The term peace support operations has certainly gained recognition in the dictionary of conflict management, and so has the study of its many facets. A solution to any problem must obviously first of all be based on factors and deductions drawn from these factors. These deductions will suggest many courses of action and the adopted course of action will produce a plan. The plan will spell out the mission.

In the execution of the plan, there must necessarily be some mechanisms in place that will ensure that every step taken, is geared towards the achievement of the mission. Some of these mechanisms can be described as control measures and guidance. Peace support operations are fundamentally political problem-solving exercises, and must therefore necessarily have some control measures and guidance in place.

As simple as the words ‘control’ and ‘guidance’ may appear, it may be worthwhile to consider their definitions. Control may be defined as ‘the power or authority to direct, order or manage’. Guidance, on the other hand, is explained as ‘help or advice given to somebody by someone in authority’. By arranging and combining the definitions of these two terms, they simply amount to ‘an authority that directs or orders or gives advice to somebody to act in a particular way’.

The topic at hand therefore has to do with the nature of contemporary peace support operations and the issue of some form of political authority giving direction, advice and help to peace support operations in Africa. The problem that is considered is whether or not it is right, appropriate and necessary for such political direction and, if so, what the advantages and disadvantages are of the present system of control and guidance to peace support operations.

Finally, a few suggestions are made, from a UN force commander’s perspective, on measures that could be applied to make such control and guidance more effective.

The term ‘peace support operations’ takes its root from what the UN originally simply referred to as peacekeeping operations. Over time, however, it became clear that there are many stages of managing conflict, hence the introduction of the term peace support operation. Historically, Africa first experienced UN operations in the Belgian Congo (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) in the early 1960s. This was the first time that a UN force was deployed in Africa. The UN Congo Operation was the largest third-party peacekeeping effort ever to be authorised by any international organisation in the early history of the UN. During its four years of operation, from 1960 to 1964, a total of over 93 000 soldiers from 35 countries served in the Congo. Since this event, there have been many UN engagements in every region of the African continent, beginning with operations in Namibia and Angola in 1989 and extending during the 1990s to Somalia, Mozambique, Rwanda and Liberia. UN operations in the Central African Republic are ongoing and there are embryonic missions in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

In most of these cases, operations have been established amidst political turmoil. The civil administration had broken down and state authority had often collapsed following bitter intrastate conflict. Indeed, some of the states became ungovernable for many years. In all cases, law and order were affected in one way or the other. Under such conditions, there was a need to re-establish the necessary authority to enable a return to good governance and stability.

Good governance implies the existence of a due political process and the rule of law, which are essential elements in building an effective relationship between people and their governments and to create the necessary environment for sustainable development. How will a due political authority be established in a failed state for example, after the UN has authorised a peace support operation? There should be certain procedures that will ensure a systematic return to the desired situation. These procedures are inextricably linked to the issue of control and guidance.

With the evolution of peacekeeping into more complex peace support operations, the UN has endeavoured to find a satisfactory way to direct the affairs of such missions. A number of experiments have been conducted during past missions. For example, in the Congo in the 1960s, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) was the head of the mission, with the chief of UN Civilian Operations and the commander of the UN force as his immediate subordinates. In the case of Cyprus, the force commander and the SRSG held equal status at the initial stages of the mission. Currently, all UN missions have an SRSG as head and these changes have been as a result of experiences gained in earlier missions.

This does not mean that the SRSG commands the force commander, instead he gives political direction to him. It is up to the force commander to analyse these political directives from time to time as he focuses his attention on the command of his troops. The force commander exercises operational control over all military contingents and every contingent has its own commander, appointed by its home government. However, this simple division of authority does not necessarily mean that there is a harmonious relationship between the SRSG and the force commander.

The problems that have been plaguing UN missions as far as the relationship between the positions of the SRSG and the force commander are concerned, stem from the fact that wrong steps are often initially taken when appointing individuals to fill these very sensitive offices. Basically, the Security Council exercises political control and guidance through the Secretary-General or his designated agent, the head of the mission. The authority that appoints the SRSG also appoints the force commander. If good judgement and care are exercised in the selection process, there should be harmony in the field. Unfortunately, this is not always the case.

For example, in the establishment of the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), General Romeo Dallaire, the first force commander, was also the leader of the technical survey team to Rwanda prior to the establishment of the mission. When he was subsequently appointed as commander, he arrived in Rwanda more than three months before the SRSG was appointed. This obviously created fertile ground for disharmony. After successfully ‘running the show’ for a considerable time, the force commander had to hand over the reins and descend to a second position.

Another issue that causes a strained relationship is the personalities that hold both of these key appointments on a particular mission. If the incumbents hold divergent views, or for any reason become tilted to one side in the conflict, then the game is about to be lost. If, on the other hand, a mission is lucky to have agreeable characters with a common purpose (to achieve the set goals), then the mission will be on course. Of course, a lot of other parameters affect the success of a mission, but nothing can be more devilish, discouraging and destructive than having an SRSG and a force commander who do not agree. This type of situation can create a worse conflict than the original one between the warring factions.

The relationship between the SRSG and the force commander also extends to the issue of impartiality in dealing with the parties to the conflict. The SRSG and the force commander should avoid any act that can be misinterpreted to mean inclination towards one faction or the other under all circumstances. For example, acceptance of an invitation to dinner may not appear to be a serious issue, but in a strife-torn situation, the individuals you talk to and socialise with can take on a much deeper meaning. Balanced thinking, a correct attitude, and awareness of an ever-changing situation are the qualities that commanders must have. A neutral stance helps the SRSG and the commander to exercise effective control.

In any well-established peace support operation, mandates will have to be given. Indeed, mandates bring peace missions into being. Budgets accompany mandates and spell out objectives to be achieved during such operations. The question is why further political control and guidance of peace support operations are necessary.

It has already been indicated that something must have certainly gone very wrong with a country before the establishment of a peace support operation. This is very evident in the appalling conflict situations that were witnessed and continue to be witnessed on the African continent. In all cases, there is a good deal of shuttle diplomacy before, during and after the conflict. As conflicts escalate, diplomacy picks up or assumes an even greater importance. General Erskine notes, for example, in his book Mission with UNIFIL, that the "UN Emergency Force II effectively established in Sinai and reduced tension between Egypt and Israel, making it possible for the peacemaking process to gain momentum." He gave the credit for the mission’s success to Dr Henry Kissinger’s strenuous and pioneering shuttle diplomacy.

In Africa, the Arusha Accord that preceded the establishment of UNAMIR is well-known. So too is the Lusaka Accord of November 1994 that gave birth to UNAVEM II. Again, the most recent diplomatic efforts in the DRC, the signing in August 1999 of the Lusaka cease-fire agreement, and the many diplomatic efforts culminating in the Lomé Accord that seems to bring a ray of hope to Sierra Leone, are all fresh in people’s memories. Who are those who conduct these meetings and conferences, which eventually result in the signing of agreements that, in turn, pave the way for the establishment of missions, or lead to the amicable solution of such conflicts? By and large, they have been and will continue to be politicians and diplomats.

Both the 52nd session of the General Assembly and the UN Secretary-General’s report of April 1998 on the causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa list the factors driving conflicts as historical legacies, internal factors, external factors, economic motives and particular situations. Soldiers do not normally discuss these issues; they are matters best dealt with by scholars, historians, politicians, diplomats and eminent personalities.

Politics are inextricably linked to the very root causes of conflicts. For example, the conflict in the Congo in the early 1960s started with the emergence of nationalist movements striving towards independence. They were political movements. The Rwandese Patriotic Front is a political movement that gave birth to the Rwandese Patriotic Army. The National Patriotic Front of Liberia led by Charles Taylor was a political organisation that fought the civil war with other political organisations and the Liberian Army for over seven years. More recently, in Sierra Leone, it is clear that the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) is a political organisation.

In nine cases out of ten, there is a struggle for power to rule a group of people or a nation. The orientation is ultimately towards political power. Unfortunately, the drive towards political power often escalates into violence and the violence results in the breakdown of law and order, which in certain cases leads to a complete failure of governments.

What have been witnessed in recent years is that, in the struggle for power, atrocities are committed, women and children are killed or maimed, and the survivors become homeless and subsequently internally displaced. The established authority breaks down and most often has to be rebuilt from scratch. Who will be the main players in returning such conflict-devastated states to normalcy if the situation has to return to good governance? Do rebels know how to run the state machinery? Is the primary job for the military directed at the running of the state machinery? Is their basic job politics? The answer is an unambiguous no.

The only logical step under such conditions of anarchy will be to put in charge those who have received adequate training in the field of politics and diplomacy. This is obviously the reason why deliberate efforts are made to nominate seasoned diplomats and personalities with a reputable background in mediation and negotiations to lead peace support operations.

The force commander’s primary aim is simply to achieve his operational objectives. The military objectives are carved out of the mandate of the mission. All being well, there should be no disagreements between those charged with the responsibility of running a peace support operation, since every operation aims at achieving the overall aim of the peace mission. However, misunderstandings often arise from the fact that, when the commander analyses the mandate of the mission and identifies certain tasks that he must undertake to achieve his objectives, he may not be allowed to do so.

For example, there have been occasions in the past when force commanders were not granted the authority to carry out operations that they considered crucial to the attainment of some of their objectives — such as conducting a cordon and search operation in order to make a particular zone safe. The approval for operations like these has not been granted by the UN on many occasions, particularly because of their failure in places such as Somalia, but also because some UN troops (such as some of those in UNAMIR) were ill-equipped for these tasks. On the other hand, there have also been instances where authority was given and the results became disastrous for the peace support troops themselves.

There have been yet other instances where commanders on the ground have carried out operations without necessarily receiving a clear-cut approval from New York, and where such operations have succeeded to the credit of the UN. An example from Rwanda was the cordon and search operation in the Kibeho and Ndago camps for internally displaced persons. Killings by the militia were reported in these camps and the Rwandese Patriotic Army became very agitated. The Rwandese government wanted something to be done about the situation and the UNAMIR commander decided to carry out an operation to rid the camps of all warlike materials and to arrest suspected criminals.

The plan was communicated to New York while preparations were under way. After answering many enquiries from UN Headquarters, some sort of vague approval was received just about at the time when the operation, code-named ‘Hope’ was about to be launched. Cordon and search operations were subsequently executed without any casualties to UNAMIR forces. In the process, a large quantity of assorted warlike materials was seized, to the admiration of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the Rwandese authorities and the international media. This turned out to be an operation that restored confidence in the entire UNAMIR force. Where authorisation is unclear, it is often a question of weighing the advantages of success against the possible disadvantages of operational failure.

Quite frankly, indecision during tense moments creates a lot of friction between those that give political directives and force commanders. The examples from UN missions are numerous. Nevertheless, the advantages of some form of political control and guidance clearly outweigh the disadvantages. It is essentially the struggle for political power that leads to the breakdown of law and order. The world will accept the situation as normal only if a due political process is restored.

Who will ensure that this occurs? How can good governance be established without appropriate political direction? Indeed, who are the parties involved in establishing a mission in the first place? They are the diplomats and politicians. Whether it is at the level of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) or the UN, it is a group of diplomats and politicians that will take the decision. Without a mandate, there will be no peace support operation.

Politicians and diplomats also know whom to talk to in order to get the financial support for the conduct of a peace support operation. Indeed, donor communities deal with diplomats and politicians. They do not normally communicate with military men or force commanders.

Apart from the simple issue of funding, it has generally been accepted that the presence of troops in any peace support operation is just one aspect of solving the problem. There are many other actors in the field: NGOs, UN agencies, church leaders, eminent citizens, and the media also have prominent roles to play. All these various actors need to be co-ordinated and their efforts harmonised towards a solution to the problem.

Admittedly, the force commander is a major player in the process, but he and his forces in the theatre only play their part in stabilising the security situation. They are not the custodians of good governance, and good governance means a return to due political process. Ultimately, democratisation, the observance of human rights and economic development continue to constitute the most valid insurance policies against the social chaos and instability that precipitate armed conflicts.

However, there is a downside to political control and guidance. The negative consequences of political indecision — of foot dragging when very important decisions must be taken — have already been mentioned. Those that the SRSG consults in New York often do not have adequate or in-depth knowledge of the situation on the ground. This is especially so when fresh violence erupts and the situation keeps changing by the hour. Any loss of time is immediately translated into the potential loss of many lives.

Sometimes, there is also tension between political control and guidance, and military command at the theatre level as well. For example, in Rwanda at one stage, the SRSG was relocated to Nairobi in Kenya, while the civil war in Rwanda continued. How could the SRSG give an accurate description of the situation, let alone issue any meaningful directives? When guns are firing, shells are exploding and fear is rife, it will be the person trained to withstand such emergencies that will normally stand up to the test.

Another area of concern relates to the position and status of the chief administrative officer. While the SRSG is the head of the mission, and the force commander commands the many officers and individuals in the contingents, there is this all-powerful position of the chief administrative officer. Neither the SRSG, nor the force commander has control over the finances of any UN mission. It is the chief administrative officer who controls the ‘purse’. This state of affairs renders the two men at the top powerless. Instant decisions concerning minor expenditures that could go a long way to boost the morale of troops or enhance their operational efficiency cannot be effected because of lengthy bureaucratic procedures in the UN system.

For example, when the civil war broke out in Rwanda, the force commander needed to get food and water to the troops as a matter of urgency. These are the basic necessities of life, but his staff could not make any procurement from the nearest point of availability. The chief administrative officer had been relocated to Nairobi, and simply did not share the same sense of urgency with the force commander.

Another large gap, which is often felt in the control of UN missions, is the lack of adequate and accurate intelligence. In a purely military sense, commanders require intelligence upon which to base operational plans. The UN resists using the phrase ‘intelligence gathering’, since this implies ‘spying’ on its member states. Whichever terminology is used, there is a pressing need to have information upon which plans can be formulated and executed. The absence of an intelligence or information gathering system within UN missions has created a gap that was filled in certain cases by unreliable and unco-ordinated news from NGOs and the news media. There is no way control can be effectively exercised without appropriate information or intelligence.

This article has attempted to give some meaning to the concept of political control and guidance in peace support operations, and to emphasise the fact that political control is indeed necessary. The reasons for the latter have been clearly outlined. It is essentially the struggle for political power that gives birth to most conflicts that, in turn, necessitate the establishment of peace support operations. It is therefore only appropriate that those who know the game of politics and diplomacy are called upon to direct the affairs of such missions when they are established.

Care must be exercised, however, in selecting the individuals in whose hands these important assignments are entrusted. There is the need to have a common objective, and there must be a harmonious relationship between the SRSG and his force commander. The need for political will to support the political control and guidance cannot be overemphasised. Under all circumstances, financial authority and well-established systems of communication and intelligence must be given to those at the helm of affairs of any peace support operation.

In conclusion, the issues may be summarised in the following suggestions towards improved political control and guidance of peace missions in Africa:

Brigadier General Henry Anyidoho is a former force commander of the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda. He is currently the Commander of 2 Infantry Brigade Group, Ghana Armed Forces.