Appendix 4

An Example of Intelligence Targeting


Published in Monograph No 49, Defence Transformation, A short guide to the Issues
by David Chuter, August 2000


The day after the Islamic Welfare Movement (IWM) took power in Njedi, a working group of the prime minister’s intelligence co-ordination staff (PICS) met to discuss information needs. As well as the PICS secretariat, the foreign and defence ministries’ regional experts, the foreign intelligence and technical intelligence services, the DMI, the interior ministry and the deputy head of mission from the Tungaran embassy in Tomu attended the meeting. It was decided that the Tungaran government urgently needed advice on the following issues:
  • the composition of the new government, and the backgrounds of its leading figures;

  • the stability of the new government and the prospects for its survival;

  • support for the new government in the armed forces, the bureaucracy and the police, as well as possible sources of opposition; and

  • the international orientation of the new government, in particular, its likely future policy towards Tungaru.
This requirement would be met in three ways:
  • an immediate analysis, based on the latest information, to be produced within 72 hours;

  • a further assessment, with the help of new intelligence, to be produced within 28 days; and

  • quarterly updates until further notice, as well as the production of assessments on topical issues.
The immediate analysis would be based on the latest existing information supplied by the foreign and defence ministries and the embassy, supplemented by topical intelligence reports. The intelligence agencies were tasked as given below.

The Foreign Intelligence Service was responsible for:
  • penetrating the new government and its embassies abroad;
  • keeping watch on the activities of the Njedan intelligence services overseas; and
  • providing intelligence on the attitudes of other governments to the new regime.
The Technical Intelligence Service was responsible for:
  • monitoring of Njedan diplomatic communications to and from Tomu;

  • helping to identify any changes in the deployment or organisation of the Njedan armed forces; and

  • providing intelligence on the attitudes of other governments to the new regime.
The Department of Military Intelligence was responsible for:
  • tracking and analysing personnel changes in the Njedan armed forces;

  • producing an assessment of their operational capability to be updated regularly; and

  • monitoring the military contacts between the new regime and other governments through overseas attachés.
The Ministry of the Interior was responsible for:
  • monitoring the activities of Njedan intelligence officers in Tungaru; and
  • comparing notes on these activities with friendly governments.