Small Arms in Southern Africa: Reflections on the Extent of the Problem and its Management Potential

---

Published in Monograph No 42: Small Arms in Southern Africa, November 1999

There is a close relationship between peace and security in Africa, both internally and internationally, and the economic, social and political development of countries in the region. The proliferation of light weapons and illicit arms trafficking in Africa pose a major threat to development. Although they do not, in themselves, cause the conflicts and criminal activities in which they are used, the wide availability, accumulation and proliferation of light weapons may escalate conflicts; undermine peace agreements; intensify violence and impact on crime; impede economic and social development; and hinder the development of social stability, democracy and good governance.

Effective intervention to control arms flows and availability requires determined, comprehensive and co-ordinated action not only at the local and national levels but also at the level of African subregions and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Moreover, the effectiveness of subregional actions to curb arms proliferation and trafficking in Africa can only be reinforced through co-operation with the OAU and other international organisations, and through the establishment of information exchange mechanisms between each subregional organisation and its counterparts.

Increased awareness of the problems of weapons proliferation and arms trafficking in Africa and internationally is to be greatly welcomed. Here, it is important to recognise the numerous initiatives, resolutions and agreements to address the problem that have recently been taken in Southern Africa (the Operations Rachel on weapons collection between South Africa and Mozambique, and the programme of action to combat illicit arms trafficking are among the most recent), and the Sahara-Sahel (for example, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) moratorium on the import, export and manufacture of weapons). These are having an impact on the OAU, the UN and its agencies, and other members of the international community.

Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that current actions in Africa to tackle these problems remain inadequately developed and often ineffective. Awareness of the severity of the problem still needs to be increased in some quarters. The problem also clearly requires a co-ordinated regional approach. However, an African policy and an action programme that cover the needs of the continent have yet to be developed.

With regard to the nature and extent of the international problem of small arms and light weapons proliferation and their impact on Southern Africa, it is known from studies undertaken by UN agencies, some academics, as well as work undertaken by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the past ten years that large numbers of weapons — most of which resort under the light weapons and small arms category (including landmines) — were transferred both covertly and overtly to Africa between 1970 and 1990. The numbers as such cannot be safely estimated, since covert operations are not often recorded and, at the time, overt transfers were not properly recorded, particularly if they were the result of conventional arms deals in which small arms were added as a bonus to a sale.

In Africa, this particular period of time was also characterised by new aggressive foreign policies instituted by both the United States and the Soviet Union in their bid to contain or expand their associations to different warring parties and insurgent groups on the continent and elsewhere (particularly Afghanistan, Central America, Central Africa and the Horn). From the Soviet Union’s point of view, the emphasis on providing Africans with the means for civil war and confrontation during the 1960s, became quite blatantly subjected to the Union’s need to expand its sphere of interest, as may be seen in the military developments in Angola since 1975. From the United States’ point of view (and that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation — NATO), the need to contain this identified Soviet expansion of its military sphere of interest in Central Africa and the Horn, gave rise to the development of the Doctrine of Low Intensity Conflict that allowed the US also to become active in fuelling non-governmental actors in their internecine wars.

At both ends of this spectrum, theissue of light weapons and small arms became a crucial tool for action. In the case of sub-Saharan Africa, the arming of Somalia (due to the strategic importance of the Horn), the arming of Angola (again due to the strategic importance of the country, both in terms of resources and geopolitics) and the support to South Africa’s military prowess can all be explained in strategic terms. The issue of the arming of different rebel groupings and liberation movements in Mozambique, South West Africa (now Namibia) and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) can be explained based on ideological and liberation theories. Geopolitical considerations can also be used to explain the sustained support to Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaïre by the French, as can the support to Rwanda and Burundi by Belgium at the time.

Regardless of these reasons, the choice of weapons in the various conflicts and by rebel groupings, and/or the retention of some repressive governments in power, was not based on the nature of conventional arms per se, but on the massive arming of opposing forces with light weapons and small arms. These weapons steadily poured into sub-Saharan Africa between the late 1960s and the late 1980s. Tracking the actual numbers over such a long period of time, is impossible. At the same time, many secondary actors became involved in the arms market in Africa (such as the People’s Republic of China, South Africa, Israel, East Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Cuba, Germany, Belgium, Portugal, and others). As long as the struggle in Africa retained its ideological value that mirrored the East-West divide, and as long as light weapons remained the decisive tools of war in protracted struggles, the proliferation of small arms could be said to be ‘under control’, since it served specific purposes. Nevertheless, with the success of certain liberation movements, the end of colonisation, and the abandonment of the East-West rivalry in the late 1980s and early 1990s, sub-Saharan Africa was internationally left without a frame of reference at a time when most governments or forces were either in transition or were spent.

The long shelf life of the tools of violence (small arms) in the African context and the abundance of ammunition dumped in the field over decades (plus the fact that some African countries saw the benefits in starting ammunition factories of their own to supply the never-ending numbers of small arms in the region) ensured the perpetuation of the utilisation of these weapons even when the original political objective for their use was long gone.

In Mozambique alone, estimates of weapons imported during the civil war range from 0,5 million to six million. During the UN peacekeeping operation (ONUMOZ 1993-1995), nearly 190 000 weapons were collected. However, most were not destroyed and soon were again on the streets of Maputo or in the process of being moved into neighbouring states. In four distinct recovery operations conducted jointly by South Africa and Mozambique over the last years, a total of 11 891 firearms; 106 pistols; 6 351 anti-personnel mines; 88 landmines; 1 260 handgrenades; 424 hand grenade detonators; 7 015 mortars; 263 launchers; 8 138 projectiles; 1 242 boosters; 33 cannons; 3 192 337 rounds of ammunition; and 5 912 magazines were seized and destroyed. Given the differences in numbers of weapons accounted for and those not, it is not difficult to assume that some of the unaccounted-for weapons have made their way to fuel — for example — the Angolan civil war.

In Angola, it is virtually impossible to estimate the number of weapons in circulation and use after two decades of war. Nevertheless, there are some figures that may be considered. For example, it was reported that 700 000 weapons were distributed to civilians by the government in 1992 following the renewal of fierce fighting, but during the demobilisation component of the most recent UN peacekeeping operation (UNAVEM III), only 34 425 weapons were collected of which many were old and unserviceable. This, combined with the small numbers of police and soldiers who have been demobilised, indicated that most weapons and soldiers were kept outside of the now broken peace process. Furthermore, besides the arms stockpiled during the 1970s and 1980s, Angola continued to receive weapons on a regular basis since 1992. Though sanctions to cut off UNITA’s supplies were introduced on 1 October 1997, Savimbi has been able to find alternative routes of supply. Without a doubt, the continued availability of small arms in the Angolan conflict has now led to a renewal of civil war in the country. This was the same principle that fuelled the eruption of war in 1992.

The implementation of transitional processes without accompanying disarmament operations in Angola or Mozambique, has also occurred in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa, although the latter has recently accepted a policy that encourages the destruction of surplus stock of light weapons and small arms rather than their sale.1 Thus, and despite some progress in the control and reduction of existing stocks in Southern Africa, the prevailing situation means that all countries in the region are threatened by the excessive accumulation of small arms and the increasing availability of illicit stock in circulation.

The 1990s aggravated the situation of the availability of small arms in sub-Saharan Africa. This was caused by three factors:

Prior to the development of IFOR in the former Yugoslavia, the thinking that permeated humanitarian interventions both by the US and other countries (under the aegis of the UN or not) was not conducive to serious and active disarmament (weapons collection and destruction operations) as part and parcel of peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations. As a result, operations seldom had a strong disarmament or arms management component, and if they did, it was seldom enforced. Most international operations in Africa succeeded in terms of their political objectives, but without any effective weapons control, reduction and destruction initiatives. Some failed both politically and operationally (and most of these failures are directly related to the failure to contain and control the vast numbers of arms in the hands of warring parties, as is the case in Somalia and Angola). When operations failed, warring parties intensified their arms procurement, linking it at times to the free distribution of weapons to civilian populations in contested geographical areas (for example, the failure of UNAVEM II led to the dumping of small arms among the population of Luanda without records being kept, as indicated earlier). Conversely, when operations succeeded, the post-electoral government (for example, in Mozambique) retained control of all weapons collected and/or in situ in the country. With no disarmament and destruction programmes under way, most of these weapons were stocked in government arsenals or in caches underground and control over them was lost as a result of corruption or negligence, leading to the disappearance of some of these weapons. At the same time, the economic problems of emerging democracies often led to weapons being utilised as ‘currency’ in payment for past services. Many demobilised soldiers (in Mozambique, for example) were ‘paid’ for their support in the past and could start their lives anew with small arms which they were at liberty to sell or trade (this also happened in El Salvador and Nicaragua).

With these issues in mind, it is easy to see why many international operations to contain violence in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s have paradoxically led to an increase in weapons availability and in freedom of action and movement for those who own weapons. Vast stocks of existing small arms started an ominous pattern of recirculation in sub-Saharan Africa, finding markets in conflict areas and feeding emerging crime patterns mostly in urban environments.

The second factor that aggravated small arms proliferation problems in sub-Saharan Africa was a new-found international incentive to rid developed countries of unwanted, unused stocks of small arms, light weapons and conventional armament. NATO countries and Warsaw Pact countries commenced with demobilisation that only included a conversion package associated with research, development and the production of dual-use technologies and/or weapons of mass destruction. Although negligible activities were undertaken in the area of conventional weapons systems conversion, the serious conversion of light weapons manufacture did not occur. With an economic crash at the end of the 1980s that continued into the early 1990s, many countries felt that the arms industry needed to be sustained for internal employment and economic imperatives. With the demise of Cold War confrontation, the sales patterns to the third world of many countries were not monitored and a fresh wave of weapons hit Africa, albeit not instigated this time by political or military considerations, but by market economy competition.

Both West and East indulged in this practice but, over the years, the production by the unregulated industry of countries such as the Ukraine and Bulgaria has had the most impact. New stocks continued to arrive in Africa to supply both governments and rebels, as well as a growing international organised crime network that depends on weapons for its operations (either because it secures its operations through the use of weapons, or because its trades in weapons on black markets). Many regulated and legal arms industries world-wide (including that of the US) added to the volume of transfers, because their operations could no longer be controlled by Cold War frames of reference. It must be pointed out that it was not only countries in developed regions that indulged in these activities. Middle powers in the South also saw the door opening for them to trade low technology military equipment (mostly light weapons, ammunition and mines) as part of their own economic recovery programmes.

The third factor that has increased arms proliferation during the 1990s in sub-Saharan Africa is directly related to the potential for control over existing and expanding stocks by African states. The bleak world economy in the early 1990s did not allow for major assistance packages to emerging African democracies at the end of the Cold War. Droughts and constant warfare in some regions also generated grave humanitarian crises that were manipulated by warlords for their own gain (such as in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia). Finally, many countries developed serious development problems in post-conflict environments which impacted negatively on demobilisation processes. Without an effective (and resourced) demobilisation package, war-torn societies that had lived off war for more than two decades, were left with no infrastructure, no resources, and a population that had adapted itself to live for and of conflict. Millions of Africans in the prime of their lives had only one skill: they knew how to wage war, and only one asset: the gun they possessed. Millions more had been involved in the business of surviving war since they were toddlers and thus have no memory of peace, law and order or any skill save that of surviving a war. The fact that most African conflicts have been fought with under-age populations also attests to the emergence of an adult population at decision-making levels, as well as a work force composed of people who have been child soldiers and have not been prepared for anything else in life. Lack of disarmament programmes, post-conflict reconstruction resources, and demobilisation resources, and increased humanitarian pressures related to basic needs have perpetuated the belief that a firearm is not a weapon, but an asset to be used for sustenance, for crime, for defence, for corruption and for abuse.

This factor needs to be unpacked even further as it really points to some basic recommendations that African nations need to consider when attempting to resolve the problem of the availability of light weapons and small arms in the region. The problems associated with control and reduction occur at many levels, some of which are detailed as follows:

ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM

Thus, in answering the question about the nature and extent of small arms proliferation in sub-Saharan Africa, it is safe to say that the problem cannot be quantified, but can be judged by its effects on regional stability and individual security. It is obvious that the numbers of arms and ammunition circulating in the region are vast. It is also evident that these are available at almost any level of the societies concerned. And it is finally evident that these stocks are uncontrolled.

By inference, then, it could be suggested that areas where more research and action are needed, must focus on all aspects of the problem simultaneously and immediately. Some of the recommendations that the Arms Management Programme has proposed, are as follows:

Although these recommendations might fit the context of sub-Saharan Africa, there are some recommendations that might apply to traders in arms abroad, particularly as they trade with Africa. These are as follows:

Therefore, the problem of the proliferation of small arms in Southern Africa is both a subregional and an international one. Its solution is as dependent upon global patterns, trends and initiatives to control this scourge as it is on the willingness of Southern African governments to do everything in their power to address the issue from a regional viewpoint.

In Southern Africa, the national capacity to control and reduce these weapons depends on many variable needs:

Because small arms proliferation in Africa is both a product of the past and of the current demand for arms for specific political, security or criminal purposes, the possibilities for control and reduction must necessarily be multifaceted, addressing not only the reduction in local demand, but also the reduction of existing stocks — both legal and illegal — in the region. Both tasks are monumental and cannot be accomplished by any one country or organisation acting alone.

The recognition of the limitations of international and regional institutions to pursue effective arms control inevitably leads to the issue of co-ordination. Hence, it is necessary to emphasise the identification of potential actors in international and regional initiatives, the structures within which they operate, and the potential for joint and/or co-ordinated action. This refers not only to global initiatives and organisations such as the UN, but also to regional initiatives which could influence the development of crossregional co-operation and consultation mechanisms (as in the Organisation of American States (OAS) and the European Union (EU) initiatives to combat illicit small arms trafficking). In the Appendix, a summary of relevant international and regional initiatives and their current status is provided.

An integrated and comprehensive response is needed to meet the complex challenges of weapons proliferation and illicit trafficking. Yet, existing responses remain fragmented and inadequately resourced. A set of co-ordinated subregional programmes does not exist to tackle illicit arms trafficking. Programmes to develop effective control of legal arms possession and transfers, among civilians and state security forces, remain inadequate. So, too, are programmes to disarm former combatants, recover unlicenced arms from civilians, and destroy or safely dispose of ‘surplus’ stocks of arms or confiscated illicit weapons. Transparency, information exchange and consultation among countries on these issues remain weak.

Internationally, the recognition of the extent of this problem has grown. However, there is still a need for solutions that can be tried — and whether they succeed or fail — evaluated and revised to be used elsewhere. Immediate steps must be taken in conjunction with medium and long-term initiatives by local communities, governments and those outside the immediate area, including the UN and its agencies.

It will only be through sustained, co-ordinated action that the scourge of light weapons can be controlled and perhaps, eventually, removed. In understanding and recognising this need, the Southern African community of nations has increasingly become an important actor in the fight against small arms proliferation. Here, and despite its infancy and structural problems, it is possible to remark that the Southern African community of countries has the potential to control illicit small arms trafficking and to reduce existing stockpiles of weapons. This potential is manifest in:

With the growing willingness to co-operate on these issues, and with some structures for consultation already in place, the Southern African community has an advantage over other subregions in Africa in terms of the control of illicit small arms trafficking.

The big question is how to go about to make the existing structures operational and effective, not only in the short term but also in the long term. On the negative side, there is as yet no agreement in the region on the perception of each member state’s responsibility with regard to illicit small arms-trafficking controls, i.e. there is as yet no regional thinking on this issue. This will eventually come. The process, nevertheless, can be accelerated if ongoing international and extraregional initiatives such as those of the UN, OAS, EU and, eventually, the OAU, undertake to share their experiences and responsibilities — co-ordinating their efforts to fit broad objectives as guideline generators, implementers or assistants to other ongoing processes.

Moves in the right direction have emerged during 1998, leading not only to an increased willingness by the OAU to take on a leadership role on the continent, but also to an increased regional interest in reinforcing and strengthening SADC and its SARPCCO component as mechanisms for action on the control and reduction of illicit small arms-trafficking. Some of the more hopeful initiatives of 1999 consolidate this trend by seeking to make SARPCCO and SADC efforts in this arena compatible with each other. The decision of the OAU to hold a continental conference on small arms during 2000 with the aim of producing an African policy on small arms proliferation; and the decision of SARPCCO and SADC to prioritise the urgency for small arms control both over licit and illicit materiel are moving the region closer to the actual implementation phase rather than the discussion of policy.

By the same token, countries such as South Africa have reinforced their own initiatives in this direction, leading the way with initiatives to destroy rather than sell surplus weapons in their national armouries and encouraging the discussions within SADC and SARPCCO to generate a regional convention similar to the one signed by the OAS on the control of illicit weapons.

If this co-operative and co-ordinated approach to small arms is adopted by those concerned, everyone will have the opportunity to benefit from others’ experiences. Each region will have something to teach the other, and controls will become a reality which might stand a chance to reduce this global scourge in future.

This is a version of a paper prepared during 1999 by the author for the Demilitarisation and Peacebuilding in Southern Africa Project managed by the Centre for Conflict Resolution in Cape Town and the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) in Germany.