For some time, the Tungaran Defence Force has been worried about the Njedan superiority in tanks and armoured personnel carriers. it is feared that an attack on short-notice could seize large areas of the country before the TDF could respond. The army has been developing a plan to purchase 150 refurbished M-60 tanks from the US to help reduce what it sees as an unacceptable capability gap.

The central staffs are not enthusiastic. The total package, including spares, ammunition and training, will cost at least US $250 million, which is far more than the amount of money available. The army hopes to keep the M-48 tanks as a reserve, so new crews will have to be trained and separate logistics systems set up. The two tanks will use ammunition of different calibres. The secretary and the chairperson of the service chiefs committee have commissioned some further research, against a budget of US $100 million.

They begin with the threat. The only plausible Njedan objective is to take and hold the Tungaran capital, Lomi. There is only one road by which the invaders can enter, and the terrain on either side is not particularly suitable for armoured warfare: most of it is hilly farmland. Only within about 25 kilometres of the capital itself does the terrain flatten out, but the TDF intends to stop invaders well before that point. The Department of Military Intelligence (DMI) assesses that any Njedan attack would come in overwhelming force on one axis, with only limited diversionary attacks elsewhere. The attack would have to make such rapid progress down the main road that the TDF did not have time to deploy. If surprise was not possible, or if the momentum of the attack was to falter, then the attack would be very likely to fail. The DMI believe that the Njedan army, assessed as well-motivated but not well-trained, would not be able to sustain casualties of more than 30-35% of the attacking forces.

Individually, the TDF’s tanks are a match for the Njedans, and their crews are better trained. The first issue is thus what needs to be done to the tanks themselves. In firepower and mobility, they are as good, if not better, than the opposition. They are, however, vulnerable to anti-tank missile fire if they should try to stage a counterattack. After some analysis, it is agreed that the most sensible improvements are

cheap bolt-on armour packs to reduce vulnerability to missiles; and



an improved fire-control system to allow faster engagements and a capability at night and in bad weather.

These two improvements amount to some US $35 million.

The main aim is to slow the Njedan forces down from the moment they cross the border. Scatterable mines are the most suitable option, but they are ruled out for political reasons. Nonetheless, the TDF makes various preparations to slow the advance down, for example, by wiring bridges for demolition. Artillery units in the forward area are provided with new anti-tank rounds, and the infantry is issued with more TOW missiles. These improvements amount to some US $25 million.

Exercises have shown that, in the hilly country near the border, helicopters are particularly useful and very hard to detect. Extra TOW missiles are provided, as well as communications equipment to enable the helicopters to be directly tasked by forward observers. Some extra weapons are also provided for the Alpha Jet force. These improvements cost some US $35 million. Finally, the DMI assesses that the Njedan forces have great difficulty conducting night operations, and would try not to do so. The TDF therefore invests in night vision goggles for helicopter and aircraft pilots, and for its para-commando battalion.

A series of exercises, based on estimated single-shot kill probabilities (SSKPs) are carried out, using a commercial spreadsheet programme, and various force mixes are tried. At one end, the finance ministry’s suggestion of concentrating on missiles alone is rejected. Although this would save money, the groundholding troops would be overwhelmed by the Njedan artillery forces, and turned to hamburger before they could open fire. They would also have no capability to retake the ground. At the other end, proposals to buy more combat helicopters are shown not to be such good value. Although exact numbers of systems to be purchased in this way cannot be definitely established, the indications are clear enough that orders for commercially sensible numbers, within the US $100 million budget, can be placed with confidence.