Chapter 8

Lesotho: Lessons and Challenges after a SADC Intervention, 1998

Introduction

The major objective of this paper is to provide a broad overview of the Lesotho crisis of 1998 as a case study of a Southern African Development Community (SADC) intervention in a small vulnerable state in Southern Africa. It illuminates the dilemmas and challenges of peacebuilding and of safeguarding democracy faced by regional supranational institutions. In discussing this case study, some general observations and lessons will be outlined which are relevant to the issues around Security in Africa.

Contextual imperatives for small states

Since its independence in 1966, Lesotho — a small state with a peculiar geopolitical position and features of structural dependence in relation to South Africa — has had to exercise its self-determination and sovereignty within this constraining environment. In this context, Lesotho has faced and continues to face dilemmas of economic and political survival. In determining their survival options, small states have to accept the following given features:

International economic dynamics, particularly in this era of globalisation, do not recognise the greater relative exposure of small states to exogenous economic dynamics which they have a limited capacity to influence, even though these determine economic survival options for small open economies.



The regionalisation process, where states in a subregion form regional blocs for co-operation and integration, has necessitated the creation of supranational frameworks like SADC where countries become stakeholders in the development and security concerns of their neighbours. In essence, given the imperatives of regionalism, the question for small states is no longer whether they should take part in regionalism, but what kind of regionalism best suits them.2 The major challenge facing these regional institutions is to manage the legacies of dependence and countervail the hegemonic tendencies of big states in the economic and security spheres.



As small states that are, by definition, generally reliant in security and military terms, their capacity to exercise their sovereignty and assert their interests is dependent on a general environment of support and solidarity at the regional and subregional levels. In order to safeguard their vital strategic interests, these states are obliged to become members of regionalised interstate defence and security frameworks. Increasingly, these states are collaborating in enhancing their collective capacity to undertake joint peacekeeping exercises.

The critical insight from the determinants identified above is that exogenous factors play a predominant role in determining the economic and political survival options of small states both at the global and subregional levels.

Lesotho’s problems of political consolidation and the sustenance of democracy

In light of the contextual factors identified above, the focus falls below on the specific features of Lesotho which have rendered it open to external intervention.

It is generally accepted that small states are susceptible to risks and threats, both from internal and external sources. Such states have a relatively lower threshold than larger states, given the interaction between size and vulnerability. As a concept, vulnerability is determined by the interaction of identified, crucial factors that determine the survival capabilities of a given small state. The following aspects of vulnerability can be identified for Lesotho:

physical and environmental vulnerability, ie carrying capacity limits due to land scarcity, over-stocking, population pressure, meagre resources and limited livelihood choices;



economic dependence on a dominant neighbour and asymmetrical relationships;



geopolitical vulnerability due to the status of being landlocked in relation to a dominant neighbour; and



weak state institutions and political processes due to legacies of authoritarian and military rule — these weak or soft institutions lack the capacity to manage and contain the pressure and stress of transition to a multiparty democracy and the virulent political contestation between rival parties.

The characteristics outlined above provided the environment that made the transition to multiparty democracy and the consolidation of this fragile democracy so problematic in Lesotho in the period 1993 to 1998. This period was characterised by chronic political instability, failure to manage the process of demilitarisation and civil military relations effectively, as well as intraparty conflicts and political party fragmentation. The role, functions and legitimacy of the electoral management system were severely tested. Hence, from this perspective, the 1998 political crisis over the administration and outcome of the election was the most violent manifestation of a multifaceted political crisis with deep socio-economic roots in a stressed socio-political environment.

In summary, the key elements of this crisis can be outlined as follows:

intense rivalry between élite-dominated political parties over access to state power and state resources within a worsening environment of poverty, unemployment and limited economic options;



structural youth unemployment and social/political exclusions of the youth, except when they are mobilised for short-term ends by belligerent political parties; and



an electoral system that gives unfair advantage to a dominant party in terms of the ‘first-past-the-post’ system.

The factors outlined above combined to create a volatile situation and a political crisis in the context of protests by aggrieved opposition parties over the 1998 elections.

The situation of chaos and anarchy that ensued precipitated the SADC intervention in August and September 1998.

The SADC intervention and challenges of post-conflict peacebuilding

The specific circumstances that precipitated the SADC intervention aimed at containing a situation of chaos, anarchy and a creeping coup in August and September 1998 are well-known and will not be systematically outlined here. General observations of some lessons learned from this episode will be offered.

Lessons of the SADC intervention in Lesotho

The SADC intervention in Lesotho was a case of trial and error in the operationalisation of peacemaking, peace enforcement and peacekeeping strategies in the SADC region, given the mismanagement of the transition from the Front-Line States (FLS) process to the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security.



There is still a lack of clarity about when SADC states are acting in concert and when one or two SADC member states act unilaterally, or claim to be acting on behalf of SADC.



The legal basis of and justification for responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and security in Southern Africa and SADC’s particular role in this regard are either vague or non-existent given the current state of affairs around the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security.



A shared vision about the concept and strategy for promoting collective regional security in Southern Africa remains lacking despite the October 1999 SADC meeting of the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) and SADC ministers of Foreign Affairs in Swaziland, where the status and role of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security were to be clarified.

The formulation of the White paper on South African participation in international peace missions, approved by the country’s cabinet on 21 October 1998, was profoundly influenced by the disastrous intervention in Lesotho in September 1998.



Acknowledgement of the bad experiences/lessons of Operation Boleas by South Africa led to the establishment of the National Office for the Co-ordination of Peace Missions, located within Department of Foreign Affairs but with a seconded officer from the defence and police services.

Dilemmas have been identified in determining the timing of an appropriate exit strategy for the SADC/South Africa/Botswana forces given the uncertainties about the security situation in Lesotho and prospects for a sustainable peace, in light of the current deadlock between the Interim Political Authority, the government of Lesotho and parliament, on preparations for elections in 2000.



The role of Interim Political Authority as a management institution is also in the spotlight in so far as it was an innovative peacebuilding initiative mandated to prepare for elections within 18 months. This period expired in May 2000 without any clear indications and timeframe for the long-awaited elections.

In conclusion a proposal for a post-conflict national peace accord (Building national peace accord) has been initiated by the Lesotho Network for Conflict Management, as a contribution by civil society to the process of national peacebuilding.

Proposal for the National Peace Building and Peace Monitoring System for Lesotho

Agreement

On 3 December 1999 the Government of Lesotho and the Interim Political Authority (IPA) signed a historic agreement whose fundamental spirit is to consolidate the country’s young democracy, ensure a free and fair electoral contest and commit parties to constructive conflict resolution in the new millennium. His Excellency Chief Emeka Anyauko (Commonwealth Secretary-General), His Excellency Mr Edward Omotoso (United Nations Resident Coordinator) and His Excellency Salim Salim (Organization of African Unity Secretary-General) witnessed this epochal development in a country which is overwhelmingly conflict-ridden. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was represented by its Chairperson, His Excellency President Joachim Chissano of Mozambique, whose country has just recently emerged from a protracted violent conflict and is widely hailed as model for recovery from armed conflict to a stable democracy. It is worth noting that after more than two decades of protracted armed conflict, Mozambique managed to hold free and fair elections in 1994 and 1999, which ensured greater inclusivity and representation within the political system.

The Lesotho Network for Conflict Management (LNCM) would like to take this opportunity to commend all the parties for agreeing to settle their political differences by peaceful rather than by violent means. We believe that conflicts are embedded in all societies and could in fact become a dynamising force for social change. We, are however, cognisant of the stark reality that once conflicts assume violent proportions they are quickly transformed from being constructive to being destructive. Contemporary Lesotho has been engulfed in various forms of conflict, open and hidden, violent and non-violent, short-lived and protracted since its political independence from Britain in 1966. The critical highlights of Lesotho’s conflict map include the 1970 forceful seizure of power by the then incumbent party; the 1986 military take-over of government; the 1994 temporary seizure of power by the King; the 1994 and 1995 military scuffles and police mutiny and the 1998 violent encounter between the ruling party and opposition parties. All these conflict inflicted hefty and immeasurable costs on the poorly endowed Basotho nation. The most recent violent conflict of 1998 alone caused destruction estimated at an astronomic M160 million and rendered about 4000 people unemployed. A reconstruction and rehabilitation programme following this conflict is estimated at R300 million.

The Lesotho Network for Conflict Management (LNCM) is optimistic that the historic Agreement signed between the Government and IPA is a harbinger of constructive management of conflict in Lesotho and essentially heralds a new dawn in Lesotho politics; an era of political stability and tolerance of diverse political views and opinions. The agreement has many important essential elements:

it introduces an electoral reform from the First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) to a 80:50 mixed ratio of FPTOP and Proportional Representation (PR) with a view to expanding representation and ensuring inclusivity in the legislature;



provides for a general election in 2000 under the administration and supervision of a new and reformulated Independent Electoral Commission (IEC);



it establishes a Security Liaison Committee which will ensure that security and stability are assured throughout the process before, during and after the election;



it affirms continued cooperation and mutual trust between the Government and IPA in the run-up to the election;



it establishes a Joint Committee on the Media to ensure equitable access of all parties to media, especially state-controlled media;



it establishes a Joint Implementation Committee which will oversee the entire implementation of the Agreement;



it re-affirms the guarantor status of the Presidents of Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe in the implementation of the Agreement.

It is our considered opinion that the spirit and letter of this Agreement will inspire all political actors in Lesotho to strive to deepen the country’s democracy and political stability. Our politicians must strive to accept each other. They must recognise that their main vocation is to lead the country and assure its prosperity in the new millennium; not to compete in trading deadly political blows at the expense of the country. In all democracies a strong ruling party needs a strong opposition. Without a strong opposition democracy is undermined and ruling parties are easily tempted to drift towards veiled authoritarianism. Even a disruptive tendency under conditions of weak opposition or one-party parliament is common trend towards faction-fighting and ultimate rupture of the ruling party leading inevitably to the destabilization and polarization of the polity.

Summary

LNCM in cooperation with its partners is proposing to assist IPA and stakeholder organisations to formulate a Lesotho National Peace Accord. All parties are called to pledge themselves to support the implementation of the recommendations of the agreements signed between the Government of Lesotho and Interim Political Authority on 3 December 1999.

We give a brief outline of our proposal, which will be followed by detailed explanations if this proposal is approved.

Basic principles of the proposed National Peace Building and Monitoring system for Lesotho – Agreement

Freedom of conscience and belief; freedom of speech and expression; freedom of association with others; freedom of movement; peaceful assembly; peaceful political activity.

Codes of conduct

Political parties

All shall:

Publicly and repeatedly condemn political violence and encourage political tolerance among their followers.



Actively discourage and seek to prevent their members from carrying any weapons of any description to any meeting.



Inform authorities of political events



Immediately establish effective lines of communication between one another.



Not apply violence to intimidate or threaten other people.



Not use language calculated or likely to incite violence.

Securiy forces and the police

Provisions

The police shall:

Endeavour to protect the people of Lesotho in a rigorously non-partisan fashion.



Endeavour to prevent crimes and attempt to arrest and investigate all those reasonably suspected



Be guided by a belief that they are accountable to society and conduct themselves so as to secure and retain the respect and approval of the public.



Expect a higher standard of conduct from themselves than from others.



Exercise restraint and use the minimum force that is appropriate.



Establish a Police Board comprising members of the public and Lesotho Police Force in equal numbers.



Not allow any operation which undermines, promotes or influences any political party at the expense of another.



Endeavour to see that no dangerous weapons or firearms are possessed, carried or displayed by members of the public at any political gathering, procession or meeting.

Code of conduct: police and armed forces

All police officials accept that:

Their authority and power are dependent upon and subject to public approval.



Any offence or alleged offence by any member of the Police or the Armed Forces shall be thoroughly investigated and appropriate measures shall be taken.



Public favour and approval be sought by enforcing the law firmly, sensitively and with constant and absolute impartiality, giving effective and friendly service, reacting as quickly as possible to requests, and encouraging police-community relationship.



The least possible degree of force shall be used, and then only when persuasion, advice and warnings have failed to secure cooperation.

A condensed guide to the National Peace Building and Monitoring system for Lesotho – Agreement

The Proposed Peace Accord would be an unprecedented social contract, demanding a peaceful purpose from any single person in the land, backed up by structures to make it work.

It requires negotiation between all the parties and its core provisions are to bring about an end to violence, an inclusive multi-party democracy and social and economic reconstruction, with all signatories monitoring each other. This is a condensed summary of the proposed accord.

Principles

The Peace Accord has two basic aims: to create peace in Lesotho and help in the development of its people and reconstruction of society.

It accepts the principles of freedom of conscience and belief, freedom of speech and expression, freedom of association, freedom of movement, peaceful assembly and peaceful political activity.



It creates an enabling environment for peace building, economic reconstruction and socio-economic development in Lesotho.



All the leaders who will sign the agreement are committed to a multi-party democracy for Lesotho, where all the people have the right to vote for their leaders and to hold them responsible for what they do.



People have the right to learn about all different points of view and all political parties. To achieve this, newspapers, radio and television must be free to report and discuss what is going on in the country.

Codes of conduct

How people behave – from individuals in communities to the leaders of the country, political leaders and the security forces – is an important factor in making sure that life is peaceful.

The Peace Accord will have codes of conduct for political organisations, media agencies, security forces and the police, and will draw commitment from both youth organisations for observance.



It sets out that political parties and organisations, and their officials, are not permitted to kill, injure, apply violence to, intimidate or threaten any person. It also requires that political parties and organisations give their full assistance to the police in the investigation of violence and help the police arrest offenders.

Security forces

The security forces have a big role to play in making peace. For this to happen, people also need to change their attitude towards the security forces, to put aside antagonism and distrust.

The security forces must protect all people from criminal acts and must not take sides. They must try to prevent crimes and try to arrest people, who are suspected of committing crimes.



The security forces are accountable to all of society and people must be able to trust and respect them. They must work together with communities to combat violence, not against them.



Where force is necessary, they must use as little forces as possible.

Police

For the police, there are more detailed requirements, including special rules for investigating political crimes and regular consultation with local peace committees and community leaders.

They must serve the community by protecting the people of Lesotho from all criminal acts and acts of political violence, and they must do this without bias against any political belief. The police must talk to local leaders about ways to work together to stop the violence.

Political organizations

To make peace work, influential leaders also have to behave in a responsible way. They cannot talk peace while making war. The Peace Accord has to have a code of conduct for political parties and organisations, which commits them to peaceful behaviour.

All political parties and organisations must condemn violence publicly and encourage an understanding of democracy and tolerance. They must make sure that they can talk to their members and supporters, wherever they may be, to get this message across.



People who work for or represent a political party or organization may not kill, injure, intimidate, threaten or be violent towards other people because they do not agree with their political beliefs.



They may not remove, damage, destroy, copy or change anything belonging to another organisation and they may not interfere with anyone travelling to or from a political party meeting.



No one can be forced to join or resign from a political party or organisation, or be forced to go to a meeting, or to give money, if they don’t want to.



Political parties and organisations must also help the police in investigating violence and arresting the people involved, and may not protect their members or supporters if they know that they have done something wrong.

Media

The media should recognise their role in peace-building and monitoring, while at the same time they should be afforded freedom of expression. Media should have a self-developed Code of Ethics and in turn monitor adherence to this code.

Youth

Youth are an integral part of the society and should be involved in all decision-making processes. Youth are prospective future leaders of this country and as such, they should conduct themselves in ways that reflect this. Youth, through their structures, whether political, religious or otherwise, will pay a big role in peace monitoring and peace building.

Churches

Basotho are a highly religious nation and as such, churches play a big role in influencing the conduct of their constitution. Churches, church leaders and church workers should strive to unite Basotho and monitor this peace. It is the obligation of the church as the messengers of Jesus.

Dangerous weapons

The Peace Accord should also have rules for people going to public meetings and rallies or marches. No one may carry or show any weapons or gun and police may take away any illegal weapons they find.

Commission of inquiry

It is important that incidents of violence or intimidation are investigated and brought to an end. The Peace Accord will allow for this in the Commission of Inquiry into the prevention of Violence and Intimidation, where people can give evidence about what has happened to them or things they have seen.

The Commission, chaired by credible judicial authority, must find out the causes of the violence and tell the government what must be done to stop it. Anyone can give evidence without his or her name being made known.

Special courts

The peace Accord also allow for special courts to deal with the people causing violence, and for justices of the peace to be appointed to act as peacemakers in their communities. The people appointed to those positions must be trusted, respected and well liked.

Socio-economic reconstruction and development concerns

It is important to give serious attention to the multi-faceted aspects of addressing the challenges of poverty, youth unemployment and development that Lesotho faces in the short, medium and long term period. The bedrock of sustaining democracy is a national development strategy that provides sustainable livelihood for all Basotho.

Structures and how they work

National level

National Peace Committee

A “council of leaders” meets to make sure the Peace Accord works and to resolve disputes. All decisions are taken by consensus.

National Peace Secretariat

Four people from the LNCM, one person from IPA, one person from Lesotho Council of NGOs and one person from the IEC co-ordinate District and local peace committees funded by IPA.

Commission of inquiry

A permanent commission investigates the nature and causes of violence, identifies those responsible and recommends action to the Prime minister and IPA.

District level special criminal courts

Special criminal courts to deal with unrest cases quickly and effectively, without delay.
District dispute resolution committees



Representatives from political organisations, community-based organisations, business and security forces attend to matters causing violence at local district level.

Each has an officer registering complaints of misconduct against the police.

Local dispute resolution committees

Representatives who are aware of the needs of the community create trust between local leaders (including local police commanders) and settle disputes causing violence. The committee reports to the regional peace committee.

The National Peace Building and Peace Monitoring system – Agreement

National Peace Secretariat

Members

14 representatives of the Government and political parties.

Responsibilities

The establishment of district and local peace committees


Liaison with international observers


Community building


Appointment of justices of the peace accord.

National Peace Committee

Members

National Peace Building and Peace Monitoring Agreement signatories.

Responsibilities

Codes of conduct


Defence Force Police


Complaints of contravention


Reconstruction and development


Community-building revolving around transgression disputes.

National Peace Commission

Members

Five or more commissioners drawn from the legal fraternity.

Responsibilities

To investigate cases of violence and intimidation.

* Lesotho Network for Conflict Management and National University of Lesotho.