Small Arms Flows in Zimbabwe*

The issue of small arms flows in Zimbabwe is inextricably linked to the history of the Southern African region, broadly defined. Zimbabwe, like its neighbours, is an historical fiction. The occupation of Southern Rhodesia by the British South Africa Company in 1890 and the subsequent resistance by the indigenous African population laid much of the foundation for the build-up of light and heavy weaponry, both in Zimbabwe and in its Southern African neighbouring states.

Small arms flows are not only of concern to Zimbabwe as a nation-state. The porous nature of its surrounding borders with Mozambique, South Africa, Botswana and Zambia magnifies the issue to one of regional proportions. It therefore becomes more than a cliché to argue that the problems of Zimbabwe are the problems of its neighbours, and vice versa; this is a reality which decision-makers must of necessity take into cognisance. A regional approach to the problem of small arms flows thus becomes the starting point in an effort towards common security.

The anti-colonial struggle in the 1950s in then-Southern Rhodesia followed in many ways a similar path to that of South Africa. In 1957 the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress (SRANC) was formed as an African nationalist party fighting for non-violent political change and majority rule, led by Joshua Nkomo. The SRANC was banned by the Southern Rhodesian government in 1960 and soon thereafter the National Democratic Party (NDP) was established, also led by Nkomo. In 1961 the NDP was banned. Again, observing the unwritten policy whereby when one party was banned a new one was brought into being under identical leadership,1 in 1961 the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) was formed, only to be banned in turn in 1962.

In that same year, following a series of sabotage activities that had been organised by ZAPU and with the majority of its leadership in exile in Lusaka, Zambia, a national search for leadership of that party ensued. Meanwhile, in Zambia, ZAPU formed a ‘Special Affairs’ unit, led by James Chikerema and deputised by Jason Moyo, which was responsible for organising the formation of a military wing. A formal command structure of this military wing was formed in 1963, comprising Akim Ndlovu (Commander) and Robson Manyika (Deputy Commander), Dumiso Dabengwa, Report Mphoko and Abraham D Nkiwane.2 In the 1970s, the military wing of ZAPU was to remain as the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA).

In 1963 the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) was also formed, as a splinter of ZAPU. The formation of ZANU by Ndabaningi Sithole and the subsequent incorporation of a military wing, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), led by Josiah Tongogara, represented an equally challenging turn of events in the maturation of the liberation struggle. One of the official reasons cited by Sithole for the formation of ZANU was his concern about the direction of the liberation struggle.

Initially both ZAPU and ZANU received arms from a number of African countries, including Uganda, Ghana, Tanzania, Algeria and Egypt. Weaponry was also supplied by North Korea and the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). Prior to the Sino-Soviet split, ZAPU received arms from the Soviet Union and China and, subsequent to the split, most of its light and heavy weaponry from the Soviet Union. ZANU, on the other hand, acquired much of its weaponry, as well as support, from China.

Two significant points should be noted with respect to the changes in the Rhodesian political environment in the early 1960s. First, the electoral victory of the new Rhodesian Front (RF) party in 1962, on an explicit platform of protection for white privilege, forced the nationalist movements to reassess their strategies of negotiated settlement. The hardening of positions and the rapid shift to the right in Rhodesian white politics transformed the remaining doves of ZANU and ZAPU into hawks, and a military victory was now considered necessary, given the deteriorating political climate. Second, the ostracisation of Rhodesia by the international community and the imposition of sanctions occasioned a close alliance between South Africa and Rhodesia, both economically and militarily.

In 1962 Winston Field and Ian Smith founded the Rhodesian Front (RF), a political party dedicated to the preservation of white minority rule in the British colony. Following intense pressure from the British government to afford some political rights to the African population after his accession to the post of Prime Minister in 1964, Smith proclaimed Rhodesia independent in 1965. The Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by the Rhodesian government and the marked shift to the right in white Rhodesian politics provoked immediate international condemnation and isolation by erstwhile allies, but also forged a higher level of political and military co-operation with an old ally: South Africa.

The military build-up in Rhodesia was necessitated by the shift in white politics. As Winston Field commented, "there are timorous ones who say: ‘But we cannot afford a worthwhile defence force.’ My only reply in this day and age in Africa is: ‘We have got to.’"3 Many of the small arms and much of the equipment in Rhodesia had been handed to Southern Rhodesia by Britain, following the break-up of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and, after the installation of the RF, Britain continued to sell arms to both South Africa and Rhodesia.

As Loney notes, the Simonstown Agreement of 1955 closely cemented both the continued arms trade with South Africa and the development of a domestic arms industry.4 The underlying assumption of Simonstown, which enabled the continuation of the sale of arms to South Africa by the British Labour government (like the Conservatives before it), was that the South Atlantic was an essential area of Western defence. During this period, almost all the large equipment used by the South African Defence Force (SADF) was British supplied.

Co-operation between South Africa and Rhodesia in the economic, political and military spheres was necessitated at a variety of levels through mutual interest. Following UDI, the United Nations imposed selective mandatory sanctions on Rhodesia, including an oil embargo. Smith’s government was, by many accounts, kept afloat by Vorster’s government in Pretoria.5 The Rhodesian government had an interest in ‘sanctions busting’, and therefore the enlistment of support from South Africa and the former Portuguese colonies was necessary. The government of South Africa, in turn, was anxious to avert the successful application of sanctions against Rhodesia, being fully cognisant of the fact that success in Rhodesia would result in the risk of sanctions being contemplated and imposed against South Africa itself.

Although there were no formal military agreements between South Africa and Rhodesia, and Mozambique and Angola (under Portuguese control), connections did exist.6 Of that period, the International Institute for Security Studies states:

"There are no known formal military agreements between the white-controlled territories of Southern Africa, but the links exist in practice. Periodical meetings on common security matters have taken place between the defence authorities of South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal: there are 'hot pursuit' agreements relating to certain frontier areas, and South Africa has given some assistance to anti-insurgent forces operations in Rhodesia."7

South African military intelligence and the South African security police were responsible for much of the intelligence information and many of the arms supplies received by Rhodesia during the early phase of UDI,8 and the presence of South African Buccaneer jets on the Zambezi border area with Zambia was reported by African National Congress (ANC) and ZAPU intelligence.9

The rationale behind the South African government’s increasing its military presence in Rhodesia during this period appears to be twofold. First, the South African and Rhodesian governments were aware of the build-up of forces and materiel in Zambia. Thus the deployment of troops along the Zambezi River seems to have had the intent of sealing the border, thereby blocking the entry of guerrillas into the country. Moreover, the South African government was intent, if necessary, upon fighting the ANC on the Zambezi as opposed to the Limpopo. The South African Defence Force (SADF) was anxious to test the relative strength of the ANC in guerrilla warfare in the Zambezi Basin before they could cross through Rhodesia.

Heightened collaboration between South Africa and Rhodesia, and the increasingly hostile and belligerent political environment in Southern Africa led to a reassessment of strategy by the various nationalist movements. In many ways UDI was a turning point: it necessitated the reassessment of political and military strategy on all sides. Reported military expenditure in Zimbabwe increased with relative regularity during the period of the liberation struggle up until independence.

Reported arms transfers (as imports) during this period, mainly from Britain, also increased with relative regularity. Of course, the period of sanctions prior to independence and the secret military relations with neighbouring states make it difficult to assess the level of illegal arms which, by most accounts, surpassed the reported levels. The independence of Mozambique and Angola in 1975 further exacerbated the situation in an already militarised region, by giving additional impetus for the Smith government to acquire arms both legally and illegally.

Table 1

 The Era of Independence and Current Issues

The immediate post-independence period presented a myriad of problems and issues related to the question of small arms flows and their proliferation. The first important issue related to disarmament and demobilisation. The forces of ZANLA, ZIPRA and the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF) not only declared a cease-fire, but were also forced, for the most part, to disarm and demobilise, as well as integrate into a unified armed forces of Zimbabwe.

A demilitarisation mandate, as part of the Lancaster House Agreement, was formally signed on 21 December 1979. This was done under the auspices of an international peacekeeping force, the Commonwealth Monitoring Force.10 There are various assessments with respect to the numbers of forces involved, sometimes highly disparate. In 1979 the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF) numbered 23 000.11 In 1979 ZIPRA force levels were estimated at 4 055 deployed within Zimbabwe, 16 000 maintained outside Zimbabwe, mainly in Zambia, and 2 950 in training, whereas ZANLA forces were estimated at 10 250 deployed within Zimbabwe, 3 500 maintained outside Zimbabwe, mainly in Mozambique, and 14 000 in training.12 UNIDIR assessed the numbers of forces expected to be disarmed, integrated and demobilised as 18 000 (ZANLA), 6 000 (ZIPRA) and 16 000 (RSF).13 It is significant to note that the RSF, and to a lesser extent ZIPRA, had substantial components of heavy weaponry and air support designed to fight a conventional, as opposed to guerrilla, war.

The Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF), deployed in December of 1979, was comprised of 1 319 persons from Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Kenya and Britain. Its chief mandate was to monitor the cease-fire agreement between the Patriotic Front (ZANU and ZAPU) and the then-Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government. An interesting and controversial aspect of the agreement was that the PF and the RSF were permitted to keep their weaponry, the CMF having no mandate for disarmament. The members of the CMF carried only light weapons, and its function to monitor assembly and rendezvous points was in preparation for the general elections of March, 1980.14

The demobilisation of ZANLA and ZIPRA and elements of the RSF at the assembly points was a protracted process, and both liberation armies were accused of retaining a portion of their personnel and weaponry outside of Zimbabwe during the cease-fire period.15 At this time the concealment of armaments was justified as a precaution, in the event of the independence process being sabotaged or manipulated by the Rhodesian forces.

Following the upset victory of ZANU(PF) at the polls in March of 1980, where they won only fifty-seven of the eighty contested parliamentary seats, the political tension between ZANU(PF) and PF-ZAPU increased. In November 1980 and February 1981 serious outbreaks of violence occurred between ZANLA and ZIPRA combatants awaiting integration into the Zimbabwe National Army at Entumbane near Bulawayo. This violence led to the defection of a number of ZIPRA combatants from the assembly points, as they were unsure about their own safety.16

In February 1982 large arms caches were discovered in Matebeleland.17 These caches, attributed to PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA by the new ZANU(PF) government led to the arrest of the military leadership of ZAPU, including Dumiso Dabengwa and Lookout Masuku. PF-ZAPU was accused of attempting to overthrow the government and senior ZAPU officials, including Joshua Nkomo, were removed from government.

Low intensity civil war in Matebeleland lasted for five years, from 1982 to 1987. The execution of this warfare involved the use of the machinery of the state and, most notably, a specially trained army unit known as the ‘fifth brigade’. Over 3 000 extra-judicial killings have been documented, as well as a plethora of other human rights abuses. The violence was only halted after the signing of the Unity Accord of 22 December 1987, between ZANU(PF) and PF-ZAPU, and the subsequent amnesty which led to the release of the ZAPU leaders. A united ZANU(PF) was formed as a result of the Unity Accord.

Zimbabwe at present has a defence budget of US$ 471 million, which has increased from an expenditure of US$ 237 million in 1995.18 The only sub-Saharan African country other than South Africa with a defence industry which exports internationally, between 1992 and 1996, Zimbabwe supplied between US$ 10-50 million worth of military supplies19 to the international market, the vast majority of which went to other African countries.

Zimbabwe does not have an ‘arms industry’, per se, but rather produces small arms ammunition, as well as mortar supplies. The Zimbabwe Defence Industries (ZDI), a government-owned company formed in 1984, controls and supplies these legal military sales from Zimbabwe. ZDI also operates a mortar bomb filling plant. The majority of small arms ammunition produced by ZDI is for military purposes, although increasingly civilian ammunition (for hunting) is being produced by ZDI for sale to the United States market. All sales by ZDI must receive the prior approval of the Zimbabwe Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs.20 Although traditionally ZDI has not been considered a security risk with respect to small arms flows destabilising the region, the more recent sale of military equipment to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the newest member of the Southern African Development Community, has become an issue of ever-increasing concern.21 In the past, ZDI also reportedly supplied arms to Rwanda and Uganda, Central African countries directly involved in the 1998 DRC conflict.

The greater volume of illegal small arms flows to (and through) Zimbabwe comes from Mozambique and South Africa, with a less significant portion, mainly for the purpose of poaching, issuing from Zambia. Traditionally, the most problematic area from which arms flows have been monitored has been Mozambique. This is for several reasons, but it is significant to note that Zimbabwe’s longest border is with Mozambique, necessitating better border controls.

Small arms flows have also been related to the state of civil war in Mozambique, and Zimbabwe’s direct involvement in that war. The advent of Mozambique’s independence from Portugal in 1975 saw the new birth of a clandestine military operation by Rhodesia. The Director-General of the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) of Rhodesia, through the CIO ‘ops-division’, set up the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) and began the training of its members in 1976 at Rusape. The main objective of RENAMO was to destabilise the new government of Mozambique, and to attack ZANLA, which operated from independent Mozambique. After the Lancaster House Agreement in 1979, the Rhodesian government stopped supporting RENAMO, leading to its virtual collapse.22 In 1980, however, the apartheid government of South Africa became the new surrogate parent of that group.

The arming of RENAMO by Rhodesia and later South Africa, and its operation in Mozambique have directly affected the question of small arms flows in Southern Africa. It is estimated that between 1982 and 1992 Zimbabwe sent 15 000 troops to Mozambique, to protect vital transit lines and directly assist the government of Mozambique in fighting RENAMO. In 1986, at the request of the then-President of Mozambique, Samora Machel, for example, Zimbabwe sent 4 000 troops to Mozambique to protect the Beira Corridor (the port of Beira, the vital railway and the pipeline).23 The involvement of troops from Zimbabwe was also to assist the government of Mozambique in containing RENAMO. This involvement with Mozambique exacerbated the problem of small arms flows in the Southern African region by facilitating illegal flows through official channels.

By contrast, the advent of peace in Mozambique and the management of hostilities have had a positive effect on the question of small arms flows for Zimbabwe. As noted in Table 2, a good indicator for the police has been the number of cases of unlawful possession of weapons, which have actually decreased.24 These cases include small arms only, from the FN rifle to the AK-47, to the smallest weapon, such as a revolver. Of course, the problem of illegal small weapons flows remains, and in different dimensions.

Table 2

An increasingly problematic area has been the flow of small arms from South Africa to Zimbabwe, as well as small arms through Botswana to Zimbabwe and South Africa. The issue of Botswana is particularly interesting because Zimbabwe has no natural boundary with Botswana, thus facilitating illegal flows of arms. Although the lessening of hostilities with Mozambique has initiated fewer problems in its border areas generally, where the border area with South Africa is concerned, a very different situation arises. Since the end of apartheid and white minority rule in South Africa, there has been a heightened level of both legal and illegal migration, particularly by the youth from Zimbabwe to South Africa. The movement of large groups of young people across borders can facilitate, indeed it has facilitated, the flow of small arms illegally. More seriously, it has allowed for the development of a culture of violence.25  

No official government policy exists in Zimbabwe with respect to small arms, a fact that has hampered effective action. Rather a set of complex policies, laws and regulations related to the question of light weapons adheres. As mentioned earlier in this section, weapons in Zimbabwe are from a variety of sources. Some have carried over from the Rhodesian regime and the liberation struggle. More recently, the majority of small arms has come from South Africa and Mozambique and, to a lesser extent, Zambia.

In Zimbabwe, the question of illegal weapons flows is within the purview of a number of government departments, most notably that of customs. Firearms must be declared at all legal crossing points. Persons smuggling firearms across the border who are caught, are charged with contravening a section of the customs and excise regulations. All weapons after being confiscated are sent to the national armoury, where they are kept indefinitely. In all such cases it is relevant to ascertain whether some of these were used in other crimes or other countries, which in turn requires a more collaborative effort. The Zimbabwe Republic Police liases with the Interpol regional office, established in Harare in March of 1997, in order to assist with a number of cross-border crimes, including small arms flows.

The source of most illegal weaponry is through legal crossing points, as concealed arms, and illegal crossing points, requiring cross-border co-ordination with neighbouring countries. Police patrols along the borders check for illegal weaponry, as well as conducting security meetings for border stations in conjunction with neighbouring states.

One of the more important cross-regional initiatives directly related to small arms flows has been the formation, in 1996, of the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation (SARPCCO), headquartered in Harare, Zimbabwe. The main vocation of SARPCCO is to provide mutual assistance between and amongst SADC member states in the field of the combating of crime.26 Articles three and four of the draft co-operation agreement of SARPCCO detail the right of entry of SADC police officials and the conditions surrounding this right. It was noted by the legal sub-committee of SARPCCO that the existing co-operation agreements between South Africa, Swaziland and Mozambique could serve as a basis for a draft multi-lateral agreement.27

Small arms flows constitute a foremost concern at regional level. Consequently, one of the first initiatives of the legal sub-committee of SARPCCO was to examine the possibility of having all firearms in the region registered. Of course, this implies having an extensive central firearms registry in all member states, which is not the case at present. Zimbabwe does have such a registry, and does require permits for all firearms owned by individuals, but this is not a comprehensive system. The ever-expanding breadth of the Southern African region, now into Central Africa, makes the prospect of a comprehensive registry programme ever less feasible.

The regional initiatives by SADC police with respect to small arms flows are instructive in several respects. First, the recognition that a regional approach must be sustained in order comprehensively to examine questions such as small arms flows is an important step. This is a major move forward in recognising new regional partnerships, particularly with South Africa, whose integration into this form of regional initiative would have been difficult even five years ago. The formalisation of a regional approach towards the combating of crime is an outgrowth of several sub-regional and bilateral initiatives, including the ‘V4’ operation between Zimbabwe, Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique which broke-up a syndicate for stolen vehicles in the region.

Equally interesting is that SARPCCO has its headquarters in Harare, also the location of the Interpol regional office. This is, amongst other reasons, because Zimbabwe has become a significant conduit for small arms flows, although the market within Zimbabwe itself for illegal weapons is not considered large by international standards.

Conclusion: Peace and Its Dividends

Peace in Mozambique and South Africa certainly has reduced the direct external dimension of political violence in Zimbabwe, particularly in the border areas, which were heavily patrolled. As noted earlier in this section, consistent with the assumption that peace brings dividends, the numbers of reported cases of unlawful weapons possession have reduced dramatically with the warming of regional relations. Of course, the military involvement of Zimbabwe in the DRC conflict and the persistent lack of peace in Angola continue to affect regional relations, but Zimbabwe does not share a border with Angola and so the direct effects have been minimal thus far. Relative peace in the region has also presented reasonable grounds for co-operation on a variety of levels. Where the question of small arms flows is concerned, regional initiatives such as SARPCCO are an outgrowth of this more positive regional environment.

Yet the reduction of political violence has presented a paradox for Zimbabwe, in that criminal violence, as well as a culture of violence, seems to be on the increase, particularly amongst the youth. This is indeed as much a socio-economic question as a political or criminal one. The Central Statistical Office of Zimbabwe indicated in 1996 that, "Zimbabwean youths in the 15-25 years age group accounted for 61% of the economically active unemployed population".28 In fact, the question of the socio-economic malaise within the region affecting the youth is one of growing significance, one which must of necessity be addressed in an examination of the prevalence of, and increase in, the culture of violence.

Zimbabwe, after emerging from a protracted liberation struggle and a violent post-independence period of civil strife, is experiencing a complex set of internal factors which are related to the question of small arms flows. Although it does have a central registry and national armoury, there are still large pockets of arms that remain unregistered and unaccounted for, often inadvertently. As late as May 1998, a female villager found a significant arms cache remaining from the liberation struggle near Chiredzi.29

The question of small arms flows in Zimbabwe, though, is first and foremost a regional question. Porous borders, a peaceful political climate in Mozambique, the outbreak of conflict in Central Africa involving a number of SADC member states, and massive population flows within Southern Africa have increased the opportunities for the movement of light weapons to various markets within and outside Southern Africa. The increased availability of weapons, both for sale and for criminal use, has prompted a regional examination of the question of small arms flows. What remains is for increased co-ordination by Southern African countries to be secured and comprehensive regional policy initiatives taken in this area, in order that a potentially intractable problem might be contained.