Introduction

Increasing levels of crime during the latter half of the 1980s combined with a police force that sought to quell rising levels of political unrest resulted in growing numbers of local authorities embarking on their own initiatives to fight crime. The result was threefold.

First, municipal traffic departments established in the 1930s after the traffic function was transferred from the South African Police (SAP) to local authorities came to resemble much more closely their counterparts in the latter force they were armed, and often pursued criminals. Resolutions passed by white municipal councils increased the powers of traffic officers and expanded their function to include not only the policing of traffic regulations but also the fighting of crime. Some traffic agencies began to resemble paramilitary policing forces, and traffic officers increasingly carried side arms and wore military-type uniforms and combat boots.

Some of them came to resemble small-town American sheriffs' departments in make-up and organisation. Indeed, many traffic and security managers of the richer local authorities visited police departments in the United States and elsewhere, and attended management training at overseas police training institutions.

Second, many municipal authorities established substantial security departments which sought to protect council property from the effects of political conflict. Over time, many of these were used to act as a counter to crime. Municipal security officials patrolled certain city areas and moved beyond a brief which had originally confined them to the protection of council property. In Pretoria and Krugersdorp, for example, municipal security officials were given additional powers and actively patrolled public areas in a crime prevention role. Security departments, though, often retained close links with the state in Johannesburg, for example, an investigation in the first months of the De Klerk government uncovered the substantial involvement of Johannesburg security officers in a `spy ring' that had maintained a system of surveillance against those in opposition political parties or liberation movements.

Third, many municipalities began to lobby central government to establish local authority police agencies to assist the SAPS. The debate consolidated during the late 1980s, and municipal and metropolitan policing functions were recognised in the interim constitution, apparently at the initiative of ANC negotiators. Although this inclusion of the metropolitan policing function in the constitution seemed to proceed smoothly, some in the ANC expressed concern that municipalities could now establish their own private armies. Indeed, a prominent ANC negotiator argued that the new South African Police Service should incorporate municipal traffic police, although this suggestion does not seem to have left the negotiating chamber.

Follow the leader?

Municipal policing had already occurred earlier, albeit in a different form. The emergency period of the 1980s had seen the state appoint a large number of inadequately trained municipal policemen or `kitskonstabels' literally `instant constables' in a bid to crack down on political opponents. The municipal police, or `green beans' (named after the colour of their uniform), were notorious for their brutality they were more often vigilante groups than anything resembling a policing agency. While municipal police were eventually incorporated into the SAP, they had really only been affiliated to the poorly supported system of Black Local Authorities (BLAs), and were administered through Pretoria rather than through local (white) municipal authorities. But kitskonstabels left a bad taste in the public's mouth, which has remained: people are often suspicious that any new municipal policing system will simply resemble the last a poorly trained, undisciplined force running amok among the communities they are supposed to protect and serve.

A more important example in the development of the metropolitan and municipal policing debate has been provided by Durban. The Durban City Police (DCP), a municipal policing agency, has been active in policing the city since 1854. The DCP is a relic of British rule in Natal it has assumed many of the traditions of British policing, is still headed by a chief constable, and sees itself as an embodiment of the ethos of the `bobby on the beat'. Attempts to incorporate the force into the SAP by successive governments during the 1920s and 1930s were resisted; the DCP has continued to operate until today, and indeed has expanded its role.

In 1990 it was decided to double the size of the DCP over three years, and to give the force a higher profile in policing crime. The immediate effect was that the DCP became more visible on the beach front, and a concerted attempt was made to increase foot and vehicle patrols in the city centre. Currently, and reflecting these changes, the force is divided into functions which include a rapid response capability, crime prevention, and street child units. Besides motorised patrols, the DCP has a 220-member special patrol group whose primary function is to maintain a visible presence in the city centre and on the beach front.

The DCP's success in countering crime in Durban is difficult to measure: it is impossible to know what the levels of crime would have been had it not been active. But the DCP's own statistics reflect its role and ethos quite closely. Given its presence on the streets, most arrests occur during or after offences have been committed; indeed, no arrests were made under warrant. And a large number of suspects (around 75 percent on a two-month sample period in 1994) were released with a warning, suggesting that the force uses arrest and subsequent warning to police less serious crimes, and appears less inclined to process offenders through the legal system.

This implies that the DCP uses a fair measure of discretion in policing lesser offences; the chief constable claims that every effort is made to enhance relations with the public, and not to allow unnecessary prosecution for minor offences.

The DCP maintains that it polices many issues at the lower or public service end of the spectrum which the SAPS is hard-pressed to address. Evidence from the United States and Britain suggests that this is a consequence of higher public visibility by far the majority of incidents which police officers on patrol have to address have very little to do with crime. The DCP statistics for 1994 show a high number of service- related responses, and the policing of municipal by-laws.

While comparison with SAPS statistics is difficult, a clear pattern of the DCP's policing role does emerge: it maintains a higher public presence in the city centre, on the beach front and in central shopping areas (and has also of late begun to expand its service to the townships of KwaMashu and Umlazi), and seems more likely to police less serious incidents on the streets, providing general assistance to the public1 and performing a crime prevention role instead.

Following the French

South Africa is not alone in developing limited support for local policing when a national force is perceived as inadequate or overstretched.

The closest international example is probably France. Here a centralised police agency was established during the war by the occupying German army, and was retained in 1945. However, several prominent (and mostly right-wing) cities argued that since national government was not in a position to protect ordinary citizens, given the limited presence of the national police, municipal police departments should be established.

Municipal police departments have existed since 1983 and operate in more than 500 cities, which have both left- and right-wing mayors. It is difficult to assess how useful these municipal police departments are. Few studies have been conducted, and understandably, the national police agencies are seldom forthright on the issue. But the number of municipal police forces has grown; they now comprise about 15 000 police officers, just more than 10 percent of the national total of 120 000. Importantly, local police chiefs argue that they are close to communities which they serve, and are directly accountable to local authorities.

The system has not been without its problems. For one, although a new system of regulations establishes minimum pay levels for all police officrs in the country, most municipalities supplement their officers' pay. The national police force also seems to look down on its municipal counterparts, regarding them as a sort of secondary community police. The reality may be different, given the role that many municipal police officers have assumed in their communities; this includes a visible presence at schools and in shopping centres, and an ethos of approachability.

But municipal police are not as well trained as their national counterparts local authority police officers receive six months' training, half of this on the street, while national police officers spend more than a year at a police training institution. Municipal police also only have the power of ordinary citizens, and so effectively make citizens' arrests when they are on duty. This lack of powers does not seem to worry local police chiefs, who say they are adequate for the function they perform. The latter is not well defined, but seems to include the broad catch-all of crime prevention, and in reality implies looking after lower-order offences; all offenders are handed over to the national police. Some local units may also exceed their powers; although they are meant to avoid public order duties, some local forces operate dog units, and some run reaction units.

The confusion has not been helped by the fact that municipal police officers wear the same uniforms as their national counterparts only a small difference in lettering differentiates the badges of the national and local policing authorities. Understandably, the public is confused about the differing roles of the agencies; municipal police officers claim most locals don't know the difference although youths in inner city areas are increasingly beginning to make the distinction, and are only too happy to inform the municipal police that they have no power.

National policing in France is too entrenched to allow any take-over from municipal level. But municipal police officers argue that while co-operation with the national police is usually good, the national police often withdraw from areas where there are municipal police, due to a shortage of resources. In these areas, municipal police are largely left to their own devices most co-operation occurs through agreement, and municipal police are fiercely protective of their independence, with national officers effectively unable to exert authority over them.

This independence has advantages as well as disadvantages: municipal police can determine their own policing priorities, while at the same time remaining subject to the whim of local politicians stories of local police forces staging parades for the mayor are not uncommon. While initially fearing that regulation would impact on their independence, local police chiefs increasingly believe that regulation would help to firm up their position. The issues of oversight and regulation, and developments in France in this regard, are crucial, and are covered in greater detail below2.

Legislative competenct

South Africa's interim constitution provided for the establishment of municipal and metropolitan police services, and gave the provinces a key role to play in establishing them. Three key provisions were laid down in this regard:

• Such services could only be established with the consent of the MEC for safety and security in the province concerned.
  
  

• The powers of metropolitan and municipal police services were limited to `crime prevention' and the `enforcement of metropolitan and municipal by-laws'.
  
  

• The MEC for safety and security was also given the power to determine the powers and functions of the police service concerned, providing these remained within the ambit of crime prevention and the policing of metropolitan and municipal by-laws.

The South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995 also provided guidelines for establishing local authority policing services. While the interim constitution referred almost exclusively to the powers of the provinces, the Police Act referred only to national powers. For example:

• The minister shall prescribe which provisions of the Police Act apply to any municipal or metropolitan police service.
  
  

• The minister may make regulations regarding the establishment of metropolitan and municipal police services. Such regulations will include which categories of local government may establish metropolitan police services, and which may establish municipal police services. This is likely to be a critical area of dispute, and is explored later in the article.
  
  

• The national commissioner is empowered to determine the minimum standards of training of metropolitan and municipal police services.

Despite this framework, recent developments have brought these provisions back into contention. The proposed new constitution does not provide for metropolitan or municipal police services at all. It is unclear whether this is a deliberate oversight; if the new constitution is adopted in this form, it will completely remove provincial competence on the issue. If the current powers of the MEC are to be retained, the best possible solution would be to mention metropolitan and municipal police services in the new constitution, and then to spell out the powers of the MEC in relation to such services in an amendment to the Police Act3.

Core personnel, functions and powers

The debate on the issue of core personnel, functions and powers is only the beginning, and may ironically have opened up another opportunity for assessing what the functions of any such services should be. What seems clear, and has been fairly widely agreed on, is that local authority police services should not investigate crimes (unless they occur on municipal property) and should not maintain their own lock-ups; suspects should merely be handed on to the SAPS.

Other areas remain in dispute. The most critical oversight of the original constitutional position was that, given that local authority police services were confined only to crime prevention and the policing of municipal by-laws, an additional force separate from the traffic police had to be created at the local level.

But this unnecessarily duplicates and fragments local-level law enforcement authorities. To avoid this, traffic control and the enforcement of traffic regulations should be key functions of metropolitan and municipal police services. These activities require a high visibility and a degree of mobility which would facilitate rather than hinder their additional crime prevention role. Given that the debate around the inclusion of local authority policing in the new constitution is currently in flux, it may have created a good opportunity to add this function. That would open the way towards traffic police forming the core of any newly established metropolitan or municipal policing functions.

Nor would this necessarily require the powers of local police officers to be increased. Traffic officers are already designated as peace officers under the Criminal Procedure Act, which gives them powers of arrest, search and seizure. Despite the protests of some local authorities, these would be adequate for the tasks that they have been designated to perform.

Security departments, on the other hand, should be restricted to protecting council property, and individuals should only be transferred to the local authority police service if they meet appropriate requirements. When establishing local police services, an unnecessarily complex system or too many categories of police officers should be avoided. Local authority police officers should receive a uniform level of training in both traffic and policing functions, and should be equipped no matter what any resulting structure will look like to perform both functions.

If local authority police services are to succeed, they must be seen as adequately trained and service-orientated structures. They should concentrate on proactive, visible policing, particularly in areas with high crime rates, such as taxi ranks or central business districts, as well high-priority tourists areas. And any future success of these structures will rely heavily on their being intelligently and adequately managed. Police managers at local level will be well placed to determine how proactive such agencies will be, and how they will respond to community needs.

Oversight and accountability

Whether metropolitan or municipal police agencies will have to be regulated is a moot point. Any attempt at regulation is greeted with disdain by the municipalities, who argue that since they are paying, they should be able to determine what standards of policing should apply. Besides this, municipal officials have argued that since any local authority policing service will be directly accountable to the municipal council concerned, there is no need for any system of oversight or regulation.

There is some merit in these arguments a comprehensive system for regulating local authority policing would simply be inappropriate. Worse, it may indeed contain dangers: any attempt at overregulation could lead to the privatisation of some components of the municipal or metropolitan police service. Already in Johannesburg a private company has been employed to police some city blocks in the central business district.

But to argue for no regulation at all is self-defeating. Some form of oversight and regulation would ensure that uniform standards are maintained, and a minimum standard of service delivered to all communities. This will help municipal policing to overcome the scepticism that has already greeted its proposed introduction.

The French example is again useful here. Originally, municipal policing agencies were established in France with little or no regulation. Now renewed attempt are being made to regulate metropolitan and municipal police agencies more stringently importantly, these initiatives have not come from central government but from the cities and towns themselves, which wish to secure a more stable position within the French policing system. While the outcome of the debate is by no means certain, the French Ministry of the Interior, acting in conjunction with local authorities, wants to achieve a basic level of regulation as well as establish an oversight commission (which may generate localised offspring) to provide basic guidelines for the French municipal police.

These regulatory or oversight mechanisms are important. Most crucially, French municipal police chiefs have argued that they have been left out of the general national policing structure; regulating them will amount to recognising their important role in policing communities, and will draw them closer to the national police agencies.

Such a `soft' form of oversight may also be helpful in South Africa. Moreover, it could easily be linked to the powers granted to MECs in the interim constitution they could effectively consent to a metropolitan or municipal police agency being established by laying down a number of minimum conditions and setting down a broad series of guidelines.

The alternative is to establish a similar structure at national level. What is clear, though, is that the oversight or regulatory body should include as many stakeholders as possible without becoming clumsy. At least initially the body should be limited to an advisory role, leaving decision-making either to the national minister or the MEC of the province concerned. Equally important for the structure will be to maintain a regular monitoring presence in relation to local authority policing, and to inform political representatives of activities and progress.

An innovative system of accreditation that has been successfully applied (albeit voluntarily) to some American police departments could also perform a useful function in South Africa. But this should be largely aimed at rating the service provided by local authority police, and suggesting improvements. The system of accreditation should apply only to non-mandatory or service requirements, and the rating should simply serve to inform any community of the value of the service they are getting for their rates and taxes.

The connection between resources and service provision should not be underestimated a simple formula system would reduce the fears of poorer municipalities or metropolitan areas that only their richer neighbours will be able to achieve high levels of service. The service rating should actively attempt to encourage innovative policing experiments, given limited resources.

Issues to be resolved

While many of the policy proposals made at provincial and local level seem attractive, the jury is still out on whether the process will succeed. A number of problems still have to be resolved:

Pay

The issue of remuneration is critical, given that municipalities already pay their traffic officials more than the national police and are unlikely to reduce pay scales in the interests of parity with the SAPS. Provincial and national government are also nervous about acting on the issue, since municipalities are vehemently opposed to the introduction of any national pay scale given, they argue, that it is their money being paid out. But signs of unrest in the SAPS are noticeable: officers at meetings discussing the issue of local authority policing have drawn attention to the issue, and ministerial policy-makers fear that that the SAPS will lose many officers to municipal and metropolitan police services offering better pay and service benefits.

Structure

This question concerns the extent to which metropolitan substructures (MSS) will be able to establish their own police services. While, according to the Police Act, the national ministry has to determine which category of local government can establish which kinds of forces, this has not yet been decided. The issue is politically contentious, for different reasons in different areas. In some, resources held at MSS level are seen by politicians and security managers to be wanted at metro level, while in other areas there are fears that various MSSs under the control of different political parties will set different priorities. The best solution may be a broad guideline that allows operation and management to occur at MSS level and policy-making and co-ordination at metro level of what will effectively be one force.

Over-regulation

Over-regulation at national or provincial level could force municipal authorities to privatise some of their services such as the hiring of armed reaction units to police some areas, or private security guards on some city blocks or allow largely unregulated anti-crime (read vigilante) groups to develop. This has potentially serious consequences over the medium term.

Security departments

Security departments have entrenched their position in many municipalities and have lobbied that they, rather than traffic, should form the core of any new policing service at local authority level. This battle is already being fought out in some municipalities, and may complicate the process of creating representative and effective institutions.

Corruption

While few statistics exist, evidence suggests that the level of corruption in some traffic departments is unacceptably high. This is partly a result of writing out fines, which immediately introduces the possibility of a trade-off with the officer concerned. But corruption could taint local authority police agencies from the beginning, and damage their ability to be seen as service-oriented institutions acting in the public interest.

Conclusion: A better service?

Establishing metropolitan and municipal policing is a complex issue, involving a large number of stakeholders and vested interests. At the moment the debate is consolidating as both provincial, national and local government players begin to come to grips with the issues involved. If the process results in well-trained, visible and proactive policing authorities acting to prevent crime at the local level, this would be an indispensable addition to South Africa's ability to combat rising levels of crime.

However, that such a result is inevitable is far from clear. In France, where a similar experiment a national police force supplemented by local authority officers was tried, the results have been mixed. Municipalities have extended their powers beyond their mandate, and national and local authorities have continually sniped at each other over guidelines. Also, local instances of abuse and corruption have been reported.

This raises the importance of adequate oversight mechanisms over any future municipal and metropolitan policing authorities. Such guidelines should be aimed at ensuring that these new services remain service-orientated, and seek to play a highly visible and proactive role in countering crime.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

For a more comprehensive outline of the DCP, see Mark Shaw, `Partners in crime?' crime, political transition and changing forms of policing control, Centre for Policy Studies, Research Report no 39, June 1995. See also Jack Jewell, A history of the Durban City Police, Durban City Council, 1989.



A visit to France in February 1996 to examine the French system of municipal policing was made possible with the kind assistance of the French Ministry of the Interior in Paris, and the French Embassy in Pretoria. See also Richard Kania, `The French municipal police experiment', Police Studies 12 (3), Fall 1989.



For a fuller explanation of this, see Gauteng Province, Ministry of Safety and Security, `Concept document: metropolitan and municipal policing', February 1996.