Preface

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Published in Monograph No 42: Small Arms in Southern Africa, November 1999


In Commemoration of the

The Institute for Security Studies wishes to add its voice to the global commemoration of the Centenary of the 1899 Hague Peace Conference. As a result of its work over the last three years, the Arms Management Programme at the ISS is not only convinced that arms control and disarmament must be dealt with simultaneously, but also that, as far as light weapons and small arms are concerned, initiatives must be supported by educational and development components to allow for the evolution of alternatives to the use of arms in the resolution of human conflict. Nowhere is the need to control, reduce and reverse violence and its roots stronger than on the African continent. The Institute for Security Studies aims explicitly to enhance human security in Africa, and therefore has to voice its concerns and share its vision on the way forward at this august occasion.

It has been said that disarmament is a continuation of strategy through a reduction of military means, while arms control is a continuation of strategy through a mutual restraint on military means. These adaptations of Clausewitz’s famous dictum about war underlines what has become the prevailing view about disarmament and that was always at the root of arms control: these concepts are best understood as strategies in the business of politics among nations, rather than as ideals or imperatives.1 This realist view of the nature of arms control and disarmament was challenged by the ideals expressed at the 1899 Hague Peace Conference.

After a century which can only be characterised as one of devastating wars and massive human suffering, it might be facile to describe The Hague Conference of 1899 and its objectives as a failure. Yet, hundred years after it was first voiced, the ideals of The Hague bring us all together again. The vision expressed at The Hague has stood the test of time, not because of the details expressed about the settlement of disputes, or the limitations on the means and methods of warfare, but because it was guided by a humanitarian approach which ultimately proposed an end to violence. Weapons and politics might change, but people do not. It is this encompassing human approach — transcending barriers of economic, political, racial, geographic and religious divides — that strikes a cord with all regions and peoples in the world today.

The long list of successes and failures that followed The Hague Conference cannot be understood if it is not accepted that neither the proposals made in The Hague nor the intentions that were expressed, were ever implemented globally. With two World Wars and the Cold War affecting most people for the best part of fifty years, it was inevitable that the spirit of The Hague was hijacked by both those who experienced an extreme urgency to make war and those who wanted to limit its consequences, particularly as these thrusts related to themselves. Thus, the failure of countries and peoples to be guided by the true spirit that was present at The Hague in 1899 produced a curious situation where wars and weapons were intentionally developed, only to make an immense effort to control and contain their effects.

If properly applied, the intentions of The Hague Conference would have prevented the development and use of gas, bacteriological and chemical weapons. Yet, it did not. It was the appalling consequence of this deviation from the spirit of The Hague that forced the international community to formulate the 1925 Geneva Protocol that now figures in the long line of milestones under the umbrella of The Hague Conference. Despite this lesson, the spirit of The Hague did not stop the development or the use of weapons of mass destruction during the closing days of World War II. Again, the international community was forced to rein in the power it had unleashed with a long list of treaties and agreements on the control of weapons of mass destruction, all of which are now seen as milestones tied to the Appeal.

The fear that new technological innovations — designed, developed and possibly put to use in future to the detriment of mankind — are still quoted as being part of this process. Yet, with the record of the past, there can be no guarantees that countries will be guided to resolve their differences with vision, before the effects of their own mistakes force them to revert to the guidelines of The Hague process after — and not before — the fact.

Based on these premises, it is possible to infer that The Hague Appeal of 1899 did not fail. It was the interpretation of and the compartments into which its guiding principles were manipulated by national interests that failed. In fact, in a very important way, it could be said that the spirit of The Hague was never a failure, but indeed became a victim of the perversity of 20th century political agendas.

There was, of course, a second victim as a result of the deviation in the implementation of The Hague’s principles. This victim was humanity as a whole. What would individual and social security have been like in the 20th century if the defence of the individual and everything he or she represents, had been the focal point of concern of nations and peoples when interacting with one another?

For example, the concerns of the implementers of The Hague agenda during the past century did not include Africa or its peoples. Africa’s needs have always included freedom, personal security, dignity, development and peace. None of these were served by the manipulation of The Hague Appeal, particularly with regard to the peaceful settlement of disputes and the reduction and limitation of violence.

While other regions in the world were focused on their own vicious cycle of nuclear deterrence and power politics, the needs of African peoples, as well as those of most people in the rest of the developing world, were neither recognised as part of a security agenda, nor accepted as relevant to the spirit of The Hague Appeal. Today, one hundred years later, there is an opportunity to correct this mistake.

The issues that are central to human and state security and of concern at the threshold of the 21st century, are not the hard and cold concepts that prevailed during the Cold War era. The ultimate objective of attaining peace and influence through nuclear deterrence and power politics alone was shaken by the demise of the bipolar hegemonies that had cast shadows on all regions of the globe. Paradoxically, we are now deeply concerned — like our predecessors in 1899 — with the micro-tragedy of human conflict and violence. All the power in the world cannot stop the massive exodus of peoples, contain genocide, or avoid ethnic and religious cleansing, nor can it put an end to the operations of international criminal organisations bent on disrupting both the foundations of the nation-state, and the peace and well-being of individuals.

We start the new millennium in a fitting way: with a people-centred approach to security. We have been forced to this position by the excessive rationalisation of power and security that has prevailed throughout this century. As a result, the voice of The Hague sounds clearer today than it did perhaps fifty years ago. And perhaps, this voice is heard more clearly on the African continent than anywhere else.

It may seem as if the events and developments arising from The Hague, after the hijacking of its implementation, were characterised by an abandonment of the root concept of the defence of human dignity and individual security. But this was again due to the way in which some nations and international power structures preferred to interpret their obligations rather as arms control than as disarmament. The focus fell on nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, without including the control and reduction of conventional, light weapons and small arms.

The reality is that, as long as the world is unable to see the connection between people and violence in all its forms, the spirit of The Hague cannot soar. A careful return to its essence is still possible for all peoples, and in Africa, the time could not be better to push for its ideals to become reality. The Hague spirit must be reborn but not changed. It must be interpreted correctly by those who need its guidance.

Thus, under the rubric of arms control and disarmament — in the spirit of The Hague for the new millennium — the control of weapons of mass destruction must take an equal place with that of arms of a different kind. Africa has been a particular testing ground where small arms and light weapons proved to be as deadly as weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, if Africa is ever to be heard in the arms control and disarmament debate, it has to bring the ‘micro-disarmament’ agenda to the table and ensure that appropriate and assertive international actions are taken. This is the general aim of this publication. Here, two important aspects are explored that relate to the causes and effects of continued small arms proliferation in Southern Africa and ways in which the international community, regional organisations and concerned African nations can act to reduce this scourge.

Africa does not need to wait for a common global reinterpretation of the spirit of The Hague. It can move in this direction right away if it so chooses. On the issues of small arms and the culture of violence which is sweeping through the continent, we can and should call on this spirit to start making a difference now. This is imperative as wars and violence in Africa utilise certain tools and rationales which have to be addressed as a matter of urgency. Any delay in this regard will mean that Africa will not only continue to suffer the physical effects of small arms, but will also fail to realise the constructive aspect of the spirit of The Hague that demands a focus on human development and human security in all its forms.

Finally, the spirit of The Hague must urge us all to consider the concept of violence with great care, and must seek to dislodge it with a culture of peace. At this stage, it is important for us to agree that, unless one’s individual conscience accepts non-violence as the highest of all principles, the case for disarmament, peace and development in Africa will never be truly accomplished.

In this context, if Southern Africa succeeds in finding indigenous solutions to improve control over small arms proliferation and reduce the culture of violence that the present surfeit of weapons propitiates among its peoples, the region will be able to demonstrate to the world that it is prepared to be guided by the principles and concerns manifest in The Hague Appeal of 1899, as well as by the spirit that still moves it one hundred years later.

Arms Management Programme
Institute for Security Studies
South Africa