Part 1:

1.1 INTRODUCTION

1.1.1 The political will to commit resources, especially of the human variety, to peace operations still depends largely upon the perceived national interest of the potential contributors. By all indications, the major powers and most of the traditional troop contributors to UN peace operations, have reached the conclusion that the costs, in terms of domestic political capital, of further engagement in 'new generation' peace operations in African countries simply outweigh the altruism of potentially contributing to the cause of world peace. The international community seems to have adopted the cry of "no more Somalias". Aside from the unique case of the former Yugoslavia (where the major powers have powerful vested interests) the contemporary literature on peace operations is dominated by 'lessons learned' from intervention in Somalia and Rwanda, lessons which reinforce the perceived futility of becoming involved in such missions.

Yet the future of effective peace operations in Africa depends upon the creation of a viable capacity to respond rapidly to emergent crises, not only in terms of preventive diplomacy, but also in terms of the timely deployment of adequate numbers of trained and equipped personnel to maximise the chances of creating or upholding peace in the wake of brutal and ruinous conflict. It is also abundantly clear that the UN lacks such a capacity, and this has already had dire consequences for Africa. A case in point is the UN Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II), which was established in June 1991 to verify the cease-fire agreements reached via the Bicesse Accords of May 1991, and to observe the elections organised by the National Electoral Council. UNAVEM II deployed only 400 unarmed electoral observers drawn from some 90 nationalities, to observe and verify elections involving 4,83 million registered voters voting at 6 000 polling stations in 18 provinces. Under such circumstances, it was difficult to refute UNITA's charges of electoral fraud which provided the rationale for the resumption of the civil war.

1.1.2 At present, the UN's rapid response capacity depends on the Stand-By Forces Arrangement, which has proven to be grossly inadequate for meeting the challenges of contemporary peace operations. For example, when the UN needed 5 500 soldiers for its operation in Rwanda in 1994, it approached the 19 countries which at the time had pledged a total of 31 000 peacekeepers for future UN operations; all declined to participate. There is also a singular lack of enthusiasm among UN member states for the implementation of the Secretary-General's idea of earmarking and training battalion size units for rapid deployment in future UN peace operations. There is even less enthusiasm for accepting the costs of more ambitious proposals for the creation of a standing UN force. For the foreseeable future, it is thus likely that the UN Security Council will continue to routinely pass resolutions without being obliged or able to provide the personnel to implement them.

1.1.3 As the unfolding tragedy in eastern Zaire illustrates, there is also an urgent and continuing need for developing effective methods for intervention in conflicts such as those which led to the launching of peace operations in Somalia and Rwanda. These emergencies cannot be addressed within the framework of traditional peacekeeping operations, as they occur not as a result of conflicts between sovereign states, but are precipitated by the resurgence of more primordial animosities which were suppressed during the Cold War. Civilian-based wars have become a primary cause of complex emergencies in Africa, with all parties to the conflict committing atrocities and suffering indignities. This lays the basis for further hatred, rather than peace. Hostilities are conducted by youthful warriors who have few employment opportunities and who find both meaning and livelihood in fighting. Inevitably, the impact of war falls heavily on defenceless civilian populations. Moreover, these wars are fought between groups who have lived side-by-side, intermarried and worked together over many years and generations.

1.1.4 Traditional peacekeeping operations cannot be launched where there is no peace to keep; where consent is absent because authority has collapsed, or meaningless because of a proliferation of groups claiming authority; where agreements are non-existent or worthless; and where international law and conventions are openly flouted. The UN machinery, however, has been slow to appreciate these realities, and even slower in reacting to them. Failure to adapt to changing circumstances, inability to find new solutions to new problems, and the taking on of more complex roles with old tools is seriously hampering the effectiveness of the UN, and is affecting the attitude of member states and belligerent parties towards UN peace operations.

1.1.5 The clear signal being sent to the countries of Africa is that they will have to shoulder an increased burden in the conduct of peace operations on the continent, for it is they alone that can justify to a domestic constituency the costs of such involvement. The latter raises a plethora of issues related to aspects such as political will, the relative poverty of African countries, instability related to political transition in many countries, etc. The major developed powers, by contrast, are busy coping with the challenges of the new strategic environment as they impact upon their national interests, and are increasingly reluctant to commit troops and resources to Africa. In the aftermath of decolonisation, liberation and the end of bipolarity, Africa has a commitment and responsibility to take the first concrete steps towards creating the capacity to prevent or manage her own conflicts. However, the inadequate training of national contingents has been cited as one of the major challenges to the effectiveness of contemporary peace operations, and African contributors have not been exempt from such criticism.

1.1.6 A number of African countries have taken up this challenge through the presentation of dedicated training and education for peace operations. Most of this focuses on the members of their armed forces, and is provided at national military training institutions. However, the content, conduct and scope of the training presented by many African countries is not generally known; nor has there been any meaningful attempt to build on the capacity of the institutions involved through co-ordination, collaboration, simplification and standardisation. Such a process may contribute to the willingness of many African countries to accept greater responsibility for providing the OAU and/or the UN with personnel who are adequately trained for future peace operations. The current, independent national training initiatives also carry a risk of personnel being trained according to different doctrine and methods, and/or of personnel being exposed to doctrine and training which is either irrelevant or inappropriate to the challenges which will confront African peacekeepers.

1.2 PROJECT OBJECTIVES

1.2.1 This report presents to the OAU the findings of an independent survey on the nature and status of current efforts by a number of national institutions in Africa to develop or enhance indigenous capacity through the presentation of education and training for peace operations. More specifically, the project aims to:

provide the OAU with an overview of what is being done in the realm of training by select countries which have either participated in peace operations, or which appear to be imminent potential participants; and



provide the OAU with recommendations for the enhancement and harmonisation of individual national efforts to train and prepare for UN, OAU or sub-regional peace operations.

1.2.2 The project focuses on the status of training for peace operations in Africa, with specific reference to:

The content of national training curricula;



The methodology used in tuition and instruction;



The level and scope of recipients of such education and training;



The dissemination of knowledge and skills gained by those attending the various courses presented.

1.3 METHODOLOGY

1.3.1 The project was mandated by the OAU, funded by the Canadian Government, and executed by the Institute for Security Studies (formerly the Institute for Defence Policy). The selection of ISS as the executing agency was based on its record as a leading non-partisan African research institute, which has published widely on the subject of peace operations and run a number of conferences and seminars on these issues within the Southern African Development Community. A survey team consisting of a representative of the OAU Conflict Management Division, a representative of the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, and a representative of the ISS was subsequently approved by the OAU.

1.3.2 Project financing allowed for the selection by the survey team, in consultation with the OAU, of nine countries which could be visited for the purposes of conducting the study. Seven of the countries were selected because of their history of participation in various peace operations. Two countries had not yet participated in multinational peace operations, and were added as samples of an emerging group of potential African troop contributors which were making specific efforts in the realm of training for peace operations. The list of countries is as follows: Botswana; Côte d'Ivoire; Egypt; Ghana; Kenya; Nigeria; Senegal; South Africa and Zimbabwe. Collectively, the countries selected provided a reasonable geographic and regional spread across the continent.

1.3.3 Following country selection, the OAU Secretariat formally approached and informed each country of the project, outlining the object of the survey and seeking approval and preparedness to participate. All but Senegal eventually agreed to the proposed visit by the survey team. The latter country preferred to respond to the request via an official note. The initial correspondence on behalf of the survey team included proposed dates for the conduct of individual country surveys and a draft questionnaire prepared by the survey team. The purpose of the latter was to inform the countries concerned on the nature and scope of information which would be sought by the team, and to assist any efforts which might be made to prepare for the visit of the survey team.

1.4 CONDUCT OF THE SURVEY

1.4.1 Guided by the responses of the countries concerned to their initial correspondence, the survey team approached the physical survey in two phases. The first leg of the survey was conducted during July 1996, during which Kenya, Zimbabwe and Egypt were visited. The second leg was conducted during the month of October 1996, and entailed visits to Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria, South Africa and Botswana. Draft reports were formulated on each country directly upon completion of the survey of that country. A consolidated draft report was compiled by the survey team at the ISS offices during the last week of October and the first week of November 1996.

1.4.2 The survey team allocated two to three days for each country survey, depending on the availability of commercial airline transport to and from the countries concerned within the overall time-frame of the specific survey leg. The final dates and duration of individual country surveys were communicated to the countries concerned well in advance of the team's visit. Upon arrival in the country, the team complied with the survey programme which was arranged by that country. The information basis provided in the appendix on each country obviously reflects the scope and depth of such programmes, which varied from country to country.

1.4.3 The general pattern which emerged for such programmes was a series of briefings by officials at various levels on the following:

past and present participation in peace operations;



an overview of the various national institutions concerned with training for peace operations;



the curriculum designed for each level of training presented;



participation in the various training courses conducted (in terms of numbers and level of students, foreign participation, etc.);



admission prerequisites for the above;



the broad doctrinal basis for education and training;



the composition and experience of training staff;



the progression of training for peace operations and linkages between the various levels;



studies and research on issues related to peace operations; and



linkages with extraneous institutions for training on issues related to peace operations (non-military, non-governmental, foreign, etc.)

1.4.4 In parallel to the submission of this first version of the report to the Secretary-General of the OAU for comment, each appendix documenting observations pertaining to a particular country has been referred back to the country in question for comment, together with a request for additional information where appropriate. The feedback received from each country will be incorporated in a final report.

1.5 LIMITATIONS OF STUDY

1.5.1 Apart from the obvious limitations inherent in the methodology and conduct of the study as outlined above, the content and recommendations of this report are restricted in scope and depth by the fact that this study was a non-intrusive survey, and not an evaluation or investigation. The OAU team was only mandated to report on the nature of training and preparation for peace operations. For this, they relied entirely on the information provided by the host countries. The depth of enquiry extended only to questions posed by the survey team and the answers provided by officials of the host country. No research was conducted on the qualitative aspects of the performance of the various participating countries in past and ongoing peace operations. Moreover, effective military participation in 'new generation' peace operations demands a high standard of conventional military training, professionalism, leadership, and an appropriate military ethos. The survey team had no mandate to investigate or report on these aspects.

1.6 SCOPE OF THE REPORT

1.6.1 Following a section on terminology, the remainder of this report is compiled as follows:

Part 2 presents a summary of the comments and recommendations for the enhancement of training and preparation for peace operations in Africa as provided by the various countries surveyed to the OAU team.



Part 3 presents the most pertinent observations made by the OAU team during the course of their survey.



Part 4 presents the OAU team's recommendations, based on the information gathered during the course of the survey, for the enhancement of training and preparation for peace operations in Africa.

1.6.2 Individual reports on training and preparation for peace operations in each of the nine countries which were surveyed by the OAU team are included as Appendices A to I. The sequence of these appendices reflects the chronological order in which particular countries were visited. Finally, a summary of the itinerary followed by the OAU team in each country and a glossary of acronyms and abbreviations are provided in Appendices J and K respectively.

1.7 TERMINOLOGY

1.7.1 Introduction

There was some difference in the terminology used by the officials of the various countries which were surveyed. This is unavoidable, and is indicative of the effects of the contemporary conceptual debate on peace operations and the influence of a number of advocates of a variety of approaches to the problem of maintaining international peace and security. However, in recording their observations and recommendations, the OAU team has attached the following meanings to the terminology used, for purposes of consistency and clarity:

1.7.2 Preventive diplomacy

Diplomatic action in advance of predictable crises aimed at resolving sources of conflict before violence breaks out, and to limit the spread of conflict if it erupts.

1.7.3 Peacekeeping operations

Operations conducted with the consent of the belligerent parties to a conflict to maintain a negotiated truce in support of diplomatic efforts to achieve or maintain peace. Peacekeeping operations will be undertaken in response to a request from the host nation(s) to an international organisation or to friendly nation(s).

1.7.4 Peacekeeping

The containment, moderation and/or termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of an impartial third party intervention, organised and directed internationally, using military forces and civilians to complement the political process of conflict resolution and to restore and maintain peace. It is conducted with the consent of the belligerent parties, and is designed to maintain a negotiated truce and help promote conditions which support diplomatic efforts to establish a long-term peace in areas of conflict.

1.7.5 Aggravated peacekeeping

Military operations undertaken with the nominal consent of all major belligerent parties, but which are complicated by the subsequent intransigence of one or more of the belligerents, poor command and control of belligerent forces, or conditions of outlawry, banditry, or anarchy. In such conditions, peacekeeping forces are normally authorised to use force in self-defence, and in defence of the missions they are assigned, which may include monitoring and facilitating implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement, or supporting or safeguarding humanitarian relief efforts.

1.7.6 Multifunctional peace operations

Peace operations which are mandated to execute more than the 'classical' peacekeeping functions of observation of peace agreements and interposition between belligerent forces. The purpose of such operations is to assist in post-conflict political transition through, among others, the provision of security, oversight of disarmament and demobilisation, assistance with electoral activities, and the facilitation of reconstruction. Such operations may also include the provision of security for humanitarian aid. A civilian representative of the UN Secretary-General, rather than the Force Commander, normally has overall authority over the mission in the area of operations. This is because a wide variety of civilians, including UN agencies, civilian police and NGOs are responsible, along with the military, for the execution of the mandate.

1.7.7 Wider peacekeeping

The wider aspects of peacekeeping operations carried out with the general consent of the belligerent parties but in an environment that may be highly volatile.

1.7.8 Peace enforcement

Action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter using military means to restore peace in an area of conflict. This can include dealing with an inter-state conflict or internal conflict to meet a humanitarian need or where state institutions have largely collapsed.

1.7.9 Enforcement

Collective security action by air, sea or land forces against an aggressor which has been clearly identified as such by the UN Security Council, as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. The mandate may involve the enforcement of sanctions and /or the conduct of other military operations to maintain or restore peace and security. Irrespective of the nature of the mandate, the UN Security Council sides with the victim against the aggressor.

1.7.10 Peace operations (widely referred to as peace support operations)

The generic or umbrella term encompassing the ambit of operations between preventive diplomacy and enforcement. These operations include diplomatic actions, peacekeeping, multifunctional peacekeeping, humanitarian operations, and forceful military actions initiated for the purpose of to obtaining peace (peace enforcement). In mandating any type of peace operation, the UN Security Council does not take sides.

1.7.11 Humanitarian operations

Missions conducted to relieve human suffering, especially in circumstances where responsible authorities in the area are unable, or possibly unwilling, to provide adequate service support to the population. Humanitarian operations may be conducted in the context of another type of peace operation, or as a completely independent task. Such operations are increasingly necessitated by complex emergencies.

1.7.12 Complex emergencies

A complex emergency is a large-scale emergency caused wholly or partly by an armed conflict, which tends to combine an internal or international conflict with serious human rights violations and large-scale suffering among the threatened civilian population, resulting in large numbers of refugees and displaced persons.

1.7.13 Background training for peace operations

Background training for peace operations is that military training which is conducted for the general preparation of personnel and units for participation in unspecified peace operations. It aims at imparting general background knowledge and understanding of the concept and nature of peace operations. As such, background training concentrates on those aspects of peace operations which are not subject to rapid change and variations (for example, the history and charter of the United Nations, the history of UN peace operations, principles of peacekeeping, basic peacekeeping techniques, etc.). It is aimed, amongst others, at fostering appropriate attitudes towards a peace operations role for the military. Background training may be presented at all levels, from basic military training to senior command and staff courses for officers. Because of its general nature, background training must be supplemented by more specific training before units or personnel deploy on a particular peace operation.

1.7.14 Mission oriented training

Otherwise known as pre-deployment training, mission oriented training is training relating to the special requirements of the specific peacekeeping mission in which units or personnel are to participate. It refers to training provided as part of the national training programme in addition to basic background peacekeeping training for all personnel and units. Mission oriented peacekeeping training should be accomplished before deployment and may then be expanded and refined by ongoing training in the mission area, as required.

1.7.15 Specialist training

Specialist training includes background training and mission oriented training for personnel who need more specialist knowledge and skills than that provided in the training programme for all units and personnel. It is normally provided to personnel such as: staff officers; logistic officers; liaison/humanitarian officers; military police; military observers and monitors; movement control officers; and press and information officers. The training package differs significantly for each category, and supplements rather than replaces background and mission oriented training for all units and personnel.