SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND THE ORIGIN OF A CONCEPT

It was highly politicised and tended to follow the ideological contours of the period. Military assistance was provided to the extent that it extended the sphere of influence of either the United States or the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics on the African continent and was linked to support for those governments (mostly undemocratic and often with appalling human rights records) that would be supportive of either of these blocs in the international arena and/or supportive of their interventions in the region or subregion concerned.



The nature of the assistance focused more on the provision of technical assistance and the development of military-technological capabilities than it did on the normative and organisational restructuring of the security sector in question. Issues concerning the creation of democratic civil-military relations, enhancing legislative and executive oversight over the armed forces and developing a military professional ethos consistent with the dictates of a modern democracy were largely ignored. Assistance sought to create well-equipped, well-trained and well-resourced armed forces that could, if required, maintain the government in question in power and, if so called upon, deploy forces against political groupings deemed as subversive.



Given the nature of this assistance — invariably bilateral agreements between the recipient country and the donor country — and the context within which it occurred — the Cold War — it was not surprising that this strategic approach was characterised by an overarching emphasis on state security as opposed to the security of individuals and of communities. Legislative reform and the restructuring of civil oversight mechanisms within the executive were often ignored, and the role of civil society (itself a term more commonly associated with the 1990s) was effectively absent from these interventions. A tradition of strong states was created (particularly among the Francophone countries) within which the security forces played a prominent and enduring role.



No real attempt was made to broaden the field of defence endeavour to include parliamentarians, the public and even important civilian policy sectors (the foreign policy and finance sectors, for example). The management of defence became the exclusive preserve of a group of highly skilled practitioners whose interaction with non-military actors was limited and whose preparedness to divulge the workings of their institution was virtually non-existent.

The end of the Cold War, the emergence of civil society (both conceptually and practically) as a new actor in governance relations, and the increasing focus of international financial institutions, bilateral donors and development agencies on governance issues, in general, created the space within which a strategic emphasis on security sector reform began to emerge.

OPERATIONALISING SECURITY SECTOR REFORM: STRATEGIC AND PRACTICAL CHALLENGES

Indigenising the concept of security sector reform

The content of security sector reform

Security sector reform and development: Ensuring an holistic and integrated agenda

The first is a maximalist approach that includes all institutions (whether statutory or non-statutory) that have the provision of physical security as their focus (armed forces, police, gendarmerie, border guards, militia and paramilitary institutions such as presidential guards); contribute to the development of conditions of national security (the intelligence services); ensure a climate of peace and stability (the criminal justice system and even, within a broadened definition of human security, those civilian government departments concerned with the provision of welfare services); and any such institution of a non-statutory nature of which the security potential and political significance merit its inclusion within the definition of the security sector (guerrilla forces, civilian defence forces and paramilitary organisations attached to particular political parties).



The second is a minimalist approach which sees the security sector as being composed of those statutory forces that have traditionally possessed the responsibility for ensuring the physical security of the state — the armed forces, the police, paramilitary organisations and, where they exist, militia organisations.



The third approach — the approach advocated by this article — is the pragmatic approach. This approach sees the security sector as being constituted out of the traditional statutory instruments of state-centred security — the armed forces, the police, paramilitary organisations and the intelligence services. It also includes such institutions as guerrilla forces (where such forces are eligible for eventual integration into new national security institutions and/or demobilisation), and indigenous military organisations that have played a positive role in contributing to the physical security of communities (civilian defence forces in Sierra Leone, and self-defence units in South Africa, for example)

This article advocates the adoption of the third approach for practical reasons. Practically, it provides a focus within which the immensely complex issue of security sector reform can be managed. Notwithstanding the political and social importance of human security, the ‘core’ components of the security sector, qua institutions, within the African context are the army, the police, the intelligence services, paramilitary organisations, as well as guerrilla and rebel armies. Failure to address these institutions effectively, taking into account the importance of linking them to broader security institutions (the rest of the criminal justice system) and larger development processes (reconstruction and development, the creation of a culture of good governance, and so on), could potentially jeopardise not only the stability of individual countries, but of entire subregions as well (as the military governments in both Nigeria and Sierra Leone vividly demonstrated).

TOWARDS AN AFRICAN TRADITION OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

The influence of Western intellectual and political traditions over both the political and intellectual traditions of the developing countries of the periphery has been well chronicled by a range of scholars and political analysts alike. The economic dependence of African countries on their former colonial masters was replicated in the introduction of various political, educational and intellectual systems that were markedly similar in both form and content to those of the departing Western colonisers, for instance.

Both the armed forces of African countries and the patterns of civil-military relations which began to emerge during the post-colonial period mirrored this close ascriptive relationship between coloniser and colonised. Although the ethnic and racial composition of the armed forces of the newly independent countries changed significantly in the first decade following independence, their culture, traditions and corporate identity remained strongly influenced by the discourses and ideological themes of those of the Western armed forces.

The emerging patterns of post-independence civil-military relations were also marked, at the level of institutions and mechanisms, by a strong similarity between the formal mechanisms and institutions of civil control found in the metropole and those introduced in the newly independent countries. Virtually all African countries possess, on paper at least, the battery of formal mechanisms via which, it is claimed, civilian control over the armed forces is ensured — although the form of these mechanisms may vary depending on the country concerned and the politico-juridical system which they have inherited and subsequently adapted. Countries possessing a stronger legislative tradition tend to emphasise the role of those legislative mechanisms entrusted with the task of civil oversight — parliamentary committees, ombudsman systems and approval of the budget, for example. Other countries with a stronger executive culture may rely more extensively on the regulatory role of civil servants and finance ministries, and presidential control to ensure the subordination of the armed forces to civil control.

Virtually all African security institutions, in general, and armed forces, in particular, are near mirror reflections of their former colonial security institutions. The rank structure is the same with very few exceptions (one of them being the largely unsuccessful attempts by the National Party in South Africa in the 1950s to create a rank structure based on those of the original Boer commandos), the doctrine has admitted to few indigenous revisions (notwithstanding the fact that many of the new defence forces were constituted out of indigenous African guerrilla armies with their own, non-Western traditions and doctrines), their institutional culture aping that of either the British, the French or the American value system and the ideological themes that pervade their discourse are manifestly European in origin.

An analysis of the political institutions of most African countries also reveals a range of formal mechanisms designed to ensure the maintenance of stable civil-military relations that are uncanningly Eurocentric in origin. Typically, these include constitutional provisions regulating the functions of the armed forces, parliamentary defence committees, public accounts committees, audit and exchequer acts, internal audits and service regulations. In some countries, fully-fledged ministries of defence and military ombudsman systems exist, while creative and varied forms of both civil and civilian oversight over the armed forces have been instituted in others.

Yet, notwithstanding this range of formal mechanisms, the salient reality underpinning African civil-military relations (and indeed the civil-military relations of most developing countries) is the fact that the subordination of the armed forces to civil control in most countries, when this has occurred, has been achieved by a complex system of processes and interfaces of a non-institutional nature. In virtually all these countries where the armed forces remain subordinate to the civil authorities (regardless of whether the latter are democratically elected or not), real control over the armed forces is wielded via a range of subjective interfaces and partnerships of which the formal mechanisms are either a component or, alternatively, are merely the formal expression of these power relations.

To give true expression to these traditions will therefore require a genuine recognition of the importance of African actors actually ‘owning’ these processes and of providing the necessary resources with which they can achieve the objectives that are, explicitly and implicitly, at the heart of the security sector reform discourse. Some guidelines in this regard are proposed below.

THEORETICAL POSSIBILITIES AND REVISIONS: AFRICAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS INTO THE 21ST CENTURY

It was stated above that developing countries, in general, and African countries, in particular, have often tended to mediate their experiences of civil-military relations through the traditions of either their former colonisers, or, with the impact of globalisation, through their major trading partners. The resulting intellectual, ideological and doctrinal dependence produces a situation aptly described as follows:

"As long as imported theories and cultural movements remain divorced from the opposition of forces which are the only means of lending specific importance and historical density to the signs produced in Latin American cultures, they act as little more than orthopaedic aides within the contexts of those cultures. Characteristically, this kind of production exhausts itself in mere formal repetitions or ‘doctrinal mannerism’."2

If African countries are to avoid the ‘doctrinal mannerism’ referred to here, then it is imperative that some of the key assumptions underpinning current Western concepts of security sector reform (to the extent that they are developed) should be contextualised within an African environment. A conceptual geography of security sector reform needs to be developed that is more consistent with the realities of African needs and African experiences, in general. The reification of one tradition and theoretical system to the detriment of other discourses can stifle and impede constructive intellectual debate, and can produce unintended political consequences if literally applied. A number of suggestions can be made regarding the proposed re-examination of the theoretical assumptions underpinning the future study and application of security sector reform strategies within Africa.

The limited utility of some Western ‘models’ of security sector reorganisation in an African environment should not be constituted as an attack on some of those principles which are cardinal to the practice of security sector reform. The limited utility or inappropriateness of certain formal mechanisms of civil control in developing countries, for instance, does not detract from the principles upon which these mechanisms are predicated (the principle of civil supremacy and the importance of precisely defining the roles and tasks of the armed forces, for instance). The limitation of the current Western civil-military relations discourse lies in its ontological pretensions and not in the formal, epistemological status of its central concepts. The latter can be redeemed and key categories of civil-military relations can be reconstructed through a critique of their ontological status — the manner in which they are constructed in relation to a plurality of contexts and realities. A key area of research in the future will be an investigation of ways in which these mechanisms can be made more effective and, significantly, how objective mechanisms can interface with subjective mechanisms to improve the overall levels of oversight over the armed forces.



The exploration of the hitherto neglected realm of partnerships (the subjective component) in civil-military relations does not imply an abrogation of the utility of objective mechanisms in ‘traditional’ civil-military relations theory. The primacy of the political and the importance of ensuring the subordination of the armed forces to elected civilian government continue within this expanded scope of civil-military relations. It is through a combination of both objective and subjective mechanisms, each developed in relation to the political and cultural peculiarities of the country concerned, that effective and context-specific civil-military relations can be developed.

At a practical level, a range of measures can be instituted to build capacity and mutual trust between the political and civilian élite and the command echelons of the armed forces. The active involvement of parliamentary representatives and non-military civilian experts in the defence policy process can contribute immensely to their understanding of both the nuances of the defence decision-making process and the peculiarities of military culture. Similarly, the exposure of the senior officer corps to the parliamentary process, the party-political process and the civilian budgeting process will sensitise them to the exigencies of political and civilian rule. Joint seminars, teambuilding exercises, active involvement by political and civilian representatives in the reservist formations of the armed forces, and joint visits to military installations are among some of the mechanisms that can be instituted in this regard. It is important to stress that such partnerships are not equal partnerships, however, and take place within the hierarchy of authority provided for by either a democratic dispensation or, where a ‘traditional’ liberal democratic system does not prevail, a situation where the inviolable authority of the elected civilian authority is respected (as in Uganda, for instance).



The scope of security sector reform needs to be expanded to incorporate non-institutional actors and mechanisms, as well as a consideration of the role that police agencies, intelligence services and, in some cases, private security companies may play in either ensuring or undermining civil-military relations. In the case of the former, the South African defence transition illustrates the critical role that can be played by organs of civil society in contributing to the shaping of the mission of the armed forces and ensuring their subordination to civil control. In the case of the latter, it is instructive to note that the downsizing of armed forces in many developing countries (a product of both budgetary constraints and interlined donor agency/IMF injunctions) has led to a corresponding increase in the size and power of the police force and the civilian intelligence agencies. Notwithstanding the emphasis on their civilianisation, and although not equipped with the organisational and logistic ability to influence civil-military relations at a national level, they do possess the capacity to influence civil-military relations at a regional and, more particularly, a local level.

Equally perturbing has been the transfer of state functions, intentionally and unintentionally, from state agencies to private security companies — a phenomenon most vividly exemplified by the influence of the South African private military company Executive Outcomes in various African conflicts, and the expansion of private security companies throughout Southern Africa generally (the latter increasingly consisting of former police and military personnel drawn from both the former guerrilla armies of the liberation movements and soldiers from the old regular forces). Ultimately, it may be more appropriate in many developing countries to speak either of civilian-military relations or even civilian-security relations rather than simply focusing on civil-military relations in the narrower institutional sense of the word.



While it may not be possible to erect an integrated and overarching theoretical system or an axiomatic foundational basis which is capable of explaining all security sector reform scenarios, it will be possible to elucidate the central values of such a project. The normative dimension of civil-military relations theory needs to be stressed and bolstered and this should provide a lodestar for all interventions in the civil-military debate in developing countries. The basis of this normative framework emphasises the importance of democratic civil-military relations and stresses those universal moral values of transparency, accountability and the primacy of elected government within this equation.



A new methodology is required that is capable of constituting the basis for an ongoing and active intervention in the civil-military relations debate within the developing world. It could be argued that any theoretical revision can only be effected on the basis on an interdisciplinary approach that incorporates both African and Western intellectual traditions originating from disciplines such as sociology, political science, international relations, state theory, and the critical-reflective traditions developed in schools of thought such as the Frankfurter Schule, postmodernism and elsewhere.



Finally, the concept of the ‘apolitical’ soldier (popular, if somewhat misapplied, in the discourses of many developing world armed forces) needs to be re-examined. Even in democracies and countries with little experience of the intrusion of the armed forces into the political realm, the armed forces are invariably involved in politics in varying degrees. This involvement (whether of a benign or more assertive nature) inevitably results in the penetration of political themes and concepts into the discourse and, ultimately, the construction of the corporate identity of the armed forces (identities as diverse as those of the revolutionary soldier; the Western professional soldier of the US and the United Kingdom, or the ‘citizen-in-uniform’ of the Bundeswehr).

The influence of the ‘political’ may be manifest in an asymmetrical and differentiated manner within the practices of different armed forces depending on the peculiarities of the country concerned, but is always present at the heart of their activities. This may be reflected in the constitutional imperatives which the armed forces are expected to adhere to, the involvement of the armed forces in the parliamentary, policy and state budgeting process, the access of the armed forces to the president as commander-in-chief or, simply, the different political persuasions of the members of the armed forces.

It is not only inevitable that the armed forces will be ‘political’, but it is also perhaps desirable that they are so inclined. It is imperative that the armed forces of developing countries, and particularly those that are involved in the delicate task of consolidating democracy, are fully conversant with the democratic features of the system which they serve (hence the need for a robust civic education programme among its members), understand and are integrated into the government’s key policy initiatives (especially when these relate to the encouragement of domestic development and stability), and are able, on a discursive and interactive basis, to interact with the elected civil authorities around a range of issues critical to their national mandate. What is critical about this ‘political’ role, however, is the fact that it does not include the terrain of the party-political (and armed forces as such must always be non-partisan in orientation), that their partnership with the civil authorities is not an equal partnership, and that their involvement in the terrain of national policy (politics with a lowercase ‘p’ as opposed to politics with an uppercase ‘P’) that is clearly circumscribed and mutually acknowledged. It will be on this basis that a more fruitful debate on security sector reform in developing countries — a debate less ascriptive than many of the present theoretical assumptions — will be generated.

 CONCLUSION

The security sector reform debate is still in its embryonic stage. Considerable political, practical, conceptual and strategic work still needs to be done on security sector reform before a fully fleshed out and sufficiently flexible approach can be developed that will be easily applicable to most situations. Security sector reform represents an ideal opportunity for both donors and recipient countries to begin with the serious task of reconstructing the battered security sector within many parts of the developing world — an architecture that has been used and abused by both colonisers and post-independence governments alike. Abraham Lincoln’s words are apt in this regard:

"We can only succeed by concert ... The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occassion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise to the occasion. As our case is new so we must think anew and act anew. We must disenthral ourselves."3

Endnotes

D Hendrickson, A review of security sector reform, Working Paper 1, Centre for Defence Studies, University of London, 1999, p 9.



R Nelly, ‘Postmodernism and periphery’, in T Docherty (ed), Postmodernism: A reader, Columbia University Press, New York, 1993, p 465.



Message to Congress, 1 December 1862.