The collapse of the Soviet Union, the subsequent withdrawal of its 500 000-strong armed forces from Europe, and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact1 opened the way for deep systematic changes in the geopolitical balance of power on regional and global levels. The new post-Soviet environment exerted a substantial influence on the nature of Russia’s foreign and defence policy, as well as on the functions, goals and tactics of its armed forces.

The new character of risks and challenges to national security in the post-Soviet environment predetermined a principally new function of the Russian military — to keep and restore peace unilaterally or under international agreements within the framework of peace support operations, or mirotvorcheckie operatsii.

The new ‘peacekeeping’ function of the armed forces, which was subsequently incorporated into national military doctrine, evolved as the result of the convergence of a number of factors. Firstly, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there was a radical change in the nature of the main threats and risks to Russia’s national security. The conflicts and contradictions between different nations and nationalities, and ethnic and religious communities challenged the integrity of many states and nations in the post-Soviet environment — including Russia itself. For the first time in modern history, Russia had to admit in its new National Security Concept that the current and potential conflicts in its territory and in the ‘near abroad’ are the main sources of threats to its stability and security. As a result, Russia had to start building a new crisis reaction and conflict management potential, including special peacekeeping forces.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the world was also faced by a number of armed conflicts in other regions that led to humanitarian crises. This forced the world community to undertake appropriate actions in an attempt to stop these conflicts and to initiate the difficult processes of national reconciliation. Russia, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, bears the primary responsibility, along with other permanent members of the Council, for keeping and restoring international peace and stability. For this reason, Russia has allocated huge material and human resources over the last decade for conflict management under the UN flag. In this regard, it is noteworthy that Russia’s National Security Concept for the first time determines that the country’s long-term interests require its wider participation in peacekeeping operations, and that "the implementation of such operations should become an important instrument for the prevention or liquidation of crises as they arise and develop."

The experience gained by Russia during the course of peace support operations in the post-Soviet environment has vividly demonstrated that conflict management at the national and international levels is an extremely complex process. Positive results can only be achieved when such operations are based on internationally recognised principles and when they have clear international support.

Starting from the early 1990s, Russia therefore began to contribute military and police personnel for participation in most of the new peace support operations conducted under the auspices of the UN, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the the Organisation for Security Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In fact, Russia has a 25-year history of participation in international peacekeeping. From 1973 to 1998, Russia participated in eleven out of 48 UN peacekeeping operations. More than 770 Russian UN military observers, and some 18 000 soldiers and officers have served under the UN flag.

The end of the bipolar system of international security, which was based on the balance of interests of two superpowers (the US and the Soviet Union) marked the beginning of a new phase in the theory and practice of modern peacekeeping. Particularly, questionable techniques used by some regional organisations2 initiated strong debates in Russia on the legitimacy and principles of regional peacekeeping. In addition, the extensive use of military power by the world’s leading nations3 highlighted the problematic nature of the new international peacekeeping and peace support operations (PSOs). Politicians, military experts and scholars are now trying to find proper answers to challenging questions such as:

The necessity to find answers to these and other questions became especially apparent in the Spring of 1999, when US-led NATO forces conducted an unprecedented (since World War II) war against Yugoslavia to protect the human rights of one of the dominant ethnic communities in Kosovo. Many experts in Russia and abroad immediately claimed that the techniques of enforcement management which were used by NATO in the Balkans could most likely be applied in other regions world-wide, where the interests of the US or other key NATO members were at stake. One of the main outcomes of NATO’s enforcement action against Yugoslavia — clearly seen especially from Russia’s point of view — is that a number of challenging precedents were established during NATO’s so-called ‘humanitarian bombardment’, that will have a direct bearing on the character of future conflict management techniques in Africa, the post-Soviet environment and elsewhere.

It is particularly pertinent that the US/NATO war against Yugoslavia, as well as Russia’s subsequent wide-scale anti-terrorist combat operations in and around Dagestan (in August-September 1999) raised strong debates in Russia on the issue of the role of military force in international peacekeeping and conflict management in the post-Soviet environment.

It is against this background that this article will address three main issues. Firstly, the main phases of Russia’s peacekeeping evolution and the development during the last decade will be summarised. Secondly, the existing legal base for the use of the Russian armed forces in conflict prevention and management is considered. Finally, some of the key lessons are highlighted that were learned by Russia from its involvement in international peacekeeping in the post-Soviet environment and in the Balkans.

The modern history of Russian peacekeeping began in Cairo on 26 November 1973, when the first 36 Soviet military officers received UN blue berets and became military observers in the UN Truce Supervision Organisation in the Middle East (UNTSO). This was a direct outcome of the Vladivostok Agreement reached between the USSR and the US, where the two superpowers decided to use a new instrument for monitoring their decision to stop the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war.4

Despite the deployment of its military observers under UN command and control in the Middle East — where the Soviets and the Americans tried to advance their national interests by different means — the Soviets resolutely refused to accept the legitimacy of UN peacekeeping operations in other regions. The USSR did not participate in their conduct, nor did it provide material or financial support. For this reason, the history of Russia’s contemporary peacekeeping really belongs in three more recent and crucial phases of evolution and development — 1989-1992; 1992-1995; and 1996 until present.

The first phase saw the re-evaluation by Russia (at the time still the USSR) of its position and attitude to international peacekeeping. It happened under the strong influence of the policy of perestroika, promoted by the then president of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev. At this stage, the Soviets officially recognised the legitimacy of ‘classical’ UN peacekeeping and began to participate in a number of newly established UN operations. For example, from April 1991, Russia’s UN military observers participated in the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM) and in the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). From October 1991 until March 1993, forty Russian military observers participated in the UN mission in Cambodia (UNTAC).

In 1992, the USSR ceased to exist and Russia became a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Among the positive distinguishing outcomes, achieved as a result of the dissolution of the USSR, is Russia’s expanded contribution to international peacekeeping. Russia’s military and police personnel began to participate actively in most of the newly established international peacekeeping missions in the territory of the former Soviet Union and further abroad. For example:

In addition, Russia’s military also participated in two other UN missions — in the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) from December 1992 until December 1994, and in the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) from October 1993 until March 1996. Moreover, since Autumn 1995, Russia’s military have been taking part in the NATO-led peace support operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

While the effectiveness of Russia’s peacekeepers in peace support operations under UN command and control did not raise much concern, their activities in the near abroad drew sharp criticism in both national and international mass media. Moreover, the disparity in the ways and methods of conflict resolution between Russian and Western military experts, became increasingly apparent.

A number of leading Western politicians and experts, analysing the character of Russia’s peace support operations in the territory of the CIS, claimed that Russia was violating some of the fundamental norms and values of international peacekeeping. For example, Mikle Orr, the Director of the Conflict Studies Research Centre at the Royal Military Academy in Sandhurst, United Kingdom, claimed that none of Russia’s peacekeeping operations fulfilled the requirements for intervention which were set by various CIS agreements. Moreover, he argued that Russia used the name of the CIS to give a cloak of international respectability to its pursuit of what the government perceives as Russia’s national interests around its borders.

Analyses of the results of Russia’s peacekeeping in the post-Soviet environment from 1992 to 1995 show that despite the fact that Russia’s military managed to bring armed conflicts in the CIS near abroad to a halt, it became patently clear that pure military force cannot address the deeper roots and causes of modern conflicts and thus provide sustainable security, development and overall political settlement of modern conflicts.

Despite the substantial decrease in the number of UN peacekeepers deployed world-wide, Russia had to increase its contribution to conflict management in the international arena. Russia allocated material and human resources for all categories of peace operations that are being conducted in Europe, Africa, Asia and in the post-Soviet environment. This happened mainly because of the following two factors.

From January 1996, Russia’s military began to take part in joint Russia-NATO peace support operations in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as part of the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement. Close co-operation between Russia and NATO’s military in Bosnia led to a new qualitative status in Russia/US/NATO relations. In addition, it opened a new page in the history of Russia’s international peacekeeping and gave a new dimension to its theory and practice.

The participation of Russian troops in conflict management in the Balkans under the UN and later NATO flags, clearly demonstrated that Russia and the US/NATO military can conduct joint peace support operations on a high professional level in different regions of the world. Russia’s military role in the peacebuilding process in the Balkans was commended by General Wesley Clark, former Supreme Commander of the allied forces in Europe. According to Clark, "the multinational forces would not have been able to accomplish their peacekeeping mission in Bosnia successfully without the Russian brigade." He also pointed to the fact that "... the peacekeeping co-operation among our armies is building a foundation for the future partnership for peace ..."

The second factor behind the expansion of Russian peacekeeping was the signing of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Co-operation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, and the subsequent development of all-round military-to-military contacts, including the joint training of peacekeepers. This exerted a substantial influence not only on the character of Russian-West relations, but also on the further evolution of Russia’s position toward unilateral and joint peacekeeping and conflict management in the new geopolitical environment.

Particularly during the period 1996 to 1999, Russia became involved in joint training for future peace support operations with the world’s leading nations, including the US, the UK and Germany. This was carried out both within the new format of NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme, and within the framework of Russian/US/UK bilateral/trilateral exercises. Alongside these troop training initiatives, Russia and NATO began examining the possibilities of engaging Russia’s military assets for joint peace support operations, including the use of Russia’s strategic air lift capacities.

During joint military exercises conducted in Turkey from 13 to 15 October 1998, Russian and NATO specialists trained an element for possible future joint peacekeeping co-operation — specifically with regard to the transportation of US/NATO resources by Russian aircraft. In particular, exercise participants loaded and transported a huge US anti-aircraft defence radar station (the AN/TPQ-64, which weighs 30 tons) in a Russian IL-76 aircraft. There are also plans to train pilots and crews in the transportation of the US Patriot anti-aircraft complex by Russian AN-124 aircraft — including refuelling of the latter in the air by US/NATO planes.

From 1996 onwards, in addition to its traditional involvement in UN peacekeeping, Russia thus began to be actively involved in joint Russian-NATO peace support operations in the Balkans, where it deployed more than 5 000 soldiers and officers from its élite airborne forces. In Africa, the Russian military has continued to be involved in conflict management exclusively under the auspices of the UN, primarily in observer-type missions in countries such as Egypt, Congo, Sierra Leone and Western Sahara.

When considering Russia’s international peacekeeping in the post-Soviet environment, it is useful to analyse the legal basis for the use of military force, on the one hand. On the other hand, it is also fruitful to examine the main techniques used by Russia’s peacekeepers in the field in all types of peace support operations, but especially those which were conducted in the territory of the former Soviet Union and in the Balkans.

Contemporary Russian peacekeeping is based on several key documents, which have been developed over the past seven years or so. The legal basis of Russian peacekeeping has evolved against a background that included the absence of a clear vision of Russia’s new national identity, of military doctrine, and of clear ways to achieve sustainable political and economic development. Before considering the main lessons learned from Russia’s practical peacekeeping experience, it is thus useful to review the legislative foundations of Russian involvement in peacekeeping, which are laid down in national laws and presidential decrees.

An analysis of the above documents reveals some of the crucial distinguishing features of the basis that established the legal and political framework for Russia’s military activities in the interest of international peacekeeping and conflict management.

Russia has determined a clear set of conditions under which it will take decisions whether or not to allocate its human and material resources for international peacekeeping. The following three may be regarded as crucial preconditions:

In addition to these three factors, the main conditions to be met before committing Russian forces to peacekeeping are listed in Table 2.

Table 1: Legislative foundations of Russian involvement in peacekeeping

Document	Year
The Constitution of the Russian Federation	1993
Federal law: About the Defence	1997
Federal law: On the procedure of allocation of military and civilian personnel for participation in the peacekeeping and peacemaking	1995
Presidential Decree No 1300: The Concept of National Security of Russia	1996
Presidential Decree: On the Establishment of a special military Contingent in the Armed Forces for participation in peacekeeping and peacemaking activity	1996

Table 2: The main conditions of Russia’s support for and participation in peacekeeping operations

1	"Conformity of the peacekeeping operation with the advancement of Russia’s national interests, fulfilling the goals of foreign and defence policy"
2	"Existence of an international dispute that requires settlement through peaceful means, or a threat to international peace and security"
3	Presence of a clear political aim and clear mandate for the peacekeeping operation
4	"The consent of the government (in cases of internal conflicts) and appropriate parties for the establishment of a peacekeeping operation, except in those cases of an extreme nature (violation of peace or act of aggression) and/or those that exert a direct threat to the national security of Russia and its borders"
5	Close ties between the establishment of a peacekeeping operation with tasks of assistance to the political process of the peaceful settlement of the dispute
6	"The availability of resources adequate to the mandate of a peacekeeping operation, and readiness of the proper states to allocate contingents and to provide financing"
7	"Relatively clearly determined period of the peacekeeping operation in the mandate, and conditions for the termination of the operation as ‘entrance’ into and ‘exit’ from a peacekeeping operation are not less important than its establishment"

Table 3: National contributions to KFOR

Country	Number of troops
United Kingdom	13 000
Germany	8 500
United States	7 000
France	7 000
Italy	5 000
Russia	3 600
The Netherlands	2 050
The Ukraine	1 300
Turkey	1 000

Finally, according to presidential decree no 1300, the Concept of National Security of Russia, the basic principles for the use of force by Russia’s military in peace support operations are determined. Among these principles, which are more widely known in Western countries as rules of engagement (ROE), the following are pertinent:

Considering the nature of ROE, it is also appropriate to outline the main principles guiding the use of force, which were agreed upon between Russia and the US military and which are being used in training during their joint military exercises. According to the Russian-United States guide for tactics, techniques, and procedures of peacekeeping forces during the conduct of exercises (1994), military force may be used in the following cases:

Alongside the legal framework for peacekeeping, Russia has also established its own peacekeeping force. In accordance with the presidential decree, On the Establishment of a Special Military Contingent in the Armed Forces for Participation in Peacekeeping and Peacemaking Activity, a special contingent was established within the structure of the Russian armed forces with the specific purpose to conduct peace support operations. The maximum total strength of this peacekeeping force is some 22 000. This includes seventeen motor rifle and four airborne infantry battalions, as well as support and service units. While the units of the designated peacekeeping force do participate in international peacekeeping, their duties have often been handed over to Russia’s élite airborne troops.

A regional peacekeeping potential that may be used when requested, has been established under the auspices of the CIS. The bulk of this CIS peacekeeping and crisis reaction potential is supported by Russia. Russia has made energetic efforts to strengthen the CIS peacekeeping mechanism, which could be more actively used not only in the post-Soviet environment, but also in other regions. However, no substantial progress has been made in transforming a number of documents and memoranda into a working and reliable mechanism for conflict prevention and management. Part of the reason for this is that Russia and some leading CIS states (including the Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaidjan) have sometimes held clearly opposing views not only on the methods and means of conflict management, but on the very essence of collective peacekeeping and international security.

Before considering the main lessons learned from Russian peacekeeping in the territory of the CIS, it is thus useful to examine how the political-military leadership of the CIS organisation understands the essence of international peacekeeping. According to the CIS manual, On training and conduct of peacekeeping operations in the CIS, a peacekeeping operation is:

"... a complex of co-ordinated and interlocking objectives, tasks, locations and timings of the activity of specially trained military, police and civilian personnel in the support of efforts towards stabilisation of the situation in regions of potential or current conflicts, conducted in accordance with the Mandate, approved by the CIS Heads of State (UN Security Council, OSCE), aimed at stoppage of armed conflict and the creation of conditions facilitating its political settlement."

However, this manual was only approved by CIS members in 1996, while Russia has been allocating its human and material resources for conflict management in the CIS territory since 1992. In July 1992, in compliance with the bilateral Russia-Georgia Dagomistskoe agreement, a Russian airborne regiment was sent to South Ossetia to assist in the settlement of military conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia. This regiment was later relieved by an infantry battalion.

Practically at the same time, in accordance with another bilateral Russia-Moldova agreement (Principles of peaceful settlement of the armed conflict in the Trans-Dniester region of the Moldova Republic), six Russian battalions were positioned between warring factions in the buffer zone, which was determined by the control commission on conflict settlement. After the cease-fire agreement was implemented and the warring factions ended their combat actions, the situation in the region stabilised and Russia was able to decrease its military presence by autumn 1994, to a 650-strong contingent.

In the autumn of 1993, in accordance with a mandate issued by the CIS Council of the Heads of States, Russia’s 201st reinforced infantry division (6 000 personnel) formed the bulk of the collective mirotvorcheckie forces in Tadjikistan. Once again, in June 1994, Russia engaged in another peacekeeping mission in the region of Georgia-Abhazia, and deployed five battalions to the mission area within the framework of the CIS collective forces. In summary, from 1992 until 1997, more than 50 000 Russian military personnel participated in peacekeeping and crisis management operations conducted under the auspices of the UN and the CIS.

When analysing Russia’s peacekeeping activities and outcomes, it is necessary to briefly revisit the nature and roots of these activities. For example, what are the main factors that predetermined the character and methods of Russia’s peacekeeping in the CIS territory? Basically, the following factors determined the techniques and character of Russian-led peace support operations in the post-Soviet environment.

Firstly, Russia had to initiate and conduct its peace support operations in a situation that demonstrated the clear inability of federal and republican political authorities to handle ethnic rivalry and communal conflicts by peaceful means through negotiation and mediation. In a wider context, the dissolution of the USSR actually created a security dilemma for most of the nations in the former Soviet Union:

Secondly, due to the unpredictable dissolution of the USSR, there were no mechanisms in place to provide collective security in the post-Soviet environment. There was no legislation or training manuals on how to use military force in peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Moreover, in the absence of international support and desire to be involved in conflict settlement in the post-Soviet environment, Russia had to invent techniques and principles for the use of the army under the CIS banner. Furthermore, Russia had to bear the brunt of the financial and material burden for these conflict settlements itself.

Thirdly, the Russian military had never been trained for such ‘special’ and extremely sensitive types of activity. There was no military doctrine, no peacekeeping concept, nor even manuals for peacekeeping training. Moreover, when Russia’s military started their peacekeeping activities in the CIS territory, no such ‘peacekeeping’ functions had ever been envisaged for the army. Even on the command level, Russia’s peacekeeping forces had no clear vision of the essence of international peacekeeping and conflict management.

Due to these factors, and the deep interconnected political, economic and social ties between the former Soviet Union republics, peace support operations in the CIS territory exhibited the following main distinguishing features (in contrast to ‘classical’ UN peacekeeping):

At present, there are four peacekeeping operations being conducted under the auspices of the CIS. Since March 1998, there were a total of 11 908 regional peacekeepers deployed in the CIS territory (6 673 in Tadjikistan, 1 690 in Abhazia, 2 309 in the Trans-dniester region, and 1 236 in South Ossetia). Financial planning for the training and deployment of peacekeepers has been practically nil. In the federal law of the Russian Federation, The Federal Budget for 1998, for example, there was no expenditure allocated for peacekeeping, despite the fact that the military costs of sustaining the four CIS operations amounted to some 512,4 million roubles (US $80 million).

An analysis of the main features of Russia’s peacekeeping in the CIS territory reveals a number of other barriers to the further development of the international peacekeeping potential of the CIS as a regional multilateral organisation. Prime among these is the lack of political will among some CIS member countries to participate in peacekeeping under the auspices of the organisation. For example, despite the fact that a decision was made in March 1997 to establish the CIS committee on conflict situations, no political consensus has been reached on the functions of the committee to date. Some countries want it to evolve into a viable and permanent conflict management instrument, which would be authorised to take decisions and to exercise command and control functions over peacekeeping operations. Others want to limit its functions to that of a representative and consultative discussion forum.

Secondly, there is still an absence of effective civil-military relations, and of acceptance of civilian control over the military. On the strategic level, the CIS mechanism sometimes seems to work, and to result in positive decision-making. For example, the Council of Heads of State issues mandates and determines the duration of CIS missions. However, there is no political oversight, direction or control at the operational level. As a result, the civil and political functions within the mission area are carried out by the force commander. As a rule, the force commander can take any decision by himself, including those on intervention in conflict situations. On the other hand, he is supposed to consult with the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs/Council of Ministers of Defence. However, even when such consultation does occur, there is very limited authority at the ministerial level.

A third problem is that most countries do not, or cannot provide contingents for CIS peacekeeping forces, and Russia has to carry the major burden by itself. For example, despite the fact that the CIS approved the establishment of collective peacekeeping operations for Tadjikistan, Abhazia and Georgia, these operations have been carried out almost exclusively by Russian soldiers (90 per cent in Tadjikistan and 100 per cent in Abhazia).

Furthermore, there is no commonly approved vision on the joint employment of CIS peacekeeping forces. The position of the Ukraine, Kazakstan and Uzbekistan is that CIS peacekeeping forces should have the status of UN standby forces, which participate only in operations under the auspices of the UN and, in some cases, under the leadership of the OSCE. In this regard, it is worth noting that regional peacekeeping forces have been deployed in seven countries of the CIS, including Russia, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakstan, Kirgizia, Uzbekistan and the Ukraine.

Finally, these and other factors, including the ‘Chechnya syndrome’, have created a strong negative attitude among politicians and ordinary people to Russia’s peacekeeping in the near abroad. Furthermore, negative attitudes to modern peacekeeping in Russia have arisen as a result of the extensive coverage in the mass media of NATO’s bombardment of Yugoslavia.

In sum, Russian attitudes towards peace support operations, especially on the techniques and ways of conflict management in the new geopolitical environment, have generally begun to coincide with the views and approaches of the leading countries, including the US and UK. On the other hand, the lack of international support, as well as the absence of institutionalised mechanisms for conflict prevention and management among CIS member states have led to some negative tendencies not only in the field, but between Russia and its former allies, including the Ukraine and Georgia. These differences may prevent the further meaningful development of an effective collective mechanism for conflict prevention and management in the territory of the CIS.

Kosovo’s potential to create a humanitarian disaster and destabilise European security has been widely understood since the Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia fell apart in 1991. The roots of the Kosovo conflict have been cultivated by a number of factors emerging through many centuries. Due to the fact that Yugoslavia did not comply with the NATO ultimatum to observe human rights and provide for the return of refugees from the Yugoslav province of Kosovo on 24 March 1999, NATO started its first full-scale combat offensive against Yugoslavia. NATO conducted an intensive bombardment of the whole territory of Yugoslavia that lasted 78 days. After a peace agreement was reached, the NATO-led KFOR forces were deployed in Kosovo and divided the Yugoslav province into five sectors.

The deployment of the advance element of Russia’s peacekeeping force in Kosovo started on 12 June 1999, when the first 200 paratroopers secured the Slatina aerodrome in Pristina. Deployment was completed by 6 August 1999. The deployment of Russia’s peacekeeping force in Kosovo was authorised by the Russian Council of Federation and was conducted in accordance with the general headquarters plan, which was co-ordinated with NATO command. About 3 500 Russian soldiers were eventually deployed in Kosovo, in addition to some 1 000 items of combat material, including eleven helicopters and a field hospital. Military transportation aviation made forty flights, while seventeen railroad convoys were used for transportation. Sea transportation was carried out by large amphibious ships of the Black Sea fleet.

Russia’s peacekeepers were subsequently deployed in four out of five sectors in Kosovo: north (French sector), south (German), east (US) and central (UK). Russia’s military presence in most of the KFOR sectors contributed significantly to the smooth deployment of NATO troops into Kosovo. According to the military command, Russian paratroopers in all sectors are trained and ready for any possible challenges. They are equipped with powerful weapons: each airborne battalion in Kosovo has artillery and mortar support units, and combat helicopters are ready to assist in an emergency.

The deployment of Russian peacekeepers in Kosovo on 12 June 1999 and the securing of the Slatina aerodrome in Pristina exerted a major positive influence on the Serb population and gave them hope that their interests would also be preserved. By late June, Russian peacekeepers were stationed in the historic area of Kosovo Pole, where there was a battle in 1389 between invading Turkish and Serb forces. The Serbs lost the battle and their independence for more than 500 years. Later, near the place of the 14th century battle of Grachanica, the main Serb Temple of the Blessed Virgin was built. The establishment of Russian positions in the area of Kosovo Pole contributed to the stabilisation of the situation and led to a decrease in the distrust of Serbs toward British troops, in particular, and KFOR, in general. In this regard, it is worth noting a British peacekeeper’s assessment from the field, "if the Serbs had left Kosovo Pole, then they would have left Kosovo also, because that village is in indicator of the whole situation in the region."5

According to the Helsinki US-Russia agreement, Russia was asked to deploy two battalions in the German south sector: one in Malishevo and one in Orahovac. The area of responsibility designated in the south sector comprised 25 square kilometres, and included a population of some 18 000, of whom 3 000 were Serbs. The meeting of German and Russian troops in July 1999 in the vicinity of the city of Rudnik in the south sector elicited increased media attention and coverage — as this was the first time in the 20th century that Russian and German military forces had worked together — appropriately in a joint peace support operation in the Balkans.

Within a two month period, 30 000 KFOR troops had been deployed in Kosovo, the bulk of KFOR’s total final authorised strength of 50 000. The current national contributions to this force are presented in Table 3. Several other countries — Greece, Austria, Sweden, Denmark, Romania, and Finland — collectively provided several hundred more peacekeepers.

In addition to paratroopers, Russia sent a police contingent to Kosovo, which is part of the 3 000 strong UN Civilian Police (CIVPOL) component. The CIVPOL component was established in accordance with the UN mandate and is expected gradually to take over some of the stability and law enforcement functions from KFOR. In August 1999, Russia deployed 210 police officers from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to Kosovo. Together with the police officers from another 63 countries, they are carrying out their assigned duties in hazardous conditions with the aim of restoring law and order in the post-conflict environment.

Russia’s milicionery (police officers) are divided into two groups: 110 are included in the UN special police forces and the other 100 are members of the UN CIVPOL. It is worth noting that the inclusion in the mission of a UN special police force is a first for the world body. Hitherto, UN CIVPOL were only involved in monitoring the work of the local police, and in teaching or mentoring them in policing according to international standards. In Kosovo, the functions of UN CIVPOL are radically changed and expanded. They are guarding key points in Kosovo and will also be expected to participate in law enforcement operations.

Russia’s active participation in conflict management in and around Kosovo became a clear indicator of its contemporary pragmatic position aimed at active participation in the efforts of the international community to support peace processes in all regions of the world. However, the techniques used in the management of the Kosovo conflict by the US-led NATO bloc raised strong objections and concerns in Russia, and placed a big question mark over future Russian-NATO relations.

However, Kosovo also opened a new phase in the history of modern international peacekeeping. The techniques and technologies used in the management of the Kosovo conflict will exert a decisive influence, not only on the Russian disposition towards peacekeeping in the post-Soviet environment, but also on the forms and methods of conflict management to be utilised by the leading nations and regional organisations world-wide.

With more than 25 years of experience in participating in international peacekeeping, there has been a substantial evolution of Russian views on the nature and techniques of keeping peace and managing conflict under the auspices of the UN and other international organisations. Despite its initiation into UN peacekeeping in the Middle East in 1973, Russia’s active involvement in international peacekeeping only really began at the end of the 1980s, when historical political and economic reforms were initiated in the Soviet Union and consequently continued in Russia.

From 1992 onwards, Russia started to conduct and participate in peacekeeping operations in the near abroad — in the territory of the former Soviet Union. Despite the subsequent development of legal and political frameworks for joint peacekeeping under the auspices of the CIS, the majority of member countries have not supported a wider joint peacekeeping posture. This may be explained primarily in terms of perceived fears among some of the smaller CIS countries that joint peacekeeping under the auspices of the organisation could potentially strengthen Russia’s domination of the post-Soviet environment. On the other hand, many experts argue that there is an urgent need to establish applicable collective CIS peacekeeping structures and mechanisms. Such a crisis reaction potential would allow the organisation to:

Furthermore, Russia believes that the final goal of CIS peacekeeping must be to provide for the maintenance of law and order in the CIS-Eurasia environment through a variety of instruments, including CIS collective peacekeeping.

Over the past decade, Russia has managed to establish a relatively developed legal and political framework for its international peacekeeping and for the use of its armed forces in different regions under the auspices of the UN or other international organisations. There are clear indications that, despite economic difficulties, Russia will continue to be involved in international peacekeeping. However, the scale of such involvement would be based on a selective approach and strategic interests. Most probably, from a long-term perspective, Russia will try to strengthen its crisis reaction mechanism and capacities to be able to meet new challenges and to play an active and prominent role in most international peace support operations initiated and conducted under the auspices of the UN — or any other international organisation that produces a legal mandate and has effective command structures.