Countries around the world have experimented with VWCPs. In this section examples of programmes from four regions will be discussed. The first region is Southern Africa, and two countries in particular, namely South Africa and Mozambique. The South African programme was conducted in 1994, while the Mozambican programme is on-going.

In Central America the focus will be on three programmes, a 1992 weapons exchange in Nicaragua, a 1994 gun buy-back conducted by United States forces in Haiti and the 1996-1997 programme in El Salvador.

The Australian case study is unique, as it is the only programme which was conducted completely with government funds and was government initiated and run. The section ends with a survey of similarities between weapons collection programmes that have been conducted in the United States, with a focus on a collection programme in Oakland, California.

Southern Africa

Mozambique

Mozambique was in the midst of civil war for sixteen years, during which time military-style weapons flooded into the country, to arm the two main warring factions: the Frente da Libertaçãdo Moçambique (FRELIMO), which was the party of the national government, and the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO), the main opposition group. While, as in many situations, there are no accurate statisteapons that were in the country by the end of the war in 1992, estimates have put the figure between 1,5 and 2 million.

In 1992 the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) was deployed with a mandate that included the demobilisation and disarmament of both government and RENAMO troops. While the UN reported that ONUMOZ collected a total of 189 827 weapons from "military and paramilitary forces, as well as from the general population",30 most of these weapons were transferred to the new Mozambican Defence Force (FADM) while only a small number were destroyed. The weapons turned over to the FADM were inadequately secured and quickly the warehouses were emptied and the weapons back on streets.

This left the task of collecting the weapons to the FRELIMO government and its police force, a task that soon proved less than feasible, due to problems ranging from corruption within the police force to the reticence of RENAMO supporters to hand their weapons over to the government.

In an effort to circumvent the apparent stalemate, in 1992 the Christian Council of Mozambique (CCM) initiated a 'Swords into Ploughshares' weapons programme. Initially the co-ordinators worked with the government and ONUMOZ to try to get information on weapons in the country. The 'Swords into Ploughshares' programme later developed into a voluntary weapons collection programme in which weapons were exchanged for tools and machinery ranging from carpentry tools to pickaxes, bicycles, sewing machines, ploughs and tractors. Recently Graça Machel has become involved in the collection programme and has made available as exchange items wind-up radios which require no batteries or electricity.

The 'Swords into Ploughshares' programme runs mainly in the capital city of Maputo and its environs. It is run wholly by the CCM and there is no police or political presence at the urban collection sites. In rural areas however, police officers are often present or are called in to handle the destruction of explosives and ammunition or arms caches. Participants in the programme are guaranteed anonymity and no identification is required to participate in the exchange.

The CCM receives funding for the programme from ecumenical partners in Europe, but has had to suspend operations at times due to a lack of funding. The programme is endorsed by the government of Mozambique which is "equally concerned that there are a lot of weapons, ranging from guns and grenades to [anti-personnel] mines, among the Mozambicans".31

The programme started in early 1996 and was still continuing in late 1997. Originally the programme organisers used a bench saw in the back of a truck to provide a mobile collection and destruction site. However, this proved too expensive and too unreliable and now people are requested to bring their weapons to the church for destruction, where they receive tools in exchange. Generally the weapons are destroyed at the collection site, but explosives and ammunition are given to the police for destruction. It is the hope of the organisers is that the materials from the weaponry might be used to "make peace-related items such as rosaries or souvenirs or household items",32 as symbols of the country's transformation from war to peace.

The total number of weapons collected by the CCM by February 1997 was about 2 000 weapons and thousands of pieces of related war matériel. Of this total, 881 were small arms. The project leaders have noted that the number of weapons themselves is not the emphasis, "we are not thinking about what 811 small [arms] means out of the existing arms in Mozambique, but we think in terms of the lives that would have been lost with the use of what we have collected".33 Critics of the programme note that participation would be potentially greater if money, food and other items more relevant to urban dwellers were offered rather than farming implements: "Everybody has to eat but not everybody wants to farm."34

The CCM runs the VWCP in conjunction with awareness and public education campaigns and makes extensive use of the media to promote the programme and the location of collection sites.

South Africa

South Africa acknowledges, like its neighbour Mozambique, that there are a large number of firearms, both legal and illegal, in the possession of its citizens. While again the statistics on numbers are inadequate, estimates put the number of legally owned firearms at 4,1 million and the number of illegal weapons range anywhere from 400 000 to eight million.

In 1994 a campaign was launched known as the Gun-Free South Africa Campaign (GFSA). Its goal was to focus attention on what were seen as the tools of the escalating crime and violence: firearms. After discussing several ideas, GFSA decided to undertake a VWCP, combined with a toy gun exchange and a widespread education campaign.

GFSA was supported by local business, media, religious organisations and government. Newly-elected President Nelson Mandela gave his full support to the weapons collection programme, stating that "this campaign is both necessary and timely. Dealing with the violence in South Africa will take time and requires a multi-faceted strategy, but people need something visible in dealing with crime and violence."35 The South African Police Service (SAPS) was also supportive of the programme, assisting in publicity and being present at the hand-in locations during the exchange programme.

Places of worship were chosen as collection sites because it was felt that people were more likely to go to a site other than a police station. However, where churches or mosques were not available, people were asked to use local police stations to turn in their weapons. In the final tally, 80 per cent of the weapons turned in were received at religious depots. The duration of the programme was twenty-four hours, starting on 16 December 1994.

There were 167 operational collection sites around the country, although most were concentrated in more urban areas. The programme was conducted on a 'no questions asked' basis and a retroactively passed amnesty law allowed participants to be free from prosecution. Owners of licensed weapons were asked to bring the licence with the firearm and the police officer present cancelled the licence when the weapon was turned in.

At the collection sites, each weapon was received by a member of the clergy who handed it to a SAPS officer to check that it was disarmed and then render it inoperable, using a welding machine and an angle grinder. At the end of the day all collected weapons were transferred by the SAPS to a storage facility.

There was a six week media campaign prior to the start of the collection programme. The support of the media and wide media coverage was seen as a key element in ensuring a successful outcome to the programme. However, due to lack of time, organisers were unable to advertise the incentives offered in the programme and felt that this may have hampered participation. Materials distributed included handbooks for volunteers, posters, stickers and handbills. A newspaper advertisement was also printed, which people were asked to send in to the organisers if they supported the aims of the campaign.

There were several types of incentives offered at the buy-back. Each participant was given a certificate featuring President Mandela and thanking them for participating in the programme. Additionally, each participant received gift vouchers to a local store and was entered in a raffle to win prizes of up to R100 000 (US $25 000). The campaign raised a total of R785 400 (US $196 000) in three months, which included both cash and in-kind donations.

While official support for the programme was strong, participation by individuals on the actual day of the turn-in was much lower than expected. Country-wide, approximately 900 firearms and explosive devices were collected, including 199 pistols and revolvers, forty-two AK-47s, seventy-two grenades and more than 7 000 rounds of ammunition.36

There was strong opposition to the collection programme from the South African Gun Association (SAGA) and some businesses chose not to endorse the programme because they disagreed with the name of the campaign. Newspaper coverage was also affected by opposition to the programme, as some newspapers covered the story, while others noticeably did not.

In assessing the programme, organisers noted that it was too large and unwieldy in its attempt to cover the entire country in one short period. They also noted that it should have broadened its reach to focus not only on collecting weapons, but also on educating the public and raising awareness of guns and gun-related violence. A final critique notes that the programme was an isolated effort that was not part of a larger campaign to collect weapons, change public opinion or improve education about guns and violence. Gun-Free South Africa does, however, remain an active organisation within South Africa and has carried its activities into a broader arena, although it has not considered undertaking another collection programme.

Central America37

Nicaragua

The war in Nicaragua between the Sandinista government and the Nicaraguan resistance, known as the contras, lasted from 1982 to 1988 when a provisional cease-fire was signed. In December 1989 the United Nations peacekeeping mission to Nicaragua (ONUCA) was deployed. Within its mandate was the voluntary demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of the contras. A Venezuelan battalion was responsible for overseeing the demobilisation and disarmament of these irregular forces. The operation began in Honduras where a number of contras were based and then moved into Nicaragua and Costa Rica.

There are no reliable estimates of the number of weapons that were held by the Nicaraguan resistance prior to the ONUCA mission. This complicated the mission's ability to determine whether, through its collection process, most of the weapons in the hands of the contras were turned in. The demobilisation process began in April 1990 and continued until June of that year. During that time 22 373 contras were demobilised and a total of 17 833 weapons, explosives and missiles were collected. All weapons turned in were destroyed in situ. According to the commanders of the resistance fronts, all weapons had been handed in and none "remained under their command or had been hidden".38

By 1991, however, it became clear that this was not the case. There was the appearance of recontras (former contras) and recompas (organised groups of demobilised Sandinista soldiers), individuals who rearmed after the war, using either weapons not collected - by the UN operation or the demobilisation of government forces - or which had subsequently been smuggled into the country.

These rearmed ex-combatants were seen by the government as having a destabilising effect on the country, so in September 1991 the government established a Special Disarmament Brigade (Brigada Especial de Disarme (BED)) to develop and run a country-wide gun buy-back programme to reduce the number of weapons in the country.

The BED was made up of government officials and ex-combatants from both sides of the conflict. Funding for the buy-back programme came from government sources and a donation from the Italian government to fund micro-enterprise projects in the country. The total cost of the buy-back programme, which ran for twenty-four months, was US $6 000 000, making it one of the most costly.

The objectives of the buy-back were to "remove weapons from individuals and find and collect weapons in arms caches".39 There was agreement among those involved that the collection programme did meet these objectives.

The BED began to collect weapons in January 1992. It would identify and approach groups known to have rearmed and offer them incentives to turn their weapons over to them for eventual destruction. There were several types of remuneration offered. First, cash equal to approximately US $100 was offered for single weapons, added to which was food also worth about US $100. Additionally, the Italian government's micro-enterprise initiative offered US $300-$500 to each participant in the programme as seed money for development projects. Often, if the BED was negotiating with a large group, the "final settlement would be cash for the weapons, food, and housing or construction material".40 Information on arms caches or other groups or individuals who had rearmed was also collected and the informants paid for assisting the BED.

During its two-year operation, this special force collected 142 000 weapons, either as a result of confiscation or buy-backs. According to one authority, "78 000 weapons were confiscated by police and [a]rmy personnel, 54 000 weapons were bought back in rural areas and 10 000 in [the capital city of] Managua, in addition to the collection of over 250 000 pieces of munitions or ordnance."41 All the weapons, both collected and confiscated, were publicly destroyed by fire in an open pit. The method was selected not only for its cost-effectiveness, but also for the psychological and symbolic impact such a process would have on the community.

As in all post-conflict situations, it is virtually impossible to know accurately the number of weapons in circulation following disarmament initiatives. While the combined efforts of the UN peace operation and the government's initiative collected a total of 159 833 weapons and other war matériel, it is not known how many weapons remain in circulation in the country today. However, the government's initiative was important. It not only showed the will of the government to address a difficult issue and to target its intervention at what were seen to be the tools of the recontras, but was also an effort on its behalf to improve the condition of the lives of those who participated in the programme by offering not only cash but also food and money for the micro-enterprise initiatives. This type of approach has not been replicated in other post-conflict countries and it is uncertain whether it would meet with a similar level of perceived success in other situations.

Haiti

The weapons collection process in Haiti was undertaken as part of an international initiative to stabilise the situation in the country. In September 1991 the government of Haitian President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, was overthrown in a military coup. In 1994 a Multinational Force was authorised under UN Security Council resolution 940 to establish a 'secure and stable' environment that would permit the implementation of the Governor's Island agreement allowing the return of President Aristide.

Under the command of a United States army general, the Multinational Force took responsibility for the following disarmament activities: disarmament of the government forces (Forces Armées d'Haïti); a voluntary weapons collection programme; confiscation of weapons found in vehicles at check points; disarmament of attachés; and the seizure of weapons caches.42

The VWCP was run entirely by the United States army under the aegis of the Multinational Force. Started in September 1994, it continued to operate after the handover of control by the Multinational Force to the UN peacekeeping mission (UNMIH), which had no disarmament mandate until March 1996, when the United States forces withdrew.

The objectives of the programme were to "reduce the number of weapons, promote stability and provide monetary incentives to citizens who supported the programme".43 Funding was provided by the United States Department of Defence and, by September 1995, the total cost of the programme was US $1 924 500. The VWCP operated from several fixed sites throughout the country, supplemented by mobile sites. Those participating at the fixed sites had advance notice of when the buy-backs would occur. However, in the rural areas, participants were given only a few days prior notice of the programme, and weapons seen after its conclusion in that region were confiscated by the United States army.44

The army provided secure areas into which people brought their weapons. The programme was conducted under amnesty and no questions were asked of participants. Each weapon turned in was inspected for a firing pin. Those deemed functional were paid for, while non-functional weapons were confiscated without remuneration. The programme was run in a series of phases, each about two months long. The total number of weapons turned in between September 1994 and March 1995 was over 33 000, which included weapons bought as well as those seized.

The army conducted a large information campaign to let Haitians know about the programme and offered remuneration in the form of vouchers that were cashed in for local currency. Initial prices for weapons were below current black market prices and were subsequently revised upwards to stimulate participation.

By September 1995 the prices for weapons were as follows: handguns - US $100; semi-automatic weapons and grenades - US $200; fully automatic weapons - US $400; and heavy- and large-calibre weapons US $600. In January 1995 the amount paid had been double the September prices but, due in part to the presence of middlemen who came repeatedly to the collection sites and who were suspected of bringing weapons in from the Dominican Republic, the prices were reduced. Arms were also collected from caches, but informers were not paid for identifying these locations.

A wide variety of weapons was collected during the programme. These included: "machine guns, assault rifles, submachine guns, rifles, shotguns, handguns, pistols, flare guns, mortars, howitzers, high explosives, tear gas grenades, and heavy weapons".45 Many of the weapons were in poor condition. These were shipped to the United States for destruction. Others, which were in better condition, were left for use by the Haitian police.

The programme was considered successful by the United States army. Run efficiently, it was reassessed every two months to redefine operational aspects and the types of weapons being turned in. It also was a way for the Multinational Force to interact with and perhaps gain the confidence of the local population. A similar programme was run by the United States army in Panama in 1989 and may be used again in similar situations. Comparing this programme to those run by local communities or government-run programmes is not easy. While the United States programme in Haiti utilised many of the same processes that any VWCP would, for example, extensive publicity, amnesty and incentives, it was also run as a military operation with resources and infrastructure not necessarily available to other organisers.

El Salvador

El Salvador was, like Nicaragua, engaged in a civil war. This lasted eleven years, from 1981 to 1992, when a peace agreement was signed and a United Nations peacekeeping mission (ONUSAL) was deployed. Military observers from ONUSAL began to arrive in El Salvador in January 1992. Within their mandate was the demobilisation and disarmament of the guerrilla and government forces. By July 1993 approximately 40 000 weapons, explosives and other war matériel had been collected from both guerrilla forces and demobilised government soldiers. The collected weapons were destroyed. ONUSAL had to rely on inventories supplied by the warring factions to determine the number of weapons held and then whether or not the majority of these had been turned in. After the demobilisation and disarmament phase, however, it soon became clear that many military-style weapons had not been handed to ONUSAL and that these were appearing among both urban and rural populations. Estimates on the number of weapons in the country in the early to mid-1990s range from 200 000 to 300 000 military-style weapons (i.e., assault rifles, grenades and mortars) most of which were in the hands of civilians.46 Unlike the Multinational Force in Haiti, which had a mandate from the UN Security Council allowing a broad interpretation of its activities and extending to voluntary disarmament of local citizens, ONUSAL had no such mandate. As such, other alternatives had to be found to reduce the number of weapons in civilian possession.

Initially, the government of El Salvador undertook a series of weapons collection programmes which were conducted at military bases around the country. However, apparently due to civilian mistrust of both the political and social situation in the country, the response to these programmes was minimal.

Within Salvadoran society there is a "permissive political culture concerning the use of violence to settle political disputes, [which has] contributed to the widespread use of arms in El Salvador. It is notable that many private individuals, politicians and businessmen were allowed to keep military weapons in their possession as self-protection ... during the civil war."47 These weapons were not collected after the peace treaty was signed and, during the subsequent disintegration of public security structures, there were no incentives to give them up. However, in an effort to curb the number of military-style weapons in the country, the government, in 1993, passed a law for the control of weapons, munitions, explosives and related artefacts. Neither this law nor the government-initiated buy-back programme brought the weapons in.

In 1995 a group of local businessmen and other individuals created the Patriotic Movement Against Crime in El Salvador (El Movimiento Patriótica Contra la Delincuencia - MPCD) to assist in combating crime in the country. In September 1996 the MPCD started a 'Goods for Guns' programme that ran in its first phase until December 1996 and in its second from March 1997 to October 1997.

The MPCD approached local government and religious and non-government organisations to support the programme. These included the Rotary Club of El Salvador, the Catholic Church, the Legislative Assembly, and the public safety and defence authorities. Fundamental to the success of the programme was the amending of legislation which prohibited citizens from carrying military-style weapons. A decree was passed in September 1996 which allowed people to carry specified weapons in public solely for the purpose of participating in the VWCP. The decree was subsequently amended to allow for a wider range of weapons to be transported. The programme was conducted under conditions of anonymity which probably also increased participation over the earlier government-run buy-back programmes.

Funds were raised from local business and, after the programme had proved to be such an overwhelming success that existing funds ran out, the President of El Salvador donated US $285 700. By December 1996 a total of US $571 400 had been spent on the programme and more than 58 599 weapons, ammunition and explosives had been collected.

There was wide-spread publicity for the programme which had the full support of local businesses, authorities and government officials. The response to the programme overwhelmed the organisers. Often promissory notes had to be given out instead of vouchers when funds were not available. It was decided in December 1996 to continue the programme in 1997, when more money could be raised. By the end of March 1997 an additional 936 weapons had been collected in two weekend sessions and plans were made for an additional six sessions throughout the year.

Vouchers were given to participants which could be redeemed for goods. The number of vouchers given depended on the type of weapon being turned in. Although eight collection sessions had been planned for 1996, due to funding limitations, only five were carried out. These were held over weekends to ensure the highest participation. The Catholic Church supported the programme and churches were used as collection sites in four cities.

The national police were responsible for transporting the collected weapons from each collection site to a secure storage area. After the final collection session in December, all the weaponry was destroyed under the offices of the Ministry of Defence.

The success of the collection programme in El Salvador was beyond the organisers' expectations. It has raised public awareness of the issue, encouraged people to rid their homes of weapons they had been storing since the civil war, and has provided the impetus for the MPCD to lobby for the implementation of stricter gun control laws in El Salvador.

Australia

In September 1996, Australia initiated the largest weapons collection programme ever held. Lasting approximately twelve months, the programme had a budget of Aus $500 million and, by the end of August 1997, it had collected over 505 000 weapons for Aus $259,8 million.

The history of the Australian gun buy-back begins in April 1996 when a gunman in Port Arthur, Tasmania killed thirty-five people. The impact this incident had on Australian society was enormous. Within twelve days of the massacre Australia's federal, state and territorial governments had agreed to a bill that would ban all semi-automatic weapons in the country, effective from September 1997. The new law also required comprehensive firearm registration, requirements for possession other than self-defence, mandatory training for first-time owners, a twenty-eight day waiting period after obtaining a gun permit, and regulations on the storage of firearms and ammunition. This marks the first time that Australia has implemented a uniform firearms policy across the country. Prior to this, each state and territory drafted and enforced its own legislation.

The most visible part of the National Firearms Program Implementation Act 1996 was the gun buy-back programme, which offered compensation to everyone who turned in a semi-automatic weapon. Handgun ownership has been strictly regulated since the 1920s, so the focus of the programme was on shotguns and rifles. The firearms specifically targeted were: self-loading centre-fire rifles, self-loading shotguns, pump-action shotguns and self-loading rim-fire rifles.

Each territory or state implemented its own legislation to carry out the buy-back, with federal co-ordination. This affected the duration of programmes, while prices were co-ordinated nationally. The funding for the buy-back was raised through a 0,2 per cent levy on Medicare for one year, which raised approximately Aus $500 million. Most programmes had a duration of about twelve months and all ended on 30 September 1997, when the new legislation came into effect. Following this enactment, individuals found in possession of banned firearms are eligible for fines up to Aus $12 000 and two years' imprisonment.

Compensation for weapons was based on two criteria: new (never fired) and used. The prices were taken from the average sales price listed in firearms dealers' catalogues in March 1996. Compensation ranged from Aus $60 to Aus $10 000. For non-military-style weapons valued over Aus $2 500, participants had the option of accepting the listed price, having the firearm independently appraised or consigning the firearm for sale overseas. All collected weapons were destroyed, some in situ, others at designated destruction sites. First the barrel of the weapon was bent on an hydraulic press and then the weapons were ground up and used for scrap. Exceptions have been made for a few extremely rare firearms which have been donated to museums abroad.

Reproduced from The Australian Firearms Buyback Compensation Handbook, Government Publishers, Canberra, 1996.

Sites for the programmes included town halls, police stations (in New South Wales) and, in remote areas, mobile collection centres. The buy-back was conducted on a 'no questions asked' basis with amnesty from prosecution, and both registered and unregistered guns were paid for. Participants were requested to bring their firearms unloaded and in a bag or covered to the collection centre. A Firearms Information Line operated for the duration of the programme to answer any queries.

The programme had strong public and government support and the authorities conducted a large media campaign to draw attention to it. During the last few weeks of the programme the government expected to spend Aus $1,3 million, in a final media campaign to bring in the remaining firearm owners. It was estimated by government authorities that 75 per cent of gun owners had participated in the programme by the end of August 1997,48 although this figure is difficult to quantify as there are no accurate statistics on firearm ownership in Australia.

Another important element of the National Firearms Program Implementation Act 1996 was the national public education campaign which sought to improve peoples' awareness of the issue of firearms and the risks associated with the unsafe use and storage of firearms.

In assessing the programme, one government official noted two things that might have been done differently.49 The first was to have garnered greater public support from the outset. The initial reaction from the pro-gun lobby in Australia was strong. An estimated 70 000 people demonstrated in Melbourne against the proposed ban, and politicians came under attack.50 The other area identified as possibly benefiting from a different approach was the co-ordination between federal, state and territorial agencies. It is thought that the impact of the programme would have been greater had all the programmes commenced at the same time. It was also noted that it would have been preferable if all collection centres could have been away from police stations.

United States of America

The United States has one of the highest firearms ownership rates in the world: an estimated 192 million legal firearms, of which about 65 million are handguns, and an unknown number of illegal weapons. It also has some of the most complicated legislation on firearm possession and use, with the federal, state and local governments all able to enact laws.

There have been more weapons collection programmes in the United States than anywhere else in the world, and arguably they are more controversial there than anywhere else. More than eighty VWCPs are known to have taken place in the United States, with most being concentrated in urban areas.

Large programmes have been undertaken in St Louis, Missouri, Oakland, California and Boston, Massachusetts. Each has had its own approach, but, as in the cases discussed above, there are similarities between them. Each has raised funds from local businesses, individuals, corporations, or local government; provided incentives in exchange for a firearm; undertaken extensive media campaigns; mobilised community support and assistance; and chosen locations that are likely to encourage the highest participation. This section will focus mainly on the VWCP run in Oakland in 1995, but will also draw on some of the common points of contact between all programmes run in the United States.

Incentives used in the United States have ranged from crucifixes being handed out by a priest, to cash, concert tickets, sporting goods, visits to a psychiatrist and used computers. The varying rates of success programmes have had using these incentives (the priest had no one take up his offer) show the importance of selecting an incentive that meets the needs of the local community and will encourage participation.

The location of the VWCP is also extremely important. Most have been held in church or community centre parking lots, locations that are easily secured, have high visibility and can be reached by public transportation. Most programmes do not use police stations as collection points, although the police are often involved at the collection sites.

Some programmes, such as the one in Oakland, California which exchanged firearms for used computers and computer lessons, are part of larger programmes designed to teach children and adults about responsible firearm use and ownership and alternatives to violence.

The Oakland programme was held for the first time in October 1995 at a local church. It was co-ordinated by the city of Oakland and the police department in conjunction with the local bar association, the Oakland Raiders football team, local law firms and individuals. Donations were collected totalling US $10 000 which was used to purchase refurbished computers from a local company. The programme, known as 'Byte the Bullet', offered participants either computers, Raiders tickets or other prizes on a one-per-family basis.

Only working firearms were eligible for a prize and pellet guns did not qualify. The programme was conducted anonymously. Each participant was requested to bring his/her firearm unloaded in a box in the boot of a car. Once at the collection site the weapon was removed by a weapons specialist and rendered inoperable. By the time the programme ended five hundred people had participated. Three hundred were given promissory notes after the available incentives ran out, and the police department raised money to purchase more computers. Weapons collected ranged from pistols to assault rifles.

The programme was the "first step in the most comprehensive gun prevention programme in the country".51 Other elements of the programme included stricter enforcement of regulations on firearm possession and use, gun safety education programmes, a weapons destruction programme that required police officers to go to homes and offices to collect unwanted firearms and the creation of a Gun Tip Hotline to report illegal gun activity.52