Figures such as 11 891 firearms, 106 pistols, 6 351 anti-personal mines and 3 192 337 rounds of ammunition (see Table 5) represent a success that cannot be underestimated. However, it remains true that these weapons are still a drop in the ocean of the estimated figures of arms existing in the country. What makes Operation Rachel a special case is not the fact that it completely solved the problem for which it was undertaken in the first place. It managed creatively to forge a sound working relationship between two police forces that:

had never worked together in any meaningful way before;

regarded each other as enemies;

had uneven operational capabilities; and

had an unequal endowment of resources.

Key success factors

The philosophy on which the operation was based, was crucial to its success. The parties understood that, in the post-conflict situation in Mozambique, a proactive policing approach would either not manage to retrieve any weapons in the country or politicise the issue. A proactive policing strategy would only find very reluctant community support, if any at all. With no support, there was nothing the police could do to locate the caches. On the other hand, if any weapons caches could be found, the prosecution of those found in possession of these caches would become a political animal with the potential of jeopardising the whole reconciliation process. As it stands now, the latter is a prerequisite for any disarmament in Mozambique. It was therefore wisely decided that the operation would be intelligence-driven. In addition, an undeclared plain amnesty would be given to those found with weapons. This was not only a disarmament measure, but also a move towards political reconciliation. Given the levels of poverty, informers and caretakers of arms caches would be rewarded as an incentive and an informal buy-back component was brought in. In short, Rachel was a combination of undeclared amnesty and buy-back programmes. The formula emerging from the combination of these two components was that of disarming the bush with the support of the people living in it. The bush concealed these weapons and people knew where they were. Operations of this kind must therefore clearly be apolitical in nature.

A flexible and ad hoc implementation strategy, aimed at confidence-building was created. Given the converging transitions in the countries, political agreements reached in haste may be misleading, as they may seem to have emerged from a tabula rasa principle applied to the recent history of the region. One needs to understand that, while politicians may have buried recent conflictual relationships, the security apparatuses of the two countries and individual police officers may have retained some resentment. In other words, political agreements too easily reached may be empty of practical content and hence, the attitudes throughout the implementation process will have to be thoroughly measured. The lesson is clear: "... take it easy, do not get upset with your counterparts. After signing the agreement, let the ground officers determine what needs to be done. Listen to the ground officers’ needs and complaints." Thus, every step in the implementation process has to be based on the experience of the previous phase. Allowing daily contacts between police officers helps to build a sense of common duty.

Mutual responsiveness and a sense of common interest are sine qua nons. In situations where stereotypes and distrust between police officers abound that can boil over into conflict, certain personal relationships can colour the reports made throughout the exercise. At outset, those involved have to be responsive to their partners’ concerns, no matter how trivial the problems may be. By trying to find a mutually satisfying solution, these problems can be sorted out. Replacing police officers whenever a complaint is presented and attempting to find the most suitable officers have been the best strategies of the Rachel operations. These are directly related to a sense of common interest. It has been a permanent feature of the Rachel operation that both the political and operational levels regarded the operation as part of their individual domestic problems. The motives, as well as the results were translated into the security concerns of each country participating in the operation. There was no support relationship. Each of the police forces was doing its own job with the means at its disposal. It is therefore necessary to define the problem in such a way that it clearly shows the concerns of each party. One of the lessons included: "... never forget that interest is the underlying motive of any political arrangement and make sure to contemplate yours as well as that of your counterpart."

Utilising sound evaluation and correction exercises with diplomatic input is an effective formula. Although there are no reports specifically evaluating individual Rachel operations, it is obvious that a very thorough evaluation took place after each operation. These evaluations were not once-off activities. They took place throughout the year that, on average, separated one operation from the next. During this process, problems were solved in a highly diplomatic manner based on well-founded discretion. Talking to police officers from both sides, one gets the impression that there were no problems. This attitude has allowed a common discourse to develop over the course of the operation. The common preferred terms were success, success and success. This unified and positive approach kept hopes high even when success was not that obvious. Given the lengthy periods between operations, ad hoc contacts to solve current problems were put in place. This was possible because permanent contact channels were open. This arrangement also bought time for thorough planning. The lesson is clearly: "... dramatise the results but not the problems."

All stakeholders have to be identified. The politically motivated hypothesis that the bush has weapons and that people just know the places where they are kept, is necessary to maintain sound relationships with the local population. The success of any operation is in its ability to understand the environment in which it takes place. Every factor had to be equated. The Rachel operations correctly managed to identify local communities as some of the most important stakeholders. It is therefore important to monitor their changing needs throughout the exercise and, where possible, provide timely responses to their needs. At the beginning, the involvement of local communities was to be encouraged through small rewards to informers. When women and children became increasingly important, sweets and other incentives were introduced. Though the team had neither the mandate nor the resources, it noted that these communities need development initiatives and the police therefore also became educators of local communities.

The future?

As to the future of Operation Rachel, a problem which emerges if such an operation is seen as mandated by national security concerns alone, is that it cannot continue indefinitely: it becomes the hostage of its own success. When success is achieved, the common ground that seems to be the prerequisite for the operation’s success, will progressively close down.

It is almost certain that, when the common concerns have been completely addressed, the operation will have to come to an end. Although the interest of South Africa is that of a Mozambique without arms caches at the level of political discourse, it will be difficult for SAPS to spend scarce resources in practice to track down weapons in the north of Mozambique. This will specifically be the case if SAPS finds it difficult to establish a direct link between remote arms caches in Mozambique and current security problems in South Africa. For Mozambique, it is time to mobilise resources to disarm its bush further north of the Zambeze River.

This dynamic points the way to two scenarios:

The Operation Rachel chapter can be successfully closed down and each country proceed in their own course.



Operation Rachel can be elevated to a first step towards a regional plan of action where member states of a subgroup promote their regional concerns over national ones.

It is here where the positive coincidence emerges: as the bilateral Operation Rachel reaches its culmination and cannot be further justified under national interests alone, it now meets with the emergence of serious regional initiatives that have prioritised the management and reduction of small arms proliferation in Southern Africa. This emerging trend comes hopefully in time to permit Operation Rachel to restructure itself under regional imperatives over and above national interests. Therefore, Operation Rachel could become a bridge between the national and the regional. This opportunity should not be lost.