Case studies provide a rare insight into the nature of criminal organisations. The six case studies which follow each illustrate a different composition, structure, method of operating and stage of development of the syndicates. Names of suspects or syndicate members are fictitious in order to prevent any ongoing police investigations from being compromised. However, an attempt has been made to use these fictitious names in such a way that they reflect the race and gender of the real persons as accurately as possible. The information relating to the case studies was obtained either from police dockets or from detectives who had personal knowledge about the specific syndicates involved.

While the police investigations relating to Case Study 1 commenced in 1992 and have since been closed, there are still cases emanating from this investigation which have not been finalised. The other case studies emanate from more recent police investigations. The case study relating to The Firm refers to a matter in respect of which no effective prosecution has taken place to date. Most of the investigations relating to Operation Mynah were completed in 1998, but some prosecutions and civil cases arising from the investigation are ongoing.

Soon after the crucial crime conference held by the police in 1991, the Organised Crime Unit took steps to implement its new intelligence-driven approach to the investigation of organised crime. One of the first major investigations focused on what appeared to be syndicates operating in the Pretoria area in which members of the police were playing a prominent role. Detectives from one of the specialised units, namely the Motor Vehicle Theft Unit in Pretoria had been investigating cases such as vehicle theft, forgery and corruption against several members of the police who were either members of the Vehicle Theft Unit or were stationed at a police vehicle pound in the Pretoria area.

The information which the detectives had at their disposal indicated that a number of syndicates were co-operating with each other in the execution of large scale criminal operations. Although these activities were concentrated in the Pretoria, Witwatersrand and Vereeniging area, they were spread throughout the country and across the borders into South Africa’s neighbouring states. In summary, the available information indicated that:

Members of the South African Police (SAP) were involved in smuggling stolen motor vehicles to Botswana, Zimbabwe and Zambia.



Members of the SAP were providing false clearance and registration certificates for motor vehicles, and were altering the engine numbers of vehicles.



Drugs were being smuggled from Botswana, Zimbabwe and Zambia into South Africa in exchange for the motor vehicles which were taken across the borders.



Large scale theft and hijacking of motor vehicles and trucks were involved.



Members of the SAP who were investigating cases against suspects were being bribed.



Information from police dockets was being made available to suspects who were under investigation.

In addition to the above crimes, other large scale criminal activities, such as the theft of cheques, corruption, bribery and housebreaking, were also investigated. A number of criminal groups or syndicates appeared to be involved. When the magnitude of their operations became clearer and when the evidence which the police were able to obtain through overt investigative methods focused mainly on some lesser operatives, rather than the leading figures of the syndicates, consideration was given to the conversion of the conventional police investigation into a covert, project-driven one. Before such a project could be registered with the Organised Crime Unit, and the funding from the special account of the police approved, a well-motivated case had to be made out by the investigating officer.

Considerable preparation by detectives was therefore necessary. A formal application for the registration of such a project had to be submitted to the management of the detective service. A prerequisite for the registration of a project was that the activities of the targeted suspects were such that they affected the national interest. This criterion had to be met before the use of funds from the police special account could be considered. To provide the necessary substantiation for the claim that the activities of the syndicate network affected the national interest, considerable details relating to the investigation done thus far had to be provided. This, in itself, required detailed detective work.

In July 1992, the detectives submitted their application for the registration of a project entitled Project Judas. They motivated their case in a lengthy document. The headings, as well as brief summaries of the content follow below.

The application for the approval and registration of Operation Judas, together with numerous organograms and supporting documents, were forwarded to police management for consideration.

Diagram 1 provides a graphical exposition of how the various syndicates linked up with each other and who the syndicate leaders were. In the police records, the name and full particulars, including a crime profile of each of the syndicate members or participants, are provided. The word ‘syndicate’ was used by the police conducting the investigation, but they explain that the syndicate members referred to in Diagram 1 were not necessarily all part of a formal syndicate structure. Mokwena (A1), Esther Rashaba (B1) and Lucy Hadebe (E1) were clearly leaders of their criminal groupings, but the persons linked by the police to the respective syndicates were not all exclusively attached to one syndicate. Some of them were ‘runners’ who also had contacts with, and occasionally did work for other criminals or syndicates. They were linked to the particular syndicates in Diagram 1 because, for the purpose of Operation Judas, they were working with the syndicate leader in question to commit the crimes which were being investigated. It would therefore be more accurate to refer to several criminal networks being involved, rather than clearly defined and structured syndicates. Police descriptions, however, will be used for the purpose of this case study.

A number of additional diagrams were produced by the police to assist in understanding the complex links and relationships which had to be unravelled by Operation Judas in order to get to the core of the operation. One diagram depicted the names and links used by police members who were stationed at vehicle testing grounds or pounds, and how they linked up with some garages to illegally acquire and dispose of vehicles. Another syndicate, not referred to in Diagram 1, specialised in bribing police officers at vehicle pounds in exchange for vehicles obtained through false documentation or no documentation at all. In addition, details were also supplied about persons with whom the suspects referred to in Diagram 1 had contact.

The investigation in terms of this project was to be one of the most sophisticated criminal investigations to be undertaken by detectives at the time. A multidisciplinary task group to conduct the investigation was envisaged. This task group included one senior and two junior advocates from the office of the Attorney-General, ten detectives, four officers with crime intelligence and technical phone-tapping experience, one informer and two undercover agents. According to a police officer who served on the task team, police management was at first hesitant about this new approach of investigating organised crime activities. The notion of using undercover agents and of relying on phone-tapping had not officially been part of previous criminal investigations. The Security Branch had made extensive use of these methods in the past, but normally not for the purpose of translating the information obtained into evidence to be placed before a court of law. Some senior officers in the detective service were nervous about it, bearing in mind that, in 1992, the SAP was increasingly sensitive about the need to improve its image and its legitimacy.

By mid-August 1992, the police management had approved the registration and therefore also the budget for Project Judas.34 Intensive investigations commenced. Undercover agents were provided with new identities and with front homes from where to operate as members of the underworld. They had the necessary funds to purchase illegal goods, if necessary, and to live the life of criminals. Approval in terms of Section 2(2) of the Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act, No 127 of 1992, was obtained from a Supreme Court judge to monitor the telephones of specific suspects. Regular progress reports had to be submitted to the head of the detective service. The legal team attached to the task group was providing ongoing legal advice and preparing the indictment for prosecution. More than 130 charges were eventually framed.

Operation Judas was to be dealt with in three phases. The first phase concentrated on identifying all syndicate members and collecting information about their activities. An undercover agent was sent into the field and other overt methods of obtaining information were utilised. During the course of their investigations, detectives came across an ever widening network of criminals and criminal organisations that had links with each other through various informal networks. A progress report to Head Office reported that "[t]he operation has shown that crime syndicates in the Pretoria area are of a bigger nature than ever suspected."

This remark was made by a detective who, by any standards, would be regarded as a professional. It illustrates the extent to which even experienced detectives tasked with investigating organised crime were unaware of the extent of the operations of crime syndicates in the Pretoria area in 1992. It must also be borne in mind that, at the time, the investigations were still at an early stage when the full extent of the criminal networks had not yet been uncovered. It suggests a lack of crime intelligence and a general lack of appreciation of how far organised crime had advanced without the police being fully aware of it. Bearing in mind that the phenomenon of organised crime had only become the target of police strategies a year earlier, namely in April 1991, it is perhaps understandable that it would take some time before the police themselves developed an understanding of what it meant in reality.

Each progress report provided summaries of additional information that had been obtained about the syndicates and the suspects involved. During the first month of operation, the progress reports concentrated on obtaining more information about the individual suspects involved. Summarised excerpts from these reports illustrate this:

Mokwena (A1): He is also involved with theft and hijacking of motor vehicles. He has smuggled vehicles out of South Africa and returned with drugs. He tends to approach other police members for information in dockets they are working on and pays bribes for such information. Works at police vehicle testing ground and has also been involved with smuggling diamonds. He is in close contact with other leading suspects, namely Ramposi (C) and Rashaba (B1).



Lucas Ramposi (C): He is a wealthy businessman from Bophuthatswana and a friend of many police members who work in specialised units. He is on first name terms with many detectives in the region. Has made financial contributions to police social occasions and supplies many sheep for slaughter to individual police members. A large section of the Bophuthatswana police are in his pocket and he is almost untouchable in many areas. He is a friend of a Bophuthatswana government minister and has contacts with influential persons in the South African government service. He is regarded as a ‘godfather’ among many criminals and never gets his hands dirty. Other criminals approach him to have their cases withdrawn or to bribe the police into losing their dockets.



Viljoen (A 18): Member of the SAP motor vehicle theft unit working with Mokwena (A1). He removes stolen motor vehicles which are stored in the police vehicle pound to various members of crime syndicates. He takes bribes from Mokwena and Ramposi and helps suspects who have been arrested.



Meyer (A5): Member of the SAP who receives bribes and who provides false clearance certificates for vehicles.



Simon: A member of the SAP who is involved in cash robbery, dealing in drugs and who drives vehicles across the borders in exchange for drugs. He is being used as the ‘hit-man’ by the syndicate to intimidate people.



Ramotse (A 15): District commissioner in the Bophuthatswana police. Takes orders from Mokwena. Suspected that his entire motor vehicle theft unit is corrupt. He protects criminals in exchange for money.



Esther Rashaba (B1): Has a number of charges for motor vehicle theft pending. Big drug smuggler. Ramposi (C) runs her and she also works with Mokwena (A1). The following link with her:



Bruce Rashaba (B3): Esther’s son who is involved in motor vehicle theft and drug smuggling;


Victoria (B4): she is the right hand of Esther and involved with drug smuggling;


Moosa (B11): deals in drugs;


Beauty (B9): (coloured female) supplies drugs;


Murphy (B16): works with Esther and Lucas Ramposi; knows a minister from Bophuthatswana who is involved with crime;


Tom (B13): lives in Lesotho, supplies dagga;


Michael (B6): Esther supplies Mandrax to him; and


Petros Motau (B8): helps Esther with drug-smuggling.

By focusing on the activities of only one of the above syndicates, a better understanding can be gained of their method of operation. Syndicate B played a significant role in the network of criminals and a brief look at its links and operations may assist. Diagram 2 only reflects a minimum of detail and lines of communication as it is based on the information contained in only one of numerous progress reports by the investigators. Only some members of Syndicate B are referred to and only the bare minimum of information relating to their activities is supplied. The actual interrelationships and the modus vivendi of all the suspects in Syndicate B were therefore far more complex and detailed than could possibly be suggested in Diagram 2.

Esther Rashaba was clearly the main brain of Syndicate B and the key person. She had contacts in Southern African states with whom she and Gumede communicated directly to arrange for the exchange of Mandrax and other illegal goods for stolen vehicles from South Africa taken across the border. She was a person of considerable wealth. The information available indicated that she had fixed assets worth R1,8 million in respect of which she owed about R370 000. Her personal authority and skill, rather than a well-structured and disciplined syndicate, appear to have enabled her to expand her influence.

Having developed a detailed profile of the key suspects from the various syndicates, the investigators shifted their focus to the activities of the suspects. These activities were reported in detail in the progress reports which were submitted to management on a regular basis. Summarised excerpts from merely one of the many progress reports provide an indication of the information which was being obtained. The brief nature and staccato form of the information is similar to the way in which it is reported in the police documents. To the outsider, some of the observations may not make sense, but to the detectives steeped in the investigation, familiar with all the individuals named and with the content of numerous similar reports, such short notes suffice:

Mokwena (A1):


registered stolen vehicle in Bophuthatswana and sold it to a member of the police for R400


looking for a 1990 model 325i BMW for a certain Moses


the following people have contact with him:


Sybrand (D)


Frik Hiemstra (A6)


Harry


Leraba



Esther Rashaba (B1):


borrowed R150 000 from Fred


Moosa got 65 Mandrax pills from her


Tiro buys 80 Mandrax pills from her


Charlie collects Mandrax from her


she registers a stolen vehicle


a stolen combi is sent to Lesotho and returns with dagga


people collect bags of dagga


Moosa collects Mandrax


Gumede (B2) has a stolen combi for her


Moosa buys 180 Mandrax pills


Magaba takes a vehicle to Zambia


Mafosi from Lesotho delivers dagga


Gadema is her contact in Zambia for Mandrax


Petros Motau is looking for a combi for her


someone needs 750 bags of dagga


policeman Bra Khumalo (B7) has stolen a docket for her


Gumede (B2) changes vehicle engine numbers for her


policeman Ramposi (C) transports dagga for her


Esther (A1) delivers Mandrax at Tiro


Noseng steals a 4-ton truck for her


Guduku is sent to Zambia with four vehicles


Gumede (B2) is looking for an Opel GSI


Esther (B1) gives two stolen vehicles to Gumede (B2)


Moosa collects drugs


Ntumaleng will steal Toyota Sprinter in Witbank and bring it to Esther (B1). Gumede (B2) will change the engine and chassis numbers for her



Maria Shezi:


Mokwena’s (A1) girlfriend


gets Mandrax from Sam


wants to buy gold dust from Elvis


Mokwena (A1) has fetched Mandrax from Zambia by plane


Maria seeks Mandrax buyers


she wants to sell two packets of Mandrax for R120 000


she contacts various people to get rid of Mandrax


the following people have contact with her:


Nelson


Sam


Elvis


Suzi


Lynette


Rose


Marilyn



Frik Meyer (A5):


contacts Lisa to forge vehicle documents for her


allocates a false number to a stolen vehicle for John and gets R2 500


Sakkie Mbali (A2) asks for a clearance certificate from him for a stolen vehicle


he clears a stolen vehicle which is to be taken to Zimbabwe by John


gives false vehicle declarations to Lisa


gives false vehicle declarations to Rick


Sipho gets two false declarations for a bakkie and a Toyota


he gets two motor cycles from Kobus Joubert


he gets bribe money from Musa


the following people have contact with him:


Lisa


Musa


John (A13)


Sakkie (A2)


Rick


Ben Verster

While this information was being obtained by the investigators, the prosecutors on the project team were providing ongoing legal advice and were commencing with the drafting of the charge sheets.

In May 1993, the first arrests took place. The police announced that six vehicle theft syndicates, which had worked with police at vehicle testing grounds, had been smashed. Thirty arrests, including five police and two traffic police officers, had been made. Vehicles worth R5 million had been recovered. The syndicates had been responsible for more than one thousand vehicle thefts, including large trucks, over a period of four months. Vehicles had been taken across the border to countries such as Mozambique in exchange for drugs or they were sold.35

These arrests concluded the first phase of Operation Judas. Due to the fact that the initial investigations had uncovered additional syndicates and individuals involved in criminal activities, police management approved the extension of the operation for a further period. As a result, further arrests followed more than a year later in August 1994. Thirteen arrested members of a syndicate, which operated countrywide, and which was known as the ‘Hoola-Hoop’ syndicate, were to be charged with more than 130 charges of vehicle theft, corruption, bribery and housebreaking.36 The police announced that they expected to arrest about twenty more suspects who were not necessarily members of the syndicate, but who did the transporting and selling of illegally acquired property.

When the project was completed in August 1994, the task team could report considerable success. Eight syndicates had been uncovered and their leaders and numerous members arrested. Many convictions had by then been passed down and some cases were still only partly heard.