Chapter 12

Efforts at Conflict Prevention and Resolution:
The French Experience

Preventive diplomacy in Africa

A focus on conflict prevention and resolution clearly falls within the ambit of preventive diplomacy. This concept can be characterised in the following manner: defining, assessing and managing those crises that emerge suddenly around the world. The appearance of this concept in the 1990s is not by chance. It coincided with the emergence of three main factors: the arrival of public opinion on the international scene, the evolution of the notion of conflict and, finally, the development of multilateral structures (international, regional and subregional organisations).

From a new UN approach …

While multilateral structures are the real forums for preventive diplomacy, they have always considered prevention as a duty. The United Nations has dedicated Chapter VI of the UN Charter to this issue, which clearly states the notion of duty in article 33:

At the regional level, a mechanism for the prevention, management and regulation of conflicts was created within the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1993 to "bring a new institutional dynamism to the conflict management process on the continent."1 Finally, at the subregional level, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) also outlined a joint defence and security policy during its summit in Maputo in 1993. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) with ECOMOG, its Monitoring Group, and the Peace and Security Council of Central Africa known as COPAX have also had the same concern. The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development in the Horn of Africa is also moving in the same direction, with its considerations of, among others, a Conflict Early Warning mechanism (CEWARN).

The UN has always been perceived as the most important guarantor of maintaining peace around the globe.2 However, it seems to be adopting a new approach towards African affairs. Concretely, the UN’s focus is increasingly on having peacekeeping operations dealt with by the OAU, subregional organisations or government groups in a region affected by a crisis (for example, the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB) in the Central African Republic, or the OAU’s mediation of the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict).

There is therefore a reinforcement of the linkage between the UN and the OAU through co-operation: the establishment of a trust fund for the prevention of African conflicts, a liaison office at the OAU headquarters, a training assistance team, and others. The aim is to co-ordinate the various initiatives more effectively by avoiding their being overtaken by events. Is this co-ordinating role of the UN not restrictive if the philosophy adopted in 1948 in San Francisco is considered? This is the first question that could be asked.

… To encourage (sub)regional organisations to assume more responsibility

Whatever the answer to this question, ensuring the co-ordination of the various initiatives is far from being obvious. Numerous structural obstacles tend to slow down co-operation. For this reason, the OAU and the UN could envisage a reflective process at institutional and relational levels. With this in mind, it would be interesting to undertake, on the one hand, a reconsideration of the structure of the central mechanism of the OAU and, on the other, a reassessment of the co-operation between the UN and the OAU. At this stage, the fact must be highlighted that the project to create a joint working group focused on peacekeeping matters was recently reactivated. This working group would enable the exchange of views and information, as well as the more effective co-ordination of activities.

If the UN-OAU relationship is fundamental, those between the OAU and subregional organisations are even more so, as these represent the spearheads of conflict prevention and resolution in Africa. Indeed, the sharing of roles seems to have occurred between the OAU and subregional organisations. If the OAU focuses essentially on actions of preventive diplomacy (mediation), then the creation of peacekeeping forces and their intervention actions are more the domain of subregional organisations (the Southern African Development Community (SADC), ECOWAS, COPAX, IGAD, and others) that operate under the aegis of the UN and the OAU. It should be added, at this stage, that these multinational organisations can hardly operate without external support. The proposal of General Eyadema, the president of Togo, concerning the creation of subregional force units that "could receive material and financial external support" is significant in this regard.3

It is clear that this African dynamic must be supported. The fundamental needs of the main organisations can be summarised as follows: logistic, financial and material support, as well as training, more particularly, training in management and peacekeeping. Western countries could not remain passive, and diverse bilateral and multilateral initiatives have been undertaken to reinforce this dynamic.

Bilateral and multilateral dimensions in Africa

On a global scale, defence and security issues are, strictly speaking, generally envisaged within a bilateral framework, while peacekeeping issues are seen within a multilateral framework. These two types of initiatives are complementary and, through co-operation and partnership, function together in efforts to prevent and resolve conflicts. In this regard, the bilateral military relations with South Africa are significant in terms of their contribution to stability in the Southern African subregion. This notion is reinforced when looking at the respective Franco-South African participation in multilateral exercises organised by either party.

Bilateral relations between France and South Africa

Bilateral co-operation between South Africa and France has been beneficial to the region. The future itself appears even more promising. The attention has been focused more particularly on the regular exchange of officers in the two countries’ respective training facilities, visiting and putting in at South African harbours, and on developing the relationship between internal security forces and the French Gendarmerie nationale, as well as with officials of the two health services. After signing the intergovernmental co-operation agreement and beginning a strategic dialogue during Spring 1998, a new commission has met in May 2000, in the same spirit as that of Spring 1999. This commission will serve as a framework for reinforcing bilateral and multilateral actions.

The multilateral dimension

The multilateral dimension has been fully exemplified by the two countries during the foreign military and humanitarian interventions in Mozambique and Madagascar. Indeed, following cyclone Eline and tropical storm Gloria during February and March 2000, South Africa, the driving force behind SADC, promptly intervened in these areas by deploying considerable means. France, for its part, was also quick to participate in humanitarian aid operations with, initially, a C160 cargo carrier, followed by the deployment of the Jeanne d’Arc helicopter carrier and another C160 cargo carrier. The remarkable and spontaneous co-operation and co-ordination between both armies in this operation have to be acknowledged. In another area, France and South Africa jointly participated in the multinational interforce peacekeeping exercises during operations Blue Crane (South Africa in April 1999), and Tulip (Madagascar, May 1999). This dynamic could be prolonged during the next cycle of the Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix (RECAMP) programme.

RECAMP

To what extent can a programme such as RECAMP answer the needs of African people as mentioned above?

RECAMP, the concrete application of the tripartite agreement signed in May 1997 in New York by France, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US), aims to reinforce African capacity in maintaining peace. It is based on the principle of standby force units as defined by the UN (Chapter VI of the UN Charter). In practice, RECAMP is about educating, training and partly equipping African peacekeeping forces at subregional level with the help of donor countries. Thus, it should enable participating African countries to engage units in peacekeeping operations on the continent. This tool is meant to be at the disposal of all African countries, without any discrimination or selection criteria. French action is essentially focused on training soldiers (particularly officers), prepositioning equipment and implementing training cycles at subregional level. Two main types of exercises have already been undertaken: Guidimakha ‘98 with ECOWAS, and Gabon 2000 with COPAX. The results of these exercises were very positively received by both donors, and contributing and participating countries.

In accordance with UN viewpoints, RECAMP principles are harmonised with those of subregional organisations and the OAU. There are four principles:

multilateralism: establishing a partnership between donor countries and African contributing countries;



access to all African countries: the benefit accrued from RECAMP must be open to all African countries, without any exclusivity, particularly regional or linguistic, where the subregion serves as the framework of privileged action;



transparency: contributions are made known to all countries, and operations are limited to peacekeeping and humanitarian aid; and



standby forces: obtaining a non-permanent peacekeeping capacity, consisting of force units that can be rapidly mobilised; this capacity is founded on the existing military structures of African countries. However, while these force units are intended for stability on the African continent, their deployment must not disturb regional balance.

While this type of initiative assists in effectively preventing and resolving conflicts, it is not without imperfections and any improvement is obviously welcome. One such an improvement arises out of the current European dynamic.

The European dynamic

As far as France is concerned, an initiative such as RECAMP is not well-founded unless it fits into the European interest and context. Most Western countries continue to undertake initiatives in favour of the African continent, whether of a humanitarian or peacekeeping nature. Due to their number and sometimes redundancy, the efficacy of these initiatives is sometimes limited.

France’s main objective is to combine these efforts under one larger programme such as RECAMP, and thus to improve the European dimension. The success of such a programme will be even more significant if the multiple initiatives are combined in a coherent whole, supported by the strong political will of member states of the European Union. In this regard, military developments in the EU (still in the early stages) could assist in defining Europe’s Africa policy in the long run.

Controlling arms

The initiatives devoted to the security of subregions in Africa can only be efficient if the control of arms and military budgets are also taken into account. Indeed, any state in search of security and stability must benefit from a budget that will allow it to develop military means that are realistic and proportionate to its needs. Such a military budget must not be overestimated.

It still happens too often in Africa that military budgets do not reflect actual needs. The result is oversized military forces, which generally lead to deficits in other areas (mainly linked to the development of civil society) and, in the long run, to a destabilisation of the country. The destabilisation risk is often exacerbated by the proliferation of light weapons and small arms which can extend to the subregional level.

To ensure security in a subregion, it is fundamental to monitor arms proliferation and to ensure that the military is appropriate to the true needs of a country. With this in mind, the monitoring of light weapons proliferation and the search for a balance in military budgets are approved of and supported. This support was officially ratified in November 1999 by the Organisation for Security Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) during its summit of heads of states in Istanbul. The OSCE is applying this position on a regional level through operations led within the UN. In addition (and this is perhaps a reflection that needs to be developed at SADC level), the OSCE operates more especially in Africa via initiatives such as that of the ECOWAS moratorium that aims at regulating the import, export and manufacture of light weapons.4

Concluding remarks

In this paper, two main aspects of efforts to prevent and resolve conflicts were highlighted.

Security in Africa is increasingly organised by and tends to be the responsibility of players at the regional and subregional level. The OAU and subregional organisations have considerable potential at their disposal that is presently hampered by structural constraints.

If these organisations become seriously concerned with the reorganisation of their central organs, if reinforcing the links between them and redefining their security and defence policies become the priority of their members, then the implementation of a policy of centralised security as it concerns external partners, implies that such partners must provide the technical, logistic and financial support that is indispensable for success. This is the aim of every bilateral and multilateral action, and of programmes such as RECAMP, the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), and others.

Co-operation between South Africa and France can only be part of a relationship based on trust and mutual knowledge. The youthfulness and dynamics of South Africa, the means and experience of France, and the accelerated construction of Europe, must be seen as assets from which the Southern African region can benefit in preventing and resolving conflicts in Africa.

In terms of military co-operation, increased exchanges and systematic participation of French and South African military forces in multinational exercises, such as those of RECAMP or Geranium on Réunion Island, will represent the main lines of co-operation between the two countries. Finally, in addition to their actual and material benefits, these initiatives and relationships are and must remain signs and symbols of hope for the stability of the African continent, and for the solidarity among its members.

Notes

OAU report, 1993.



Article 24 of the UN Charter: "The main responsibility for maintaining peace and international security."



This proposal was made during his many activities that followed the Summit of Biarritz in 1994.



In November 1996, Mali launched this moratorium project, approved in Abuja in October 1998.

* General staff, French armed forces