Chapter 3

The South African National Identity and its Key Postulates


Dr (Col) Rocky Williams*

Published in Monograph No 50, Franco-South African Dialogue
Sustainable Security in Africa
Compiled by Diane Philander, August 2000


Introduction

 

Few countries in the international arena, or at least the governments that represent these sovereign entities, act in a totally spontaneous manner when making certain key strategic decisions. Most decisions made by governments, groups and individuals are based, to an extent, on certain strategic, conceptual and cultural assumptions (of varying degrees of clarity). To speak, therefore, of a South African national identity — an identity based on a series of interconnected philosophical and conceptual approaches towards the world — is to beg a series of interrelated questions which require ‘unpacking’ if any semblance of meaning is to be bestowed on the concept of a ‘South African national identity’:
  • It assumes that there is a coherent national identity upon which these conceptual and strategic assumptions are based.

  • It assumes that there is an integrated and overarching philosophical framework that can be truly defined as being a uniquely South African approach to the world.

  • It assumes that it is possible to identify the different conceptual and strategic elements or themes which constitute this national world view.

  • Perhaps most importantly, the positing of a national identity often assumes that such a national identity has indeed emerged from ‘something’. One approach argues that national identity is pre-given, rooted in the mythical (often mystical) and preternatural mists of the past. This religious sense of identity assumes that identity is preordained, predetermined and (often) fatalistic. A second approach sees identity, as such, and all its related constructs as products of the teleological unfolding of the greater Hegelian absolute over which the human agency has little influence. The freedom to shape one’s identity in this sense (whether individual or national) is simply to recognise the parameters of necessity. A more realistic approach, and one that is more consistent with the realities of history, is that identities are constructed, are continually changing, and are moulded by a continually changing matrix of historical, cultural and social factors.
These issues are by no means straightforward and require considerable debate before a national consensus on this national identity and the conceptual assumptions which do, or should underpin it is fully elaborated. It is argued in this paper, however, that while it is not possible to identify an holistic and integrated South African national identity (as yet), strong themes do exist which have historically pervaded South African political and intellectual discourse and which can be regarded as constituting the essential elements of a South African national identity. These are to be found in two main quarters. Firstly, they are present within the historical traditions and conflicts from which the present South Africa has emerged, and which have shaped much of South Africa’s current national political identity. Secondly, they are also to be found within existing government policy — most of which has been based on a wide-ranging consultative process which has included a wide spectrum of stakeholders from, among others, government, political society and civil society.

The historical basis of a South African national identity

 

South Africa does not possess, at this stage of its development at least, the integrated and coherent world view that France has managed to develop over the past two centuries. Neither does it possess the foreign policy cohesion and practice that France has been able to develop in Africa over the past four decades. This is not surprising and is a product of both South Africa’s divided past and its ongoing endeavours to construct a post-apartheid foreign policy. For this reason alone it is erroneous for European, and sometimes even African analysts to portray South Africa as either an Anglo-Saxon country or a Western country in terms of its philosophical and conceptual contours.

To determine the emerging nature of the South African national identity also requires the recognition that this national identity cannot be simplistically derived from the expressed policies of its democratically elected government (although this is an important arena within which aspects of the South African national identity are constructed). Elements of an emerging national world view are to be found in informal quarters, in seemingly obscure cultural nooks and crannies, and in many of the myths that South Africans have constructed about themselves in the past and are currently creating. Chuter’s words are apt in this regard:
"Very often these public attitudes are uniformed, but they may be powerfully supported by the media and elsewhere, and they make up a significant part of the unspoken assumptions that experts themselves bring to their work ... there is, beyond the strategy elaborated by experts, an unofficial meta-strategy elaborated by non-experts; a complex of ideas, memories and associations that sets boundaries within which a government can work."1
Chuter provides further insight when he refers to the historical and cultural premises on which this national identity is often based. Although Chuter’s observation refers to the construction of a national identity in France, his comments are applicable to any country attempting to define its national identity in historical, cultural and temporal terms:
"It must be sought in pieces, and not learned in journals and policy statements, but in schoolbooks, popular histories, the media, incidental statements by politicians, inscriptions on monuments and a dozen other places where the French are talking informally to themselves, often in shorthand with nuances left out."2
Many of the common themes which pervade contemporary South African political discourse, for example, derive from the influence which modernism has exerted on both South African political and intellectual life. The influence of both Enlightenment principles and the concepts of modernity on South African political and intellectual life is strong. The constitutions of the Boer republics in the 19th century were strongly influenced by and modelled on European values and constitutions. The influence of Enlightenment thinking is strongly evident in the writings and activities of prominent 19th century South African liberal activists — Olive Schreiner and J X Merriman, for example — and is partially evident in certain political traditions — the so-called ‘Cape Liberal tradition’ and the narratives of the early African National Congress, for instance.
This influence, in both political and economic terms, was even more marked during the 20th century. In the economic domain, the advent of industrialisation, the increase in urbanisation and the emergence of the first elements of a modern state, brought millions of South Africans into the heart and onto the periphery of global modernity:
"Urbanization had a homogenizing effect on the whole society and expanded the area of shared values among Africans, Coloureds, Indians and Whites. The Black leadership that grew within these circumstances accepted the modern world because they recognized its liberatory potential for opening up new vistas for themselves and their people. They were modernists."3
This was manifest in political terms in both the positive and the pejorative sense. In the positive sense, the language of resistance, largely dominated by the traditions of the ANC alliance, were markedly modernist in ethos. Nowhere is this more vividly demonstrated than in the values of the Freedom Charter — a document which reads like a compendium of 19th and early 20th century modernist values. More recently, the political discourse of the South African transition has been strongly influenced by classic modernist meta-narratives — rationality, humanism and a belief in the global emancipation of humankind, for example. This is vividly demonstrated in both the ethos of the negotiation process that unfolded between 1990 and 1994 and the letter of the Interim Constitution adopted in 1994. In a very real sense, therefore, the South African transition can be seen as a concrete extension of the very principles of the Enlightenment. According to Jordan, his vision is predicated on a belief in the following:
"an inclusive nationhood rooted in the universalist, liberatory outlook of modernity and the realities and imperatives of South Africans of all races sharing a common territory."4
Against this backdrop, the pessimism pervading much postmodern discourse indeed appears to be more pertinent to a Eurocentric environment than it is to the countries of the developing world.

The impact of modernity upon South African society, however, has been ambiguous, contradictory and asymmetrical. It has been asymmetrical precisely because a feature of developing countries is the co-existence of different modes of production, political cultures, institutional forms and intellectual traditions. This is a product of the different political, ideological and intellectual ‘layers’ that have either been imposed on and/or generated within developing countries (an uneven development that manifests itself within South Africa as well). The present transition highlights the contradictory nature of this process, and this is reflected in the different debates and ‘language games’ which pervade the South African state and society.

On the one hand, the South African transition epitomises the triumph of the values and principles of modernity as argued by Jordan above — itself an encouraging phenomenon in the midst of the cynicism and despair of the late 20th century. In South Africa, this is manifested in a variety of different forms — the South African Constitution
and the process through which it was compiled, South Africa’s adherence to the normative and legal tenets of international law, the compassion which has underpinned South Africa’s reconciliation process, and the extent to which the country is attempting to define a common identity among its diverse peoples as the basis for the creation of a non-racial sense of nationhood.

Yet, key areas of South African political and ideological discourse — whether referring to the reconstruction and development strategy, community policing policy, constitutional development, or education — are characterised by the continual attempt to recognise, seek and affirm the diversity of traditions, suppressed histories, and regional and local peculiarities that are, in this sense, similar to many of the narratives of postmodern discourse. This is reinforced, in the positive sense, by the emphasis on cultural, religious, ethnic and linguistic plurality that receives concrete expression in the South African Constitution
, key post-1994 policy documents, the tendency towards decentralisation and regionalisation at both an economic and political level, and the growing diversity and influence of civil society over the formulation and execution of government policy.

In a somewhat more problematic sense, it manifests itself in the resurfacing (or creation) of various ethnic ‘nationalisms’ (often with extremely divisive consequences), the attempts by several groupings to separate themselves geographically from a common South African sovereignty, and the continual critique of the rational and normative methodology that underpins the current attempts to define a common ‘South African-ness’. These countervailing discourses confirm the reality that, regardless of the unifying influences present at the ‘centre’ of the South African debate, an emerging plurality is evident throughout the fabric of contemporary South African political and social life.

In a very real sense, these seemingly conflicting tendencies have been reconciled within the heart of South African modernity — particularly since the advent of the Kempton Park negotiations and the adoption of the Constitution
. South African modernity has grown from and conceded valuable space to pluralism and has accommodated within its architecture multicultural and linguistic diversity, regional and local autonomy, and diverse cultural recognition. Although South Africa cannot lay claim to a national identity that has existed for centuries, it is clearly in the process of constituting itself as a political nation. Indeed, this process is not vastly dissimilar from the process of political identity construction that characterised the creation of France’s national identity since 1789.

South African national interest: Common themes, common concepts

 

Aspects of the diversity referred to above are to be found within South Africa’s current national policy framework. Its foreign policy, for instance, reflects a strong normative orientation akin to the foreign policy dispositions of the Scandinavian countries. This includes a strong emphasis on the observance of human rights, the inculcation of a culture of democracy and good governance, a respect for cultural and political plurality, and a commitment to growth, development and progress. Interpolated into this foreign policy is a strong sense of South Africa’s place in Africa as reflected in the vision of the African Renaissance, as well as the vision of an inclusive African humanism best exemplified in the different philosophical versions of ubuntu.

South Africa’s domestic policy is strongly influenced by a range of normative and pragmatic perspectives. Its unique vision of participatory democracy and negotiation (as successfully practiced during the 1990-1994 negotiating period and, since 1994, in government itself) is buttressed by a national security policy that is strongly informed by the debates emerging from the human security arena. An emerging tension between its economic policy (notably influenced by neo-liberal theories of economics) and its national development strategy (influenced by socialist and developmental thinking) reflects the attempts by the country to define its place in both the domestic and international arena in a pragmatic, yet moral manner.

Throughout these discourses, it is evident that South Africa’s world view, although homogeneous in its formal contours, admits to a heterogeneity of philosophical and political influences. It is thus neither wholly ‘north’ nor ‘south’ in influence, neither Eurocentric nor totally Afrocentric in vision, but more accurately in the words of President Thabo Mbeki, as being a policy best described as "walking on two legs" — whether between the north and the south, Africa and Europe, or the Non-Aligned Movement and the rest of the world. The key ingredient of this ‘walking on two legs’ policy is for South Africa to be a catalytic facilitator and play a supportive role in the subregion, the region and the global arena in all efforts that are aimed at promoting dialogue, peace and stability, and, ultimately, an environment within which both South Africa and other African countries can develop.

The recent approval of South Africa’s White paper on South African participation in international peace missions
constituted a practical example of how the South African government, parliamentarians and civil society representatives attempted to define a common South African ‘national interest’ in light of these different influences. The question of defining South Africa’s national interest had vexed policy planners within government for a number of years. Arguments during the process of formulating the white paper were torn between a minority and a majority opinion within the government and civil society groups involved in the process. Policy analysts in the minority, clustered mainly in some of the civil society groups, maintained that defining national interest within the context of a dynamic and pluralistic society was an exercise in futility. The sheer diversity of the country and the rapidly changing nature of global politics mitigated against the formulation of a core set of interests which could be said to guide the country in all its deliberations.

The majority opinion adopted a more Cartesian approach to the definition of national interest. Clustered in the Department of Defence, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the intelligence community and some civil society groups, they maintained that such a definition was both necessary and possible for two reasons. The first was the belief that, without a definition of national interest, albeit embryonic and tentative, government policy would be relegated to a world of postmodern relativism. National policy had to proceed according to certain normative and national political guidelines, they argued. Secondly, it was argued that there were indeed common elements of such a national interest already in existence in South African political discourse.

A consensus position was finally adopted whereby it was acknowledged that, although it was difficult to outline the nature and content of South Africa’s national interests in minute detail (particularly in light of the changing nature of global politics and the heterogeneity of South Africa as a nation), it was possible to provide a broad normative outline of South Africa’s emerging national interests as based on its Constitution:
"South Africa’s emerging national interests are underpinned by the values enshrined in the Constitution, which encompass the security of the state and its citizens, the promotion of the social and economic well-being of its citizenry, the encouragement of global peace and stability, and participating in the process of ensuring regional peace, stability and development. These national interests are concretely reflected in key national policy documents — examples of which include the Constitution, a range of White Papers on the RDP, GEAR, the Transformation of the Public Service, Intelligence and Defence."5
From this definition of national interest, the linkage between South Africa’s national interests and its participation in peace missions was a relatively straightforward exercise, although an attempt was made to prioritise those geographical areas within which South Africa would render assistance:
"In short it is in the South African national interest to assist peoples who suffer from famine, political repression, natural disasters, and the scourge of violent conflict. South Africa may thus provide civilian assistance and armed forces in common international efforts when properly authorized by international authorities to help in such efforts ...

Although South Africa acknowledges its global responsibilities, the prioritization afforded Africa in South African foreign policy makes Africa the prime focus of future engagements. South Africa has an obvious interest in preserving regional peace and stability in order to promote trade and development and to avoid the spill-over effects of conflicts in the neighbourhood."6

Conclusion

 

It is possible, at the current stage of South Africa’s political and intellectual development, to identify a series of common themes that constitute the basic scaffolding of an emerging South African national identity. These are explicitly derived from both South Africa’s history and its current policy positions. Key elements of this scaffolding include the following:
  • respect for democracy and the promotion of human rights;

  • recognition of a common African-ness and the affirming of African potential (the essence of the African Renaissance);

  • recognition and protection of cultural, ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity within the framework of a national constitution;

  • a strong normative commitment to the values of justice, reason and tolerance in dealings with one another and other non-South Africans; and

  • a commitment to the constructive management of conflicts within South Africa and elsewhere.
Onto these values and principles there further values will, no doubt, be grafted. In future, the ‘building-blocks’ of this national identity are more likely to be derived from a more nuanced reading of the multiple cultural, subcultural and mythical influences that together will constitute the unifying elements of a national psyche.

Notes

  1. D Chuter, Humanity’s soldier: France and international security (1919-2001), Berghahn Books, Oxford/Providence, 1998, p 2.

  2. Ibid, p 6.

  3. P Jordan, The national question in post-’94 South Africa, Mayibuye, November/December 1997, p 17.

  4. Ibid.

  5. Republic of South Africa, White paper on South African participation in international peace missions, Government Printer, Pretoria, 1999.

  6. Ibid.
*Dr (Col) Rocky Williams is a former member of Umkhonto We Sizwe. He served as the Director of Operations Policy in the South African Ministry of Defence until his departure in late 1999. He is currently the Head: Security Sector Transformation Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria.