No peacekeeping operation has ever been perfect and none is likely to be so. None has ever achieved all its aims, but some have achieved at least some of their aims. At a time when peacekeeping, in general, and the United Nations (UN), in particular, are suffering from the backlash of exaggerated expectations and some significantly less than perfect operations, the question of the limits and boundaries of peace support operations becomes ever more pressing.

Stedman has observed that a "common thread throughout [the UN’s] efforts has been the lack of a rule on which cases to tackle, and a coherent strategy for intervention in civil war."1 Deducing guidelines on how to circumscribe peace support operations is therefore extremely difficult, and the argumentation tends to become circular. This article represents an attempt to structure some of the suggestions put forward in this area. If this does not succeed in bringing some order to the discussion, it might at least live up to Harry Truman’s norm that, "if you can’t convince them, confuse them."

Some of the ground that is covered, is likely to be familiar, as it is necessary to begin with a brief overview of the fundamental principles and challenges of peace support operations. This is presented in the light of indications of the potential limits or boundaries of peace support operations. This basis is used to suggest a series of principles that might guide assessments of when and — perhaps more importantly — when not to intervene. All principles have their rationales, as well as shortfalls, both of which are discussed before some final conclusions are drawn on this challenging topic.

Before reviewing some of the limits and challenges of peace support operations, it is important to call to mind the traditional, fundamental principles of peacekeeping and to note how they have evolved in recent operations. Peace support operations have undergone fundamental changes in the post-Cold War period. They have increased in depth and in breadth, and are charged with a greater number of and more complex tasks, and involve more and a greater variety of actors. This is due to the unlocking of the UN Security Council as a decision-making forum, which gave rise to high expectations of the role that the organisation would be able to play in future conflict management. Similarly, the notion of peacekeeping was extended from a purely humanitarian task to attempts at finding political solutions to the conflicts in question.2

At first glance, it appears that the development has come full circle, as little faith is once again being displayed in the UN as a tool for conflict management, following some less than successful operations. However, it is argued, firstly, that the UN still has a major role to play and, secondly, that the evolution of the concept of peacekeeping continues. This is confirmed by the fact that other organisations have taken over in cases where the UN has been unable or unwilling to act. Thus, the traditional guidelines for peacekeeping are applied in a very different context than the one envisioned in the heyday of peacekeeping and in the literature of the early 1990s.

Moreover, rather than distinguishing between different kinds of peace support operations by categorising them as conflict prevention, peacekeeping, post-conflict peacebuilding, peacemaking, or peace enforcement,3 factors should be identified that characterise different operations and have different implications for the assessment of whether or not they should be attempted. Although they provide useful understanding of various aspects of peacekeeping operations, Boutros-Ghali’s categories are often falsely regarded as part of a continuum. Instead, most peace support operations simultaneously display features of several categories and change over time. Three major criteria for assessing the nature of a peacekeeping operation are therefore suggested as being more fruitful for purposes of analysis:

These factors can all be linked to a model of the constellation of actors to be found in any given mission. In addition, the factors are interrelated.

The model of actors involved in missions consists of three major elements that are, in themselves made up of component parts:

It is the conflict itself that is to be managed by the international presence, but in the course of their conflict management efforts, international actors have to relate to local counterparts.4 Typically, the international presence is composed of a military peacekeeping or observer mission (‘military force’), and various combinations of civilian police, human rights and election monitors, and the relief and development community (‘civilian actors’). Actors range from representatives of international organisations, to government representatives or non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Similar to the international presence, the local counterparts are diverse groups, consisting of a political leadership, the population at large, and regular and irregular armed elements.

The first factor is the legitimacy of an operation, which, in turn, is a function of consent/sovereignty, impartiality, credibility and effectiveness. Legitimacy refers to the acceptance of the peace force by the international community and by the parties to the conflict, its mandate and the way it relates to the conflict. The degree of legitimacy also affects security and stability in the conflict area.5 Many equate peacekeeping with "an operation that enjoys the consent of the parties", whereas peace enforcement is one that does not. Just as Boutros-Ghali’s categories are flawed, so too is the notion that one either has consent or one does not.6 Not only does consent usually change over time, it also varies among the different levels of actors that are party to the conflict.

Moreover, referring to the multiplicity of actors who need to work together during the course of an operation, Diehl points out that "while co-operation from the disputants is a necessary condition for success, it is not a sufficient one."7 Still, it is highly unlikely that the international community will engage in a peacekeeping operation that lacks the consent of all the parties from the outset. A minimum of consent can thus be assumed in all operations, from at least one of the major parties and its supporting population, and at least at the time when the mission is initiated.

Consent and sovereignty are two sides of the same coin. Sovereignty is far from the fixed concept tied to non-intervention that it used to be. Similarly, different tasks undertaken by the peacekeepers as part of the peace support effort affect a party’s sovereignty and, concomitantly, its consent to varying degrees. Kofi Annan also distinguishes between state sovereignty and individual sovereignty. He supports the view that the former has become a more diverse concept in the face of globalisation and international co-operation, and underlines the relevance of the latter in the context of humanitarian intervention.8 Neither lack of consent, nor proclaimed violations of sovereignty necessarily need to preclude international involvement, but peacekeepers have to be aware of the degree to which they are compromising a state’s sovereignty, as this will have direct implications for their legitimacy.

Although impartiality is perhaps considered the most fundamental of the traditional concepts of peacekeeping, it is extremely difficult to maintain in practice. In recent years, the sometimes crippling notion of strict impartiality has been replaced by even-handedness that is tied to compliance with the force’s mandate. As Annan puts it, "[i]mpartiality does not — and must not — mean neutrality in the face of evil."9 The implementation of the Dayton Agreement is an example of the Implementation Force (IFOR) led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in Bosnia, and the later Stabilisation Force (SFOR) presupposing a minimum degree of consent, given in the signing of the agreement by all the parties. All enforcement action taken during the course of the peace process was then related to the Agreement to the greatest degree possible, in order to maintain the impartiality of the intervening force. Thus, pressure may indeed be placed unevenly, such as on the Bosnian Serbs, if one of the local parties is more recalcitrant than another.

Credibility and effectiveness are functions of the force’s ability and willingness to exercise its mandate. They form a mutually destructive or a mutually reinforcing cycle with legitimacy, in that an increase in the peacekeepers’ credibility will render them more effective and will strengthen their legitimacy. In contrast, should the peacekeepers prove to be ineffective, their credibility will be seriously undermined and their legitimacy damaged.

The second critical factor in peace operations is the level of force that is used. This factor affects legitimacy and all its constituent elements, such as the corresponding question of consent. Most peacekeeping operations have experienced a lack of consent or opposition at some level, regardless of the overall consent and compliance of a given government or other local actor. Gow and Dandeker speak of a "broadly consensual environment" in which enforcement actions might become practically necessary, both reflecting and reinforcing a "semi-consensual environment."11

Whether or not force is actually used, it should not be excluded as a potential arrow in the quiver of the peacekeeping force. The mere availability of the forceful option, coupled with a demonstrated willingness to use it, can be enough to render its application unnecessary. When threats are made that force will be used, it is critical that the participating countries are prepared to use it, as well as willing to do so. If they are not, their credibility will be questioned and the effectiveness of the operation will be impaired. At the same time, the extensive use of force is likely to affect a peacekeeper’s perceived impartiality in the eyes of the party against whom force is used the most.

Through the years, the concept of the use of force only in self-defence has been steadily extended. When first formulated by Hammarskjöld, it was a minimalist interpretation of the right of self-defence based on the simple fact that peacekeepers could not be denied this right. In the course of several missions, especially after the end of the Cold War, the concept has been extended to include the defence of UN equipment and the defence of the mission. This reflects the evolved notion of impartiality, where loyalty to the mission and its goals has precedence over all other parties and concerns. In the context of the above figure, coupling the level of force with the question of impartiality means distinguishing between force used against local elements, armed or unarmed, and force used in support of conflict management.

Although the use of force is perceived by some as an attractive tool, particularly following the supposed success in Kosovo, that very same case underscored the fact that force without a political counterpart — diplomacy — can only have a limited effect.12 Still, there are a number of challenges in linking force and diplomacy, not least of which is the discrepancy in pace and the public gratification that each option provides. Furthermore, the two may have such diverging approaches that they may almost be counterproductive along the way, despite the fact that they pursue the same overall goal.

The forceful option has also become more tempting with the growing superiority of Western military power. Whereas the balance of the Cold War prevented the use of force in all but the defence of cardinal issues,13 the tipping of the scale in favour of the West has unleashed a certain trigger-happiness. Yet, there remains a relatively high threshold for the use of military force and the option requires powerful motivations in order to be considered a legitimate tool — particularly by the domestic constituencies of the potential contributors. In contrast, when the use of force fails, it triggers a serious crisis of legitimacy for the contributing states.

Figure 1: Constellation of Actors in PSOs

Finally, the type of conflict in which the peace support force is to intervene is a pivotal factor in the context of deployment. Still, most conflicts evade classification into civil wars, internal, interstate or international conflicts, and Smith has suggested that the existing terminology is simply inadequate.14 In order to avoid the pitfalls of those classifications, Sabin prefers to describe the general features of future conflicts as follows:

All of Sabin’s characteristics point to the fact that peace support operations will be launched in increasingly difficult conditions. Therefore, it is absolutely essential for the interventionists to understand the dynamics of the conflict, in order to operate effectively and to be perceived as legitimate. The nature of future conflicts also suggests that a wide range of tools will have to be used in order for an operation to be successful. In practice, the force has to relate to the conflict before it relates to the parties, such as the evolved notions of impartiality and consent imply.

In addition to the type of conflict, the mission will face very different circumstances due to the stage in which the conflict is at the time of intervention. The most important distinction will be whether or not the conflict is ongoing. Quite often, this is difficult to determine, and formal markers are used, such as a declaration of war or a peace settlement, an international presence, the casualty rate, or the number of violent incidents. Thus, pre-conflict deployment is virtually impossible and highly unlikely without the explicit consent of a given local authority or authorities. Whereas peacekeeping in a post-settlement context is the most straightforward, intervention in an ongoing conflict is excessively difficult. Thus, different issues will be at the forefront, depending on whether the force is being deployed preventively, in an ongoing conflict or in an operation in the wake of a cease-fire or a peace agreement. Ironically, as Woodward points out, intervention is usually late, when a significant level of violence has become undeniable, but also when the situation has become far more complex and more difficult to manage for outside actors.17

Given the evolution of peace support principles and practice, there is obviously a whole series of limits and challenges to interventions in future conflict environments. Among the many challenges, three aspects have once again been selected that are critical to the success of a peacekeeping operation:

Political willingness of the parties

Closely related to the issue of consent is the question of the political willingness of parties to comply to a given mandate. It always has to be realised that the solution to a conflict is never practical or technical in nature, but is a matter of addressing underlying political issues. Therefore, despite the fact that a peacekeeping force will expect to face opposition from different sources and levels during a peace support operation, it should take political opposition to its presence seriously. In the same vein, there is a need for flexibility and an open ear for legitimate security concerns, even though these may at times be difficult to distinguish from hostile propaganda.

As the figure indicates, the international presence faces a diverse local counterpart. Particularly in the wake of an agreement of sorts, there is often a group of people who profit from a sustained level of tension, whether in terms of economic gain or power, and who disrupt the peace process. This group of ‘spoilers’18 frequently targets the relationship between the local population and the international presence. This clearly needs to be managed if peace is to be consolidated. It is important to realise that, regardless of the peacekeeping force’s specific actions and relationships with different components of the local counterpart, it is "bound to influence, in one way or another the military and political balance."19 The more the peacekeepers affect the local power constellations, the more consent will be inconstant and tactical.

Having said this, it is also true that "[p]eacebuilding agencies are not conquering powers: their influence is limited because they generally lack the capability to impose peace, and must therefore rely on the continuing co-operation, or at least acquiescence, of local parties."20 In fact, it has been argued that the lack of consent and local opposition to the presence of the peacekeeping force are among the most damaging factors for the success of an operation. Kofi Annan, stressing the importance of post-settlement support, maintains "... that peace is not true or lasting if bought at any cost; that only peace with justice can honor the victims of war and violence; that without democracy, tolerance and human rights for all, no peace is truly safe."21

The strength of the intervening coalition22 and the political willingness of the international community to engage in a peacekeeping operation are closely linked to the degree of co-operation demonstrated by the parties to the conflict. The more resistance the mission meets on the ground, the more will the strength of the coalition be tested. In part, this reflects an unwillingness to put the lives of a contributor’s personnel at risk, such as happened in Angola. The coalition is likely to be weaker, the higher the level of violence in theatre. Chayes elaborates on this, in the context of the Gulf War:

"As a practical matter, in the fall of 1990, it was no longer possible for the United States to use force in the Persian Gulf without the concurrence of those engaged with it. Because these coalition states joined in the UN effort, they too became exposed to the military, political, and economic consequences of any military action the United States took. Indeed, the first consequence of such action would have been to shatter the international consensus that gave legitimacy and strength to the enterprise."23

It is a well-known fact that the fragility of the coalition is one of the international community’s most vulnerable points. Thus, the unity of the coalition can be targeted directly by local armed elements that would profit from the withdrawal of the international presence.

Any coalition of states that initiates a peace support operation has to realise that a mission will not face the same conditions in the course of its operational life as it did at the time that the mandate was determined. Instead, the situation on the ground is dynamic: it varies over time, with different mission tasks and in different areas. In addition to a change in conditions, the mandate might also be adjusted, such as in Somalia where the mandate was expanded even before the first authorised contingents had managed to reach the theatre.24 There have been frequent calls, particularly from the military components of a mission, for a clear mandate. However, it is seldom recognised that "the importance of a clear mandate is probably overestimated as it is merely a surrogate for the political consensus underlying it."25

In this sense, a vague mandate might be an indication of a fragile political consensus that could not agree on a common vision for the operation. Similarly, it has been suggested that "[f]inancial support of a peacekeeping operation is, to some degree, a barometer of the political support for the operation."26

Peace support operations generally suffer from three types of major organisational constraints: decision-making, co-ordination, and funding. The pitfalls of decision-making and the large bureaucracy in the UN have been discussed extensively elsewhere, but it is worth touching on a few aspects in the context of this discussion.

Ironically, it may be argued that difficulties in decision-making are indicators of an organisation’s relevance and weight. The authorisation of peace support operations is not taken lightly by any of the members of the Security Council, as they are well aware of the significance of legitimisation by the UN. Another aspect is the simple fact that these constraints are far from unique to the UN. Any international organisation struggles to establish consensus among its members. It is the price that is paid for co-operative action among democratic states. When it comes to the size and unwieldiness of the UN system, the issue of collecting, processing and responding to information that has been gathered, is central. Improvements are sorely needed with regard to the analysis of past experiences, as well as the monitoring of current situations, in order to optimise the information available to peace missions.

Co-ordination between different agencies within the UN system has clearly improved, but given the number of agencies and the scope of their activity this will be a continuous challenge.27 In recent years, the spotlight has increasingly been directed towards the challenge of civil-military co-operation. Arguably, it is one of the areas in which most progress has been made. Although co-operation remains sketchy and uneven, there is clearly a better understanding between military and civilian actors in terms of their respective philosophies or doctrines, organisational structures and needs. In part, this has been reinforced by the fact that local counterparts also increasingly regard the military and civilian actors as two sides of the same story.

Thus, challenges that previously isolated the military component of the international presence are no longer distinctly military, and the security of civilian actors has become threatened to a greater extent. Naturally, this also has to do with the fact that most contemporary peace support operations take part in the context of ‘civil wars’ and civilian targets are more frequently chosen which, in turn, exacerbates the civilian aspects of the humanitarian emergency and calls for greater involvement of civilian relief agencies/providers. However, military and civilian actors do remain at odds about calls for a clear mandate: while civilians prize flexibility, the military prize clarity.28 The situation in the theatre has been additionally complicated by the presence of private security companies whose activities significantly impact the environment in which the peacekeepers operate, but that usually do not form a direct part of the international presence.29

Financial constraints are among the most crippling challenges faced by peace support operations.30 Lack of financing, more specifically, can have two effects. Firstly, it can place limitations on the activities of the force, forcing it to select certain tasks or concentrate on different regions rather than pursuing a comprehensive approach. This triggers a vicious circle, as the peace process becomes delayed, which means that it will need more funds than anticipated. Secondly, a shortage of money can lead to the complete abandonment of an operation when sources of funding run out.31

In practice, the lack of funding is far less dramatic for UN peacekeeping operations which have traditionally run on, regardless of budget deficits. In contrast, the work of some of the UN specialised agencies, such as United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) or the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), has been severely impaired when appeals have not been met by contributions. Similarly, regional and subregional organisations, such as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), have not been able to initiate effective peacekeeping operations due to a lack of funds. Obviously, the more comprehensive and the more forceful the peace support operation, the more cost-intensive it will be.

Among all the restraining and conditioning factors for peace support operations, cash flow remains a key issue. Given finite funds and resources and too many conflicts too manage, selection will have to take place. What are possible guiding principles for when and where to intervene?32

It is important to keep in mind that the guiding principles of peacekeeping discussed above are not mutually exclusive. In fact, there will be many cases in which several principles apply. In addition, the following principles focus on the question of where and when to engage in peace support operations, rather than how or with whom. The concluding remarks will include suggestions for the practical application of these principles, and what this implies for the how to intervene.

International law is a seductive determinant for a decision to intervene, due to its supposed neutrality and legitimacy. A legal approach strengthens the legitimacy of an operation in that it ensures that at least a minimum of consent is given at the outset.33 International law can have two functions. On the one hand, it can serve as a legal framework for peace support operations. On the other hand, it can be a substitute for peace support operations by trying to solve problems in the legal arena rather than through the deployment of military forces. The following focuses on the former role of international law.

There are two preconditions for action. Firstly, there must be a generally accepted system of law and norms, such as laid down in the UN Charter and similar documents.34 These determine not only when action is ‘allowed’ or called for, but also what type of action may be taken in the course of a mission. The most central issue here is of course the degree to which and under what circumstances force may be used. According to international law, only the UN Security Council has the right to authorise the use of force.35

Secondly, the norms are only useful when there is a system for putting them into practice. When being asked to decide on instruments to implement international norms in Kosovo or Rwanda, the system failed. A major problem in the UN system is the fact that judicial and executive power lie in the same hands, namely those of the Security Council. As a result, there is no division of power, and the act of deciding on action and legalising it, is one and the same.36

As international law always reflects the status quo, it may be unsuitable or inadequate for the novel situations that may have to be faced in upcoming peace support operations.37 In an attempt to remedy the static nature of international law, its jurisdiction has been expanded to include the ‘security of individuals’ as a trigger for intervention, in addition to threats to international peace and security.38 This reflects Annan’s distinction between state sovereignty and individual sovereignty, where the individual is given equal standing in international law by being a party to treaties and conventions. In practice, the extension creates another stumbling block for the application of the legal principle, as it implies a value dimension which undermines the neutrality of international law.

In theory, there is a great advantage to the use of international law, due to the continuity and neutrality it provides. However, the lack of legal consistency is a serious impediment to its unchallenged position as the guiding principle. Thus, it hinges on the political will and the consensus among member states whether action is authorised or not. The legal instrument is thereby deprived of its neutrality and credibility.39 Even the UN Secretary-General recognises the limitations of his organisation in this respect, and argues that there is a moral imperative to seek alternative options when the UN system is paralysed. This leads to the second potential guiding principle.

The notion that there is a responsibility to assist others in times of crisis, especially innocent civilians, is one of the founding principles of the UN. This is also reflected in early statements by Hammarskjöld, who exclaimed that the "[p]rohibition against intervention in internal conflicts cannot be considered to apply to senseless slaughter of civilians or fighting arising from tribal hostilities."40

In the post-Cold War era, the international community has managed to go full circle in a very short period of time. The initial enthusiasm illustrated by the concept of a New World Order was thwarted by the over-ambitious and less successful peacekeeping activities of the mid-1990s. Today, the concept of humanitarian intervention displays a renewed concern for and willingness to defend values and individual rights rather than territorial interests. As a result, speaking almost forty years after Hammarskjöld, Annan essentially represents the same point of view, when he states "the need for timely intervention by the international community when death and suffering are being inflicted on large numbers of people, and when the state nominally in charge is unable or unwilling to stop it."41 This development is also reflected in the fact that humanitarian issues are increasingly pushed as ‘high politics’ by countries such as Canada.42

Thus, a moral obligation is instinctively right. Still, there are a number of drawbacks when applying the moral duty as a guiding principle for when to engage in conflict management through peace support operations. For example, Woodward argues that humanitarianism seldom provides the answers to the causes of conflict, such as issues of political control or territory.43 This shortcoming is exacerbated by the fact that there is a tendency among international actors and organisations, which are frequently dominated by Western thinking, that if only democracy and liberal market economy have been established, peace will be a given. Roland Paris has warned that both concepts — democracy and market economies — bring with them substantial instability, and both thrive on conflict.44 Instead, a more flexible approach is essential that should take the specifics of each conflict into account and should not shy away from reasserting and strengthening the state so that it can effectively exercise its sovereignty, and provide security and stability for its citizens.45

Perhaps the most important factor that detracts from the moral duty as a guiding principle is the role of the media in channeling attention and international concern. As Stedman has noted with respect to the trigger for international involvement, "[b]y default the present criterion is whether there are pictures of the war and its suffering on television."46 Thus, rather than a noble instinct, a sense of moral duty is all too often a product of ‘manipulative’ news coverage, that is the degree to which the media focuses its attention on a given conflict and for which it is lobbying for action.47

To an increasing degree, public opinion is thus an important determinant of a state’s decision whether or not to act and what action to take, if any. If the media only triggered action, there would be reason to be thankful. Unfortunately, the feeling of moral responsibility called forth by media images is a fickle thing, which can wear out too quickly, leaving the conflict area in worse shape than it might have been, had the international community not intervened at all.

Ever since the publication in 1992 of Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace, calls for regional organisations to bear a greater share of the responsibility for regional security have been growing louder. In part, the demands spring from a fear among Western governments of getting caught in ‘mission creep’ on a global scale. The official argument for regional action points to the proximity of regional neighbours to a given conflict, which implies a more immediate interest in its solution, as well as to the fact that such states are an immediate subject of a conflict’s regional implications, such as refugee and arms flows.

Moreover, one might suppose that, in theory, a regional peacekeeping mission or a regional coalition of states would be based on a common perception of the problem and thus diverge less with regard to the goals that are to be achieved. However, practice, such as the military engagement in the Democratic Republic of Congo. indicates the enduring prevalence of national, as opposed to regional interests. The same is true of Europe’s efforts in the Balkans.

Despite the lack of impartiality that is sometimes attributed to neighbouring states, demonstrated for example in Liberia and East Timor, these will quite often be the only ones willing to take action and incur the costs of action. An argument in favour of regional intervention is that the success of a peace support operation hinges on it not being opposed by neighbouring countries. Although positive influence is not as easy to pinpoint, it is clear that, when the regional context is hostile to the process, peace efforts are doomed.48 Therefore, the direct involvement of regional countries in peacekeeping efforts, casting them in an active supportive role, might be desirable.

Strangely enough, the transatlantic community’s difficulties in handling the Balkans has not produced a greater understanding of the challenges faced by far poorer and far more unstable regions, such as Africa. Yet, it is only realistic to recognise that this is the pattern that has been established in recent years and that it is unlikely to change in the near future. Cases in point are the ongoing operation in East Timor, the UN withdrawal from Angola, and the merely nominal presence of Western contributions to UN operations outside Europe.

UN peacekeeping is experiencing a triple crisis: a crisis of mandate, a crisis of methods, and a crisis of means. Therefore, it has to realise its organisational limitations, and it has been suggested that the UN should "go back to basics."49 Stedman, for example, draws the line at engagement in ongoing conflicts and argues that military intervention in a civil war is far too ambitious a task and is to be avoided at all times. Instead, the UN should intervene "where there is the best chance to save the most lives."50 This is best done in two ways: by acting only with a sufficient degree of consent, such as in a cease-fire, or with peace agreement in place, or by improving the capacity to bring about a negotiated settlement. It is important to stress that, while this points in the direction of so-called traditional peacekeeping, Tharoor argues that revitalising the principle of consent, as the key to an operation, need not preclude ‘multidimensional’ peacekeeping. Both Stedman and Tharoor underline the critical importance of co-ordinating the actions and goals of the international community.51

The above argument appears very reasonable at first glance. But how can there be certainty that the operation is indeed as feasible as envisioned? When the argument for engaging in a peace support operation is the conviction that the job can be done, this implies that there is a clear idea of the tasks and a common understanding of the strategic goal of the mission. But, as Anderson emphasises, the one certainty in a military mission is the "inevitability of unpleasant surprises."52 When unforeseen obstacles arise and it becomes more difficult to achieve the predefined ‘endstate’, the strength of the coalition becomes a crucial factor and the will of the international community is put to the test. Too often, when the tasks are believed to be manageable, the international community falls into another trap by setting an ‘end date’ for the operation. Ironically, the surest way to undermine political will is to set unattainable goals, with the result that the peacekeepers gradually lose credibility.

The need for sustained international engagement is the single most important determinant for a successful peace process.53 Indeed, "[i]f the international community is unwilling to commit the assets to mounting an operation and seeing it through to a conclusion, it might be better not to attempt such intervention at all."54 Unfortunately, the kind of involvement that peace support requires — regardless of whether one believes that the mission is practicable - "probably means making longer, more expensive and more frustrating commitments than most publics are willing to tolerate."55 This is true with respect to both the human and the financial cost of an operation.

As a result, in ongoing operations that comprise a wide variety of components, such as military officers or observers, civilian police monitors, deminers, humanitarian agencies and other development staff, donor fatigue is a serious problem. Despite the general realisation that a long-term approach is imperative to the success of an operation, donor patience is often insufficient. Frequently, this is due to a lack of progress or the increasing awareness of the complexity of the situation to be handled. International efforts towards implementing the Lusaka Protocol in Angola are a case in point. Although the first two years elicited enthusiasm among donors, willingness to contribute funds to the international efforts waned as tensions gradually grew and the lack of co-operation by local counterparts became more apparent.

Following every concluded peace support operation, attempts are made to assess what can and what cannot be done in future, and to establish a limit for peace support operations. Every time a new crisis arises, the lines thus drawn, prove to have been drawn in the sand. A recent article by the UN Secretary-General in The Economist is a case in point. Annan writes that he believes "... it is essential that the international community reach consensus — not only on the principle that massive and systematic violations of human rights must be checked, wherever they take place, but also on ways of deciding what action is necessary, and when, and by whom."56

But the international community simply does not have the capacity to address all ‘massive and systematic violations of human rights’. As much as it may be desired, it is unlikely that the international community will move away from an ad hoc approach in determining the limits of its peacekeeping activities. As it unfolds, each crisis is assessed individually, in a unique context of national interests and public pressure. A peace support operation will be initiated only if there is a group of states that have a particular interest in managing the conflict and that are willing to pay the price. The tasks that are undertaken, will be consistent, not with the needs of a given situation, but with the level of commitment of the international actors.

Naturally, an operation that reflects the political concern of a chosen few, brings questions of neutrality to the fore. The discussion is similar to that on the special interests of regional organisations. Suffice it to say that vested interests are not necessarily a bad thing and "[n]eutrality in peacekeeping is determined more by behaviour and situation than by force composition."57 Still, multilateralism is always desirable as a way in which to mitigate partiality by any one actor. In this respect, the role of superpower participation is another aspect that merits further analysis.

However, as the type of force that is authorised and deployed and the mandate that is devised, is so contingent upon the particular situation, it is critical to reduce the unpredictability to a minimum.58 Therefore, planning, preparedness and intelligence are essential. Intelligence co-operation, in particular, has long been a taboo topic, but if peacekeeping is indeed to become more efficient and effective, it requires a thorough understanding of the conflict based on information-sharing and predeployment fact-finding. For example, it is astounding how unprepared the international community was for the refugee flow in Kosovo, and for the violence that ensued after the referendum in East Timor.

Another crucial aspect is the need for strategic thinking.59 Once a mission has been decided upon, even if in an ad hoc manner, its execution should follow explicit and predetermined objectives. This involves co-ordination among all the international actors, both at a strategic and a tactical level. Although milestones, timetables, and subordinate goals should be flexible enough to take account of developments in the course of a mission, the overall aims should not waver, and should be commonly understood and accepted by all contributors.

Furthermore, regardless of the level of force used or the type of conflict, any form of peacekeeping will only be successful if it addresses the underlying causes of conflicts or provides a stable framework in which they may be addressed by the parties involved. One of the main realisations of past efforts to bring about peace is that the political willingness of the parties is a key to success and that peace can never be forced on them. One clear limit for peace support operations is thus that the international community should never relieve the parties of their responsibility to bring about peace.

Finally, there is a clear responsibility to act. Naturally, most peacekeeping operations could be better organised, run more efficiently, be more co-ordinated and more focused, but that does not mean that peacekeepers should not do their best even under difficult circumstances to assist in bringing about or consolidating peace, or preventing the outbreak of hostilities. As Edmund Burke pointed out, "for evil to flourish, it is only necessary for good men to do nothing."