Conclusion

Defence and security co-operation is not new in the SADC region. Following the start of decolonisation, the first such co-operation was between governments and liberation movements. Thus, Zambia was the rear-base and headquarters for the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and hosted the ANC until 1991. The South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) also had its headquarters in Zambia before moving to Angola and thereafter to Namibia. Tanzania was the headquarters of the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO), in addition to hosting offices of almost all the liberation movements in the region.141

The trend towards greater formalisation and therefore greater structure is an irresistible one in even the most informal of processes. It began when the FLS summit started to meet more regularly, and was to receive particular impetus from the ISDSC. Whatever form the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security eventually takes, the region has recognised that it has to move beyond the informal approach of the FLS towards one that is solidly rooted in international law. The creation of a permanent executive secretariat for the Organ and/or the ISDSC is an inevitable next step. With a clear legal base, structures and procedures, there will be less opportunity to abuse a regional mandate and a more coherent and predictable basis to seek international support.142

As a weak institution, SADC often responds rather than initiates action on security-related developments. This was the case with the EU initiative that led to a protocol on drugs in 1996 and partially lies behind the recent initiative to draft a protocol on small arms issues. Donor assistance, increased levels of conflict and international marginalisation are all driving the move towards the creation of a viable security framework within Southern Africa. Considerable progress has been made in this endeavour, although the impasse on the issue of dual SADC/Organ summits can only be resolved at the level of heads of state during 2000.

The choice would appear to be a simple one: draft an entirely separate treaty to the SADC Treaty, or accept that the Organ is a subsidiary of the SADC Summit.

In the latter case, it appears to be technically possible to use the SADC Treaty to legalise the Organ and the ISDSC through the adoption of an amended version of the draft Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security with minimal amendments. It is well-known, for example, that South Africa would like to use the opportunity created by the linkage of the debate about the future of the Organ and the restructuring of SADC that occurred at the recent Maputo Summit meeting to push for a revamped SADC Treaty. A number of factors make such an option now more feasible than at any time in the future. The most obvious is the opportunity created by the imminent appointment of a new Executive Secretary for SADC and the reduction in the animosity between Zimbabwe and South Africa in recent months on the future of the Organ.

The alternative is to convert the draft Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security into a separate treaty, independent of the SADC Treaty. Here the evolution of regional co-operation structures in Southern Africa, in one way of thinking, has shown a circular trend. Some years ago, the FLS alliance existed alongside SADC, the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). Following efforts to establish a single integrated regional co-operation structure, the latest developments may indicate a trend towards the development of a separate structure for political and security issues in the region. There are many advantages to such an approach. Most important of all, it would not require that the SADC Treaty to be amended at this stage.

Whatever direction the heads of state would eventually decide upon, SARPCCO should not become too closely integrated into either SADC or the Organ. Apart from the fact that the organisation is independently established in terms of international law, too close a linkage would threaten the advantage of the dual use of the subregional Interpol bureau as SARPCCO secretariat and the cost benefit that this implies. But, more importantly, cross-border crime prevention should not suffer tight political control or interference.