Chapter 4

PRECEDING INITIATIVES TO STRENGTHEN BORDER CONTROLS

According to a report delivered by the Permanent Mission of South Africa to the United Nations in New York on 24 June 1999, the South African government has declared the combating of small arms proliferation as the SAPS’s highest priority. This strategy represents an integrated and holistic approach to the introduction of stricter control measures. The government’s goal is to remove the causal factor in small arms proliferation; to stop the flow of illegal arms into South Africa; to prevent arms in legal possession from becoming illegal; to mop up the existing pool of arms in South Africa; and to educate South Africans on the possession of firearms.

The report indicates that firearms entering South Africa illegally often find their way to criminal elements inside the country, but that this flow is not the main source of firearms to criminals in the country. It points to legal firearms becoming illegal as the main source of firearms to criminals. The report furthermore states that the SAPS is taking concrete action to address the problem of the illicit trafficking in small arms through:

training and briefing members of the Border Police Unit and Dog Units;



a new curriculum for courses presented to members of Illegal Firearm Investigation Units;1



training members to etch serial numbers on firearms; and



initiatives to ensure that the issuing of export permits is centralised by the Central Firearm Register.

In addition, the SAPS has taken steps to address the problem regionally, including:

trilateral meetings with Swaziland and Mozambique in order to exchange information and devise joint initiatives;



joint monitoring operations with Swaziland and Mozambique concentrating on shared border posts and areas;



training of Mozambican police officers and conservation officials working close to border areas in order to combat the problem.2

In this section, the initiatives undertaken to strengthen border controls in South Africa will be discussed according to those roleplayers that have implemented them, in the following sequence:

the South African Police Service;

the UNODCCP office in Pretoria, South Africa,

Business Against Crime; and

the US Immigration and Naturalization Services.

Reference will also be made to other relevant comparative studies focused on the issue of border control.

South African Police Service

The SAPS Border Police Head Office has embarked on an intensive recruitment drive among police officials to do six months detached border duty at identified problem border posts and areas.

The detached border duties involve the recruitment of 140 police members from all divisions in the SAPS for a six-month voluntary uninterrupted contractual border duty at a particular border post. Such contractual border duty is seen as a temporary transfer to the border police.

Members passing the recruitment, selection and training process will be provided with accommodation at the border post, but officers are responsible for their other personal needs like food and transport. Police officers volunteering for these detached duties or temporary transfers will get an extra allowance and remuneration for their duties besides their normal police salary and allowances.

The SAPS Border Police believes this concept of detached border duties will improve service delivery. Proactive planning and higher productivity become possible with fewer disciplinary problems.

This method of detached duties is undertaken on a trial basis to evaluate the feasibility of the concept. The implementation of detached duties started on 18 September 2000 and ended in February 2001.

This new programme has been carefully considered and, if implemented with right-minded and positive police officers willing to do extended detached duties, it can be the successful. The close monitoring and evaluation of the programme are crucial so that problems can be identified and rectified at an early stage to keep the programme on track and make it work. Because of its interest in the border project, the ISS will independently evaluate this new method of detached duties.

UNODCCP office in Pretoria, South Africa

The United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNODCCP) for Southern Africa has instituted a programme focused on assisting the governments of Mozambique, South Africa and Swaziland to strengthen their capacity to counteract drug-trafficking and firearms-smuggling, and curb the movement of stolen vehicles across their borders.3

The UNODCCP contracted an independent consultant, Bill Scholes, who is a law enforcement expert, to undertake a five-week mission to examine control on the South African, Swaziland and Mozambican borders. An assessment was made of the:

vulnerability of the contiguous border regions, paying special attention to the smuggling of drugs, firearms and stolen vehicles;



the respective governments law enforcement capabilities; and



any apparent gaps or weaknesses in primary legislation.

Mr Scholes held meetings in South Africa, Swaziland and Mozambique with senior officials from the different police, customs and immigration services. He also held discussions with drug control units, border police and various other departments concerned with the co-ordination of national efforts, specialised and crossborder operations, as well as intelligence and training units.

According to the report on the assessment, the mission was well received and supported by people who were interviewed. Useful information was provided and good ideas and suggestions were put forward during the meetings.

"There was real readiness to accept shortcomings and discuss difficult issues of co-operation between departments and countries, corruption, lack of motivation, an absence of a culture of intelligence within the disparate organisations and a feeling at grass roots level that they sometimes lacked leadership and a sense of direction. These comments are not universal and do not fairly reflect the situation in every sphere, in each country."

This remark reflected the exact experience of ISS researchers when making their assessment of border control in South Africa.

The Scholes report identified the South African, Mozambique and Swaziland land border area as one of the principal routes for the flow of illegal goods in the region. The report further states that proper border policing in this area is hampered by the type of terrain,

"which is inhospitable and remote. They cross bush, veldt, sand dunes and mountainous areas with often no fencing at all or fences more suitable for preventing livestock from straying and delineating the boundary than preventing incursion."

Proper border policing is also hampered by insufficiently trained personnel and a lack of equipment.

The report also identified the lack of suitable facilities to do proper searches on vehicles or people. If searches are conducted on large cargo-carrying vehicles, this results in huge congestion at border posts. The lack of suitable office space and equipment was also identified in the report as a problem at some border posts.

At the conclusion of the expert mission, a two-day workshop with senior government officials was held in Pretoria where conclusions and recommendations were presented and discussed. The Training Sub-committee was established with the objective to elaborate a detailed training programme.

All three governments have signed to participate in the project (RAF/E06 — Capacity Building Against Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in Southeastern Africa). The project is worth US $600 000 and is funded by the government of Italy.

The project objectives are as follows:

Phase 1: an assessment of the extent of the problem; and the provision of equipment to address the most immediate needs.



Phase 2: the establishment and training of specialised border control teams; and the strengthening of legal and institutional frameworks.

Project activities

Aug 1999: Project approved by the UNODCCP.

Sep 1999: Phase 1 assessment mission undertaken by Mr Scholes.

Sep 1999: Workshop to finalise the project held in Pretoria. Representatives from Mozambique, South Africa and Swaziland attended. Following the workshop, a costed workplan was developed that provided for the project’s immediate equipment needs under phase 1, as well as a list of equipment and a suggested training schedule/curriculum for the commencement of phase 2.4

Sep 1999: Swaziland signed the Letter of Agreement.

Dec 1999: Telecommunications and surveillance equipment provided to the Royal Swaziland Police.

May 2000: South Africa agreed to join the project.

May 2000: South Africa provided its request for equipment.

July 2000: Mozambique signed the Letter of Agreement.

July 2000: The first Project Steering Committee meeting.

July 2000: The second meeting of the Training Sub-committee.

July 2000: South Africa signed Letter of Agreement.

Sept 2000: The South African National Inter-Departmental Structure on Border Control (NIDS) executive committee meeting endorsed the use of the NIDS operations committee structure in support of the project’s joint task team concept.

Oct 2000: The tri-border training strategy elaborated.

Oct 2000: Surveillance, drug detection and search equipment provided to SAPS Border Police.

Although the project places heavy emphasis on equipping the border police in each of the three countries, as well as fostering crossborder and interdepartmental co-operation, the most important contribution will be training. The training curriculum will cover:

Theoretical training:

Teamwork, communication skills and conflict management
Profiling/selecting a targeting system
Identification of narcotics
Searching methodology and concealment techniques
Risk assessment of suspect vehicles and searching procedures
Documentation verification
Document examination and inspection
Basic investigative procedures
Handling of exhibits
Identification of suspect vehicles and precursor chemicals
Introduction to controlled delivery procedures/powers of seizure
Sources of information
Interviewing/questioning techniques



Practical training:

Venue: four priority border posts — Oshoek/Ngwenya (SA/Swaziland), Lebombo/Ressano Garcia (Mozambique/SA), Golel/Lavumisa (Swaziland/SA) and Lomahasha/Namaacha (Swaziland/Mozambique).

Trainees: Priority to trainees who have received theoretical training.

Trainers: Practical training to be done by 2 teams of mentors consisting of 2 people who have given theoretical training.

Practical group size: Average 3-4. Maximum 6.

Duration: 2 days on each side of the border (i.e. 2 + 2 days).

Timing: 3 phases per year.

It should be noted that the training in the specialised equipment provided under the project will be included in the delivery of the equipment by the service provider. Importantly, a briefing to senior officers will be arranged primarily as an internally driven exercise within each of the services with no cost implications for the project. This is to ensure that new approaches and training outcomes are fed up the chain of command.

The Training Sub-committee is developing a curriculum for the course, using the model developed by the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-ordination Organisation (SARPCCO).

Although the UNODCCP project is mainly concerned with narcotics interdiction, it will serve to strengthen border controls for all forms of interdiction. It is hoped that such projects will be extended to further borders in Southern Africa as the increase in the trafficking in illegal goods starts to affect all countries in the region. Tighter border controls can thus be one of the measures to curb the illegal flow of firearms and smuggled vehicles in the Southern African region.

The UNODCCP project can be a model and a practical initiative for other donors to follow and become involved in.

Business Against Crime

The Business Against Crime border project aims to result in the:

"Improvement of regulation of movement and persons and goods in and out of the country through enhanced control of ports of entry and co-ordinated management of border control."5

The Business Against Crime project concentrates mainly on vehicle crime. Its objective is to assist in the removal of the commercial benefit of the trade in stolen vehicles and vehicle parts by participating in the following projects:6

the facilitation of the creation of partnerships in which government departments and private enterprise have controlled access to the NaTIS database;



to upgrade the technology and procedures at South African border posts to ensure that stolen vehicles are not taken out of the country;



to enforce comprehensive parts-marking on existing vehicles and all new vehicles;



to investigate the possibility of incorporating a microchip into vehicle licence discs to assist the SAPS in combating vehicle crime;



to undertake the regular verification of all vehicles in order to ascertain that they are roadworthy and that the numbers displayed are original and are in accordance with the NaTIS database;



to ensure the integrity and security of input and amendments to core data on the NaTIS system;



to investigate and implement changes to obviate fraud involving clearance certificates and SAPVIN numbers;



to investigate and implement changes to improve the effectiveness of Vehicle Theft Units;



to implement changes at the Vehicle Safeguarding Units to comply with SAPS national instructions;



to investigate and implement changes to improve the effectiveness of Licence Offices and Vehicle Testing Stations; and



to draft new legislation to combat vehicle crime.7

From these objectives, it is clear that there is a need to share information and on databases, particularly with regard to vehicle thefts.

US Immigration and Naturalization Service

In the US Immigration and Naturalization Services’ report, an assessment was made of conditions at South African land borders, airports and seaports by the US Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Problem areas in terms of land borders identified by the report were situated along the Lesotho/South African border where crossborder crimes like stock theft and drug-smuggling were identified as the main criminal activities taking place.

On the South African/Mozambique/Zimbabwe/Botswana border, crossborder crimes included the illegal crossing of people and cargo, and the smuggling of firearms, vehicles and drugs. Contraband and ‘round-tripping’ seemed to be the order of the day.

The report also found that there is a lack of resources, personnel infrastructure and equipment that seriously hamper proper border control. It was suggested that the South African government should make the control of all movements across its borders one of its top priorities.

Other observations made in the report included the following issues:

Command structure: confusion over grey areas in terms of roles exist between customs, immigration and the SAPS;



Military role: presence of the SANDF on the borderline creates negative public perceptions;



Technology: lack of technical tools to aid in border control is critical at most border posts;



Personnel and training: personnel shortages at all border posts, and laws governing border control are not enforced due to the lack of training and knowledge;



Equipment: lack of basic equipment is apparent at all border posts like radios, nightvision devices and four-wheel drive vehicles;



Corruption: recruitment of personnel does not take integrity into account;



Designing and upgrading of border posts (physical layout): a lack of security measures in transit areas at all border posts; and



Detention facilities: a lack of detention facilities at border posts to deal with illegal immigrants.

The Border Control Operational Working Team made use of the US report as a guideline to compile a structured implementation plan on the collective approach without disrupting the line functions of border control. The team pointed out that one of the conclusions in the US report was that there appeared to be a disjointed border control command structure in South Africa. The recommendation was the creation of one unified Border Police command, with divisions including immigration, customs, internal investigations and border control.

Other comparative studies

Since establishing that South African border control is in a very weak state and that something needs to be done to improve the situation, the following comparative studies were done on the issue:

National Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee (NICOC), report to the Cabinet Committee on Safety and Intelligence (CCOSI);



the Customs Law Enforcement Task Group (CLETG) document for the executive head of SARS;



a draft document prepared by Mr I Lambinon for the Department of Home Affairs; and



the South African Assessment Document by the US Immigration and Naturalization Services: Office of Inspection.

As is indicated in the report on the Collective Approach Implementation Plan by the Operational Working Team on Border Control, the authors of the above documents all indicated that a collective or joint approach should be taken to controlling or managing border control in South Africa.

Conclusion

The UNODCCP and Business Against Crime initiatives are still ongoing and their assistance to the SAPS Border Police Units is some of the most valuable provided by outside organisations to improve the control on South African borders. Assistance by other countries such as France and the United Kingdom in training aspects is also very valuable as this is one of the areas identified by all as among the weak points in Southern African border control.

The new detached duties initiative by the SAPS Border Police Unit is also a step in the right direction in addressing the problem of expertise and corruption. It will improve service delivery in the form of more arrests and seizures of illegal people and goods.

One other initiative that is not discussed here in detail but is very valuable to the border police is that of UNICODE. UNICODE provides a database of stolen vehicles to the SAPS at border posts, as well as handheld systems for officers to test vehicles when they are not close to a computer to establish whether they are stolen or not. The system and the database are being upgraded, a process which will also involve other businesses in South Africa. It is believed that this type of database can be improved to include stolen firearms, household goods or any stolen commodity where a serial number of some kind is present. This type of access to a database with a wide range of circulation capability of reported stolen goods, accompanied by dedicated police officers at border posts, will make it harder for stolen goods to leave the country. It will also assist insurance companies to determine if false claims are made or to trace and find stolen cars in neighbouring countries.

Notes

The Illegal Firearm Investigation Units were integrated into the Serious and Violent Crime Unit, Detective Service early in 2001.



Ibid.



Quarterly newsletter of the Regional Office for Southern Africa of the United Nations Offices for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNODCCP).



B Scholes, Final report: Mission to assess needs for capacity building against drug-trafficking and organised crime in Southeast Africa.



Business Against Crime, <www.web.co.za/bac/projects.htm>.



Ibid.



Ibid.