SADC Sectors and Protocols

The SADC Plant Genetic Resource Centre is based in Lusaka. The Southern African Centre for Co-operation in Agricultural and Natural Resources and Training is based in Gaborone. The Southern African Transport and Communications Commission is located in Maputo.

Sectors are also further divided into a number of subsectors that may be co-ordinated by other countries.

Following a conference sponsored by the European Union (EU) on constitutionalism in Gaborone in 1999 and a subsequent regional conference on local government in Johannesburg in July 1999, participants agreed to establish a regional ministerial committee on local government. The idea is to eventually establish a SADC Sector on Local Government.29

At present, no sectoral responsibilities have been formalised for security-related matters or governance issues despite the fact that these have frequently been under discussion in recent years.

Co-operation in each area is spelled out in protocols that, after approval by the Summit, become integral parts of the SADC Treaty. These protocols are legally binding after being ratified by more than two-thirds of the member states. Generally, the protocols spell out the objectives, scope and institutional mechanisms for co-operation and integration. In pursuit of the above, SADC has signed the following protocols — not all of which have entered into force (dates of signature in brackets):

Shared Watercourse Systems (28 August 1995)



Immunities and Privileges (14 September 1995)



Combating Illicit Drug Trafficking (24 August 1996)



Energy (24 August 1996)



Trade (24 August 1996)30



Transport, Communications and Meteorology (24 August 1996)



Education and Training (8 September 1997)



Mining (8 September 1997)



Development and Tourism (14 September 1998)



Wildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement (18 August 1999)



Health (18 August 1999)

The SADC Treaty only provides for one Summit, Council and Standing Committee, and determines that the quorum for all meetings of all institutions will be two-thirds of its members. Decisions must be by consensus.31 Thus, a meeting or consultation, for example, by South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Mozambique with regard to a military intervention in Lesotho would not constitute a quorum, neither would a meeting between, for example, Namibia, Angola and Zimbabwe to support Laurent Kabila in the DRC.32

The absence of such a required quorum does not detract from the sovereign right of an internationally recognised government to defend itself and call upon its neighbours and friends to assist it when faced with external aggression (DRC) or a domestic threat to an elected government (Lesotho). It does imply, however, that the efforts by Zimbabwe and its allies and South Africa and its cohorts to provide such military assistance as representing a SADC mandate do not stand up to scrutiny.

Not all protocols refer to designated sectors and/or are assigned to a particular country. This is, for example, the case with the Protocol on Combating Illicit Drug Trafficking for which no sectoral responsibility has been allocated. The drugs protocol is also, at first glance, an apparent anomaly — given the stated reluctance of the Secretariat to retain its focus on economic development and integration issues and to avoid being distracted from this task. The initiative that led to the development of this protocol came from the so-called Berlin initiative of 1994 that created the general impetus for EU-SADC co-operation.

Typical of a number of initiatives such as that regarding landmines, the EU funded and drove the process that led to the drafting and adoption of this protocol in 1996.33 The EU consequently also funds a technical advisor in Gaborone responsible for the implementation of the protocol. It is important to recognise that, at the time, SADC was the only legal vehicle for such an agreement. In terms of Article 2, the main objectives of the drugs protocol are:

"to reduce and eventually eliminate drug trafficking, money laundering, corruption [resulting from illicit drug trafficking] and the illicit use and abuse of drugs through co-operation among enforcement agencies and demand reduction through co-ordinated programmes in the Region; to eliminate the production of illicit drugs; and to protect the region from being used as a conduit for drugs destined for international markets."34

Collectively, the protocol exceeds the scope of SARPCCO competencies as discussed elsewhere.35 The protocol further calls on member states to accede to various UN conventions (Article 5), harmonise their domestic legislation, afford mutual legal assistance, establish a regional drug database, and more (Article 6). Article 9 of the protocol calls for the establishment of a committee to oversee the implementation of the protocol, responsible for drug-related information, training and evaluation.

The initiative to draft the protocol followed the Berlin EU-SADC ministerial meeting of September 1994 during which the combating of illicit drug trafficking was identified as one of a number of priorities. This predated the finalisation of the establishment of SARPCCO and the multilateral agreement on crime combating.36 Despite various letters from the head of Interpol, as well as the regional bureau chief of Interpol in Harare requesting SARPCCO involvement, SADC proceeded to draft the Protocol on Combating Illicit Drug Trafficking.37 The result is a clumsy, but not unworkable system within which the issue of drugs has been elevated to protocol status despite the fact that it cannot be separated from general cross-border crime, including the smuggling of vehicles and illegal migrants, for example. Following several years of effort, it would appear as if donor funding has now been released for project implementation, although national progress in combating drugs is clearly uneven.38

There is therefore a trend where the reluctance of the SADC Secretariat in Gaborone to involve itself in security issues has been overcome by donor pressure in areas such as drugs and possibly soon, small arms. Practically, this antipathy translated into a bureaucratic reluctance to push for any movement on the finalisation of a protocol on politics, defence and security (see below).