the past few years, has undergone a sort of 'ideological regression'. As a result of its politicisation and militarisation, humanitarian assistance has taken ever more massive and spectacular forms, and tends increasingly to substitute and destroy local resistance and coping mechanisms and institutions, rather than to support and reinforce them.

PEACEBUILDING – THE ESSENTIAL AGENDA

Meeting the challenge of sustaining social values and capacities through conflict situations and rebuilding conflict-stricken communities requires the pursuit, in an integrated and comprehensive manner, of at least eight interrelated objectives:

demilitarisation, which includes demobilisation, disarmament, demining, and the reintegration of soldiers into civil society and the economy;



the continuation and careful phasing out of humanitarian and emergency relief;



political reconstruction, including support for the organisation of elections;



social reconstruction, including the rebuilding of human capacities to engage in meaningful economic, social, cultural, and political activities, in a manner that permits both self-fulfilment and respect for the rights of others;



economic reconstruction, including the identification of means of integrating with the global economy without the risk of renewed collapse and conflict;



rebuilding respect for basic human rights, and the creation of mechanisms for their promotion and monitoring;



support for the formulation of new shared visions of communities and nations (the realisation of such social visions constitutes perhaps the best definition of development); and



capacity building (that unglamorous, essential responsibility) in all of the above areas.

DESIGNING A MORE APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

The above enumeration of some of the challenges of peacebuilding that must underpin peace initiatives at all stages, suggests certain imperatives upon which a concerted strategy and mechanism for their realisation could be based. These might include:

the need for all actors to remain responsive to the will, the justified aspirations, and the needs of the affected societies and communities, as expressed through their recognised representatives;



clear recognition and concerted emphasis at all stages of operations on community initiatives, and on the utilisation and where necessary, the strengthening of local coping capacities, including the capacity to assume responsibility for the new challenges of reconstruction and development;



the need to integrate approaches adopted by the military arm of peacekeeping with the advice and initiatives of political, humanitarian, human rights and development specialists (it is unlikely that any one of these has the full range of relevant information, or the diverse capacities and methodologies required to respond to complex and socially sensitive situations);



the importance of ensuring that such integration is respected at global, regional and national levels, as well as by local structures, and that there are specific mechanisms for group recommendations emerging from each to be shared effectively with all relevant partners;



the need for organisation which enables each group to speak with a unified and equal voice in the search for integrated approaches (this is especially important for the humanitarian and development aspects, where institutions are more complex and where there is less experience in developing common positions than for military, political and human rights matters – the humanitarian agencies and development programmes also generally have to deal directly with even more diverse external partners, including bilateral donors and non-government organisations);



the importance of mutual respect and commitment to draw on the comparative strengths and recognise the comparative responsibilities of each group;



the value of joint analysis of the underlying causes of conflict, of the scope for effective support for peacebuilding, of the potential for renewed social harmony and sustainable development (this should enable each to bring the insights and the strengths of each group to bear on the formulation of a coherent response);



the need for collective recommendations to be presented in a coherent framework to which all actors are committed (in terms of mandates and objectives) and against which the contributions of each can be jointly monitored;



the value of integrated programmes bringing together various actors under a single management structure, to relate in a unified manner to populations for whom a new shared vision and collective action is such an important part of the healing process;



the need for sustained and predictable funding, if a meaningful contribution to long term solutions to complex emergencies is to be made (this calls for active and sustained resource mobilisation strategies in which all parties are involved – national or local leaders, peacekeeping officers and political advisers, as well as the humanitarian, development and human rights specialists); and



the need for flexible funding.

It is evident from the above that the method of providing support is likely to be as important to the outcome as the magnitude of that support. This means that special emphasis must be placed on the design of flexible mechanisms that allow funding to be transferred to meet emerging opportunities, across all types of action (peacekeeping to humanitarian relief, to development, to human rights, etc.), as well as between communities and partner organisations. The earmarking of funds by activity or geographical location under complex emergency conditions is a major additional burden for the designers and managers of integrated programmes. In short, the imperatives of the situation call for greater co-ordination, for clear comprehensive strategies, for integrated action; for flexible management partnerships, and for sustained and flexible funding. The peacekeeping forces and their leaders are perhaps in the most difficult position in this regard, since they often do not have any past experience at working together with the arcane humanitarian and development system of the UN and other donors.

TAKING STOCK OF CURRENT PERFORMANCE

Peacebuilding was sadly neglected during the UN operation in Somalia. A Comprehensive Report on Some Lessons Learned from United Nations Operations in Somalia, prepared by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung of Germany, the Life and Peace Institute of Sweden, and the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI), in co operation with the Lessons Learned Unit of the DPKO of the UN, states that "[t]he United Nations must pursue an integrated strategy aimed at supporting the judiciary, police, local government, the economy, reconciliation, disarmament, and demobilisation." After such an unequivocal statement of commitment to the integration of development into complex peace operations, it is disappointing to find that the report makes no reference to modalities that would ensure the effective participation of development and development co-operation specialists in the process. It appears that from the very design of the report, as in the formulation of the UNOSOM operations themselves, the development community has been left out. The four syndicates established for the review covered Security Council mandates; Political and Associated Institution Building; Humanitarian Aspects and Information Management; and Military Aspects. The report repeatedly emphasises that "it is essential to have an integrated mission plan covering political, humanitarian and military aspects", without development even being mentioned. In short, despite the recognition that peace and development are intertwined, this report shows that when it comes to emergency action, development is put on hold.

On the other hand, there is the example of the peacekeeping operation in El Salvador and Nicaragua a few years ago, where large scale peacebuilding activities were successfully incorporated in the mission and led to a more consolidated peace than anyone at the time had hoped for. The key to the relative success of this operation was the setting up of reintegration and reconstruction programmes with massive funding from the donor community. One successful example of such an integrated programme is the PRODERE programme, implemented by the UNDP and the UN operation. It built successfully on the principles of a co-ordinated and integrated approach, community initiative, non-differentiation of beneficiaries within a given geographic area, and a vision of peacebuilding.

More recent examples in the Southern African subregion, those of Mozambique and Angola, show the recognition of the need for a more integrated approach. In Mozambique, a conscious effort was made to co-ordinate the peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding structures. Building on lessons learned there, the Angolan experiment saw the same person act as humanitarian assistance co-ordinator, resident co-ordinator of the UN development structures, and deputy to the SRSG. Although the three tasks proved to be too much for a single person, and the roles were subsequently separated, the experiment was beneficial in terms of bringing the three structures into closer acquaintance and daily operational contact. The holding of regular co-ordination meetings and the appointment of specific task forces became routine. The demobilisation and reintegration programme certainly showed at its inception the kind of co-operation and mutual reinforcement between the three structures which should become the rule in such operations.

TOWARDS BETTER MECHANISMS FOR PEACEBUILDING

To a large extent, the failure to integrate peacebuilding in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations does not stem so much from conceptual opposition to such integration, but rather from the following:

a lack of co-ordination between the actors involved in peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and development;



a 'top-down' approach, where the local realities and aspirations are not, or are insufficiently understood and respected; and



a lack of funding.

After a brief analysis of each of the above areas of concern, a number of steps which can, and should be taken to resolve these issues are outlined below.

MECHANISMS FOR IMPROVED CO-OPERATION

There is much room for the improvement of co-operation and co-ordination at the global level, where policies are established and parameters set for country operations. Even within the UN Secretariat, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, there was a sharp divide between the operations of various departments – peacekeeping and political on the one hand, and the funds and programmes responsible for humanitarian assistance and development on the other. This was compounded by the fact that, for development, operational responsibility was shared with a wide range of more than twenty autonomous specialised agencies, each with its own mandate, its own constituency, and its own governance. It also proved impossible to engage the best resource institutions of the UN system (the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), with their different stakeholders, management structures and ethos) in equal partnerships at global or country level.

The Department of Humanitarian Affairs was established in 1992 to provide, with technical and operational support from an interagency standing committee, a focal point for the consolidation of UN efforts in this area. Yet, the mandate and the authority of the DHA, (like that of most other co-ordinating mechanisms introduced within the UN), remain ambiguous, and its resources, capacity and operational experience are very limited compared to the immensity of its tasks.

As for development, in 1995 the Secretary-General entrusted a single official, the administrator of the UNDP, with the responsibility to assist him in co-ordinating the work of the different funds and programmes operating under his overall authority and engaged in operational activities; for encouraging the autonomous specialised agencies to collaborate around agreed goals; and for mobilising for these same purposes the support of the World Bank group.

With respect to the broader challenge of designing and implementing complex peace operations, in 1993, following the realisation that new style peacekeeping missions increasingly had as objective the saving of lives of millions of civilians trapped in conflict situations, weekly meetings were established between the Under Secretaries General for peacekeeping, Political Affairs and Humanitarian Affairs. In 1995, the administrator of UNDP was added to the group to ensure that it also addressed peacebuilding and development concerns.

While the latter developments are encouraging, a number of further improvements are needed, including the following:

better co-ordination with regional organisations and other interested donors;



full involvement of development specialists of the UN in early warning systems ;



comprehensive assessments of emerging situations by the Secretary-General, drawing on all relevant information, including that from development co-operation managers;



design of preventive development strategies as an essential complement to preventive diplomacy and preventive humanitarian actions; and



development and presentation to the Security Council of truly comprehensive strategies, that build on the analysis of underlying causes and suggest how these might be addressed, by the country or populations themselves, by regional structures and by the international community. Through the UN, such strategies should be updated regularly.

More importantly, improvement is needed at the country level, where policies and parameters are translated into operations, often with substantial adaptation to meet the needs of the real world. In theory, the co-ordination of UN activities at country level is clear: it is under the responsibility of a single official – the resident co-ordinator of the operational activities for development. In reality, the mandate of the resident co ordinators emerges from a gruelling process of inter-agency compromise, and is couched more in terms of 'thou shalt not' than in terms of agreed enabling principles. Of course, no specific resources accompany the mandate. It was only in 1989 that the role of the resident co-ordinator in emergency situations was recognised in principle. Nevertheless, where the role of resident co-ordinator is exercised with appropriate initiative and imagination, in a spirit of partnership with the rest of the country team leaders, the resident co-ordinator system has served as a useful countervailing force to the pressures for fragmentation that come both from within the UN system and generally from partners in the host country.

In the case of complex operations involving peacekeeping forces, most often the Secretary-General has designated a SRSG with full responsibility for negotiating and implementing the peace process and, in this context, managing the input of the Secretariat, mobilising the support of the operational funds and programmes for humanitarian and development activities, and leading the team of autonomous specialised agencies. The transfer of important responsibilities from the resident co ordinator to the SRSG and from the SRSG back to a resident co-ordinator has often proven problematic, with ongoing co-ordinating responsibilities for development activities of the resident co-ordinator under the overall authority of the SRSG.

Solutions must be found to the challenge of organising co-ordination 'on the ground' to avoid the kind of problems that plagued the Somalia operation (in a context where national actors appear to have revelled in the confusion among external partners). In pursuit of such solutions, several recommendations can be advanced:

There is a need for clear structures for regular consultation among all key partners; these may include the holding of daily briefing sessions among all senior staff, including the humanitarian and development co-ordinator, and regular sessions with a broader grouping of all humanitarian and developmental agencies. This was successfully implemented in Angola.



There is also a need for the development of clear and comprehensive operational strategies – if necessary for different parts of a country or region – against which resources can be mobilised and assigned, initiatives taken and security assured on the few occasions where this has been achieved (again, Angola is an example, were the results of such strategies appear to be highly successful).



Recognising the different backgrounds of the actors involved and the interdependence of their efforts, it would appear essential to ensure a period of intensive group briefing and management skills development at all levels. In the new South Africa, for example, great emphasis is justifiably placed on the development of group dynamics and team work especially at the executive and managerial levels. Similar exercises, engaging an even more diverse range of actors, and involving experienced outside facilitators, would seem ideal for the development of a unified team of team leaders and decision makers around an SRSG.



Given the need for military and civilian staff to share or exchange responsibilities regularly, or at least for the latter to take over at a certain stage, it is essential that there is standardised training for specific functions. Such training should occur across the military/civilian divide, and draw on the best practices of each; this would certainly require 'give and take' on both sides.



Respect for the principle of transparency (within the confines of collective confidentiality) should be inculcated among the various key actors under the responsibility of the SRSG. The incident in Mogadishu where the entire senior management team of UNDP has been held hostage overnight at gun-point by the forces of UNOSOM II has demonstrated that it is essential that the other actors are aware of the intentions of the military and that the military is kept fully abreast of initiatives to be undertaken under humanitarian and development programmes.



Finally, given the intense degree of interest in peace operations by local populations and international media alike, it is essential that the public information aspects of the operations are formulated by the integrated team, and that these form the sole basis for the public information initiatives of all participating entities of the UN. The alternative is confusion, the provision of ample material for criticism and, in extreme cases, increased risk for the members of the various programmes.

ESTABLISHING PARTNERSHIPS WITH LOCAL COMMUNITIES

One of the greatest failures in conflict resolution by the international community has been the inability to relate effectively to those most seriously affected by conflict and crises, the local communities themselves, when faced with the need to save lives. Humanitarian assistance managers, and especially peacekeepers, are unlikely to realise that their well-intentioned actions could endanger the very livelihoods of those they are striving to help.

There is thus an urgent need to adopt a completely new approach in which the intended beneficiaries of peace operations are fully associated with the search for solutions. This does not mean the multiplication of interminable and often divisive high level conferences (although these certainly have their place when conditions are right), but rather the development, despite the difficulties involved, of discreet, sensitive contacts, including through informal channels, with local groups of all kinds, and developing the capacity to listen and observe, and thus to gain insight. Understanding of local aspirations and processes must be the basis of sustainable solutions.

An example of the failure to recognise and build on underestimated strengths and resources of communities, especially in Africa, has been the neglect of the women's peace movements. In recent years, women's groups across the continent have struggled to make an impact – without resources, without formal structures and, most often, without a voice in the design of relief and rehabilitation operations that have tended to be both necessitated by and dominated by men. One programme that has tried to make an impact, and that has indeed achieved a great deal in a short time, is the African Women in Crisis Programme (AFWIC), which is sponsored by the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM). In Sudan, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi and elsewhere, AFWIC has aimed at empowering women to express their views and to make a direct contribution to the improvement of their own situation. AFWIC helped to make the contribution of women to the search for peace in Africa one of the high-points of the fourth International Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995. Yet, this initiative still goes unnoticed in many UN and regional circles, and suffers from totally inadequate core support, depending for its effectiveness on the often fleeting interest of individual donors in actions proposed for specific countries. When one talks of local actors, one tends to forget that half of the population who are left to cope with the responsibilities and the suffering that the other half has usually imposed upon them.

Actions such as support for the revival of associational life, the resurrection of a web of civic, professional, business, athletic, and other associations, are a major component of the reconciliation process in war-torn societies. Building multiple bridges across lines of conflict and improving lines of communication are essential, as civil society is the backbone of a sustainable political system. Though this is ultimately the responsibility of the community itself, the international community, including peacekeeping forces, can play a constructive role in catalysing such developments.

For peace operations, an essential component must be the design and creation of safe 'political space' for such programmes, so that elements of civil society may re-emerge without fear of intimidation and retaliation. As already suggested, the design of public information around peace operations must also take into account the needs of the local population, with appropriate methods (generally radio transmissions) and full involvement of the local actors in the identification and formulation of the messages.

Among the UN partners, the closest linkages with local populations are likely to be found among those who have been the development partners of a society. This is at least the case where those partners have been responsive to civil society, as well as to their official host governments. They constitute in many cases an underutilised source of advice, ideas, knowledge, experience and commitment that must surely benefit peace operations as a whole. The local development NGO community is normally even better qualified to play an advisory role, although they are just as likely as others to be diverted from their long term objectives by pressing humanitarian imperatives.

FINANCING PEACEBUILDING ACTIVITIES WITHIN A UN PEACE MISSION

It is widely accepted that the greatest challenge to successful peace operations in recent times has been the lack of financial resources. When the multiple additional elements – political, humanitarian and development – that are the key to the sustainability of peace initiatives are added, the challenge is even greater.

Although it is essential to be cautious in the projection of financial demands and to take account of the constraints on national budgets in all parts of the world, being realistic in predicting the impact of under-funded or incomplete operations is very important. It may even lead to the recognition that the net effect of progress that cannot be sustained could be negative.

Successful peacekeeping is costly, in terms of additional funding and effort, especially when operations are conceived as global rather than as regional exercises. The overall impact of the massive investments involved, however, can be greatly enhanced (and the long term costs reduced), if military intervention is accompanied by the peacebuilding measures that are needed to achieve lasting solutions and to tackle underlying causes.

Official development assistance flows are under attack everywhere, and their distribution raises many questions. Within the Office of Development Assistance (ODA – by far the largest source of development funding in the case of Western Europe), there has been a shift to both bilateral and international programmes in order to meet the agreed obligatory contributions to the aid programmes managed by the EU. However, these programmes tend to be frozen when countries collapse into crisis without legitimate structures for negotiation and decision-making.

Similarly, despite the difficulties in recent years of ensuring adequate replenishment of the concessionary loan funds of the World Bank, the negotiated obligatory contributions to the international financial institutions (IFIs) represent a major element in funding available for development. These are not normally available to countries whose basic institutions of state financial management and organised banking have collapsed.

In situations of complex emergency, development assistance funds are supplemented by special appeals, principally the UN Consolidated Appeals. These exercises are co-ordinated by the DHA, and focus almost exclusively on immediate humanitarian needs. Funds for peacebuilding activities have to come either from existing multilateral and bilateral sources, from ad hoc fundraising, or through special donors' conferences, organised by the UN, the World Bank, or the EU. These conferences are preceded by quick, but thorough situation analyses and plans, developed jointly by the national authorities and the international community. The 1995 Angola Round Table, for example, resulted in pledges for over a billion dollars, although a large portion of this was the redeployment of already earmarked funds.

The following conclusions and recommendations may be drawn from the above:

Examining the cost-effectiveness of various forms of intervention is essential. This will certainly entail looking at new partnerships. For example, a partnership may emerge in which regional military contingents would be fully financed by the international community through the UN, at regionally determined rates, and act under the overall authority of the Security Council. In the case of Africa, such contingents may be mobilised jointly through the OAU and relevant subregional institutions.



There is a need for the preparation and presentation to the Security Council, after review by other members of the international community, of comprehensive cost estimates for peace operations. These should include specific provisions (based on informed assessments by multidisciplinary teams) for the other aspects that must be addressed to give the overall peace mission a reasonable chance of success. Various options could accompany the estimates, and funding could be provided through a range of different channels. What is essential, however, is that there is an opportunity to review peace initiatives holistically, and that the international commitment is to the peace process, rather than to stop-gap measures designed to avert immediate catastrophes or respond to sudden disasters.



The organisation of a series of resource mobilisation occasions within the comprehensive strategy is recommended. These could include the presentation of the broad-based peace operation to a special international conference, as well as more specific sessions on humanitarian and development needs. As the example of Rwanda has suggested, these are most effective when organised together, and when the first steps towards rehabilitation are addressed as integral parts of the package of immediate humanitarian requirements. The proposals arising from such occasions would probably be area specific, and would again be based on 'ground' assessments. Over time, the aim should be to return as soon as possible to the normal donor co-ordination and resource mobilisation mechanisms, including UNDP sponsored round-tables and World Bank-led consultative groups. There should be flexibility in deciding between these mechanisms, as it is difficult to imagine the latter being feasible until legitimate government structures and functioning national financial systems are in place.



Far greater flexibility in implementation is required. Those in the development field have the advantage of a great deal of delegated authority, and the associated strengthened procedures for ensuring full accountability. With the adoption of the programme approach to development, decisions on the allocation of resources within broadly defined budgets have also been decentralised. This spirit needs to pervade other aspects of UN peace missions.



Flexibility is also required in the grey areas of responsibility. For example, the managers of military and political processes need to be able to deploy supplementary humanitarian or basic physical development resources in support of their initiatives. This could include the funding of actions undertaken by the military in demining and the reconstruction of basic infrastructures, which is an important element in gaining the acceptance and goodwill of local populations. Through development co-operation, specialists should be associated with such operations in order to ensure sustainability and community involvement. A mechanism is also needed to allow the transfer of humanitarian resources to development as soon as the situation allows this.



New partnerships must be forged between the institutions that still have substantial resources for development – the EU, the World Bank, Japan and the newly industrialised countries of South East Asia – and those which are able to organise development co-operation in times of crisis. At the national level, such partnerships might be with the UN development system, and concentrate on capacity building and institutional strengthening (including support for the re-emergence of viable and trusted state structures that must provide the basic framework for law and order, justice, basic human services, the planning and maintenance of essential infrastructure, etc.). Such organisations, together with the NGO community (local and international), community-based organisation and, above all, the communities themselves, could be engaged in the implementation of grassroots initiatives that are the key to the restoration of health and the dynamism in society at large.



New partnerships should also be explored with the private sector. The example of South Africa has demonstrated the political role that a responsible private sector with an eye on its long term interests can play in peaceful political transition. There must be scope to harness the imagination and the resources of the private sector, international and local, formal and informal, in the search for renewed development (of which they will be principal monitors and beneficiaries).



Finally, there is an urgent need for sustained international financial support, for positive resource flows. There must be adequate financial support to safeguard the livelihoods of the most vulnerable – including whole communities and small nations – as they struggle to adapt to the competition of the global marketplace. There must be a strong commitment to provide the means that will allow national efforts to recover past economic strength, or to break out for the first time from the vicious circle of poverty and under-capitalisation.

CONCLUSION

The linkage between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, though often unrecognised or ignored, is obvious. In the words of James Gustave Speth, administrator of the UNDP: "The UN's work in development is essential to the success of the United Nations in its various non-development missions. Most important are the links between development and peace ... Many critics of international assistance have not paused to think about the underlying causes of the conflicts in which the UN and others are becoming involved. Degrading poverty, diminishing material resources and increasing joblessness all feed ethnic and social tensions. It is from this cauldron that crises boil over ... Of 82 significant conflicts in the last three years, 79 are within nations, not between nations. 90% of the casualties have been civilians, not soldiers. These conflicts require development upstream, not soldiers downstream, acting preventively, landing development now, instead of peace-keepers tomorrow ... If we want a UN for peace, we need a UN for development."

This was clearly recognised by the founding fathers of the UN, as they struggled to bring to a close half a century of world war. Political leaders, economists, and generals alike concluded that an enduring peace was one that built on a foundation of expanding prosperity and social justice. This was embodied in the UN Charter itself, with its commitment "to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all its peoples."

Finally, the linkage between peace and development, and the need for increased co operation, have been firmly stated in the Secretary-General's An Agenda for Peace: "The times call for thinking afresh, for striving together and for creating new ways to overcome crises. This is because the different world that emerged when the Cold War ceased is still not fully understood. The changed face of conflict today requires us to be perceptive, adaptive, creative and courageous, and to address simultaneously the immediate as well as the root causes of conflict, which a