Towards an Integrated Doctrine for Peace Support Operations in Africa

Mark Malan
Institute for Security Studies

Published in Monograph 46, Building stability in Africa: Challenges for the new millennium, February 2000

The United Nations has been quite unambiguous in articulating what it can and cannot do in terms of peace support. Basically, it cannot do much beyond Chapter VI peacekeeping in the realm of military intervention. African coalitions, on the other hand, have proven themselves capable of conducting fairly sustained multinational operations that have involved some heavy combat engagements. Since 1990, African multilateral interventions have developed a momentum of their own, and they have increasingly leaned towards some type of peace enforcement, rather than regional peacekeeping operations in a benign security environment.

The principles guiding such interventions have yet to find expression in a realistic intervention doctrine, informed by practice, that goes beyond the ‘right of humanitarian intervention’ and the paying of lip-service to An agenda for peace. From an institutional and legal point of view, the issue of developing multilateral intervention doctrine is a global one. In practice, however, the problem is more pressing in some regions than in others. Africa and the Balkans, for example, have emerged as the most dangerous and challenging environments for the conduct of contemporary peace operations.

The member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) have learned some serious lessons from their experiences in the Balkans, and are at an advanced stage of developing doctrine for more ‘robust’ interventions. On the other hand, the mainstream debate on multilateral intervention in Africa, which is shaped to a large degree by Western powers, continues to focus on the need for more ‘UN-type’ peacekeeping training for African soldiers. There have thus been few meaningful advances in doctrinal thinking in support of regional or coalition peace operations in Africa.

Part of the reason for this doctrinal lacuna relates to restrictions by donor countries on the use of development aid for military engagement — including the development of military doctrine for multilateral interventions. It also reflects the inherent difficulties of building consensus among the 53 member states of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) around a suitable military doctrine for peace support that goes beyond ‘classic’ consensual operations, for fear that it might threaten the principle of state sovereignty.

The aim of this article is to introduce the concept of ‘integrated doctrine’ for military interventions in support of peace processes, and briefly to outline its application to doctrinal development within the North Atlantic alliance framework. This provides the basis for comparing and mapping the progress made towards doctrinal consensus in Africa — at the continental and subregional levels. The contradictions thus revealed, will hopefully serve as something of a wake-up call for those concerned with the development of African ‘peacekeeping capacity’.

THE CONCEPT OF ‘INTEGRATED DOCTRINE’

Military doctrine has a different content and emphasis at various levels of application. At the supranational level, doctrine manifests itself in various tenets of international law — the most overarching, of course, being the UN Charter itself. At a national level, doctrine is often articulated by white papers that explain broad policy guidelines from a political perspective. Operational level doctrine has a somewhat different focus. It concerns itself with the principles that govern the conduct of campaigns and major operations, and imparts understanding. At the tactical level, doctrine focuses more on instruction and training and ensures that commanders have a common foundation on which to base plans for the execution of their mission.

Among the countries of the world, there are also many different formal definitions of doctrine. For example:

The British Army defines military doctrine as "a formal expression of military knowledge and thought, that the Army accepts as being relevant at a given time, which covers the nature of current and future conflicts, the preparation of the Army for such conflicts and the methods of engaging in them to achieve success."1



According to the South African Department of Defence, "Operational Doctrine consists of the main principles and concepts by which armed forces guide their actions in military operations in support of national objectives. Doctrine derives from, and must be consistent with, defence policy and structure."2



The US Army defines doctrine quite simply as "... the statement of how America’s Army intends to conduct war and operations other than war."3

While such national military definitions of doctrine vary in form, there is a commonality with respect to their substance. At a multinational level, it is therefore not impossible to reach definitional consensus on the nature of doctrine. For example, NATO has agreed on the definition of doctrine as "[f]undamental principles by which the military forces guide their action in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application."4

However, at the global level, there is also substantial divergence with respect to doctrinal matters — a divergence rooted particularly in the Cold War division of the world into two opposing military-ideological blocs. The confrontation between the USSR and the West effectively also divided the world into two large doctrinal blocs, with less developed countries adopting either Western-style doctrines, often modeled on British or French ideas, or Soviet-style doctrines, with active Soviet involvement at all levels of their military development. Military bureaucracies are notoriously resistant to change. China, for instance, is still following a military style established in the 1950s during the period of its closest political engagement with the USSR. The Cold War doctrinal legacy therefore remains prominent in many developing countries.5

A central problem is thus posed by the remaining discrepancy between the Soviet and the Western conception of doctrine. When Russians discuss their ‘military doctrine’, they naturally include political principles — such as doctrinal statements about the right to intervene in the so-called ‘near abroad’. This means that numerous international discussions on doctrine for multilateral military interventions in support of peace have never really taken off.

The African debate on peace support doctrine suffers from all these maladies. The colonial heritage saw a rough divide between those African militaries that espoused French doctrine and those that espoused British military doctrine. The situation was exacerbated during the Cold War, when the armed forces of many countries were infused with Russian/Chinese-style military doctrine. Indeed, there are some cases (for instance, in warlord armies) where it is not clear whether there is any military doctrine at all. On the positive side, it may be said that Africans, collectively, have some direct experience with the military doctrine of four of the permanent five Security Council members — and that they may be uniquely positioned to unify or synthesise such thinking into a viable doctrine for multinational peace operations.

Despite the considerable obstacles involved, some see an inexorable trend towards the acceptance of a universal military doctrine for the conduct of peace operations. Christopher Lord has coined the phrase ‘integrated military doctrine’ to describe what he sees as a process through which the military doctrines of armed forces around the world are being integrated into a single global system. This, he argues, is an objective process that is happening regardless of any attempts to foster doctrinal consensus in the realm of multinational peace operations.

The immediate reason for the emergence of such a process in the early 1990s was the end of the Cold War and the bipolar world. However, Lord contends that the global process of integrating military doctrine is not driven solely by this seismic shift in world politics. The process of ‘globalisation’ is also changing the whole nature of world society. Politics, economics, medicine, law and all other public activities must adapt themselves to these changes — and military policy is no exception.

Since there is always a political and ideological component in military doctrine, Lord admits that there is no reason to suppose that the process of integration will be complete. Countries will preserve their independent military traditions, in the same way that they will preserve their political traditions and their independence and sovereignty, in general. The starting point for a deliberate process of developing integrated military doctrine must therefore be the recognition that the term ‘doctrine’ simply means different things in different countries and languages. From a theoretical perspective, the process should encourage an inclusive approach — one that does not exclude those countries embracing ‘political’ doctrinal statements from the military doctrinal debate.

Inclusiveness should be combined with the notion of seeking minimal consensus. The latter requires recognition of the fact that it might be impossible to reach agreement on comprehensive doctrine all at once, but that agreement on specific issues and on specific principles can still be reached. Consensus on discrete ‘doctrinal statements’ can then be built into national and multinational doctrines in an incremental fashion.

Unfortunately, emerging consensus has frequently been obscured by a preoccupation with concepts such as peacekeeping, peacebuilding, peace missions, peace operations, peace support operations, complex emergencies, humanitarian interventions, operations other than war, and many more. The ensuing pursuit of terminological clarity, though not unimportant in some respects, tends to hide the important common denominator — that all these interventions are at root the same. They all share the same essential logic: there is a conflict in progress, and this results in a military deployment that inserts a force into the conflict area. This gives these deployments a special character, since they are neither offensive nor defensive.

Each individual case of intervention may be unique, and have its own complexities. For example, there may be more than two sides to a conflict, and it may not be practical to deploy troops so that they are physically interpositioned between these parties. However, the point is that the overarching purpose of all such operations is not to participate in the conflict, but to act impartially to bring it to an end. Minimal consensus therefore already appears to exist on the fundamental purpose of multinational military intervention in support of peace processes.6

This essential logic of intervention has been agreed upon and has found doctrinal expression among the nineteen NATO member countries, in the form of a doctrine for the planning and conduct of peace support operations. Peace support operations are defined as " ... multi-functional operations conducted impartially in support of a UN/OSCE mandate ... they include peacekeeping and peace enforcement as well as conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace building and humanitarian operations." While all these elements of peace support operations are undeniably important, the major concern of military doctrine must be peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

There is little room for debate or speculation on extant peacekeeping doctrine, as it has evolved from 51 years of UN experience. The principles of peacekeeping are largely uncontested across existing global divides. The crunch comes when the debate turns to peace enforcement. This constitutes the logical focus of the further discussion of NATO progress within the scope of this article.

MINIMAL CONSENSUS AT WORK: NATO’S PEACE ENFORCEMENT DOCTRINE

NATO has articulated a doctrine that "... is to be used as the guidance for planning all NATO Peace Support Operations (PSO) and exercises ... where practical, it takes account of national doctrines and UN policies."7 Such national doctrines include, of course, the military doctrine of the most powerful alliance member. Whereas most countries attempt to separate various forms of counterinsurgency and low intensity warfare doctrine from the notion of peace operations, the US recognises the utility of incorporating such doctrine into its concept of peace support operations. According to the US Army:

"The principles of OOTW [Operations Other Than War], as outlined in FM 100-5, apply to the conduct of peace operations. Although peace operations are clearly OOTW, many tasks at the tactical and operational levels may require the focused and sustained application of force. This is particularly true of [peace enforcement] actions. Thus, while the principles of OOTW provide guidance for the conduct of the great majority of peace operations, the principles of war and doctrine for conduct of war in FM 100-5 must be included in the planning process for all peace operations."8

With this kind of thinking, it is not surprising that extant NATO peace support operation doctrine goes way beyond ‘UN peacekeeping doctrine’ — especially with respect to the utility and use of force in pursuit of mission objectives. NATO doctrine is also strongly informed by British Army doctrinal thinkers, who draw on years of experience in counterinsurgency operations. NATO has thus managed to produce some unambiguous doctrinal statements on ‘peace enforcement’ as the significant alternative to peacekeeping when consent and compliance are absent, but where there is a strong rationale for multinational intervention.

Indeed, it has been stated upfront that:

"NATO has the unique capability to deploy, direct, and command and control operations mounted to take peace enforcement action against those responsible for threats to peace or security, or who carry out acts of aggression. As such, this is the most likely task for a NATO force in support of the UN."9

The doctrine elaborates on the fact that the link between political and military objectives of peace enforcement must be very close, and that the aim of peace enforcement operations "... will not be the defeat or destruction of an enemy, but rather to compel or coerce any or all parties to comply with a particular course of action."

In NATO thinking, the increasingly popular (though not uncontested) notion of ‘humanitarian intervention’ is firmly linked to the concept of peace enforcement. NATO peace support operation doctrine does not refer to ‘humanitarian intervention’, but does specify ‘humanitarian operations’ as a subset of peace support operations. By way of definition, it explains simply that:

"Humanitarian operations are conducted to alleviate human suffering. Humanitarian operations may precede or accompany humanitarian activities provided by specialised civilian organisations."10

Briefly mentioned under the rubric of humanitarian operations are ‘humanitarian assistance’, ‘disaster relief’, and ‘protection of human rights’. Under the latter, the doctrine states that:

"The protection of human rights is a fundamental element of all military operations. However, the prevention and redress of wide spread abuses to human rights will require a [peace enforcement] force ..."11

Importantly, the doctrine goes on to emphasise that, "[i]n the conduct of [peace enforcement] the link between political and military objectives must be extremely close", while recognising that such interventions are "... increasingly into situations of widespread human rights abuses including genocide and ethnic cleansing associated with collapsed or collapsing states."12 In effect, such doctrinal statements obviate the need to agonise over a doctrine for ‘humanitarian intervention’ — for this is integral to present conceptualisations of peace enforcement.

However, any forceful conflict resolution action in Africa will have to be undertaken by Africans themselves. Beyond the inherent limitations of the UN system , sensitivity to violence and the low tolerance for casualties effectively eliminate Western involvement in any type of peace enforcement operation that goes beyond the ‘distant retaliation doctrine’ underpinning Operation Desert Storm and the more recent NATO aerial operations in Kosovo. The reluctance to deploy ground forces in combat situations where the distinction between friend and foe, or soldier and civilian is unclear, is far greater when the region in question is of little strategic significance — as is the case with most conflict zones in Africa.

CONTINENTAL EFFORTS TO DEVELOP AFRICAN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATION DOCTRINE

Even if some or most of NATO’s entry and exit requirements can be met, the prospects of outside intervention remain weak as long as no Western power feels threatened by African conflicts. This is morally indefensible and potentially subversive of the idea of enforcing general human standards under multilateral authorisation, and clearly contravenes the legal obligation of governments to deal with acts of genocide. However, it serves no purpose to bemoan the situation and wait for the dawning of a new international rectitude. Africans should rather focus on what can (and cannot) be done by Africans themselves under these circumstances.

These sentiments were echoed in the following opening statement by the Secretary General of the OAU at a meeting convened to deliberate the future of peacekeeping in Africa:

"OAU Member States can no longer afford to stand aloof and expect the International Community to care more for our problems than we do, or indeed to find solutions to those problems which in many instances, have been of our own making. The simple truth that we must confront today, is that the world does not owe us a living and we must remain in the forefront of efforts to act and act speedily, to prevent conflicts from getting out of control."13

Dr Salim was speaking at the Second Meeting of the Chiefs of Defence Staff of Member States of the OAU Central Organ, which was held in Harare from 24-25 October 1997. This meeting was specifically tasked to arrive at concrete and workable recommendations relating to the logistics, finance, training, doctrine, structure and operational planning needed for the conduct of African peace support operations. The mandate emanated from the previous year’s meeting of the Chiefs of Staff, which had called for a working group of military experts to "... come out with practical and realistic recommendations on the technical issues raised" at the meeting on the subject of peace operations under OAU auspices.14

The OAU Secretariat had decided that this experts meeting would be held just prior to the second meeting of the Chiefs of Staff, and that it would be divided into three subgroups, dealing respectively with logistics and funding; doctrine, training and liaison; and command, control and communications. The subgroup on doctrine, training and liaison was more specifically requested to develop "... guidelines which should inform doctrine and training" for the conduct of peace operations.15

In order to focus the deliberations of this group, a background discussion paper was provided by the Secretariat, and three officers were tasked to make brief presentations on issues of doctrine and training. The group would address more specific issues as they arose during the course of the deliberations. Given the diverse and multinational composition of the group, it was inevitable that discussions could not be rigidly structured, and space was allowed for coping with national sensitivities and differences of opinion.

Such sensitivities soon became apparent, with one member objecting at the outset to the group’s intent to discuss doctrine. The objection was based on the grounds that the matters under discussion had no approval at the policy level, and that doctrine was a political and strategic concept. This, it was felt, implied abrogating the OAU principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, and could not be discussed by a group of military experts. After lengthy deliberation, it was decided to refer to the development of recommendations on ‘guidelines’ or ‘concepts’ for the conduct of peace operations, rather than to ‘doctrine’.

There were also strong objections to the content of the discussion document. It was argued that it contained revolutionary ideas which reflected extracontinental proposals that contradicted both the OAU Charter and the Cairo Declaration of 1993. The meeting continued only after it was explained that the discussion document had no official status, and that it did not negate the classic peacekeeping principles of consent, impartiality and the non-use of force. The document merely urged the experts to go beyond these principles to suggest ways in which the OAU might take meaningful action in order to prevent and resolve conflicts and alleviate human suffering.

Nevertheless, after two days of deliberation, the group could only reach consensus on the notion that the OAU should adopt and adapt the concepts, principles and practices of UN peacekeeping, and that member states should only engage in peace operations mandated by the UN. The latter point, namely that all operations involving OAU member states may only be conducted under a UN mandate was challenged by the question: "What happens when there is a crisis or impending crisis, and there is no UN mandate?" This was followed by the more pertinent question: "Why would the UN not react to a crisis?" The answers included a lack of finances and other resources — including political will.

It was felt that this problem may best be addressed by OAU efforts to strengthen UN capacity for peace operations, by placing African crises on the UN agenda, and by providing the bulk of a ready force package for utilisation by the UN. However, it was noted that the OAU or subregional organisations may have to take action first in order to place matters on the UN agenda, as illustrated by the decision of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to impose sanctions on the military rulers of Sierra Leone, which was later endorsed by the Security Council.

Given the reality of a number of existing crises on the continent, the need was expressed for a clear vision of what the OAU can realistically be expected to do to ameliorate conflict where the UN is unable, unwilling, or slow to act. The concept that eventually emerged for the conduct of OAU peace operations included the use of subregional organisations, as a possible first line of reaction where the OAU is unable to act.

After considering the report and recommendations of the ‘Group of Military Experts’, the Chiefs of Defence Staff adopted the following pertinent recommendations on the concept of African peace support operations:

All peace support operations in Africa should be conducted in a manner consistent with both the UN and the OAU Charters and the Cairo Declaration.



The OAU should evolve a glossary of OAU peace operation terminology to ensure common understanding.



As a principle, the OAU should take the first initiative in approaching the UN to deploy a peace operation in response to an emergency on the continent. If the UN is unresponsive, the OAU must take preliminary action while continuing its efforts to elicit a positive response from the world body.



All peace support operations conducted by subregional organisations in Africa should be endorsed by the OAU.



Where the OAU deploys a peace operation, this should be an all-African force. In the event of a UN operation in Africa, the UN principle of universality should be respected. Where Africa provides the majority of troops, the force commander must be an African.16

The working group also reasoned that, if the concept of peace operations under the auspices of the OAU is accepted, then the Central Organ needs to have some type of military instrument at hand for preliminary interventions. It was felt that this may be provided by a workable system of African standby arrangements, and that such a system would enjoy more support if contributors had an idea of the overall requirement of the end-user (the OAU). In this regard, the Chiefs of Defence Staff recommended that:

"The OAU could earmark a brigade-sized contribution to standby arrangements from each of the five African sub-regions as a starting point, which could then be adjusted upwards or downwards according to evolving circumstances."

They added that, "[w]hile the OAU should adopt standard UN staff procedures for training and operations, it must also develop its own Standard Operating Procedures" and that "these must be disseminated to Member States for use in training and preparation for peace operations."17

Needless to say, there has been little progress on the implementation of any of these recommendations at the continental level. Nor has a third meeting of the Chiefs of Staff been convened, which might trigger some urgent action in this regard. Not that this makes much difference from the perspective of doctrinal development. The recommendations that emerged on ‘the concept of African peace support operations’ were a compromise that amounts to little more than a move towards the ‘Africanisation’ of UN peacekeeping — something that had already been done in Angola and which was more recently applied in the Central African Republic.

However, the Chiefs of Staff did provide recognition for the concept of subregional engagement in peace operations, and this is perhaps where more significant progress will be made in the realm of future doctrinal development.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC), as an intergovernmental entity, has not succeeded in progressing much further than the OAU in the articulation of a common doctrine for peace support operations that includes peace enforcement. Indeed, while the southern region, over the past year, has witnessed two extremely forceful ‘multilateral’ military interventions under the auspices of SADC, the organisation’s military leaders have clung to the notion of embracing a ‘universal UN doctrine’ for the conduct of peace support operations. Doctrinal development has therefore been informed less by regional multinational operational experience than by ‘mainstream’ UN-type training and capacity-building initiatives.

For example, the most recent meeting of the Operations Sub-Sub Committee of the (Southern African) Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) did not address the issue of doctrine for peace support operations, but chose to focus rather on training and capacity-building issues.18 The debate on the latter has largely been shaped by the Harare-based Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC), which specialises in the presentation of a variety of UN peacekeeping courses for select members of the armed forces of the SADC countries. This role and focus have been embraced by the ISDSC, with the Operations Sub-Committee recommending that the "ISDSC Defence Sub-Committee officially endorses Zimbabwe as the Regional Peace Keeping Training Centre." The March 1999 meeting of this committee was also presented with a report by the RPTC on a seminar that it had convened to consider the future of peacekeeping training in the SADC region.

Importantly, the deliberations of this seminar were guided by the assumption that: "[a]ny [peacekeeping] capacity building within SADC should occur within the UN framework and comply with UN doctrine, procedures, guidelines, etc."19 The only decision taken at this seminar that is vaguely related to doctrinal development, is recorded as follows: "Drawing from the direction of the ISDSC, the RPTC would provide guidance on peacekeeping concepts and serve as a repository for regional peacekeeping Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) and policy documents."20 Thus, at the (official) regional level, there is a blind adherence to ‘UN doctrine’ with any further debate on doctrine for peace enforcement remaining taboo.

At the unofficial level, however, some modest but promising progress has been made in advancing a more ‘enlightened’ approach to the issue of doctrinal development. On the initiative of the Institute for Security Studies and the Institute for International Relations (IIR), the RPTC agreed to host an unofficial regional workshop on Integrated principles for peace support operations from 24-26 August 1999.21 Mindful of the objections raised to the term ‘doctrine’ at the second OAU Chiefs of Defence Staff Meeting, the stated aim of this workshop was to:

"Enhance mutual understanding of the principles and guidelines for the conduct of PSO at the operational and tactical levels, through the proposal of workable solutions to existing problems and the recommendation of research projects to address those key problems/issues that could not be adequately addressed by the participants."

The deliberations of the workshop participants were informed by a number of discussion papers, including a draft working paper to orientate participants and to guide discussions. The idea was to initiate a deliberate process which examines the best evidence of past conflicts, and draws on African opinions and African experiences to bring together a considered, robust set of statements that will inform the evolution of doctrine for peace support. It was agreed that the workshop should focus on doctrine (i.e. the operational and tactical levels) rather than political, legal or strategic matters. These higher levels normally result in nebulous discussions without form or conclusion. The working document contained some forthright questions, such as:

Participants found that the much vaunted UN doctrine on peace support operations consists of some training notes, manuals, and videos covering tactical matters. There is also a seventeen-page document on the conduct of peacekeeping operations, but it is thin on detail. Similarly, peacekeeping manuals from the Nordic countries emphasise ‘peacekeeping’ techniques at the tactical level, largely to the exclusion of operational concepts. These publications all emphasise techniques, drills and procedures, and do not really address key issues of doctrine at the operational level.

It was also felt that training exercises within SADC, based on such tactical skills, have emphasised doctrinal weaknesses, and that SADC should train to a common doctrine that embraces the types of peace support operations that member countries are conducting, or are most likely to conduct in future. At the moment, standard operating procedures are being developed to fill the doctrinal lacuna. However, these do not address critical facets such as multinational command arrangements and relations between the regional military and civilian structures.

Without the political baggage associated with ‘official status’, participants readily agreed that the doctrinal deficit in Africa centres around the need to define circumstances which should trigger peace enforcement methods. They agreed that extant traditional peacekeeping doctrine is not sufficiently robust to confront the new challenges of conflict resolution in Africa, and that warfare doctrine is overly destructive. Furthermore, warfighting doctrine is predicated upon the defeat of a designated enemy and does not address the peacebuilding and reconciliation challenges necessary to create a secure and self-sustaining society and environment.

Participants felt that there is a need for a more comprehensive doctrinal publication to address this issue coherently and provide, inter alia, operational concepts, as well as tactical standard operating procedures. While extant (NATO) peace support operation doctrine goes a long way in filling the doctrinal lacuna between traditional peacekeeping and warfare, it needs to be updated and modified to suit the realities of Africa. The workshop subsequently arrived at a significant number of ‘doctrinal statements’, or observations with doctrinal implications, based on African operational experience, that should inform future doctrinal development.

Participants also identified a number of areas that could not be adequately addressed during the workshop, but which nevertheless merited further analysis. These have been expressed as future academic research projects.22 In terms of immediate steps towards addressing the ‘doctrinal deficit’, the preference was expressed for a comprehensive draft publication, which could be circulated for comment as widely as possible in the form of a discussion document — rather than attempting to work from scratch and ‘redesign the wheel’.

The author of the current NATO doctrine23 was therefore asked (and kindly agreed) to produce a draft version of his ‘peace support operation’ doctrine which takes account of the special needs of peace support operations in the African context and incorporates the doctrinal ideas developed during the workshop. The product of this endeavour will be in the form of a working draft which will be circulated among select African command and staff colleges (and relevant African research institutions) with requests for comments. The idea is to begin an interactive process of peer review and refinement that will lead to greater consensus on peace support operation doctrine in Africa to influence decision-making and training across the continent.

Participants recognised the problem of endorsement, and realised that the process of developing a common and integrated doctrine will necessarily be continuous, becoming more and more inclusive in time. There was consensus that the widening process should result in the early inclusion of West African experts in the debate. Ideally, deliberations should extend to all regions and language groups in Africa — but it was agreed that this must be preceded by a deepening and consolidation of tentative gains, lest these be lost through premature ‘overreach’.

Although not articulated or presented as such, some basic tenets of African doctrine for peace support operations are emerging from West Africa. This has not been a deliberate construct of ECOWAS, but rather a by-product of the involvement of members of this organisation in regional peace operations over the past nine years.

The ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was formed spontaneously in August 1990 as a direct reaction to the carnage caused by the civil war in Liberia. The communiqué of the summit meeting of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee held in Banjul, The Gambia from 6-8 August 1990, mandated ECOMOG to keep peace in Liberia by separating the warring factions, as a precursor to further diplomatic initiatives aimed at the resolution of the crisis. The force was also tasked with the provision of humanitarian assistance and with the creation of a security zone around the capital city of Monrovia. The co-operation of the belligerent factions was assumed and expected.24

Armed with a peacekeeping mandate, ECOMOG forces landed in Monrovia on 24 August 1990, only to be met by fierce gunfire from the forces of Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia. No cease-fire was in place and the refusal of a major party to the conflict to accept the impartiality of ECOMOG meant that the force found it extremely difficult to execute its peacekeeping mandate. Indeed, within its relatively short lifespan, ECOMOG was forced to go the full cycle of peace support operations — from peacekeeping and peace enforcement in Liberia, to ‘restorative intervention’ in Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau.25

Speaking at a recent ISS conference, former ECOMOG force commander, Brigadier-General Mitikishe Khobe categorised the type of peace operations conducted under the auspices of ECOWAS as intervention missions; peace enforcement missions; and peacekeeping missions.26 His description of each type of operation is briefly summarised below.

ECOMOG intervention missions involve combat action against insurgents or factions which resist the authority of the de facto government of a country suffering from a complex emergency caused by armed violence. Such intervention missions are aimed at securing a cease-fire, creating an atmosphere conducive to negotiations, and protecting non-combatants through the establishment of safe havens for civilians under direct ECOMOG protection.

Although such interventions should be premised on the consent of the conflicting parties, it is accepted that the situation prior to an intervention operation will often preclude securing the agreement of all the parties to the conflict. Nevertheless, ECOMOG intervention operations have been successful in forcing armed factions to accept negotiations which, in most cases, lead to the signing of cease-fire agreements.

ECOMOG has been tasked to monitor and enforce the provisions of cease-fire agreements brought about through intervention operations and diplomatic peacemaking efforts. Because the factions that have signed these agreements have not always done so in good faith, violations have been rampant. ECOMOG has thus accepted the need to use force to get recalcitrant parties to adhere to what they have agreed upon. This may involve outright and large-scale military operations against the most belligerent insurgent group or groups.

ECOMOG peace enforcement operations have always resulted in a widening of the initial safe havens established for non-combatants. This is due to the fact that the belligerents have not been conventional armies, and their strategy has been to inflict intolerable hardship on the civilian population in order to make ECOMOG and the legitimate authority it is supporting unpopular. ECOMOG operations have thus also aimed at compelling recalcitrant armed factions to realise that they cannot obtain their political objectives by military action.

Where a negotiated general peace settlement has been reached, ECOMOG has transitioned from enforcement to peacekeeping operations. A consistent aspect of such settlements has been the inclusion of provisions for the disarmament of belligerents, the formation of an interim or transitional government (including military reform), the return of refugees, and the staging of a general election. ECOMOG is typically tasked to carry out disarmament, ensure the security of the interim or transitional government, as well as UN personnel, and to assist in the military reform and the conduct of the general elections.

ECOMOG’s transition from peace enforcement to peacekeeping roles has obviously not been easy. It takes considerable effort, time and diplomacy to persuade the factions that were engaged in combat with ECOMOG that the force is capable of neutrality. However, ECOMOG has largely overcame such difficulties. In Liberia, the force successfully executed the disarmament of combatants and assisted with the return to a state of law and order.27

This description of ECOMOG operations roughly parallels (or indeed precedes) developments in NATO doctrinal thinking. In fact, it goes quite a bit further than extant NATO doctrine in that it provides for ‘intervention operations’. Although these are not explicitly ‘humanitarian interventions’, ECOWAS can lay equal claim to such motives as NATO did with its humanitarian bombardment of Serbia and Kosovo. After all, ‘humanitarian intervention’ may be defined simply as "... military intervention in a state without the approval of its authorities, for the purpose of preventing widespread suffering or death among its inhabitants."28

A number of other ‘doctrinal statements’ were made at the ISS conference by Brigadier-General E T Dowyaro of the Nigerian Army. He noted that, once the ECOMOG task metamorphosed into hybrid operations involving peacekeeping, counterinsurgence and peace enforcement, the principles of internal security operations were applied in varying degrees, according to their relevance to particular phases of operations. Dowyaro lists these principles as follows:

This inclusion of aspects of ‘internal security operations’ as part of the concept of peace support operations echoes, in some respects, contemporary Russian thinking on peacekeeping. In addition to political solutions supported by multilateral military interventions, Russia accepts that forceful methods will be required in order to maintain internal stability, and that some individual instances of instability will require decisive action by organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and by the internal troops.30

Whether or not such principles will or should find their way into an African doctrine for peace support operations remains a matter for debate and consultation. However, it is important not to discard such ‘doctrinal statements’ as being extraneous to the ‘peacekeeping debate’. Observations and statements by former ECOMOG commanders obviously do not constitute an eloquent and integrated doctrine for African peace support operations. There is room for much refinement and adjustment and, importantly, a need for a broader acceptance of such principles in Africa and abroad.

Progress in the evolution of West African doctrine for peace support, as in the case of NATO in the Balkans, has evolved less from academic reflection and the deliberations of ‘experts’ than from the harsh experiences of force commanders and peacekeepers on the ground. The difference is that the ‘lessons learned’ from the ECOMOG operations have not been as widely analysed, and they are certainly not as well-packaged as those that have emerged from the Balkans. However, they do provide a far more robust and practical articulation of principles and guidelines for the conduct of peace support operations in Africa than what has hitherto been produced by either the OAU or by SADC.

CONCLUSION

In Western states, doctrinal thinkers have been preoccupied with questions of consent: hence the quarrels over Chapter VI or Chapter VII (traditional peacekeeping versus peace support operations). But this is essentially a non-issue. On the one hand, everyone knows how to do Chapter VI peacekeeping (within a benign security environment, of course). Everyone wants to do this kind of peacekeeping, even with its newfound ‘multifunctionality’. Indeed, a whole industry has developed around new generation (Chapter VI) peacekeeping with its attendant ‘civilian component’ and notions of ‘new peacekeeping partnerships’.

In the African context, it should be remembered that the whole issue of building African ‘peacekeeping capacity’ is inextricably linked to the Rwandan genocide of 1994. There is nothing wrong with building African capacity, but this has to be linked to a realistic concept of operations and modalities for extremely rapid deployment. What was needed in Rwanda in April 1994, was ‘humanitarian intervention’ which, as is evident from NATO peace support operation doctrine, means ‘peace enforcement’.

If this is the kind of contingency that Africans should prepare for, then the OAU Chiefs of Staff recommendation of a standby brigade in each of the five African subregions may not be such a bad idea. However, SADC is modeling its standby brigade on the UN Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), a hollow formation designed to do what everyone wants to do — consensual peacekeeping. Subregional initiatives should clearly not be based on the development of more hollow capacity, but should rather be guided by the type of operations for which there is a proven demand in Africa, and by operational concepts that can actually be executed by regional formations.

The articulation by Africans — either at the continental or the subregional level — of a clear and unambiguous peace support operation doctrine that includes peace enforcement operations, is clearly a sine qua non for meaningful ‘peacekeeping’ capacity-building. Training must be informed by relevant doctrine, and this approach has several obvious advantages over the current ‘ostrich’ mentality. It will provide clear guidelines for mission planning and for the command and control of operations. It will provide operational and tactical level commanders with a much clearer concept of operations and will facilitate much more realistic and meaningful training for such operations. In the process, many lives may be saved.