When the founding fathers of the Economic Community West African States (ECOWAS) reached the historic accord to establish the subregional body in 1973, the focus was on the integration of the region to accelerate economic progress.

Neither the founding fathers nor indeed subsequent West African leaders particularly considered the effect of conflicts and regional instability on the economic objectives which they set forth to accomplish for the subregion. The first arrangements made to guarantee subregional security merely consisted of a Protocol on Mutual Assistance in defence matters, signed in Sierra Leone on 29 May 1981.

However, it was obvious that conflicts and the likelihood of instability could not be wished away, since West Africa was characterised by economic backwardness, ethno-religious divergence and political rancour. The spontaneous formation of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in August 1990 was therefore a direct response to the realities of the earlier omission of security concerns from the organisation’s agenda. Within the relatively short period of its existence, ECOMOG has gone full circle from peacekeeping and peace enforcement in Liberia, to restorative intervention in Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau.

Except in the case of the Dominican Republic, where the Organization of American States (OAS) intervened in 1965 to save the country from anarchy, the use of substantial armed forces in support of peace operations was consigned mainly to the purview of the United Nations.1 Throughout the Cold War, relations between nations were marked by an overriding desire to protect national sovereignty. Indeed, the charters of the UN, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and ECOWAS, drafted during this period, all emphasise non-interference in the internal affairs of member nations and mutual inviolability of sovereignty among member states. This was an era of paradox, of unrelated brothers with a professed mutual desire for an embrace — but with both hands behind their backs. This paradox defined the general concept and principles of peacekeeping world-wide, until the end of the 1980s.

Kitson has defined the Cold War concept of peacekeeping as "preventing by non-warlike methods one group from fighting another group of people."2 It precludes a formal attack by an army on one or both parties to a dispute in order to halt it. Logically then, the orthodox principles of peace operations were distilled from such normative doctrine. These principles posit the following:

The end of the Cold War heralded some fundamental global policy shifts. As the Cold War thawed, so did the balance of power, and its ripples threatened stability in various regions. The UN’s incapacity to deal with the new threats to international peace and security, particularly in Africa, was palpable. Ironically, humanitarian concerns, desire for global economic progress and the survival of democracy took centre stage at the UN during this period. At the same time, the realities of conflicts that stood between stability and economic progress became pervasive. The unfolding era called for greater initiatives in the management of conflicts and regional stability. In crisis-ridden Africa, the surge of pragmatism gave rise to a renewed rigour for regional collective security. In West Africa, it was the Liberian crisis that provided the test case with regard to the following dichotomies:

ECOMOG operations, which were originally conceived on the orthodox principles of peacekeeping, brought into focus the usual dilemma of the peacekeeper — the tricky nexus between established principles, and their application in a situation where peace had assumed priority, but the principles themselves begged for reform. The priority of peace as the antithesis of regional communal welfare underscores the necessity for examining the dynamics at play in peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace restoration.

The aim of this contribution is therefore to review the ECOMOG operations in West Africa, from the perspective of both principles and praxis. Consideration is given mainly to the operational dimension, without dwelling too much on tactical and logistic issues. Considering that ECOMOG operations in West Africa have generally been very similar in concept and execution, this article is limited to the operations in Liberia, beginning with an overview of the causes of the crisis and the initial involvement of ECOMOG. This is followed by an overview of the principles guiding ECOMOG operations, including the mandate from ECOWAS, before the focus shifts to the operational challenges of peacekeeping and peace enforcement — including the ever-problematic aspect of disarmament. Finally, brief mention is made of ECOMOG’s role in elections and during the post-election phase.

A primary operational requirement for the contemporary peacekeeper is an understanding of the background to a crisis. Usually, this consists of historical factors in which may be embedded the socio-economic reasons for conflict. This understanding is important, in order to form the basis of conformity with the general principle of an informed neutral stand. Nevertheless, suspicions of peacekeepers and their motives are almost certain to arise, with or without foundation, as was the case with the UN (British) operations in Cyprus in 1963-64. In Liberia, operations were made difficult by the refusal of the National Patriotic Front for Liberia (NPFL) to accept ECOMOG and, in particular, Nigerian involvement in the attempts at conflict resolution.

The remote causes of the Liberian crisis are traceable to the political and economic domination by the Americo-Liberians, dating back to 1822, to the total exclusion of the indigenous majority of the population. Socially, the domination of the indigenous inhabitants by the few settlers created a master-servant relationship which continues to reverberate through the political life of Liberia until today. From independence in 1848 to date, Liberia has been ruled by 21 presidents. From Joseph Jenkins Roberts (1848-1856) to William Tolbert (1971-1980) up to President Charles Taylor (August 1997 to date), and the rest in between, only one president has come from the indigenous communities that constitute over 90 per cent of the population. Master Sergeant Samuel Doe came to power in April 1980 through the barrel of the gun. It was a popular coup that was staged largely by his tribespeople and was widely accepted as the emergence of the oppressed local majority.

Over the years, however, President Doe was also regrettably found to be dictatorial, ruthless and repressive in dealing with political opposition. The arrest and kidnapping of politicians became rampant. People were arbitrarily arrested, tortured and detained for varying periods by Doe and his henchmen. In addition to these methods, Doe resorted to arson as a political weapon to eliminate any opposition. With a record marked by bloodletting and injustice, the stage was set for the return of the Americo-Liberians to power. In December 1989, Charles Taylor, an Americo-Liberian, led his Libyan-trained fighters across the Liberian-lvorian border and secured a foothold in Nimba county. This incursion into Liberia by the fighters of the NPFL was the immediate cause of the Liberian civil war.

Though the NPFL continued to grow in strength under Charles Taylor, its initial motive of removing tyranny and installing democracy became compromised as Taylor’s ambition to fight his way into the Executive Mansion became evident. This ambition gave rise to the factionalisation of the NPFL, with Prince Yormie Johnson forming the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL). As it turned out, both factions were bent on fighting their way to the seat of government in Monrovia. All efforts at reconciliation by mediation committees and respected leaders failed as Charles Taylor remained intransigent. This was because his faction was better equipped, trained and funded than the others, and victory (entry into the executive mansion) was perceived as achievable.3

Clearly, the situation had become chaotic and the country was fast becoming ungovernable. Already, many members of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) had left the barracks and joined the factions of their choice based on tribal affiliation. Faced with imminent collapse, the government of President Doe turned to ECOWAS for assistance.

The crisis in Liberia soon became a threat not only to neighbouring countries, but also to the entire subregion of West Africa. Consequently, during the summit of heads of state and government in Banjul, The Gambia, in May 1990, ECOWAS formed a mediation committee which later formulated and adopted the following outline of a peace plan for Liberia:

By July 1990, Nigeria, Ghana and Guinea had each pledged a battalion towards the formation of ECOMOG to monitor the cease-fire, while The Gambia and Sierra Leone pledged a battalion minus.4 On 24 August 1990, ECOMOG, with a total strength of about 3 000 in its ranks, started to land at the Liberian port of Monrovia. Right from this first beachhead, ECOMOG was met with belligerence from the NPFL. The troops under the command of Lieutenant-General Quainoo had to fight their way into the streets of Monrovia. Although the peacekeepers were in Liberia to monitor a cease-fire, they were compelled to fight first for their own survival. The initial fighting was an act of self-defence, rather than a deliberate attempt at peace enforcement (which came as a later development in the operations), but it heralded the nature of operations in the Liberian situation.

The general principles of peacekeeping have already been mentioned, as well as the fact that the emergent perspective of the ECOMOG operation in Liberia was one of contradiction in terms of principles and their application. Firstly, the force was hurriedly set up with a mandate which did not reflect the realities on the ground. Secondly, the force moved in before clear terms of reference could be established. Thirdly, it was only once the force checkmated the game plans of contending parties that the looming protraction and complexities of the conflict, and the increasing burden on the peacekeepers, became evident. Much of the rules of the ECOMOG ‘game’ therefore had to evolve in response to the peculiarities of the situation.

Peacekeeping is essentially different from other military operations such as countersubversion and counter-insurgency. Consequently, the methods of operation are necessarily different. As is well-known in military circles, the offensive spirit which every soldier must have to ensure success in combat operations is strongly de-emphasised in peacekeeping. Indeed, a peacekeeping soldier requires some retraining and reorientation to prepare him for subsequent engagement in warlike activities. Therefore, a commander facing both peacekeeping and combat situations at once is indeed in serious difficulty.

Traditionally, insurgents primarily employ persuasion backed with force as a mode of operation. However, the situation in Liberia was not that of popular rebellion, but one in which insurgent factions employed armed force as a primary means of operation. Had the situation been otherwise, ECOMOG’s role in Liberia would simply have reverted to that of internal security operations — a military role primarily concerned with the maintenance and restoration of essential services in the face of civil disturbances and disobedience, using minimum necessary force to accomplish these tasks. Although not universally applicable, the principles of internal security operations did help to address the doctrinal lacunae that confronted the ECOMOG contingents.

It is thus useful to recall these basic principles:

It needs to be pointed out that, once the ECOMOG task metamorphosed into a hybrid operation of peacekeeping, counterinsurgency and peace enforcement, these principles were applied according to their relevance to respective phases or a combination of phases of operations. In the Liberian case, the principles of maintenance of public confidence and that of safeguarding loyal citizens were given prominence throughout.

There is a traditional analogy that compares the insurgent to a fish, and the populace to the water in which it thrives. According to counterinsurgency doctrine, the perceived solution to insurgency is therefore to drain the water in order to suffocate the fish. To some extent, the Liberian situation confirmed the voracity of this thinking. Here, the fish also constituted a threat to the water in which it lived, given the extreme level of mutual ethnic annihilation which had ensued. There was therefore a need to drain the water, not only to suffocate the fish, but also to save the water from involuntary evaporation by massacre.

In Liberia, the ‘water’ was drained through evacuations, by creating and expanding safe havens for those who desired to escape to relative safety. Survival instinct induced the populace to flow to relative safety as refugees outside Liberia, or as displaced people in the safe havens created within the country by ECOMOG. In this way, collateral damage to the innocent was eliminated or minimised while dealing with insurgents — although military concerns obviously shifted to the humanitarian concerns of looking after the basic needs of thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons.

Of course, no amount of theorising can bring results in a practical scenario, and the Liberian intervention was not a pure counterinsurgency campaign. Therefore, apart from the necessary political support required for such an intervention, the command must be sound and effective. As a practical guide for the high command and, indeed, at all levels, there is no substitute to those time-tested principles of actions based on necessity, impartiality and good faith. A clear and practicable mandate is also a desirable, but elusive source of direction to all commanders.

At the inception of ECOMOG, the mandate was for peacekeeping. It included the creation of safe corridors for victims of the crisis to escape to safety in neighbouring countries. It also included the evacuation of foreign nationals and the restoration of law and order. Specifically, in accordance with the decisions of the ECOWAS Standing Committee signed in Banjul on 7 August 1990, ECOMOG was to do the following:

It should be noted that the ECOMOG mandate suffered the basic handicap inherent in principles that are distilled from mere idealistic and parochial platforms, as already discussed. Thus, ECOMOG was mandated to maintain a cease-fire in an environment where none was in existence, and in which the force quickly recorded casualties as a result of hostile actions. In view of the belligerent reception, the mandate was reviewed by ECOWAS heads of state and was changed to include peace enforcement. Accordingly, the force commander gave his directives for enforcement actions to commence on 1 October 1990. From then on, ECOMOG operations in Liberia were an admixture of peacekeeping and peace enforcement activities. It became a case of developing principles to rationalise the meeting of objectives. A parallel may be found in the Korean campaign which, though fought under the auspices of the UN, was clearly not peacekeeping, but rather a venture in collective security.5

Concerning operational objectives, ECOMOG was not only expected to stop the warring factions from fighting each other, but was also expected to prevent any further resumption of hostilities by them. Its area of operation was not to be utilised for hostile activities of any kind. Despite its manpower deficiency, ECOMOG was to provide protection and humanitarian assistance to the local population and the international community within the area of operation. As a peacekeeping force, it was to operate on the basis of consent and co-operation. This required the force to combine firmness in carrying out its mandate, with sensitivity towards the local community. The aim was to solve problems in a practical, just and fair manner and to avoid confrontations whenever possible. ECOMOG was to limit any restriction it imposed on the population to the minimum necessary to enable it to undertake the task successfully. It was not authorised to assume responsibilities which normally belonged to the Liberian civil authorities.

The opposed landing of ECOMOG in Monrovia on 24 August 1990 marked the beginning of Operation Liberty in Liberia. The hostile reception notwithstanding, the troops managed to fight their way to a safer and defensible area north of St Paul’s River. It must be understood right from the outset that it was the NPFL that presented the greatest threat to ECOMOG, and that resented the participation of Nigeria in the monitoring group. After consolidating its position, ECOMOG continued to receive supplies and reinforcements. Negotiations and discussions were started between the ECOMOG leadership and the leadership of the warring factions. This was the beginning of the process of peacekeeping.

On 10 September 1990, President Doe was kidnapped and brutally murdered by Prince Yormie Johnson of the INPFL. The situation was blamed on the Ghanaian force commander who was immediately withdrawn and replaced by a Nigerian.6 With the death of Doe, the doors of the executive mansion were now widely opened, and the presidential seat was up for grabs. However, some of Doe’s supporters escaped to Sierra Leone where they were to organise themselves as yet another belligerent faction.

With the escalation of the crisis by all factions, humanitarian relief services became impossible. Thousands of civilians were trapped, and hundreds were dying daily. To redress the situation, ECOMOG received a clear mandate from ECOWAS to clear Monrovia of rebels and to make it a safe haven out of the reach of Taylor’s guns. Clearly, such a mission did not call for handshakes, but for bullet-trading — by peacekeepers. The principle of minimum force was no longer appropriate or applicable. By the end of December 1990, the entire Monrovia was cleared of fighters, except for the occasional infiltration by the NPFL.

Having been forced out of Monrovia, the faction leaders agreed to go to the negotiating table. The Lomé Agreement of 13 February 1991 and the Yamoussoukro Accords I-IV (June-October 1991) were brokered by ECOWAS to put an end to the crisis, but they were doomed to failure. However, an interim government of national unity under Dr Amos Sawyer was inducted into office as a result of these initiatives.7 Importantly, the Yamoussoukro IV Accord, signed on 30 October 1991, outlined steps to implement a peace plan that included the encampment and disarmament of warring factions under the supervision of ECOMOG. It also included the establishment of transitional institutions to carry out free and fair elections.

Over time, it was made increasingly clear to the warring factions that ECOMOG was there to stay, and that none of them could win by force of arms. Consequently, they became more receptive to peace overtures. A decision in the Yamoussoukro Accords which was of major significance was the disarmament of the warring factions. To conduct this, ECOMOG was to deploy troops in strategic places for the collection of belligerents’ weapons. The plan for this disarmament was accepted and signed by all the warring factions. Two major lessons, learned the hard way during this phase, were the requirement for firmness of purpose and decisive action as a means of ensuring compliance.

For example, in the first week of September 1992, ECOMOG deployed its troops in all areas held by the factions for purposes of monitoring their disarmament. To everybody’s surprise, on 8 September 1992, the NPFL held all the ECOMOG troops deployed in its area as hostages. This development infuriated the high command, as these troops were tortured and humiliated.

After intense negotiations, the NPFL reluctantly released the hostages, having achieved the aim of nullifying the disarmament plan. However, as if that was not enough, on 15 October 1992, Charles Taylor decided to unleash an offensive action against ECOMOG positions. This action, which Taylor dubbed Operation Octopus, was launched with the following aims:

Operation Octopus almost succeeded, as the rebels captured most of Caldwell just behind ECOMOG headquarters. However, the headquarters (under the able command of the chief of staff of ECOMOG at the time, Brigadier-General S V L Malu) were quickly reinforced with troops from the Nigerian contingent and the attack was successfully repelled. Prince Yormie Johnson was also extricated from NPFL encirclement by the Nigerian troops.

However, the Sierra Leone-based supporters of late President Doe, who had formed another group in June 1991 called the United Liberation Movement of Liberia (ULIMO), now became apprehensive of NPFL moves. ULIMO’s aim was to challenge the intransigence of Charles Taylor and to stop any of the factions from taking power by force of arms. This faction, led by General Roosevelt Johnson and Alhaji Kromah crossed into Liberia and drove the NPFL out of Bomi, Lofa and Cape Mount counties. However, as a result of internal rivalry, ULIMO also split into two factions: ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K.

At the peak of factionalisation, ECOMOG had to contend with a total of about ten factions. It is also noteworthy that, at this point in the crisis, the polarisation of factions was no longer solely based on disagreement over ideological principles or political log jams, but purely on disagreement over economic and financial matters. In effect, the Liberian territory had been scrambled into enclaves with the warlords in control and reaping the benefits that accrued from the resources within each enclave. Thus, the financial muscle to prosecute their notorious agenda was guaranteed by their external trading collaborators, a factor which contributed immensely to the intransigence of the various factions. Indeed, there was much interfactional movement and shifting of allegiance among the armed fighters, depending on which faction’s enclave was more lucrative.

By the end of October 1992, the city of Monrovia was cleared of belligerents and once more restored as a safe haven. The operation to repel NPFL attacks was carried out by the combined efforts of four Nigerian battalions, one Guinean battalion, one Ghanaian battalion and a battalion minus from Sierra Leone. Though ECOMOG troops suffered casualties, their morale remained high. Some of the pertinent lessons learned during this phase include:

As the Liberian conflict dragged on, the relationship between ECOMOG troops and the fighters of ULIMO-J began to deteriorate. Cases of exchange of fire at Tubmanburg were reported. On the eve of Christmas 1995, the fighters of ULIMO-J attacked the ECOMOG location in Tubmanburg. As a result of the attack, the rebels seized two 122mm guns and destroyed another. They also seized some mortar tubes and a large consignment of arms and ammunition. Besides the humiliation, ECOMOG suffered some casualties. This action was planned and directed by Roosevelt Johnson himself.

Having taken over the control of the city from ECOMOG, the fighters of ULIMO-J rushed into the town, looting and shooting anybody who resisted their demands. Some people who were considered to be collaborating with ECOMOG were immediately arrested and taken to unknown destinations. There was a total breakdown of law and order in Tubmanburg.

From all indications, it was clear that the ECOMOG troops in Tubmanburg had become complacent. To redress the situation, two more ECOMOG battalions were quickly dispatched to the sector. After two days of fierce fighting, Tubmanburg was liberated and peace was once again restored through the use of force. The captured guns were later recovered by the chief of staff ECOMOG on 19 August 1996, through diplomacy and negotiations.

One of the most important tasks carried out by the peacekeepers was the disarming of the warring factions. The issue of disarmament was originally raised in the Yamoussoukro Accord of October 1991. After the debacle of September 1992, disarmament was given more prominence in the supplement to the Abuja Accord of August 1996. At the level of ECOMOG, preparation for this disarmament effort included the following:

According to UN and ECOWAS arrangements, the disarmament was to be conducted by ECOMOG from 22 November 1996 to 31 January 1997, with UNOMIL officers as observers. It was estimated that there were 33 000 fighters to be disarmed. To ensure success, various meetings and conferences were held, usually with the leaders of the warring factions in attendance. To provide for closer understanding and remove any suspicions, ECOMOG embarked on confidence-building visits to all rebel locations. Though there were anxious moments when some ECOMOG officers were again taken hostage, the situation generally improved gradually and cordiality was re-established.

On 22 November 1996, against enormous external hurdles and a cloud of uncertainty, the force commander, Major-General Malu, declared the commencement of disarmament in Liberia.9 This courageous decision earned ECOMOG the respect and admiration from Liberians and the international community. By 7 February 1997, a total of 28 819 fighters out of the estimated 33 000 were disarmed. The following arms and ammunition were recovered:

Though the collective strength of the factions is put at 33 000, it is clear that not all fighters were in possession of rifles. From ECOMOG experience, the ratio was approximately one rifle to four persons. There were also about 15 000 child soldiers within the six major factions — most of them carried arms at some stage.

Having disarmed the combatants, there was a feeling of relief and hope among Liberian society. Within the first three months after the disarmament which ended in February 1997, thousands of Liberian refugees and displaced persons returned. They composed a song entitled Thank God for ECOMOG, which was sung in the churches, mosques and markets. Having conducted a successful disarmament process, the only major item on ECOMOG’s mandate that still had to be attended to, was the presidential and general elections planned for March 1997, but later moved to July 1997.

After disarmament, the people of Liberia started to enjoy relative peace and security. However, ECOMOG continued its peacekeeping duties by intensifying patrols, improving on the checkpoints, and conducting cordon and search operations. In doing these, the willing participation of the local population was most encouraging. About five per cent of the recovered arms and ammunition were as a result of information given by individuals. Indeed, the six field guns recovered from the NPFL were found on the basis of paid information.

While routine activities were going on, ECOMOG was fully involved in the preparations for the presidential and general elections. It must be understood that, at this stage, the international community was showing considerable interest in the Liberian crisis. Besides the active participation of the US, the European Union was also beginning to contribute to the peace process. The activities of international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) also became more intense and wider in coverage. More West African countries also decided to contribute troops to ECOMOG. ECOMOG’s duties in the elections were stipulated as follows:

The presidential elections took place on 19 July 1997, and Charles Taylor was duly elected as president of Liberia. With his inauguration on 2 August 1997, the peacekeepers had fulfilled one of the major duties in their mandate. With an elected government in place, ECOMOG’s role had to be reviewed. Its security duties, for example, could only be executed with the co-operation of the government of Liberia.

The Liberian National Police, the Armed Forces of Liberia and the ministers of Defence and Justice were all involved in security matters. Meanwhile, President Taylor had made it publicly clear that ECOMOG should leave Liberia six months after his inauguration. Consequently, by February 1998, all national contingents had left Liberia, except for Nigeria and Ghana. These two countries remained in Liberia because of the fragile nature of the peace in the country. From all indications, Taylor saw ECOMOG as a parallel government and, as such, a challenge to his authority and a threat to Liberian sovereignty. There were musings about the president’s ingratitude in many quarters.

To cover up the accusations of ingratitude, and perhaps more for security reasons, Taylor requested the countries of ECOWAS to assist him with a force for capacity-building in the security sector of the Liberian state. Taylor expected the proposed capacity-building force to resort under the authority of the Liberian Ministry of National Defence, with himself as the commander-in-chief. Clearly, no country would be willing to contribute troops in such a manner, even if the host country is willing to assume some responsibilities. Therefore, the continued stay of Ghanaian and Nigerian troops was primarily on the wider request of the Liberian people, in the interests of their personal security rather than regime security. The services of the troops, however, were rendered at no cost to the government of Liberia.

The ECOMOG experiment in Liberia has been widely acclaimed as one of the most successful and unprecedented in the history of peacekeeping. It is indeed gratifying to hear some countries urging the UN, as well as other subregional organisations to attempt the resolution of African conflicts by emulating the example set by ECOWAS and ECOMOG. For those who may indeed be willing to learn from the ECOMOG experience, the critical success factors may be summarised as follows:

Despite the historic contribution to international peacekeeping, it is on record that several powers were strongly critical of ECOMOG operations in Liberia. However, these same powers eventually supported and assisted the ECOMOG peacekeepers.

In the final instance, everyone learned that peace can only be kept peace when there is peace to keep in the first place. Consequently, the nexus between peacekeeping and peace enforcement must be the subject of constant study. For peace to be durable, it seems that the peacekeeper should be ready for both peace enforcement and yet more peacekeeping.