Chapter 6

CASE STUDY 1: KWAZULU-NATAL BORDER WITH SWAZILAND AND MOZAMBIQUE

The study sought to assess the capacity of border controls in northern KwaZulu-Natal to prevent illicit firearm-trafficking into South Africa. The northern KwaZulu-Natal area, bordering Swaziland and Mozambique, was selected for the case study as it has been one of the most significant transit routes for illicit firearms entering South Africa in the past. Considering the ongoing violence in the province, it may still be the case.

The large quantities of weapons not recovered after the war in Mozambique, much of it buried in caches, have created a plentiful source of supply to the illicit markets in Southern Africa. This border area contains many of the main routes formerly used by the liberation movements for smuggling weapons into South Africa. Political violence decreased after the 1994 elections, but tensions still remain significant in the province until today. The assassination of the mayor of Nongoma and other political leaders are good examples of the political tension prevailing in the province.

The selected border area starts on the Mpumalanga provincial border, borders on Swaziland, up to the Ndumo Game Reserve on the Mozambican border. It is mountainous terrain and difficult to explore or patrol by vehicle. The wetlands and swamps on the Mozambican-South African border from Swaziland up to Kosi Bay on the Indian Ocean hamper movement by vehicle, especially during the rainy season.

Border posts

There are three official ‘ports of entry’ on this stretch of border - the Onverwacht, Golela and Kosi Bay border posts. Only the Golela border post is staffed by personnel of the SAPS Border Police Unit, the Department of Home Affairs (immigration) and SARS (customs and excise). The other two border posts, Onverwacht and Kosi Bay are only staffed by personnel of SAPS and Home Affairs.

Seizures of illegal weapons at the border posts have dropped dramatically since before 1994. Only 44 illegal firearms have been seized at these three border posts in 1999 and 2000 and 1% of all seizures made by the border police at Onverwacht are actually made at the border post itself. The rest of the seizures are made at roadblocks or away from the actual border post.1 The police believe that this is because the border fence was rigorously patrolled by the South African Defence Force and the South African Police before 1994. Border posts themselves were therefore actually the best point of entry. With the presence of the SAPS and SANDF on border posts reduced, the posts themselves have become the main points of control and it has become much easier for criminal groups to smuggle weapons across the fence on the borderline.

Routes and crossing points identified

The terrain in this area could almost have been designed for illicit trafficking. "Smuggling is very easy", said one police officer.2 There are apparently 67 active paths in current use by traffickers in a stretch of 80 kilometres on the South Africa-Mozambique border in northern KwaZulu-Natal.3 This figure is believed to be twice that of the known illegal crossings in the area.

A four-foot wire fence runs along the borderline, but it has been cut in so many places and frequently used paths can be clearly seen running from one side of the fence and continuing on the other side. In many places, there are tyre marks on both sides of the border where stolen vehicles have transited recently.

Certain paths are apparently used particularly for stolen vehicles and others mainly for smuggling contraband. The section of the border with Swaziland in the Pongola area is apparently a major transit route for illegal immigrants and goods entering South Africa. It is very close to the national road (N2) and illegal immigrants can easily find a taxi to take them inland.4

Another main crossing area for the entry and exit of people and stolen vehicles is in the Mhlosheni Hills area. The Sitilo area, close to Pongola, was identified as one of the old liberation routes. It is still extensively used today to smuggle goods across the border.5 Illegal immigrants and goods are mainly transported to Mpumalanga or Gauteng from here.

Illegal firearms, immigrants and goods enter at the farthest northern section of KwaZulu-Natal bordering on Mozambique at places like Muzi, Gate Six, the Ndumo Game Reserve through the Suthu river, and in the Kosi Bay area between the border post and the Indian Ocean.6 Illegal goods and immigrants entering South Africa are normally transported either to Durban or Johannesburg.

The area bordering Swaziland and Mozambique between Ingwavuma and the Ndumo Game Reserve was also identified as a smuggling route for firearms in the past. It is still in use by gunrunners. The area is very difficult to patrol due to the mountainous terrain and lack of suitable roads. The local population make no secret that they move freely through the Cecil Mack’s pass area and that criminals also use these routes.

The Onverwacht border police are responsible for patrolling and enforcing all border policing functions in this section from the Mpumalanga/KwaZulu-Natal provincial border with Swaziland up to the Golela turn-off from the N2 highway. On this stretch, it was clear that uncontrolled crossings from Swaziland into South Africa happen on a daily basis. The border fence has been cut at regular intervals and there are many crossing points that could easily be used by illegal immigrants and smugglers. There are a number of houses very close to the border on both sides of the fence and the police believe some are used to store smuggled goods.7

Specific crossing places are known as places where smugglers prefer to smuggle contraband and illegal goods like cigarettes, music tapes and false identity documents into South Africa from Swaziland, and others are identified as those where stolen vehicles would be smuggled out of South Africa. At one such a crossing point, a stolen Toyota pick-up truck (bakkie) was found. It was stuck in the mud just 100 metres from the border. The criminals simply stripped all the spare parts and carried them across the border into Swaziland.8

The border divides many communities and families which creates problems in itself. Families live on both sides of the divide and it is very difficult to control their movement. Economic opportunities, education and the price of goods are often better in South Africa than in Swaziland or Mozambique. This provides strong incentives for illegal immigrants to cross the border in search of cheaper food or to give their children better education opportunities.

According to some of the soldiers patrolling the area, illegal firearms are not as much a problem, as they rarely find or seize illegal firearms coming across the border. They regarded stolen vehicles and contraband as the main smuggled items.

By definition, it is impossible to gauge the quantities of illicit firearms and other goods crossing into South Africa accurately. By all accounts, the quantities appear to have dropped since the peak at the height of political violence in the run-up to the 1994 election. The police believe that the number of illicit firearms entering South Africa from Mozambique and Swaziland has dropped. This view was echoed by SANDF soldiers and community leaders who were interviewed.

However, all agreed that illicit firearms are still crossing the border. It is clear that there are many opportunities for enterprising smugglers. If stolen vehicles, contraband and illegal immigrants can cross the border seemingly at will then, it cannot be very hard to smuggle an AK-47 across the border. Law enforcement agencies appear to lack the capacity to enforce border controls rigorously.

Issues undermining effective border control

A number of key issues emerged from the research that have to be addressed if border controls are to be effectively implemented.

Co-operation between government departments at border posts

Border posts appeared to vary in terms of the effectiveness of their operations. Key factors seemed to be personnel, motivation and co-operation between government departments.

At Onverwacht, there appeared to be good co-operation between the police and immigration officers at the border post. It seemed as if they were coping in handling the customs duties as well. However, the absence of customs officials at the Kosi Bay border post appeared to be a problem. In this situation, police officers were meant to undertake the customs responsibilities, but their view was that it was not their job.9 As a result, there was no evidence of cars being searched or revenue being collected on goods exported from the country. People were witnessed walking freely through the border post in both directions without being stopped, searched or having their passports checked. These crossings were apparently made by the local population who were known to the police at the border post. If vehicles are not inspected or searched at a border post and people are allowed to come and go as they please, it is not surprising if there is not a knock-on effect on security, illegal immigration and revenue collection. It is sometimes the person who is a regular at the border post and who does not pose any security or criminal threat who is the smuggler or the informant of the smuggler.

Co-operation between the SAPS and the SANDF

Close co-operation between the SAPS and SANDF is vital for effective border control. With such enormous distances to cover and not enough people to do so, sound communication and the best deployment of available resources are vital. This was not always evident, with SANDF soldiers on the borderline mainly concentrating on arresting illegal immigrants entering South Africa.

SANDF soldiers patrolled the border around the clock, but there were some accusations of corruption facilitating illegal trafficking. From the police, there is clearly a problem with trust.10 One reason for this distrust could be the lack of liaison between police and soldiers on the ground. Co-ordination at a national and provincial level seems to be more effective with the National Inter-Departmental Structure (NIDS) in place, but it does not appear to have filtered down to co-operation along the borders themselves. It is good to have weekly meetings at management level, but the workforce on the ground needs to communicate and get to know one another. One simple problem that must be addressed is the lack of direct radio communication between the police at border posts and the SANDF. Information exchange and reaction times to border incidents both seem to suffer from this state of affairs.

On a subsequent visit to the border area by ISS researchers, the co-operation between the police and the defence force seemed to have improved and a new combined task team was formed in the Jozini/Kosi Bay area in an attempt to address the high level of crossborder crime, especially vehicles leaving South Africa illegally.

Co-operation between the SAPS and the National Intelligence Agency

The gathering and use of intelligence are critical in tackling the illicit traffic in firearms, particularly given the lack of resources and the size of the border. The intelligence officer responsible for information-gathering on the Swazi border area appeared to be well informed of criminal groups operating from Swaziland in South Africa and shared his information with the border police at the post.

During an internal operation in January 2000, the Onverwacht border post in conjunction with the Golela border post, the SANDF, the National Intelligence Agency officer and other government departments concerned arrested 780 illegal immigrants, including one Somali, four Burundians, two Congolese and two Mozambicans. What is interesting about the arrest of the two Mozambicans is that both had false South African identity documents with which they had successfully applied for handgun licenses in South Africa.

Co-operation between the South African border police and Swaziland police and military

Illicit trafficking is a transborder problem that requires a transborder approach to tackle it effectively. Co-operation between the South African border police and the Swazi police and military appears to be good at the border post itself, but very poor elsewhere along the borderline.

This was somewhat surprising as monthly or tri-monthly meetings take place between the different forces and services involved in crossborder crime and border control on both sides of the border. At these meetings, problems and possible co-operation are discussed and information is exchanged, for instance, on common criminal activities. But this occurs at management level and it may be that the involvement and discussions at management level are not filtered down to the ground level, where distrust and professional jealousy consequently set in. Soldiers and police officers patrolling the fence do not know one another and, for this simple reason, will not communicate effectively.

South African police officers claim that the Swazi soldiers who patrol their side of the border warn people not to cross the border when they know that the South African police or military are on patrol. This is unfortunately only the view of a South African police officer and no comment was available from the Swazi military personnel patrolling the other side, as they refused to be interviewed and simply walked off when approached.

It is estimated that there are 236 criminal gangs operating just in the stretch of border between Mpumalanga and Golela.12 One South African farm, approximately 200 metres from the border, has been attacked six times in two years by armed gangs operating from Swaziland, resulting in one death on the farm during this period.

The lack of co-operation between the South African and Swazi police and military, however, limits the action taken to prevent these crimes. South African police cannot cross the border in pursuit of suspected criminals without the permission of the Swazi’s and vice versa.

In the light of the ‘grievances’ of police officers, it has to be considered that there are political agreements in place between South Africa, Swaziland and Mozambique for following up on information about criminals, but that permission must be obtained through the right channels for any police officer to be allowed to do so. These complaints can be as a result of an eager police officer who is frustrated because he can see his suspect getting away, but he knows he must first obtain political permission to cross the border.

Co-operation between the South African border police and Mozambican police and military

Co-operation between the SAPS and the Mozambican police and military at the Kosi Bay border post seems to be effective. However, once away from the border post itself, the co-operation seems to deteriorate into distrust and there is little evidence of effective co-operation to prevent crime.

South African soldiers are only placed at the border for three months and do not get to know their Mozambican counterparts well, and cannot build up a good information network. Although it is not the prime function of soldiers to build up information networks, this can clearly assist them to understand the nature of crime on the border and improve the information passed on to intelligence networks.

Co-operation between the SAPS and local communities

Co-operation between the police and local communities along the border has to be improved as a matter of urgency. There are 48 community police forums in the northern KwaZulu-Natal area but relations appeared to be poor with the local police stations. A series of interviews with local community leaders and members of community police forums indicated that local people have substantial information about illicit firearm-trafficking that appears not to be utilised. There was a high level of distrust of the police among the people interviewed and many accusations of corruption were levelled at the local police.

The political situation in KwaZulu-Natal is still very tense with pronounced rivalry between political parties. This creates a difficult environment in which the police have to operate with certain actions bound to be perceived as ‘political’. However, the poor community relations seemed to be exacerbating this situation and hampering efforts to stem the influx of illicit firearms. One of the most worrying accusations was that certain police stations in the area did not respond to information supplied by local people about individuals involved in firearm-smuggling syndicates. This has sometimes led members of community police forums to take police matters into their own hands and seize firearms from the homes of suspected criminals.13 There were other allegations that weapons handed in to a local police station subsequently ‘disappeared’ and were not accounted for.14 It could be that increased transparency would allay many of the local fears, but, until the flow of information to the community is improved, suspicions are bound to linger.

The interviews and information gathered from the local communities indicated that there is a flow of illegal firearms entering from Swaziland and Mozambique and moving to criminals in South Africa.

Personnel and resources

Insufficient personnel and resources were two of the biggest problems identified. At the Onverwacht border post, there are currently only four permanent border police officers responsible for control of the border. However, this number was increased with the new detached duty programme at the affected border areas. The commanding officer believed that, to be more effective in fighting crossborder crime and to do proper searches at the border post itself, he would need another 14 police officers.15

Accommodation for border police is a long-standing problem that has been identified before as needing attention. The permanent accommodation available at Onverwacht is occupied by local police officers from Pongola.16 This means that the border police have to pay high rent for accommodation on local farms, a situation that could understandably lead to a drop in morale. The border police base at Pongola is in a poor state and is urgently in need of upgrading.

The resources at the Kosi Bay border post also leave much to be desired. There are only two permanent border police officers, supported by the new detached police officers and sometimes by two police dog handlers with one trained to find explosives and the other drugs. There is also no facsimile machine at the border post and officers have to make use of the one at the local police station some 20 kilometres away. This can sometimes lead to a delay in the transmission of urgent information from other police units to the border post or confidential information landing in the wrong hands.17 Another area of concern is the frequent breakdown of the generator that supplies electricity to the border post, which also results in damage to computer systems at the post.

The project by the UNODCCP regional office in South African will assist with equipment such as vehicle search kits, communication systems like facsimile machines and radios at the border posts, including the Kosi Bay border post on both sides of the post.

Due to a lack of manpower and the shortage of vehicles, the border police in the northern KwaZulu-Natal area tend to leave the actual patrolling of the borderline to the SANDF.

At the Kosi Bay border area, SANDF soldiers are deployed in two sections. One section of 20 men is responsible for patrolling the area between the sea and the border post itself.18 The other group is responsible for patrolling the larger area from the border post to the Swaziland border excluding the borders of the two nature reserves (Ndumo Game Reserve and Tembe Elephant Park) against the international border. Patrolling of the nature reserves is done by nature conservation security personnel.

The SANDF group responsible for the area between Kosi Bay and the Swaziland border had no transport or functional communication systems at the time the research was carried out. Twelve soldiers were responsible for patrolling a 53 kilometre stretch of border between the border post to Swaziland.

Co-operation between the South African border police and Illicit Firearms Units

The SAPS has a number of local Illicit Firearms Units.19 The two in the northern KwaZulu-Natal area are in Jozini and Pongola. Excellent regular communication between these units and the border police could be expected, but there was little evidence of this. Indeed, some of the border police interviewed were under the impression that the Illicit Firearms Unit in Jozini had closed down. The commander of the Jozini unit died in 1999 and it does not appear as if there has been any substantial activity since then at the unit.

The Illicit Firearms Unit in Vryheid is fully operative, but says that its main area of concern is the poor control of weapons within South Africa and that it would react only on information about crossborder smuggling if the information was given to them. The unit only co-operates with the border police when acting on specific information, not as a matter of routine.20 All the Illegal Firearm Investigation Units are now under the control of the Serious and Violent Crime sections after the closure of some specialised units earlier this year.

Corruption

Almost all of the people interviewed for this case study mentioned that there was corruption that facilitated illicit trafficking. The accuracy and precise nature of this corruption are difficult to ascertain and most allegations are therefore not published in this monograph.

Many members of local communities who were interviewed perceived police corruption to be the biggest problem. It was a common view that most crime was perpetuated as a result of the deliberate negligence of the police. There were claims that the police officers had to sneak out of their living quarters at night during special police operations in the area so that they would not be seen by corrupt colleagues who would alert crime syndicates of the police presence or planned operations.21

Corruption will always be an issue in border areas where there are financial rewards to be reaped. It complicates the task of the many honest, hard-working SAPS border police and SANDF members. Corruption must be comprehensively addressed if efforts to stem illicit firearm flows into South Africa are to be effective.

Conclusion

Border policing in the northern KwaZulu-Natal area was set to improve mainly because of the assistance of the private sector. This area can become one of the most popular tourist attractions in South Africa. Roads are being upgraded and access to many areas have become much easier than in the past. Co-operation between the police and the defence force is improving as is evident in the creation of the joint task team to address crossborder vehicle crime in the area. But all will be in vain if the relationship with the communities and corruption are not tackled as matters of urgency, and if all types of crossborder crime are not seriously addressed.

Notes

Interview with border police officer, 4 February 2000.



Interview with border police officer, 4 February 2000.



Interview with nature conservation officer, 10 February 2000.



Interview with border police officer, 4 February 2000.



Interview with border police officer, 4 February 2000.



Interviews with border police and community groups, 4 February 2000 and 5 February 2000.



Interview with border police, 4 February 2000.



Interview with border police, 4 February 2000.



Interview with border police, 5 February 2000.



Interview with border police, 4 February 2000.



Interview with border police, 5 February 2000.



Interview with border police, 4 February 2000.



Interview with members of community police forum, 6 February 2000.



Interview with members of community police forums, 5 February 2000.



Interview with border police officer, 4 February 2000.



Interview with border police officer, 4 February 2000.



Interview with border police officer, 5 February 2000.



Interview with SANDF patrol, 6 February 2000.



At the time of the research, the Illegal Firearm Investigation Units were still operational. Thes units were integrated into the Serious and Violent Crime Unit, Detective Services, early in 2001.



Interview with illicit firearm unit, 7 February 2000.



Interview with community police forum 6 February 2000.