Bilateral Treaties, Agreements and Related Issues

More recently, a number of bilateral defence and co-operation treaties have come into existence within the Southern African subregion. One of the more well-known is the Defence Protocol between the Republic of Angola, the DR Congo, the Republic of Namibia and the Republic of Zimbabwe that was signed in Luanda on 8 April 1999 by the ministers of Defence of the respective countries. Article 4 of the protocol states:

"That an armed attack against one of them shall be considered an attack against the other and that in the event of such an attack, each of them will assist the Party so attacked by taking forthwith individually or in collaboration with other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to repel such attack and restore peace and security in the territory of the Party so attacked. Any such armed attack and measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council of the United Nations."

Article 7 determines that no action in terms of the protocol may be undertaken within the territory of a signatory save at the request of that country "

... except where the extent, violence or rapidity of the aggression has disrupted the free and effective functioning of its institutions and rendered the exercise of its sovereignty impracticable."

Article 9 demands co-operation in all defence matters, particularly regarding training, the exchange of military intelligence and military industrial co-operation. Article 11 establishes "... a Joint Committee to be called the ‘Angola-DRC-Namibia-Zimbabwe Co-operation Committee’ whose function shall be to ensure the smooth implementation of this Protocol."

This protocol resulted from the military threat to Kabila’s government by, among others, rebels backed by Rwanda and Uganda and his subsequent appeal for military support from his regional allies. President Mugabe responded rapidly to the request and hosted a summit of regional leaders on 18 August 1998 at the Victoria Falls in Zimbabwe. Although Mugabe claimed that SADC had unanimously agreed to Kabila’s request for assistance, the region was sharply divided on the issue. On 19 August, the Defence ministers of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe announced that their three countries would rush to Kabila’s assistance and the first troops were dispatched within a matter of days.

The above protocol therefore served to legalise an existing situation - much the same as South Africa did some months later in the case of Lesotho. Escalating unrest and violence followed the May 1998 parliamentary elections in Lesotho and eventually prompted military intervention by South Africa and Botswana in September 1998. Although claiming to be a ‘SADC force’, similar to the claim made by Zimbabwe in the case of the DRC, only limited telephonic consultations had preceded the decision to intervene.133 The two subsequent agreements between South Africa and Lesotho therefore served to legalise and regulate an existing situation. The first is the Status of Forces agreement between South Africa and Lesotho that governs the South African armed forces that provide military assistance in Lesotho

"... for the provision of military assistance ... for the purpose of restoring stability in the Kingdom, including, inter alia: The disarming and containing of all armed groups that threaten the de facto Government and the security and stability of the Kingdom of Lesotho; The taking of control of military and other strategic installations; and The protection of the territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Lesotho."134

Apparently, no similar agreement has been concluded between Lesotho and Botswana to provide for the troops deployed in Lesotho by South Africa’s military ally in Operation Boleas. A subsequent agreement covers the status of members of the South African National Defence Force in Lesotho providing assistance in the establishment of a sustainable training capacity for the Lesotho Defence Force.135

The 1994 general elections in both South Africa and Mozambique presented turning points in the long process of political, social and economic changes. As far as arms, violence, crime and social stability are concerned, the change was characterised by a transformation from predominantly political violence to criminal violence. Violent crime rates threatened to undermine social stability, democracy and human development in both countries.

Although the countries had individually devised unilateral strategies to curb arms proliferation, the porousness of their borders, the existence of supply networks and routes, the interconnection between illicit arms and other cross-border crimes, namely vehicle theft and drug-trafficking, the unilateral successes in both countries became clearly insufficient. Co-operation became not a matter of choice, but an imperative. The presidents of the two countries, Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique and Nelson Mandela of South Africa, met in March 1995 to sign the Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Mozambique and the Government of the Republic of South Africa in Respect of Co-operation and Mutual Assistance in the Field of Crime Combating.

The agreement provided for access to detainees for interrogation purposes, and an exchange of information on arms smuggling. It also allowed the police forces of the two countries to undertake joint operations in response to common safety and security problems (Article 6).

Under the umbrella of this agreement, the SAPS and the Police of the Republic of Mozambique (PRM) designed Operation Rachel, a joint initiative to destroy arms caches. The formula was that South Africa would supply the bulk of the financial resources, landmine resistant vehicles and other specialised equipment, as well as highly trained senior police officials. Mozambique would gather the necessary information and, with its knowledge of the local conditions, facilitate contact with local communities.

Apart from these basic understandings, and perhaps aware of the political complexities around the arms caches, it was necessary to define an appropriate collection strategy for the prevailing situation in the country. It was decided that:

The first Operation Rachel was launched on 11 August 1995. As conceived, the operation had to tackle the security concerns of both South Africa and Mozambique simultaneously. Each of the task force teams had to be able to see the results in terms of solving the security problems of its own country. The only way that this could be immediately accomplished, was to concentrate on the areas immediately surrounding the countries’ shared border. This would allow both the South African and Mozambican authorities to attach every weapon that was retrieved meaningfully to criminal exploits in their respective countries. South Africa, for instance, could easily convey the message that arms were found and destroyed literally on the border, showing that if these were not destroyed, the potential existed that they could easily cross the border and could be used in criminal activities inside the country. By 1998, four such operations had taken place and statistics show that 11 891 firearms, 106 pistols, 6 351 anti-personnel mines and 3 192 337 rounds of ammunition were destroyed. These figures represent a success from a security point of view, and both South Africa and Mozambique have indicated that the Operations will continue. Despite the lack of evidence, the perception is that arms-smuggling into South Africa has been reduced as a consequence of the Rachel Operations.

What makes Operation Rachel exceptional is that it managed to devise a strategy that combined the different stakeholders in a common cause. It has been able to overcome both security and political hurdles.

The South African Department of Defence also has a number of agreements with other SADC countries, as well as with countries beyond SADC’s boundaries. Most of these agreements are in an advanced state of finalisation, including:137

Generally, these agreements provide for training, exchange of military intelligence, military sport and cultural contact, military medical co-operation and joint exercises. In the case of Angola, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, the draft agreements include the supply and manufacture of equipment.138

Numerous other bilateral agreements exist in the region, for example, the Zambia-Zimbabwe joint permanent commission on defence and security, and the Angola-Namibia permanent defence and security commission.

Some SADC member states are also members of other regional groupings. Tanzania, for example, together with Kenya and Uganda is a member of the East Africa Community (EAC), due to be formalised as a treaty during November 1999. The EAC structure is very similar to that which is being proposed for the structure of the Organ, and includes a defence and security committee. The defence committee meets at ministerial level and has a subsidiary defence chiefs’ forum and various expert working groups. The security committee includes substructures at ministerial and other levels from the departments of intelligence, police and immigration.139