The province did not experience any integration of former bantustan police agencies with the former South African Police (SAP). This means that problems of police integration, amalgamating crime databases and the inclusion of areas where recording has been poor or absent have not been an issue.



Although the province is largely rural, with large distances between towns, the settlement geography of Northern Cape encourages reporting. Small town communities – 78 per cent of the population is urbanised63 – which are relatively isolated are each served by an individual police station. Small town dynamics, associated with people knowing each other as well as the police, are also believed to encourage reporting.64



Afrikaans is widely spoken as the first language of the province, and most people understand and speak it as a second or third language.65 It is also largely the dominant language used by state agencies, such as the police.



The infrastructure in Northern Cape – particularly roads and telephone distribution – makes the police more accessible to ordinary citizens than elsewhere in the country. Although many rural communities in Northern Cape are without access by proclaimed road, and most proclaimed roads are gravel, the provincial road network is extensive and well distributed across the whole province.66 The number of people with access to a telephone is higher than the national average of 9,9 per 100 people. In Kimberley 12,9 people in every 100 have access to a phone.67



Interview material suggests that community and family support networks or structures in former coloured areas are not as developed as in African areas. This encourages the use of the police as the first recourse, particularly in the case of rape, domestic violence and associated crimes.68 It may also be true that higher reporting rates for rape and assaults reflect the precarious position of women whose lives are in danger, and who simply have no other means of resolving the problem. Similar dynamics have been reported in native American communities, where 'reporting abuses in small communities where escape is limited are acts of near-desperation or defiance'.69



Since 1992, several government departments in the province have run campaigns to promote the reporting of violent crime.70

Although perceptions of security and of changing crime levels do not always correlate with official statistics, high reported crime rates in Northern Cape are reflected in victimisation surveys. Most Northern Cape residents (53 per cent) feel unsafe in their communities, which is higher than the national average of 46 per cent and second only to KwaZulu-Natal, where the highest number of people (62 per cent) said they feel unsafe. One reason for this is probably that the majority (57 per cent) in Northern Cape believe crime has increased in their community over the past six months, as indeed do most South Africans surveyed. However, more people held this view in Northern Cape, Western Cape, Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal than in the other provinces. The fact that 13 per cent of those in Northern Cape said they had personally been a victim of crime in recent months – a higher figure than that recorded in any other province in the country – must contribute to feelings of insecurity.71

For the vast majority of people living in Northern Cape, unemployment and poverty are seen as the fundamental causes of the crime problem.72 These views are by no means exclusive to the province: in a national victimisation survey among black South Africans, 80 per cent of all respondents listed socio-economic factors such as unemployment, poverty and illiteracy as the root cause of crime.73 In Northern Cape a lack of recreation and entertainment, particularly for the youth, are also believed to cause crime.74 Without exception, the excessive use of alcohol – often as a result of these broader problems – was identified as a key factor leading to crime.

Poverty and unemployment can be associated with the perpetration of certain crimes. But focusing only on structural features such as these as causes of crime does not always explain crime patterns in particular areas, and is not helpful to policy-makers. Poverty and unemployment often usefully describe the contexts within which crime occurs. In terms of trends, these arguments are too general: they do not explain why rates for most violent crimes are substantially higher in Northern Cape than in other provinces equally or more affected by unemployment and poverty.

Northern Cape is facing long-term economic decline and a shrinkage of formal sector employment.75 But when compared to other provinces in the country (which have lower violent crime rates), Northern Cape is better off in terms of economic and human development indicators. The unemployment rate is lower than the national average and that of Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, Northern Province and North West. Northern Cape also has the second highest human development index – a measure of life expectancy, adult literacy and income – of all provinces.76

Explanations of the comparatively high rates of violent crime in Northern Cape cannot be separated from the socio-economic context in which crime occurs. But these structural conditions need to be 'linked down' to specific situations and patterns of criminal behaviour in particular communities.77 If interventions are to be identified and implemented, it needs to be clear to policy-makers how being poor, for example, actually translates into criminal behaviour.

Generally, most black South Africans – including those in Northern Cape – do not believe the police are fighting crime effectively. Countrywide, the most common complaints related to police performance (49 per cent), corruption (33 per cent) and inadequate staff and resources (which in this survey referred to vehicles, 16 per cent). In Northern Cape, resource shortages are ranked above corruption.78 Vigilante action is not, however, believed to be the solution for people in that province. Only 19 per cent of people, less than the national average of 23 per cent, thought the community itself should sentence criminals instead of handing them over to the police.

Despite some negative perceptions of the police, policing in Northern Cape may be better than in other provinces. Asked about reasons for feeling unsafe, the perceived absence of the police was given by 18 per cent of all black South Africans. Compared with the rest of the country, people in Northern Cape reported the lowest proportions in this regard: only 8 per cent compared with 27 per cent in Northern Province and 22 per cent in North West, for example.79 And people were found to be most critical of the police in Mpumalanga, KwaZulu-Natal, Northern Province and Gauteng. Compared to the other provinces, Northern Cape is better off in terms of police numbers, with the lowest number of civilians per official at 237:1.

If the statistics on violent crime in Northern Cape clearly reflect the extent of the problem compared to the rest of the country, they say little about the underlying causes or features which are common to most incidents of crime.80 Until police statistics in the province are collected with a view to recording specific details around individual instances of violent crime, the task of fully understanding the causes of criminality in the province will be difficult.

In the absence of useful statistics, interview material provided some insight into two defining features common to the majority of violent crimes in Northern Cape and in Kimberley in particular.

Victims and offenders are known to each other

The police statistics, as outlined above, suggest that the chances of becoming a victim of violent crime are higher in Northern Cape than elsewhere. This needs to be interpreted carefully, since research suggests that outsiders to particular areas are less likely to be victimised since a significant proportion of violence takes place within the context of the family or the community.

Again, this raises the importance of understanding the dynamics of criminality specific to particular places: despite the statistics, the defining features of crime in Kimberley mean that a stranger walking the streets of Hillbrow is probably more likely to become a victim of violent crime than one in Kimberley's Galeshewe township.

Interpersonal violence in Northern Cape, and especially Kimberley, often takes the form of violence between friends, within the family, and in particular against woman and children. At the time of the research, the Child Protection Unit (CPU) in Kimberley had 700 dockets relating to instances of child abuse, statutory rape, and a range of other offences relating to the abuse of children.81 (By way of comparison, the Western Cape CPU handled 1 500 cases in 1995.82) In particular, the rape of young children and under-age teenagers is a serious problem, and many of these attacks occur within the family unit.83 This pattern fits the national picture for crimes reported against children in 1996.84 While rape as a general category appears to have decreased over the past year in Northern Cape, recorded rapes of under-age girls has increased.85

In 1996 there were 1 450 reported rapes in the province – a figure of approximately 120 a month for a population of just over 700 000. Prosecution rates are significantly lower; the police in Galeshewe, for example, were only investigating 31 cases over a three-month period between December 1996 and February 1997. In Kimberley hospital's casualties department, on the other hand, 26 rapes, largely those cases in which serious physical injury had occurred, were reported during January 1997. Although no figures are available, police, prosecutors and health officials reported that many complaints were withdrawn, particularly where offenders and victims were known to each other.86

Rape is not the only crime which results in the withdrawal of complaints. Domestic violence (which police largely record as assault), which may contribute to Northern Cape's very high rate of serious assault, is another crime in which cases against offenders are often dropped. There are three dimensions to complaints being withdrawn. First, if victims lose faith in the legal process and believe the case will not have the desired result, they may withdraw the complaints. Second, as would be expected, victims do not follow through with prosecutions when they fear retribution from offenders who are known to them. Third, where people – especially women with children – are dependent on the perpetrators, many fear the loss of support that would result if they were to separate, or the latter were to be imprisoned.87

The heightened vulnerability of the poor to domestic violence and rape was described in Kimberley. Problems which begin as conflict over money or food often result in violence: 'Men think women are their property to do with what they like. They don't think they are committing a crime when they abuse women. They are not worried about the police.'88 At a recent White Ribbon Campaign launched in Kimberley, women were encouraged to speak out about their problems. The common predicament was that women often felt 'trapped' in abusive relationships due to their dependence on partners for food, shelter and money.89

Young parenthood, especially among the poor, has also been associated with domestic violence.90 Teenage pregnancy is prevalent in the urban areas of Northern Cape: in Kimberley and Upington about one quarter of teenage girls become pregnant.91 The absence of working mothers, and fathers' limited presence, often lead to neglect and the abuse of children. Violent tendencies among children have also been associated with inadequate parenting skills, especially among young parents.92

If violence in the home environment and between people who are known to each other is as common in Northern Cape as the research suggests, this may be one reason why there is a high incidence of violent crimes generally in the province. Campbell, drawing on McKendrick and Hoffmann's analogy of the family as the 'cradle of violence',93 argues that 'because the family is a microcosm of society, the prevalence of violence in a particular society is invariably linked to high levels of domestic violence'.94 The family is the arena in which men particularly learn to use violence as an accepted means of resolving conflicts generally.

At another level of dependency, there is some evidence in Kimberley that teenage girls and children of poor families receive financial or material rewards in exchange for sexual favours, effectively beginning a process of criminalising the victim.95 A similar scenario faces (largely male) youths who are reportedly employed by drug dealers to sell their merchandise in Galeshewe township. Competition between these children for entry into the business often erupts violently on school premises.96 Child labour, which is associated with poverty, is considered to be a problem in Kimberley. Some children are involved in buying and delivering alcohol from shebeens to people around the township. Children who start working at an early age – often at the behest of their parents – spend their time on the streets outside of parental and school supervision, where they are more exposed to victimisation as well as being drawn into criminal activity.97

Victims and offenders are often under the influence of alcohol

Alcohol is a crucial feature of Northern Cape's crime landscape, and has been associated with a variety of violent crimes in the province. Research elicited graphic accounts of the effects of alcohol on child abuse and rape: parents who drink excessively become negligent and abusive, sometimes being present and intoxicated while children are molested; young women drinking at shebeens and street parties are exposed to rape. A lack of entertainment and 'boredom' was identified as one reason for high alcohol consumption. This was also a factor in a study of the alcohol–crime relationship among offenders: prisoners in Northern Cape commonly identified 'a need for fun' as the reason for their first try at alcohol. They also expressed a preference for drinking in company, especially with friends of the same age or younger than themselves.98

Shebeens are open throughout the day, and several sell liquor to teenagers and children – many of whom are sent to buy alcohol for adults. Shebeens are the locus of much violence, particularly over weekends, and alcohol is believed to be the driving force behind most assaults.99 Characteristically, both victims and offenders of violent crimes are under the influence. This alcohol–violence scenario has several important features:

women also drink excessively;100



although guns are now used more often in criminal activity, most murders are committed with knives, and most serious assaults with broken bottles and blunt instruments. The majority of murders were described as 'assaults that go too far'.101 Against a background of high alcohol consumption, many of these incidents may be the result of spontaneous, and possibly avoidable conflicts – such as men fighting over a woman102 – as opposed to pre-planned, purposeful attacks;



this has implications for the province, given that the murder rate is already the second highest in the country, and the rate of serious assault is more than three times higher than the national average. Significantly, Galeshewe township - with a population of around 140 000 - is the main contributor to these provincial totals. During 1996 the provincial ambulance service in Kimberley transported 6 887 assault victims from Galeshewe to hospital. This amounts to 52,6 per cent of all serious assaults recorded by police for the entire province,103 and an assault rate of 4 919,2 per 100 000 people - significantly above the already high provincial rate of 1 751,2. If alcohol abuse is the main contributor to these very high levels of assault, intervention in this regard is crucial. The number of assault victims transported by the ambulance service is also more than the 5 991 incidents of serious assault recorded by police for the Diamondfield region where Kimberley is situated - indicating the degree of under-reporting of assault to police. Forty per cent of murders in Northern Cape in 1996 occurred in the Diamondfield area - probably also largely in Galeshewe.

The prevalence of alcohol abuse in Northern Cape is not altogether surprising. South Africans generally drink large quantities of liquor: between 1 July 1995 and 30 June 1996 an estimated 6 billion litres of alcohol was consumed. With an adult per capita absolute alcohol consumption of nearly 10 litres per year, these drinking habits place South Africa among the highest consumers of alcohol in the world.104

The history of alcohol in South Africa has influenced these drinking patterns. For decades alcohol presented a useful way for the state as well as mining concerns to control the black labour force, both for political and economic reasons. Inspired by similar motives, the tot system in the Cape was already entrenched by the 18th century. By the 1970s the state's liquor interests, according to Scharf, 'formed an integral part of the functioning and success of the apartheid policy'.105 Not all black people were passive participants in these processes, however. Alcohol became a rallying point for defiance of and resistance to the state, as well as a means of economic survival in impoverished urban communities. In the process, excessive alcohol consumption took its toll on society, affecting people's health, families and livelihoods.

Particular aspects of this history contributed to current high consumption levels:

Prohibitions on drinking among black people between 1928 and 1962 encouraged the development of an extensive illegal liquor trade. Eventually about 60 per cent of all alcohol supplied to Africans was channelled through shebeens.106 Even after consumption was legalised in 1962, shebeens continued to flourish in the absence of adequate numbers of legal facilities in townships and due to trading restrictions and regulations.



It was in the previous government's interests to promote alcohol consumption, since local government finance in black townships depended on it for three decades. In 1945 the state established beer halls selling sorghum beer in townships. The profits from these sales were the primary source of local authority revenue until 1980. Despite the illegality of shebeens, many liquor outlets run by municipalities after prohibition supplied shebeens with most of their alcohol supplies. During the 1976 student uprising, many of the beer halls were targeted and destroyed because they symbolised the state. Importantly, they were also a source of social decay, wrecking the lives of people in townships and beyond, where ties were maintained with family in rural areas.



In the Cape, the tot system – providing wine as part of the wage – reduced the outlay of farmers' cash wages and tied workers to farms through alcohol dependence. Unsurprisingly, 'a bottle and a half of doctored wine per day from the age of 12 also did much to produce a rural class of alcoholics'.107 The tot system was not only used to secure cheap labour, but also to dispose of surplus wine. According to Scully,108 the sale of poor quality wine was so vital to wine farmers' livelihoods that the state did not limit wine sales to the coloured population (in the face of restrictions on African consumption) or abolish the tot system.

With its economy dominated by diamond mining and the wine industry, all these aspects have shaped Northern Cape's alcohol history. The tot system – despite the fact that this practice is now illegal – is still used on wine and other farms in the province. Socio-economic factors such as the lack of development, illiteracy, low levels of school attendance, a lack of recreation and sport facilities, low wages, unemployment and boredom have also been associated with high levels of alcohol abuse in towns and rural areas.109

These factors would not, however, explain why alcohol consumption is higher in Northern Cape than in other provinces which are worse off in terms of similar indicators. Compared to other provinces though, legally supplied liquor does seem more accessible. There are nearly twice as many liquor licences per unit of the population in Northern Cape as there are for South Africa as a whole, mainly issued for bottle stores – of which there is nearly three times the national average per unit population in the province. The majority of liquor stores in Northern Cape are white-owned, but many are situated on the periphery of townships and sell almost exclusively to township customers.110 The fact that under apartheid (and until 1962) coloured people were allowed unlimited choice of alcohol (which African people were not) probably accounts for the high number of liquor licences in the province.

The sale of illegal alcohol from unlicensed outlets is as widespread in Kimberley and Upington as in the rest of the country. Galeshewe typically has three to five shebeens per street, with the figure rising to between seven and 10 in some streets. Most shebeens are run in residential areas by people (often women) desperate to make a living: South African Breweries has estimated that the average income per person per month from this informal business in 1994/5 was only R400.111 Several operate 24 hours a day, and serve under-age customers.

The impact of the alcohol industry is severe. The prevalence of risky or binge drinking is high. Adult, African and coloured urban males and the youth fall into the high-risk group in South Africa, and estimates are that 30 per cent of these people drink at dangerous levels.112 This can be compared to 6 per cent in England and Wales.113 In Northern Cape, rural farm workers and women join this category of risky drinkers. Excessive drinking can in turn be linked to crime and violence, with high social and health-related costs.

Alcohol is a major factor in domestic violence, child abuse, assault and murder. In the absence of data about perpetrators, information is usually gathered from victims. In the case of murder, 53 per cent of homicide victims in the Cape metropole in 1996 had considerably high blood alcohol levels.114 This compares with 30 per cent of victims tested in Los Angeles between 1970 and 1979.115 In the case of assault, the Cape Metropolitan Study established that 63,6 per cent of injuries caused by interpersonal violence were alcohol-related.116 The same study found that in violence occurring in the home against women, nearly 68 per cent of incidents were alcohol-related.117

There is much circumstantial evidence that strong links exist between alcohol consumption and crime.118 Indeed, the first study on alcohol and drug use among offenders in South African prisons confirms findings in Northern Cape: violent crimes such as murder and rape are associated with alcohol use, with offenders reporting it gives them 'courage'.119 But worldwide, research has failed to show a linear causal relationship between alcohol and criminal activity. It has been argued that the social situations, circumstances and environment in which crime occurs may be more important than the consumption itself, and that violence and intoxication may have the same causes. It has even been suggested that alcohol makes offenders less able to avoid arrest.120 Most research suggests that while drug and alcohol use does not necessarily start criminal careers, it tends to intensify and perpetuate them.121 It is likely, then, that alcohol will be more closely associated with repeat offending.

EASTERN CAPE

If crime statistics for Northern Cape, measured per 100 000 of the population, demonstrate that the province has very high levels of violent crime, the same cannot be said of Eastern Cape. Recently released SAPS statistics for January to December 1996 suggest that crime in Eastern Cape is less of a problem. Reported crime statistics show that the province is below the national average in virtually all categories of crime, including housebreaking, robbery, stock theft, shoplifting, theft of motor vehicles, fraud, attempted murder, rape, and common assault.

There are two exceptions to this, however: the province is above the national average for serious assault and murder (see figures 7 and 10, pages 24–25). But in both cases Eastern Cape is closer to the national average than a range of other provinces. In the case of murder the national average is 61,1 per 100 000 head of population; Eastern Cape, with a reported figure of 64,5, falls behind Western Cape (85,5), Northern Cape (83,7), Gauteng (80,0) and KwaZulu-Natal (74,8). In the case of serious assault – with a national average per 100 000 people of 545,6 – Eastern Cape, with a figure of 625,7, falls behind Northern Cape (1751,2), Western Cape (841,7) and Gauteng (630,5).

The SAPS statistics for murder in Eastern Cape (as in the rest of the country) are probably fairly accurate, given the greater likelihood of reporting. However, the same cannot be said of other categories of crime. If the particular circumstances of Northern Cape encourage higher levels of reporting, the opposite may apply to Eastern Cape. Interview material suggests that a combination of a number of factors has contributed to this:

The quality of the statistics for the whole province, and the former Transkei in particular, are generally poorer than for the rest of the country. Prior to 1995 no crime statistics were kept in the former Transkei, and so the system of recording had to be established from scratch. Although the former Transkei did provide reported crime figures for January to December 1996, provincial police managers regard the data as an uneven reflection of the extent of crime; consistent reporting procedures still need to be established in some areas, and there is no history of data management at station level.



People in Eastern Cape, particularly in the former Transkei, do not trust the police and are therefore less likely to report. Almost all interview material from both police and non-police sources confirmed this. In the words of the provincial MEC for Safety and Security: 'We have to persuade people that the police are there to serve them, and that they should participate in community police forums and approach the police for assistance.'122



People do not report crime to the police because, in many instances, alternatives exist to the state agencies of criminal justice. According to a senior Safety and Security official: 'People devise their own mechanisms of protection, and have a self-help attitude to criminal justice issues.'123 Added to this, there is almost no history of reporting crime, and people see little necessity for doing so; 'reporting crime does little because the police do nothing about the reported instance'.124



The geography of the area makes reporting difficult. Many areas are inaccessible and so do not have a permanent police presence. Reporting thus requires a considerable effort on the part of any witness or victim of crime. The 33 police stations in the former Transkei serve a dispersed population of more than two million,125 compared with 85 stations for a population of 763 900 in Northern Cape.126

The above factors suggest that the SAPS statistics for the area are far less accurate than those for Northern Cape. There is some evidence, however, that reporting may increase over the short to medium term. If policing services improve, and local police commissioners become more active in building the trust of community representatives, then more reporting may follow. In turn, there is general agreement that the old system of tribal courts no longer functions in most areas, and this could result in a higher propensity to report. Over time this may point to the need for provincial decision-makers to manage perceptions that crime in Eastern Cape is growing rapidly, when any such growth may simply reflect higher levels of reporting.

It is difficult to determine from the available evidence the extent to which more accurate reporting will change the overall crime profile of Eastern Cape. Interview material, however, suggests that the extent of some crimes which directly affect the poor in the province are not accurately reflected in the statistics. These are as follows:

Stock theft: The stealing of stock in the rural areas of Eastern Cape is nothing new. Stock theft here differs from that in Northern Cape, where commercial farmers are targeted. In the former Transkei, stock theft is mostly 'the poor stealing from the poor', with a small number of animals being taken at one time.127 While it is difficult to determine the extent of the problem in the former Transkei, it appears to be fairly widespread. Given perceptions that the police cannot resolve the problem, the issue of stock theft has given rise to community self-help groups in particular areas. The dynamics of stock theft and the responses of citizens when the police response is inadequate are clearly illustrated by the examples of Qumbu and Tsolo near Umtata in the former Transkei. Here, clashes between stock thieves and anti-stock theft groups have left at least 400 people dead since 1993.128 The conflict has been complicated by local political dynamics, and the poor response of the police.129

Taxi violence: The province has been plagued by high levels of taxi-related violence. The problem stems from the deregulation of the taxi industry and the resultant levels of competition among rival taxi organisations. A new dynamic in the province is the use of 'hit squads' by rival competitors to eliminate competition. The issue of taxi violence in the province, however, has been complicated by a specific dynamic unique to Eastern Cape. Given that in the former Transkei and Ciskei police officers were allowed to operate taxis to supplement their income, policing the industry was often biased in favour of specific organisations. Since 1994/95 no police officer is (theoretically) allowed to be involved in the taxi industry, but many of the old linkages remain. Following the rationalisation of the police agencies in the Transkei and Ciskei, many officers fell back on the industry as a source of income. Those operators who are former policemen are often able to access police weapons through old networks, and maintain a good knowledge of police operations and tactics.130

Quantitative survey data along with interview material also suggest that under-reporting is possible in the following categories of crime: robbery, housebreaking, rape, child abuse, and car hijackings. It is difficult to verify the extent to which this is the case. If anything, however, these findings reinforce the conclusion reached above around lower levels of reporting in the province. Indeed, provincial comparisons suggest that Eastern Cape shows consistently lower totals for most crime categories (see figures 7–14, pages 24–27).

As in Northern Cape, the majority of residents in Eastern Cape believe poverty to be at the root of crime in the province. This conclusion is strongly supported by quantitative survey evidence131 – the vast majority of survey respondents regarded poverty to be the central cause of crime – as well as qualitative interview material. Police managers at all levels as well as political representatives in the province agreed that high levels of poverty resulted in crime. Such explanations, however, explain little: even taking into consideration lower levels of reporting in Eastern Cape and higher levels in Northern Cape, levels of poverty do not necessarily correlate with levels of crime. Indeed, to attribute high crime levels to the poor in particular because they are poor is to victimise them twice.

Feelings of insecurity in the province are extensive, and growing: about half of all survey respondents indicated that they did not feel secure in their communities – an increase of around 5 per cent over earlier survey findings.132 Fear of crime appears to be a key concern: what is clear from survey data of community perceptions is that residents of Eastern Cape perceive (wrongly as it turns out) that increases in levels of crime in their province have been higher than in any other province. Indeed, no other province's residents regard crime to have increased as dramatically as those in Eastern Cape. Given current levels of reporting, it is difficult to verify this, but it is probably the case (as has been found in numerous comparative studies) that fear of crime is not necessarily related to actual levels of recorded criminality.

Importantly, the survey data from the province suggest very clearly that feelings of insecurity are directly related to perceptions of ineffective policing. The majority of respondents in the Eastern Cape survey felt that the police 'were not fighting crime effectively'. Only 38 per cent of respondents viewed the police to be effective in fighting crime. Respondents regarded the police to be weak in three key areas: performance (62 per cent); corruption (23 per cent); and infrastructure (18 per cent). A significant number of respondents (16 per cent) asserted that communities themselves should sentence criminals instead of handing them over to the police. Almost 70 per cent of respondents said they would contact the police if they caught someone committing a violent crime against a member of their family, and 28 per cent (a figure comparatively higher than the rest of the country) said they would take the law into their own hands.133

Qualitative interview material reinforced the quantitative research findings that the key reasons for increases in crime are related to the inefficiency of the criminal justice system and the police in particular. Quantitative interview material suggested that one key issue of concern is the absence of state policing institutions in many areas, and (where they were present) a complete lack of public confidence in their ability.

In this respect Eastern Cape differs fundamentally from Northern Cape. In the latter, despite the seriousness of the crime problem, there is a well-established system of policing. Northern Cape provincial police managers are not faced with the difficulties of transforming a system of policing the poor – one which has always been more aimed at control than community service. This is not to argue that there are no problems with policing in Northern Cape, but that institutionalised lines of command and uniform operating procedures will ease the transformation exercise.

Also, it has been argued that many of the problems of crime in Northern Cape cannot be solved by policing interventions alone, and that particular crime prevention solutions need to be sought which encompass a complex array of social and economic features. This may not be the first priority in the former Transkei: the challenge there is to establish legitimate and effective forms of policing for the poor in areas were they have never been present.

Policing structures in the Transkei were built on earlier colonial forms of control, and were designed more to assert a degree of central state authority among the rural poor than to operate as a system of service delivery. Colonial forms of control policing were interwoven with other forms of local authority – district commissioners, magistrates, chiefs and headmen – to ensure compliance among the poor.134 Indeed, the police were often junior players in the hierarchy of local state control – headmen, assisted by a small contingent of 'native constables', performed as much of a policing as an administrative function. The system of local control remained closely integrated: by the late 1920s, when 'native constables' had become members of the SAP, they remained 'under [the magistrate's] direct command for duty'.135 It was also only in the 1930s that criminal investigation was transferred from magistrates to the police. When required, local forms of control were supplemented by 'fire force' policing interventions: before 1912 by the deployment of detachments of the Cape Mounted Rifles, and later by units of the newly established SAP.

Until the 1960s – despite the increasing role of magistrates and the SAP itself – the headman's role as policeman persisted. From then on the SAP presence in the Transkei was consolidated, and over time it was they 'rather than the local magistrates who were expected to receive intelligence inputs from headmen and local informers'.136 Indeed, the collection of intelligence was (and remained) the key role of local police. This signifies just how skewed the policing function was towards control, and illustrates the extent to which informer networks represented the penetration of the security instruments of the state – in short, the poor were not policed, they were spied on. A visible policing presence was often more a cause for concern than a source of security. This form of control persisted: in a study of a Transkei community in the early 1980s, Andrew Spiegel noted that 'it was still regarded as exceptional and indeed quite threatening to see uniformed police off the arterial road running through the village and in any homestead other than one alongside the road'.137

The administration of policing was transferred to the Transkei government's own department of police in 1972, four years before the territory became 'independent' in 1976. By 1975 the SAP had handed administrative control over all police stations, personnel and equipment in the territory to the Transkei Police. The Transkei Police were the key to the buttressing of state authority under the autocratic and corrupt regime of George Matanzima – control of policing fell to a select number of ex-Rhodesian security force members, and increasingly became a brutal mechanism for eradicating political opposition. The military coup of 1987 (led by then Brigadier Bantu Holomisa) resulted in the downgrading of the Transkei Police. The Military Council actively sought to depoliticise the role of the police (presumably to lessen the threat of a countercoup), and downgraded their security role.

Tensions between the police and the military remained a feature of the local political terrain – reflected in the almost complete absence of the Transkei Police at the second anniversary celebrations of the coup in December 1989.138 Such tensions meant that attempts by Holomisa to encourage new methods of police work, including communication and increased contact with Transkei citizens, was given little more than lip service by police commanders. The discrediting of the Transkei Police in the military takeover also had specific organisational implications: there was a dramatic increase in corruption (which remains a problem) as levels of morale fell.139

Post-1994 attempts to transform policing in the territory have met with only limited success. The amalgamation process in Eastern Cape has meant bringing together police officers from the former Transkei and Ciskei and the SAP – most of the 8 500 members of the Transkei and Ciskei Police have had only a six-week basic training course, and many have never had any formal police training.140 The average length of training up to the level of a superintendent is three weeks.141

As elsewhere in the country, the skills of the middle management complement of the former Transkei Police are weak. The need for good managers in rural policing is accentuated by the degree of independence enjoyed by station commissioners operating in isolated areas. Interventions in this area, however, are generally short-term – station commissioners are to be given a one-week course on management techniques in the near future.142

Poor management has resulted in high levels of corruption, given weak controls and weak administrative systems. Corruption is also institutionalised in many areas, and community trust in the police remains poor. The position is complicated by the fact that former jurisdictions which fell under Transkei and Ciskei continue to operate under their bantustan police acts.

SAPS structures in Eastern Cape are plagued by poor morale. This is particularly the case in the former Transkei where, in February 1995, striking members of the Transkei police clashed with units of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). The officers were protesting against poor working conditions and levels of pay. Many of these grievances remain; station level officers are often unmotivated, and display little desire to initiate contact with the communities they are meant to serve.

The degree of access which police have to the poor is limited by the lack of infrastructure in many areas. Central to this is the inadequate development of the system of roads, and the lack of telephones – 19 of the 33 police stations in the former Transkei have no telephone or fax communications. In 1995, in the whole of the former Transkei, there were only 27 working police vehicles.143

Provincial police managers place great store on the upgrading of policing facilities: 'When the infrastructure is up and running, only then can we improve the confidence of the people in the police.'144 Policing without adequate levels of infrastructure, the outgoing provincial commissioner argues, makes the community policing concept a hollow one: 'community policing is useless without actual delivery – otherwise it is simply raising expectations which cannot be fulfilled'.145 Police managers are thus critical of a European Union project being instituted in the province which aims to provide training on community policing, when 'the money could be better spent on improving infrastructure'.146

Community policing initiatives in fragmented and conflict-ridden communities are plagued by problems of representation, as well as power plays between opposing groups. In Qumbu the domination of the CPF by some individuals and the presence of a weak station commissioner (who in fact never attended CPF meetings) ensured that the forum was unable to deal adequately with the conflict.147 The poor, lacking resources and more likely to be intimidated by the police, are often not well placed to sustain CPFs. Indeed, CPFs often work best in (white and wealthy) areas which require them the least, and remain fragmented and weak in poorer areas. Evidence from Qumbu suggested that interest in, and attendance of, the CPF was low, and that there was some safety risk attached to participating in the forum.148

In general, participation in CPFs is affected by the perception that the police and criminal justice system are unable to secure convictions. As in the rest of the country, a critical area of weakness in the former Transkei is among detectives – 87 per cent of all detectives have had no training at all in detective work, and in most cases detective work is 'nonexistent'.149 Here, more than in any other area, the legacies of the past weigh heavily. The shift from a system of informants to one of detection has been a slow one. Police are still said to 'use people as spies, alienating communities away from the police'.150 As in the past, the police remain largely isolated from the communities they are meant to serve and 'rely on a culture of using people as informers' rather than seeking to build the trust of citizens.151

One of the key problems in Tsolo and Qumbu was the poor standard of the police's investigative work. The Kroon Commission, appointed to enquire into the matter, reported a litany of defects in the work performed by investigating officers in the former Transkei. The commission listed 47 areas of concern about the role of detectives, which included the following:

'failing to interview and take statements from complainants or from other persons named in statements by them or other witness or in the warning statements of suspects or failing to establish the identity of, and take statements from, other persons who must obviously have been present at the time;'



'failing to make enquiries from neighbours of complainants or victims or from other local persons or from headmen;'



'failing to contact informers or to maintain contact with them.'



'failing to become properly acquainted with the contents of a docket, with the result that no further investigative work was done or that indicated investigative work was not done;' and



'failing to pick up the interrelationship between different cases and to investigate such cases jointly.'152

The very real problems surrounding policing in the former Transkei suggest that concrete improvements in the workings of the criminal justice system will be difficult to achieve. This is not to say, however, that general levels of service (and community confidence in the police) cannot be improved. It was clear from visiting local police stations that the police have a valuable role to play as a mediating agency in local disputes. In most cases, however, station commissioners lack the confidence and experience to initiate such contacts with the community, and policing remains isolated from the communities with which it is meant to engage. This interaction, however, is very important if confidence in local level policing in the Transkei is to be strengthened.

In poor rural communities in which service delivery is almost absent, the burden on those state structures that are in place is great. Police in these areas often play a wider variety of roles than their urban colleagues. The discussion on policing in colonial Transkei pointed to the degree to which state representation in rural areas was embodied in a limited number of institutions – generally magistrates, district commissioners and the police. Contemporary forms of rural policing carry many parallels with these forms of local governance. In poverty-stricken rural communities the police are often among the few accessible representatives of state authority, or are at least equipped to reach communities where there is little or no state penetration.

That suggests a broadening of the role of the police in the short term, for which they may be ill-prepared. Provincial police managers are increasingly aware of the degree to which they act as the 'leading edge' of governance, simply because the state remains administratively weak in the poor rural communities of the former Transkei. As one officer noted: 'Anything that goes wrong becomes the responsibility of the police. The demands on the police go way beyond dealing with crime.'153 That overburdens a poorly equipped and trained organisation. Senior police managers argue that 'policing cannot occur in a vacuum', and that a number of developmental issues should be introduced simultaneously with policing services.154

It also suggests, however, that local level development and the introduction of government services (including those of safety and security) should be co-ordinated. Proper policing should not be seen as outside of and unconnected to development processes, but as central to their delivery.

The degree to which the lack of infrastructural development impacts on how the poor are policed in the former Transkei is obvious from the discussion above. As important, however, is the ability of the poor to impact on police priorities and actions in the areas within which they live. This is accentuated by the fact that for many poor people in rural areas, the police are the front end of state representation.