Chapter 4

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MINING INDUSTRY AND THE DIAMOND AND GOLD BRANCH OF THE SAPS

RELATIONSHIP AT MINE AND BRANCH LEVEL

In assessing the working relationship between the mining industry and the Diamond and Gold Branches of the SAPS, two levels of interaction between mine personnel and police officials will be considered. The first level relates primarily to the interaction between the security personnel of individual mines and the local Diamond and Gold Branch members, while the second level refers to the interaction between the gold-mining industry and the police at more senior level, both regionally and nationally. Other levels of interaction could be identified, but it is in essence at these two levels that the relationship between the gold-mining industry and the police is determined.

Every significant mining company employs its own investigators who in many ways mirror the activities of members of the Diamond and Gold Branch, except that their activities are generally confined to the mine property. Their task is to protect the mine’s property at source. They open their own dockets on suspects who are being investigated, and they confiscate gold and PGM-bearing material that is suspected of being stolen. Agents infiltrate at all levels of the mines in order to identify individuals involved in unlawful activities. They establish their own database on suspects and related matters. The members of the local Diamond and Gold Branch are involved with similar activities but in a wider geographical area and with more extensive powers. The similarity in their activities has the potential of either leading to a closeknit co-operative relationship between the two, or could result in negative rivalry. The degree of competitiveness that is inherent in such a situation could therefore benefit both the mine and the police if it is correctly managed, or it could lead to a breakdown of the relationship between mine security staff and the police to the detriment of both. The management of the relationship between the two often depends on the personalities involved.

Not all mines or Diamond and Gold Branches were canvassed for their views on this matter, as it was not within the scope of this study to do so. However, as a result of interviews conducted with members of the police and mine personnel in the Free State, West Rand, Rustenburg, Namaqualand, Pretoria and Johannesburg, it is possible to make the following observations:

Mine personnel often complain that the police only arrest the ‘foot soldiers’ and not the senior syndicate leaders who buy and deal in large volumes of gold. Some are of the view that the police do not seem to have the necessary enthusiasm to do so and that they seem to have no strategic plan to tackle the top buyers and sellers.

On this issue, members of the Diamond and Gold Branch concede that there have been very few successes against the ‘top boys’. They see themselves as overworked with huge docket loads and with local projects that keep them occupied with covert investigations. Such investigations do not necessarily focus on the few large buyers and sellers in Gauteng or Durban. They tend to know about the existence of these top syndicates but are often under the impression that some other unit of the police is probably busy investigating them. "We had a file on that (Gauteng) buyer but Johannesburg also has one", was one response.

At senior police level, there is uncertainty over the destination of South Africa’s stolen gold. Some claim that a large proportion is smuggled out of the country almost on a weekly basis to the East, while others believe that most of the stolen gold goes to the internal market via Europe.

Both the police and mine personnel complain about corruption. Police add that the biggest problem that they have in some areas is the increase in collusion that occurs on mines between mine security and illegal operators. They blame this on inexperienced, badly qualified and poorly paid private security company personnel who have been employed. The co-operation between the police and mine security seems to be better where long established in-house security is in place.



A criticism that the local police and the mine security personnel share is that neither of their head offices make enough resources available to enable them to do their job properly. Both are of the view that the shortage of resources leads them to focus more extensively on reactive than proactive initiatives.



The relationship between mine security and the local Diamond and Gold Branch is significantly influence by the personalities of top officers of the local branch and those responsible for security on the local mines. Where there is a positive approach from both sides and a will to co-operate and to build up a relationship of trust, the relationship between mine security and the police is inevitable a very positive one.

Where the necessary relationship of trust does not exist, criticism related to the other’s bona fides occasionally emerges. With regard to some mines, for example, the police are of the view that they are not prepared to admit the full extent of theft from their mines. This complicates the police’s task. Some mine security staff members are of the view that police statistics are not accurate, while police officers claim that there are certain mineralogists at mines that lie about the ore grades that they have to determine. They allegedly do so because it could affect their bonus.

One view that was expressed by a senior mine security official suggests that the phenomenon of theft of gold from mines could be addressed more effectively if the Diamond and Gold Branches of the police were to be privatised and taken over by the mines. He referred to the considerable degree of overlap between the activities of the two.

Despite some criticisms that mine security personnel and police members have about each other, the overwhelming impression was that the level of co-operation between the two was very healthy. In general, there was an ongoing exchange of information, the mines make resources such as vehicles and electronic equipment available to police investigators for specific operations, and regular contact occurred between the two. The fact that both mines and the Diamond and Gold Branches are dependent upon each other for success seems to be the major driving force that determines the need for ongoing co-operation and good relations between them.

RELATIONSHIP AT REGIONAL AND NATIONAL LEVELS 

At these levels, the relationship between the Diamond and Gold Branches (from head office to local branches) and representatives from mines and mining companies was also found to be very positive. Among some mining companies there is a fear that the government might want to scale down the operations of the Diamond and Gold Branches and many branch members were also not certain about what the future holds for them. In discussions during 1999 with the divisional commissioner of the Detective Service and the head of Specialised Investigations, the assurance was given that there were no plans to scale down or disband the activities of the Diamond and Gold Branches. They commented favourably on the co-operation and relationship between the mining industry and the police.

Senior officials from the mining industry, while pointing out that there was room for improving the co-operation between the two, were satisfied that a good relationship existed. There was a view that this good relationship should be the basis on which both the police and the mining industry jointly explore more effective ways of co-operating in order to reduce theft from mines. Frequent reference was made to the recently established National Forum and Regional Forums.

The initiative to set up these forums came from the mining industry. The objective was to increase the co-operation between the Diamond and Gold Branch and the mining industry with the aim of reducing the theft of precious metals and diamonds from mines. The thought was that a better strategic co-ordination of resources would follow and that this would lead to a reduction of theft from mines. Among others, it was hoped that the establishment of the National Forum and the Regional forums would lead to the merging of the different databases that exist at regional and national levels. A National Forum has been in place since 1998 and Regional Forums are operating in areas such as Carletonville, Klerksdorp and the Free State.

The Regional Forums consist of representatives from mines who are responsible for mine security and members of the local Diamond and Gold Branch(es). The officer commanding of the local Diamond and Gold Branch is often the chairperson. The Regional Forums normally meet on a monthly basis to exchange information, inform each other of operational plans and to identify areas of future co-operation between the mines and the police in the area concerned. One of their aims is to develop a joint intelligence gathering system in each area covered by a Regional Forum.

The National Forum, presently chaired by the national head of the Diamond and Gold Branch, comprises representatives from the Standing Committee of the Chamber of Mines representing gold, platinum and diamond industries, the chairperson or a representative from each Regional Forum, representatives from the National Diamond and Gold Branch and a representative from the National Office of Public Prosecutions or the Department of Justice. The National Forum presently meets on a monthly basis. Some of its objectives are to:

improve the communication process between regions and national structures of the SAPS and the mining industry;



ensure that Regional Forums are established and function properly;



collect, share, evaluate and analyse data and relevant information; and



develop more effective approaches to neutralise major crime syndicates.

It is also in the interest of all parties to the Forum to ensure that crime relating to precious metals and diamonds is accorded a higher priority by the state. Some hold the view that a National Investigation Team, consisting of investigators from the mining industry and the Diamond and Gold Branch of the police, and of representatives from the office of the national prosecuting authority, should be established.

From discussions at all levels it appears that both the National and Regional Forums have contributed positively towards the relationship between the Diamond and Gold Branches and the mining industry. There was, however, a degree of frustration noticeable among some of the persons interviewed that the rate of progress was not what it ought to be. There is a lack of clarity about how suggestions such as a joint intelligence gathering system, or a National Investigation Team, will be accepted and accommodated by the state.

COMMENTS ON THE NATIONAL AND REGIONAL FORUMS* 

(*This monograph was completed during 2000 before the SAPS announced the restructuring of specialised police units (editor's note).

The establishment of these forums was a very positive and commendable step. Their creation should be seen as the first phase in an evolutionary process in which the forums need to be flexible and creative so that they can constantly adapt themselves to changing circumstances. Their present role and functioning should therefore continuously be evaluated and adapted where necessary.

Some of the key issues that the National Forum has not yet been able to resolve are the following:

Precisely how should the state and the mining industry co-operate in ensuring that major syndicates are exposed and apprehended?



Is a National Investigation Team feasible and how will it relate to the state with regard to command and control and resources?



Is it feasible to establish an industry owned common database at regional and national levels, staffed by both members of the Diamond and Gold Branch and the mining industry?

It was not within the mandate of this study to investigate these issues specifically, but they do impact on the relationship between the industry and the police.

In exploring how best to combat organised crime and the top crime syndicates, it is important to bear in mind that there has been a fundamental shift in the approach of the state when dealing with this phenomenon. Ten years ago organised crime was not a concept under consideration by the police that required a different investigative approach from the ordinary criminal investigation against an individual suspect. A docket would be opened to investigate a case against a suspect and if sufficient evidence was found, there would be a prosecution. The focus was not to establish whether or not the individual was part of an organised group and who the individuals at the top were who were co-ordinating the activities of small-time criminals.

A change in approach by the police occurred in 1991, but it has been particularly evident during the past four years. Not only has organised crime been declared a priority crime, but the entire approach of the police towards investigating it has also changed. In essence, the new approach attempts to beat sophisticated crime at its own game. Top crime syndicates, including those involved in buying and selling stolen gold and PGMs, inevitably rely on the best technology and expert advice available. They have the money to obtain the best legal, financial and technical advice on the basis of which they then plan their activities and attempt to outwit the authorities. The new approach by government is also to combine the best investigative, legal, financial, forensic and technical skills in combating organised crime in an holistic manner. The establishment of the Scorpion Unit is evidence of this new approach. Countering organised crime requires intelligence-driven investigations by a team of investigators who have multidisciplinary skills. The objective is to crack the conspiracy at the top rather than to prioritise the prosecution of the individual junior member of a crime network. The aim is not only to arrest and convict the top leaders of criminal groups, but also to deprive them of their livelihood, those assets they have acquired through the proceeds of crime. The controversial Prevention of Organised Crime Act of 1999, which entitles the state to seize the assets of crime bosses, is an example of this approach.

Of course, the investigation and prosecution of individual criminals must and will proceed as usual. But where there is an indication or suspicion that a suspect is part of a larger organised criminal group, the extent of the threat that such a group poses to society will determine whether the investigation will proceed by the detective against the individual only, or whether it is to be dealt with as an organised crime case requiring an intelligence-driven multidisciplinary approach. Crucial, therefore, to the combating of sophisticated organised crime, also in the mining industry, is a threat analysis of those top organised criminal groups to assess the impact that they have on society, in general, or on the mining industry specifically.

Because the above holistic investigative approach towards sophisticated organised crime was only introduced in South Africa during the past few years, the SAPS has embarked on a steep learning curve to develop reliable and scientifically sound threat analysis methods to assess organised criminal groups.

The fact that a number of syndicates, some with international links, are actively involved in dealing in stolen gold and PGMs, is beyond dispute. The role that is played by the smaller local syndicates that mine, crush and melt, transport and sell gold and PGMs at local level is quite clear to mine security staff and the police. It is the more dangerous syndicates — those at national level that have international contacts — about which very little is known. In line with recent developments in the area of organised crime, such syndicates are likely to use the most sophisticated methods of operation that can only be accurately identified by intelligence-driven investigations. The mining industry needs to ensure that the seriousness of the threat that is posed by the top gold-smuggling syndicates is brought home to the relevant authorities. This should ensure that the government’s new approach towards organised crime is also applied when investigating such syndicates.

The determination with which the government is pursuing its new course against organised crime is evident in comments made by the Minister for Safety and Security, Mr Steve Tshwete, at a media briefing in parliament on 7 February 2000:18

"As the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security cluster of Government, we have set ourselves priorities for the coming year that will ensure our contribution towards this vision (i.e. the President’s) … Our main objective will be to focus our endeavours and resources jointly in addressing the incidence of crime and public disorder (security breaches) that has the most negative effect on society, which are mainly organised crimes, serious violent crimes … The Cluster has identified several strategic interventions that will be highlighted in this presentation. These are:

Social crime prevention

Prosecution-led and intelligence-driven investigations

More effective border control

Alternative containment mechanisms and reduction of awaiting trial prison population

Human Resource Development

Quality service delivery

Private-public partnerships …

Prosecution-led and intelligence-driven investigations are a key element in the fight against crime and corruption. All prosecutions are being brought into line with the national strategy concerning crime and crime prevention. The legislative framework for the Directorate for Special Operations (Scorpions) is nearing finalisation and will be tabled in Parliament later this month.

The creation of this unit gives effect to the cluster’s determination to increase national conviction rates through prosecution-led investigations. This unit will direct its energies at priority crimes including vehicle hijacking, syndicated drug and arms dealing, transnational crimes, money laundering and corruption. Cases are given priority according to clear guidelines, and the resources and services of several Departments are being brought together where required, in a structured manner.

The Intelligence Services will be pivotal to combating crime at its source. Improved methods of intelligence gathering and closer co-operation between the intelligence arms of State, the SAPS, Scorpions, customs and immigration services will contribute to significantly improved investigations which in turn will impact on the quality of prosecutions and increase public confidence in our systems.

To ensure more effective intelligence capacity, the cluster has agreed that the consolidation of signal intelligence capacity is a priority for the year 2000. The Ministry for Intelligence Services will spearhead the setting up of the national communication centre during the course of this year. This will give us a crucial weapon in our fight against crime."

What is of concern is that the mining industry and the National Forum do not appear to be part of the above debate or of the developments that are rapidly taking shape. The impression exists that, despite the great strides forward that were made with the establishment of the National and Regional Forums, they have somehow been left behind and need to catch up.

Indications are that a restructuring is taking place within the SAPS to accommodate the new focus of a co-ordinated approach towards sophisticated organised crime. There has been speculation, for example, that the South African Narcotics Bureau (SANAB) might be radically restructured or even disappear in order to be merged with some of the new multidisciplinary organised crime units. The logic behind such a development is not difficult to understand. Sophisticated drug syndicates that deal in narcotics, are also involved with crimes such as money-laundering, vehicle theft, diamond-smuggling, prostitution and others. If SANAB concentrates on investigating big narcotic cases and not so much on money-laundering, vehicle theft and diamond-smuggling, can it investigate such an organised criminal group more effectively than would the newly established multidisciplinary investigating teams? Where does the work of SANAB stop and the work of existing organised crime units start? Does the resource, skills and information base that SANAB maintains not constitute a duplication of what the new organised crime units have, or require? It would seem that there is a case for restructuring some of the specialised police units that were established in the past in order to strengthen the hand of the police against organised crime in general. Specialised units such as SANAB or the Motor Vehicle Theft Units, should perhaps become part of the holistic approach towards attacking organised crime. There are probably very few top organised criminal groups whose criminal activity relates only to drugs, or only to motor vehicle theft.

If a restructuring within the police is taking place, it could have direct consequences for the Diamond and Gold Branch of the SAPS, despite the assurances by senior police officers (in September 1999) that there are no plans to do so. The question has to be posed: In the light of the government’s new approach towards organised crime, is the Diamond and Gold Branch the most appropriate structure of the police to investigate those top gold-smuggling syndicates that have until now escaped the net? Would an organised crime unit, equipped with top investigators, prosecutors, financial experts, electronic device experts and undercover agents not be better equipped to deal with them?

The possibility of an affirmative answer by the government cannot be disregarded. The office of Mr Bulelani Ngcuka, the National Director of Public Prosecutions, plays an important role in these matters. It is also from there that the Scorpion Unit was established.

Despite the possibility of those investigations relating to top crime syndicates (including those involved with gold and PGMs) being taken over by newly established organised crime units, there is an overwhelming case for the retention of the Diamond and Gold Branches. Investigations into the theft of precious metals and diamonds require specialised investigation methods, skills and experience, also in cases relating to runners or middle level crime syndicates. Those responsible need to rely on their own intelligence and databases at local level if they are to succeed against the smaller syndicates in their areas. The cases that they handle fall into a category that cannot be successfully investigated by the normal detectives from the local police station who have to deal with many other types of crime in their area.

It would therefore appear that changes could occur as far as investigations into the top syndicates are concerned but that there is a strong case for the Diamond and Gold Branches to continue with their existing work. The mining industry, however, should not sit back and wait for possible changes to happen without being proactive and without engaging the relevant government actors in order to ensure that the best solutions are found. Initiatives by the mining industry, irrespective of how well intentioned they may be, are unlikely to be effective if they do not relate to the emerging new strategies of the state to deal with crime, and more specifically organised crime. Among others, the following aspects could be considered by the mining industry:

In the first instance, the mining industry — gold, PGMs and diamonds — should get together on this issue in order to ensure that they speak with one voice when engaging the state on the issue of product theft from mines and initiatives to counter it.



The expertise and resources of mine security divisions have a crucial role to play in assisting with investigations and preventive measures to combat theft from mines. The mining industry should therefore develop proposals on how this could best be achieved. Various possibilities exist. In discussion with the National Commissioner of Police, the National Director of Public Prosecutions, the intelligence agencies and others, a way can be found for a meaningful partnership between the state and the mining industry in jointly addressing crimes involving precious metals and diamonds. Such a partnership could include the establishment by both the industry and the police of a joint national investigation team that is linked up with organised crime investigating structures and not totally divorced from them.



If members of the National Forum plan to establish a national database, separate from the database of police and intelligence organisations, and operated jointly by the industry and the Diamond and Gold Branch, a reassessment should be undertaken to ensure that its development occurs in consultation with those authorities that deal with organised crime. Again, it may well be possible to establish such a database, but it needs to relate to the state’s strategies with regard to organised crime if it is to form a meaningful part of a state/industry partnership.



Discussions with state authorities should also relate to the existing Diamond and Gold Branches of the police, the important role they play, and how a joint effort by the industry and Diamond and Gold Branches could enhance the effectiveness of their operations. While the wholesale privatisation of the Diamond and Gold Branches would be regarded as far-fetched at this stage, there may well be aspects or functions of the Branches that could be taken over by the industry after discussion with government authorities. More research needs to be undertaken into this issue and clear proposals developed in consultation with the relevant government authorities.

During his media briefing on 7 February 2000, Minister Steve Tshwete highlighted eight areas for strategic intervention by the justice, crime prevention and security cluster of government. One of the eight areas of intervention related to ‘private sector partnerships’. In his statement, he had the following to say about private sector partnerships:

"Private sector partnerships are another way of ensuring effective service delivery. The member departments of the Cluster have been involved in various initiatives aimed at co-operative governance and enhanced service delivery. In the year to come, some critical partnerships will be established with the private sector, which will strengthen the public sector’s hand in fighting crime and corruption. This includes:

the strengthening of Community Police Forums in order to strengthen the interaction with the public



Partnerships with private sector institutions such as banks to combat Border control financial crimes …"

The banking sector, referred to by the minister in his statement, has established an effective partnership with the SAPS jointly to combat bank robberies and robberies of cash-in-transit. This co-operation between the public and private sector has contributed towards the considerable success that the police have had in apprehending members of the syndicates that were involved. As a result, the number of bank robberies and robberies of cash-in-transit have dropped since 1997. The number of reported robberies of cash-in-transit dropped from 410 in 1996, 230 in 1997, to 214 in 1998. The number of reported bank robberies for the same periods were 642, 497 and 214, respectively.19 The special police investigating team that was appointed to deal with bank and cash-in-transit robberies also ascribes its recent successes to the increased reliance on intelligence gathering and better co-ordination.

There is therefore no reason why the mining industry should not explore the possibility of entering into a partnership with the relevant authorities responsible for combating crime in order to address thefts from mines more effectively.

While the existing relationship between the mining sector and the Diamond and Gold Branch of the police is a good one, the potential for far greater and more intensive co-operation has not been effectively explored. As a potential partnership with the justice, crime prevention and security cluster of government would involve a number of roleplayers in addition to the Diamond and Gold Branch, discussions with government on this issue should start at senior levels. The mining industry should use the positive environment that exists at present to develop a public/private sector partnership with the state jointly to combat product theft from mines more effectively.