The six case studies provide an indication of the variety and nature of organised crime structures and networks in South Africa. They appear to be part of a dynamic phenomenon which will continue to be subject to ongoing adaptations and innovations. No fixed patterns of organised criminal activity therefore exist. Even though these case studies may not provide enough information from which to draw definitive conclusions about organised crime in South Africa, some general observations are justified.

Organisational sophistication: Organised crime structures appear to develop through various stages of financial and business sophistication. Between the street gang level – where the typical activities would include theft of car radios, dealing in narcotics on street corners and protecting turf with violence – and the elevated position of organisations such as The Firm, there exists a vast sophistication gap. This gap is similar to the one which would exist between a street hawker and a successful international import/export and wholesale business.

Most of South Africa’s crime syndicates find themselves at various levels of development between these two poles. Case studies 1 and 5, which feature networks and alliances of different syndicates and individuals, are indicative of criminal organisations which have not yet accumulated sufficient capital to finance the acquisition of drugs for further distribution. They rely largely on stolen and hijacked vehicles and other illegally obtained goods to pay for drugs through barter transactions with the suppliers. The Firm, the Nigerian syndicates and the the closed partnership syndicate in Case Study 2, all have sufficient capital to make their dealings in narcotics self-funding. It is at this level where money laundering becomes a necessary activity to enable the successful criminal to deal with accumulated funds.

The leader of The Firm, Bob Richards, has to launder his vast profits in order to secure his investments and to buy fixed property throughout the country. The two partners who operate the closed syndicate, as illustrated by Case Study 2, have to do the same to finance direct transactions with their overseas suppliers. While syndicate leaders such as Ben Mokwena, Esther Rashaba and Venter (Cases Studies 1 and 5) may have accumulated a degree of personal wealth, their profits are largely reinvested into renewed purchases of narcotics or vehicles stolen by other criminals.



Non-racial and gender-neutral approach: It is almost encouraging to note the degree to which the indigenous networks of criminals and syndicates appear to be ahead of the rest of South African society in their non-racial and gender-related composition. If only those South Africans involved in legitimate business or other walks of life could follow their example and cross racial barriers in the same way! The common interests of the criminals involved seem to overlap to such an extent that no legislation or other transformation steps were required to achieve the ‘rainbow nation’ ideal among the criminal elements of South Africa. In Case Study 1, the white police officer Sybrand worked hand-in-hand with the African woman who heads a syndicate, Esther Rashaba. Esther Rashaba, in turn, ran a syndicate in which black and white men as well as women worked for her. The various syndicates and individuals referred to in Case Study 5 depended on the close co-operation which has been established between African, white and Indian criminals. This non-racial and gender-friendly approach is not reflected in Case Studies 2, 4 and 6 where the ethnic/language/nationality factors involving white Afrikaners, Chinese and Nigerians, serve to keep the syndicates closed to outsiders and therefore more secure against infiltration.



The role of the police: Case Studies 1 and 5 indicate that serving members of the police play an important and direct role in the activities of indigenous crime syndicates and criminal networks. Even allowing for the fact that the police investigations into the syndicates mentioned in Case Study 1 were initially mainly targeted at the police members involved in the criminal activities, it is clear that corrupt and criminal members of the police are important factors in organised crime in South Africa. Senior detectives involved with investigating such cases confirm this. According to these detectives, contact with and the involvement of state officials from other government departments are also part of most of the operations of crime syndicates. Although not all the case studies reflect this, detectives point out that no crime syndicate of any significance can thrive without the involvement of corrupt state officials from one or other government department.



‘Freelance’ criminals: The tight cohesion under which the Chinese and Nigerian crime syndicates operate, referred to in Case Studies 4 and 6, leaves little room for the individual members of those syndicates to utilise their skills outside their specific organisation. The more loose and network-oriented a criminal organisation, the more it seems that individual criminals are able to use their entrepreneurial skills in the service of a number of crime syndicates simultaneously. Ruby, referred to in Case Study 5, is a prime example. With his contacts and his skills in forging documents he was in high demand, to the extent that he was working with at least three syndicates at the same time. The same applied to the police officer Sybrand in Case Study 1. Although he associated with many criminals, he tended to operate as an individual who worked directly with Esther Rashaba and members of Ben Mokwena’s syndicate. This ‘freelancing’ of criminals carries its risks for the syndicates in that the removal of such key people through successful police investigations could significantly undermine their work.



Relatively risk-free environment: The very loose nature of many indigenous criminal networks, the important role of ‘freelance’ criminals and the large number of people involved in the chain of events, as illustrated by Case Studies 1 and 5, suggest that the fear of possible infiltration or apprehension by the police is fairly low among many indigenous criminal operators. Only in a real or perceived low risk environment would networks of criminals act in such a casual or brazen way. The opportunity for infiltration by undercover agents and the collection of crime intelligence should be less problematic when dealing with such loose networks involving so many individuals and so many unco-ordinated transactions than would be the case with well-structured and controlled syndicates. The closed Nigerian and Chinese, or the more sophisticated indigenous syndicates, such as the partnership syndicate illustrated by Case Study 2, have built-in precautionary measures which tend to protect them more effectively against infiltration and arrest. They are either more conscious of the risks involved, or they anticipate that the risks might increase, and have therefore taken the necessary precautionary steps in advance.



Implications for the definition of crime syndicates: On 19 March 1998, the Minister for Safety and Security, in response to a question in Parliament, stated that there were 192 crime syndicates active in South Africa in 1997, that 96 of them were involved in drug-trafficking, 26 in arms-smuggling and 69 in vehicle-smuggling.40 While it will be easy to classify specific criminal organisations as being syndicates in many cases – as with the syndicates involved in Case Studies 2, 3 and 4 – it becomes more problematic when dealing with networks of criminals. Should the different components which co-operated in Case Study 1 be regarded as one crime syndicate or were these potentially six of the syndicates referred to by the Minister? In Case Study 5, Motau and his three men who supplied the vehicles to Venter’s syndicate were regarded by the police as a separate syndicate. Should they not have been regarded as an attachment to Venter’s syndicate? It becomes more difficult to categorise a criminal enterprise which relies on networks, floating individuals and shifting associations.



The lack of specialisation: The activities of the criminal groups referred to in Case Studies 1 and 5 relate to a variety of crimes, including drug-trafficking, theft, fraud, dealing in diamonds, forgery, corruption, vehicle-smuggling and bribery. While the co-ordination of such a wide range of criminal exploits requires a significant degree of management skills, the low level of specialisation exhibited by those syndicates suggests that they still have to move up the sophistication ladder if they are to match syndicates such as The Firm, the Nigerian syndicates or international criminal organisations such as Chinese triads or the Russian mafia. It would appear that the specialisation by criminal organisations in the commission of one category of crime, or a very narrow category of criminal activities, should be regarded as an indication that they have reached an advanced level of development and that they have established a niche for themselves in which they can operate with great effectiveness. More effective criminal organisations are likely to take over, dominate or displace existing ones that are less effective. The dominant role which The Firm has achieved for itself in the Western Cape is a good example. The relatively unsophisticated indigenous criminal organisations have made it much easier for highly skilled groups, such as the Nigerian syndicates, to rapidly establish a strong foothold in the country. For this reason, there remains much scope for international criminal organisations involved in organised crime to establish themselves successfully in South Africa.

A thorough analysis of the case studies would not only produce additional points worth noting, but would also provide material and insights which are likely to have policy implications for South Africa’s criminal justice system. While the six case studies provide some information on which a tentative typology of organisations involved in organised crime in South Africa could be established, such a typology is likely to be too superficial in the absence of further research and additional case studies.