Chapter 6

Human Security, Governance and Development in Africa

Introduction

The brief of this paper is to explore the link between human security, governance and development in Africa. It is thus argued that, in essence, it is of little lasting value to emphasise this link only at the national or even regional level. What is needed, is to draw the link between national, international and global governance.

The link between human security, governance and development was drawn concisely and clearly in the Boutros-Ghali’s report An agenda for development (1995) and given a specific African emphasis and dimension in Kofi Annan’s 1998 report The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa. In this paper, this link is explored in order to argue that there are some fundamental aspects related to peacebuilding that are not being addressed and that the human security-development-governance linkage cannot therefore be properly operationalised.

Three caveats

Before turning to the link between human security, governance and development, it is necessary to introduce three caveats, of which the latter two are, in themselves, of crucial importance to this discussion.

Firstly, my empirical and, to some extent, theoretical knowledge is largely confined to and predicated on the Southern African subcontinent, excluding the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This leads directly to the second caveat: despite the sometimes glib references to Africa or sub-Saharan Africa as if these regions are homogeneous in all or even broad aspects, the differences between African states are great and important, and often preclude broad and uniform policy prescriptions. The difficulty in treating all African states as somehow similar, especially when not defining or circumscribing what is meant by such similarity, is that some of them often have to be excluded in observations or attempts at generalisation with a view to theorising about the state in Africa. As Bayart et al state with reference to their exploration of the criminalisation of the state in Africa: the interaction of various processes and activities "has its origin in the specific experiences of societies."1

Annan, in his 1998 report on conflict in Africa, pays attention to the fact that though there are certain broad sources of conflict in Africa, there are also factors that are particular to specific situations and subregions. In Central Africa, there is competition for scarce land and water resources. In oil-producing countries, there is conflict generated by a local sense of exclusion from the benefits accruing from this activity and of having to cope with the environmental degradation resulting from oil extraction. In North Africa, there are tensions between seriously opposing visions of state and society.2 And, in a number of countries, there is competition for access to mineral resources which then either results in or feeds existing conflict. Specificity and difference should be kept in mind in the deliberations lest the same fault is repeated that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank made for so long and with such negative and damaging consequences: treating specific cases in a generic way when it comes to ‘solutions’. The irony, however, is clear: the constraints of time and space in the presentation of this paper result in this very sin of generalisation.

The third caveat is one that, to some extent, permeates the subtext of this paper and though it should not be allowed to paralyse arguments and analyses, it is good to remember it and when appropriate to even use it as a tool of analysis. This caveat lies in the fact that language can be manipulated to hide many things, to privilege certain actors or decisions, to dress up old concepts in new outfits, or it may mean different things to different people. In a recent paper, Thompson paid detailed attention to this problem with reference to the security discourse in Southern Africa.3 She pointed out how alternative discourses are often appropriated by those who wield structural power in order to give their policies and decisions legitimacy and the appearance of radical change, while actually disguising the fact that conventional thinking and practices are still reigning supreme.

To give an example: the idea of privatisation features largely in the IMF and World Bank’s structural adjustment programmes, ostensibly as a means of empowering people economically. In this sense, it is in accordance with ideas about human development, for instance. Yet, it is known that, in a way, underlying the demand for privatisation is the expectation that it will make an economy more efficient, eventually to allow for debt repayment. In the case of some countries where these programmes have been implemented, privatisation served as a means for the governing élite and their cronies to lay their hands, this time legally so, on valuable and profitable assets. Therefore, discussions about sustainable development, human security and the like should be circumspect, keeping in mind Strange’s sound advice: always ask cui bono? — who benefits?

What ails the ‘state in Africa’?

It is impossible to list and discuss comprehensively the problems of ‘the African state’ in the limited space of this paper. Yet, in order to contextualise the arguments about good and bad governance at the national and international level, it is necessary to mention a number of problems facing the majority of states in Africa. Again, such a generalisation does not paint the complete picture.

The problems that African states face in relation to human security and development are mainly related to the way in which these states as producers of primary commodities have been integrated into the international division of labour. They also stem from the faultlines running through societies that had been artificially joined into ‘states’ without going through a natural evolution to a preferred form of political community. These faultlines — the lack of social and political cohesion, the lack of confidence and capacity to govern effectively, and a lack of resources, or rather, a lack of an efficient and fairly just and equitable distribution channel or mechanisms in these societies — are exacerbated by external penetration into the economies of such states. Political disorder, as Chabal and Daloz argue and demonstrate in their book Africa Works, becomes a chosen instrument of those who benefit from bad governance.4 The authors, however, should have taken into account that political disorder does not only benefit the local élite, but also very much the international élite, both financial and political. Too much is at stake for those who reap the profits of disorder, and peace, security and development might disadvantage them. It must be emphasised again that these beneficiaries are also located in the external environment.

The security-development-governance nexus

Europe and the West’s (including Japan) phenomenal development over the past half a century was built on the existence of peace at the international, but also at the domestic levels of these societies. It is therefore clear that development strategies are usually built on the implicit assumption of conditions of peace. These development strategies do not interrogate their own implicit assumptions. The wholesale adoption of northern development strategies, or the implementation of development strategies largely developed in or imitating northern growth paths, could therefore, perhaps in retrospect, never have paid off on a continent where the condition of positive peace does not exist.

At the same time, there is also the vexed problem that the deep foundations of peace and security seem to lie in the "economic, social and environmental spheres."5 Furthermore, a perusal of the development history of the north shows clearly that the state played a pivotal role in development, and the contemporary debate about the so-called increasing irrelevance of the state, does not convincingly hide the fact that the state is still an important actor in development. Governance therefore also belongs in the security-development nexus. As the process and manner in which a society is politically organised and managed, governance can be either good or bad.

The state, as an instrument of development, can be used by a government either to thwart or encourage development. It can hinder or actively undermine development through a variety of measures, ranging from erroneously equating economic development with economic growth and therefore not paying attention to the distribution of wealth, to simply using power to accumulate personal wealth. Concomitantly, a government can use the security apparatus of the state to create and maintain a secure environment in which its development strategies might flourish, or it can use this apparatus to support and assist its plundering of resources.

The extent to which a government is able to use its power positively or negatively, taking the well-being of the population as a yardstick, would seem to accord with the degree and scope of participation in decision-making. This assumption accounts for the value attached to democracy as a form of good governance. The less participation, and the greater the separation between ‘state’ and ‘populace’, the greater the opportunity for bad governance and its concomitant manifestations, such as authoritarianism, corruption and inefficiency, all aspects associated with a lack of development and with insecurity.

If it is accepted that the primary function of the state is to protect the well-being of its population and that such care is exercised through ‘good’ governance (a normative approach), it becomes clear that most states in sub-Saharan Africa have suffered from bad governance over the past several decades. A comparison of the Human development reports compiled by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) over time leads to the realisation that, in terms of quality of life indices, many countries have shown regression. The worst regression is experienced in societies embroiled in internal strife and civil war, thereby empirically proving the security-development nexus. It is tempting also to bring governance into the picture and to conclude that bad governance is the explanation for insecurity and underdevelopment. But, one should be careful. If governance is limited to the national (and subnational) levels of government, there are a number of dangers that may obscure the broad picture.

The first is that it then becomes easy to ascribe all of Africa’s problems to Africans themselves, thereby simultaneously turning international involvement, for example, in the form of overseas development aid, into something innocent and friendly and almost patronising. It would mean that the north, and the way in which Africa had been incorporated over time into the international division of labour, have no bearing on and responsibility for the current crises besetting the majority of states in sub-Saharan Africa. Lastly, and this is the crux of the matter, it would obscure the fact that governance is a term also applicable to the international and global level.

Bad governments, in many instances, may carry the major blame for insecurity and underdevelopment, but more often than not, these governments were aided and abetted either directly by other international or external actors, or indirectly by processes and trends in the international political economy, pointing to at least aspects of bad governance in international regimes and institutions. Mobutu’s Zaïre and apartheid South Africa are two examples. If democracy is taken to encourage and promote, and to be a characteristic of good governance, the Bretton Woods institutions and the UN Security Council, to name but a few, do not have much of a claim on the status of exhibiting good governance practices.

In short, development and security are promoted and maintained through good governance, but good governance refers to national and international practices. To get back to Thompson’s argument mentioned earlier: the Bretton Woods institutions are the main proponents of good governance and democratisation as elements of political conditionality, yet, governance jargon is used to obscure the lack of democracy in these institutions, as well as the extent to which their policies actually undermine development prospects in some cases. The damage done to Mozambique’s cashew nut industry by shortsighted and badly informed World Bank demands over the past few years serves as a good example.6 Such policies actually increase human insecurity and inhibits development. Another example is the World Bank estimate that sub-Saharan Africa loses US $20 billion per year in exports due to various forms of trade barriers implemented by developed countries.7

Furthermore, the apparent disjuncture between development and security discourses, particularly in the policy realm, further exacerbates underdevelopment and insecurity. Before exploring this premise further, it is necessary to point to an exception. There are times when the international community, again through financial institutions such as the IMF, do use financial instruments, for example, economic conditionality and the withholding of loans, in order to apply pressure that might, in the view of politicians, force a particular government to the negotiation table or to conduct democratic elections. Such was the case in Burundi in the mid-1990s, and earlier in Kenya to ensure that Moi hold elections.

But, these are often short-term measures, while the nexus between development, security and good governance at the deep level and with a view to the long term, is not taken into consideration. The continued protection, for instance, of ‘grandfather’ industries, such as agriculture, clothing and textiles in the north, especially the EU’s CAP, also inhibits development and increases insecurity. More often than not, it is women, already defined as ‘the poorest of the poor’, who have to bear the brunt of such policies in the form of job losses.8 Also, the continued pressure on developing countries to liberalise trade often boils down to the fact that they have to open their markets to industrial products from the north, thereby preventing an own industrial capacity from developing and, in some cases, even resulting in deindustrialisation.9 These examples may seem to be ranging far away from security and the pressing problems of civil war and internal strife, but if the link between security and development is accepted, such instances of international bad governance are actually of great relevance to peacebuilding in Africa.

Peacebuilding and profitseeking

Mention was made earlier of the fact that development strategies have seldom taken into account the fact that post-World War II northern development and progress have been predicated on the existence of peace. It is as if this condition was conveniently forgotten when applying development strategies to and in Africa, or maybe, due to disciplinary boundaries, the connection between peace and development was not fully or properly comprehended. Yet, Boutros-Ghali’s definition and discussion of peacebuilding reads almost like a brief history of the period after World War II.10 The most important elements of peacebuilding, according to this report, are briefly:

There are two aspects of peacebuilding not touched upon by the Boutros-Ghali report: the locus of responsibility for peacebuilding operations and the extent to which certain forms of international involvement in African conflicts inhibit and actively obstruct peacebuilding efforts. The Annan report deals with the first, placing a measure of responsibility on the international community in the form of UN involvement, again emphasising the link between national and international governance.11 Judging from the Angolan experience after the initial peacebuilding exercise of the mid-1990s, and from the lacklustre performance of the UN following the Lusaka peace accord in the DRC, it is doubtful whether the national/international governance link has been sufficiently conceptualised. This is perhaps an aspect that scholars should pay attention to, particularising the conceptualisation to fit individual cases.

Although Annan does mention economic motives as a cause of conflict in Africa, he does not take this into consideration in his recommendations on peacebuilding.12 Yet, this is perhaps one of the most serious shortcomings in the current knowledge about peacemaking and peacebuilding, and in the frameworks negotiated and constructed to deal with conflict resolution. The profit motive inherent in many conflicts, it could be suggested, is perhaps the single most important aspect that should be dealt with in attempts at providing and maintaining peace and security and in promoting development. The locus of this link — the one between conflict and moneymaking — is at the level where the national and the international meet. It is therefore necessary to think of ways in which the political economy of war can be incorporated into the search for peace, taking the profit motive into account right from the start when a cease-fire is negotiated and dealing with it as a major variable in constructing a peacekeeping operation, right through to the peacebuilding phase of conflict resolution.

In this instance, governance, at the national and international level, is of primary importance. The role of local and international profiteers, and the many instances and opportunities for convergence between them should be taken into account. Vested interests should actually enjoy as much of the attention of peacemakers as any other considerations. The prolonging of the wars raging in Angola, Sierra Leone, the DRC, Sudan, Burundi and Rwanda all exhibit various forms of financial interest. Financial interests include a host of benefits to various groups, from local politicians and the military who grow rich on the war economy and black market trade, to druglords, international arms dealers, mercenaries and other forms of privatised security firms, and exploiters of natural resources. Continuing hostilities are sometimes worth more to those in or contesting power, than would be a stable and peaceful society characterised by good governance. Sometimes the apparent political will of a particular group or government to find a negotiated settlement perhaps has more to do with the expectation of control over scarce and valuable resources, than with the wish for peace.

Conclusion

Unless efforts at good governance as part of the peacebuilding process take account of the link between governance at the local and international level, and allow for and/or include all stakeholders in negotiations and the development of frameworks for peacebuilding, calls and plans for demobilisation, disarmament, good governance and international assistance for reconstruction and development, to mention but a few requirements, will be in vain. Neither peace, nor human security, development and good governance will be achieved. In attempts at conflict resolution, the question that begs to be asked and considered, is: who benefits?

Notes

J Bayart, S Ellis & B Hibou, The criminalization of the state in Africa, James Currey, Oxford, 1999, p 31.



K Annan, The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa, report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, United Nations, New York, 1998, paragraph E/15.



L Thompson, South and Southern African security dilemmas, paper presented at SARIPS annual colloquium on Peace and security in Southern Africa: Challenges and opportunities, Harare, September 1999.



P Chabal & J Daloz, Africa works: Disorder as political instrument, James Currey, Oxford, and Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1999.



B Boutros-Ghali, An agenda for development, United Nations, New York, 1995, p 12.



J Hanlon, Power without responsibility: The World Bank and Mozambican cashew nuts, final draft, ROAPE, 2000 (forthcoming).



World Bank, Africa Reconstruct 13(4), December 1999, p 33.



C September, COSATU’s perspective on the SADC Protocol and its implication for labour, in Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Opportunities and challenges for women in Southern Africa: Report of a conference on the SADC free trade area, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Johannesburg, 12-13 April 1999.



See European Union/South African Free Trade Agreement. Also, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, ibid.



Boutros-Ghali, op cit, pp 21-22.



Annan, op cit, paragraphs 63-68.



Ibid, paragraph 14.

* Prof Maxi Schoeman teaches international politics and international political economy at the Rand Afrikaans University in Johannesburg and is the deputy chairperson of the IGD.