Guy Martin: Conflict Resolution in Africa

Over the last forty years, Africa has been (and continues to be) one of the most conflict-ridden regions of the world, resulting in untold human suffering. Thus, it has been estimated that between 1955 and 1995, some 7 to 8 million people died as a result of violent conflict in Africa, including about 850 000 in the Rwanda genocide of 1994 alone. Of forty-eight recorded genocides in the world, twenty have occurred in Africa. Of a total of sixty-six minorities under threat world-wide, twenty-seven – representing 36,9 per cent of the total population – are in Africa. At the end of 1992 there were 23 million refugees – almost half of the total world refugee population – and about as many internally displaced persons in Africa. While African conflicts are typically internal rather than inter-state, many of these have taken (and continue to take) an increasingly sub-regional character, particularly in the Greater Horn, the Great Lakes Region and Southern Africa. African conflicts, moreover, are becoming increasingly ‘civilianised’: of the victims of African conflicts, 90 per cent are innocent civilians, mostly women and children. As of April 1998, some form of latent or open conflict persist in twenty-three out of fifty-three African countries, namely, Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Egypt, Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Somalia, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda.

An analysis of the costs and benefits of African conflicts is not possible, given the current state of our knowledge in this area. Luc Reychier has, however, identified eight types of costs entailed by African conflicts:

humanitarian cost: number of deaths, wounded, refugees, internally displaced persons and famine;



political cost: state collapse, anarchy, subversion of the democratic process, political corruption and criminalisation of power;



economic cost: loss of revenue from trade and tourism, destruction of economic, transport and educational infrastructure, diversion of resources away from development;



ecological cost: loss of arable land, soil erosion, deforestation and desertification;



social cost: breakdown of family structures, female victims of sexual violence, war orphans;



cultural cost: breakdown of traditional socio-cultural values, institutions and lifestyles;



psychological cost: psychological disorders, post-traumatic syndromes, fear and mutual hostility between groups in conflict;



spiritual cost: loss of values related to the sanctity of life, development of a culture of violence.

An analysis of African conflicts requires an historical perspective. In Africa, as elsewhere in the world, conflicts are part and parcel of the dynamics of society. There is a perennial struggle among individuals, families, clans, ethnic groups and nations for control over scarce natural, economic and political resources. While conflicts are a constant in African history, African conflicts should be viewed in their specific historical context. According to this dynamic perspective, what changes is the nature and intensity of conflict as a function of internal societal factors (such as ethnicity, class and religion) and of changes in the environment (sub-regional, regional and international), with various degrees and levels of influence on the internal situation. In other words, the nature and intensity of African conflicts is a result of a complex, dialectical relationship between internal societal factors and the structure of the external environment.

At the sub-regional level, regional hegemons have often acted as facilitators in certain conflict management and resolution exercises (e.g., Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire in Liberia; Kenya and Uganda in Rwanda and Burundi; South Africa in Southern Africa). In this regard, it is interesting to note that African sub-regional organisations, initially created as economic integration groupings, have increasingly been entrusted with security and peace-making functions. The three most notable examples of such a functional shift are: the involvement of ECOMOG (the Monitoring Group of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)) in the Liberian and Sierra Leonan conflicts; of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in the southern Sudanese conflict; and of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in peace-making initiatives in Southern Africa.

These experiences in sub-regional peace-making demonstrate the promise of subregional organisations as peace-makers, despite their principal role of fostering economic co-operation, integration and development. Because of an overriding interest in their neighbourhood’s stability and their actual or potential leverage with disputants, sub-regional organisations, such as ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC, may be uniquely qualified to launch preventive diplomacy efforts and to effect change in attitudes that leads to viable and sustainable negotiated settlements in cases of civil war.

Regional Conflict Management – The Role of the OAU

At the summit of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in June 1992, African heads of state agreed that the OAU should establish a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR). At the 1993 summit the heads of state formally approved the Mechanism as it was proposed by the OAU Secretary General, Salim Ahmed Salim. Rather remarkably for an organisation that hitherto had avoided involvement in internal conflicts, the new OAU Mechanism has a clear mandate to concern itself with such conflicts. As the Secretary General cogently remarked, "given that every African is his brother’s keeper, and that our borders are at best artificial, we in Africa need to use our own cultural and social relationships to interpret the principle of non-intervention in such a way that we are able to apply it to our advantage in conflict prevention and resolution".

Early warning system

The need for the exchange of information among and between countries, regional and international organisations and non-governmental organisations is a prerequisite, not only for improving controls over weapons proliferation and identifying trading routes, smuggling syndicates and modes of smuggling but also for developing an effective early-warning system to prevent the outbreak of conflict, in which weapons, while not being the cause, may exacerbate or prolong that conflict. A paper on the development of an early warning system within the OAU was presented at the conference. It is summarised in this section, prefaced by a broader overview of the need for an early warning system in Africa.

It is apparent that violent conflict remains all too likely in Africa for the immediate future. Only too often this violence arises before any significant effort has been made to address its causes. One reason for this is that insufficient diplomatic and political activity is devoted to the early resolution or amelioration of conflicts, and that often because of a want of information and intelligence about the likely course of events.

A number of think-tanks has designed matrices to measure economic and political risk. Paradoxically, these systems, for all their pretence to scientific accuracy of measurement are misleading. So multifarious are the elements in real-world situations, and so complex their interaction, that only informed analysis and argument can convey likely and unlikely developments and outcomes, and then only on the basis of constant revision and re-evaluation.

Such analysis must take into account not only the known concerning a given society in terms of its structure, history and traditions, but the most recent developments, most of which go unrecorded and unreported in the popular press. It follows then, that this can only be done by expert analysis of the literature and other intelligence, and by such refinement of understanding as is available only in the field.

Deon van Schoor: The OAU – Towards an African Early Warning System

The OAU has developed an early warning system that currently consists of an Internet-linked situation room and the development of a system of early warning focal points. These include non-governmental organisations, universities, journalists and others who are appointed by the OAU to act as providers of information. In addition, two sets of indicators have been developed, the first for the ‘prediction’ of impending conflict and the second to indicate ongoing conflict. The situation room is currently manned by a volunteer. The OAU has requested secondment of UN staff and staff from member states to assist in capacitating the situation room so that it can become fully operational.

Some of the indicators identified include organised crime (both intrastate and transnational) as it impacts on democracy and the role of weapons, including legal and illegal build-ups, qualitative increase and public displays (for example, during military parades and national celebrations).

The information provided by the early warning unit will be directed to the Secretary General and his staff, as well as the OAU Central Organ, the organisation’s governing body. The Central Organ contains one-third of the OAU members, each of whom is elected to one-year positions. Discussions are currently underway to enhance the functioning of the Organ, including a refinement of meetings and modification of the decision-making processes.

Co-operation between the OAU and other regional organisations – in Africa, for example, L’ANAD and SADC – was highlighted as an area for further interactions. The suggestion was also made that the OAU work with the EU, in addition to its ongoing work with the UN in developing its early warning system.