Chapter 7

CASE STUDY 2: NORTHERN CAPE BORDER WITH NAMIBIA

Introduction

Understanding the permeability of the Northern Cape-Namibia border is a crucial element in the assessment of border control mechanisms to prevent illegal firearm flows. The Northern Cape-Namibia border is the closest South African border to the raging conflict in both Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). These facts mainly informed the decision to use the area as a case study in the project. In addition, previous experience showed that, during periods of peace, firearms continued to flow from these conflict regions into South Africa.

The Northern Cape borders on both Namibia and Botswana. It comprises South Africa’s longest international land border covering a distance of 1 400 kilometres. The border area is very remote and sparsely populated, and consists of harsh arid terrain characterised by large open plains surrounded by mountains. The stretch of border between South Africa and Namibia is demarcated by the Orange River and a fence marks the remainder of the border with Namibia and Botswana. The fence is merely a marker, and is not higher than four feet at some places.

Due to the vast expanse of the border, the research concentrated on a specific stretch of border. The focus of this study was the South African-Namibian border area from Alexander Bay to the Nakop border post. In this area, three specific border posts were visited: Alexander Bay, Vioolsdrift and Nakop. In contrast to the KwaZulu-Natal case study,1 the researchers were accompanied by two border police officers from the SAPS Border Police Head Office. The use of a police plane during this field trip also gave researchers a better understanding of the difficult terrain and the vastness of the border, as well as more insight into the obstacles faced by the border police.

Historical firearm-smuggling routes

The flows of illegal firearms through what was often referred to as illicit pipelines historically occurred between South Africa and the conflict areas in Angola and the DRC. From these conflict areas, weapons are currently funnelled through these existing routes down to Windhoek in Namibia, from where they are usually transported by truck to South Africa.

Both the volumes of firearm flows and their net direction are heavily influenced by the level of conflict in Angola and the DRC. This was demonstrated during the short peace period in Angola in 1994. As the prospects of a short cease-fire became a reality, an increase was witnessed in the movement of firearms. It was reported that organised crime syndicates were enticing women from Gauteng to buy or exchange clothing for firearms in northern Namibian towns close to the border with southern Angola. These women, usually with between one and three firearms in their possession, brought them back to South Africa by obtaining lifts from long-distance truck drivers. The firearms would be hidden in the cargo on the trucks, the woman would travel with the truck and, close to the South African/Namibian border post, would leave the truck and cross the border at another crossing point. She would then join the truck once it has passed through the border post. There were two pipelines or routes used for this movement - either trucks travelling from Windhoek to Cape Town, and then on to Gauteng, or via Botswana to Gauteng.2

The pertinent question is whether the current border control mechanisms are able to handle the anticipated influx of firearms that will occur if peace is achieved in Angola and the DRC.3 In addition, what is the minimum threshold of peace that needs to occur before the demand for or value of firearms in South Africa outweighs their utility in the Angolan and DRC conflicts? Although this research did not aim to answer the latter question, it is indisputably a matter of urgency to ensure that border control mechanisms are enhanced in the Northern Cape to prevent the anticipated inflow of firearms.

Overview of the case study

At each of the three border posts that were visited, interviews were conducted with border police officers on duty. This included both permanent and detached police officers. Detached police officers were from police stations throughout South Africa and some from specialised police units such as the Narcotics Unit, Vehicle Theft Units, Dog Units and Firearms Investigation Units.

The border posts are inaccessible to one another as a result of the mountain range or rivers dividing them. In order to drive from one border post to the other involves major detours that cover large distances and are costly. This poses a problem as motor vehicles cannot patrol the entire borderline.

Informal crossings exist along the border at a number of points. The main crossings were identified at Sendelingsdrif, Grasdrift (or Aussengehr as it is known on the Namibian side), Goodhouse and the Richtersveld National Park.4

Seizures of firearms at these border posts have dropped in the last few years. The main reason identified by the border police was that licensed firearms brought over the border post by legal owners were not declared and the border police no longer had the capacity to search vehicles regularly.

According to the border police, legal firearm owners from South Africa are seldom allowed to take handguns into Namibia. Another problem experienced at border posts is that travellers from both countries do not have the correct documentation for exporting or importing firearms. Over time, the level of reporting licensed firearms has decreased as more legal firearm owners choose not to declare their firearms at the border post - especially South African licensed firearm owners travelling to Namibia.

The border police are disillusioned by the situation. As stated by a border post commander: "if we are unable to track or control legal firearms crossing the border, how can we possibly hope to find or track illegal firearms crossing the border."5

Nakop

The Nakop border post is an ‘A’ grade border post. As a designated land border post, it is operated with representatives from all three government agencies involved in border control: the SAPS, SARS (customs and excise) and the Department of Home Affairs.

At the Nakop border post, there were 15 SAPS officers to handle all border control functions. They were both permanent and detached officers from other stations undertaking border duties.

The border post checkpoint is 31 kilometres from the Namibian border post and approximately 15 kilometres from the actual borderline. The Nakop border post was built away from the border as this was the only suitable area for offices with accommodation available for the border police. A small mountain range and vast pans that are filled with water during the rainy season make the terrain closer to the actual border unsuitable for building. A new border post closer to the borderline is presentely planned and funds have been made available for this. The pans and sandy semi-desert plains with the small mountain range also make patrolling the border by vehicle and foot difficult.

An interesting provincial police working arrangement exists at the Nakop border post at the time of the research. The model relies on the rotation of police officers from specialised units to the border post. The rationale underlying this is to increase the level of specialised policing skills at the border post and the capacity of the border posts by increasing the number of police officers at the posts. The system makes use of the Upington-based SAPS specialised unit officers at the Nakop border post. These officers drawn from the Narcotics Unit, the Illegal Firearms Investigation Unit and the Vehicle Theft Unit.6 Under the temporary assignment, police officers work for three days at the border post before returning to their permanent units. The provincial border police office, based at Upington, established the system.

This initiative aims to increase the level of expertise in the fields of narcotics, firearms and vehicle thefts, which enhances the operational capacity of the border post. It must be seen if this exercise will continue with the closing of some specialised units in the SAPS. Over time, it is hoped that this expertise will be transferred to the border police in terms of specific search and identification techniques used to find illegal drugs, stolen vehicles and illicit firearms. Some of the limitations of this system are the following:

The different specialised units do not have access to other specialised units’ computer functions for the testing of firearms or vehicles. This means, for example, that should a member of the Illegal Firearms Investigation Unit not be on duty, another border police officer would not be able to check if a firearm is stolen or who the owner is. Providing access to the different specialised units’ functions on the computer would rectify this problem.



It also appears that certain specialised unit officers, especially those with an assigned police vehicle, do not stay at the border post for the duration of their assignment. This is the result of the work overload of their permanent assignments, as well as the lack of desirable accommodation at the border post.



Finally, the different specialised units are not trained to work in multidisciplinary teams. By the very nature of their specialised unit training, they are inwardly focused. It appears as if the level of competition between the different units undermines their ability to work as a single unit on the border post. This could be overcome through the use of strategies, such as better leadership, training and longer assignments to the border post to encourage teambuilding.



The desired number of police officers to fulfil all border control duties sufficiently at Nakop is 30 police officers.

Vioolsdrift

The Vioolsdrift border post is an A grade border post. As a designated border post, it is staffed by the SAPS, SARS and the Department of Home Affairs.

At the Vioolsdrift border post, there were 12 SAPS officers to handle all border control duties. The use of a police officer from the Vioolsdrift police station for detached duty at the border post resulted in a positive change in his attitude towards border crime. Through the placement of the first detached police officer from the local police station at the border post, recognition was gained for the fact that border crimes affect the broader community. It was anticipated that this realisation would spread to other detached police officers.7

At the Vioolsdrift border post, there are no clear demarcations of the area for which the border police unit is responsible. The border police generally patrol the same area as the local police station. This comprises a stretch of 80 kilometres to either side of the border post on the Orange River.

Two main problems were experienced by the Vioolsdrift border police:

Lack of personnel: This was partially addressed by the use of officers from the local police station as a temporary measure until more permanent border police officers can be assigned to the border. The desired number of personnel at the border post is 30 police officers.



Low firearm declaration by legal firearm owners crossing the border: International visitors to South Africa often bring legal handguns into the country. The measures to ensure that they also leave South Africa with their firearms are weak. These firearms are often lost or sold in South Africa and these transactions are not reported to any South African authority.8 The implication of not declaring legally held firearms to the border police, is that no measures can be taken to halt the flow of legal firearms to the illegal firearm pool. Firearm owners know that the police cannot search every vehicle crossing the border. In addition, when the police do search vehicles, they seldom find firearms as they are in a hurry to search as many vehicles as possible and to keep the queue of vehicles moving. It stands to reason that if the border police are having difficulty in controlling legal firearms, they most certainly will not have a significant impact on illegal firearms crossing the border, since arms traffickers use more sophisticated hiding techniques than legal firearm owners. It would be extremely difficult to stop the flow of illegal firearms.

Alexander Bay

The Alexander Bay border post is a B grade border post. This implies that the border police and immigration officials are responsible for all border control functions, including immigration (Home Affairs) and customs and excise (SARS). Although a B grade border post, the movement of goods through the post is almost equivalent to that of the Vioolsdrift border post. It is estimated that about R50 million worth of goods are exported through Alexander Bay per month.9

The jurisdiction of the Alexander Bay border post follows the Orange River from the Atlantic Ocean for approximately 140 kilometres. The first 30 kilometres upriver from the ocean are well patrolled and guarded as this is a restricted diamond area and mine security officials are responsible to ensure that no illegal crossings take place. Outside this restricted diamond area, illegal crossings are fairly easy as it is only the border police and, on occasion, the SANDF that patrol the rest of the 140 kilometres. The sea area falling under the border police’s jurisdiction, which is also supposed to be patrolled, stretches from the Orange river mouth southwards for 400 kilometres up to the Groen River.

The mountainous terrain on the South African side of the border hampers patrolling as the mountain forces the road away from the river. As a result, it is almost impossible to monitor the river without specialised methods and resources.

At the Alexander Bay border post, there is a police rubber dinghy that is piloted by the police officer in charge of the border post. This boat is used in both sea and river patrols. Land-based patrols are done by vehicle on an ad hoc basis.

At this border post, firearm declarations by legal firearm owners are very low and the seizure of illegal firearms is nearly non-existent.

The Alexander Bay border post is an old garage used by diamond miners from Alexander Bay to park their cars while at work in Oranjemund. It first belonged to the De Beers mining company which donated it to AlexCor after the independence of Namibia. The latter made it available to the police as a border post with the understanding that the Department of Public Works would be responsible for its maintenance. But the officers stationed at the border post often use their own resources to maintain the post. For example, they used their own funds to erect floodlights and paint the building.

At the Alexander Bay border post, there is one permanent and six detached police officers. The detached police are assigned on a two-monthly rotation basis. The main problems associated with the rotation system are:

Lack of training of detached police members in border control duties: Every new detached police officer stationed at the post must be trained in the task and functions of border control. Usually, this is the responsibility of permanent members.



Training is time-consuming: The training in the procedures, regulations and legal requirements relevant to the policing of South Africa’s international borders is time-consuming and utilises resources that could be used for border patrols.



Short period of time for detached police officers to serve at border: By the time detached police officers are fully functional at the border post, it is usually almost time for their return to their permanent stations. By this time, they start to focus on going home and stop putting in the extra effort required to combat border crimes.10

These problems are seen as by-products of postings that take people away from their homes and families, usually with poor accommodation and benefits for a short period of time.

Issues undermining effective border control

A number of key issues emerged from the research that have to be addressed if border controls are to be effectively implemented.

Co-operation with other South African government departments involved in border control

This section considers the level of co-operation between the border police and other agencies. It was found that the level of co-operation was case-specific. It is important to understand this as the ability to prevent the smuggling of firearms is largely information-driven. Given the lack of police capacity to search vehicles, the police need to be tipped off in advance of vehicles suspected of transporting illicit goods.

Of the three border posts visited in the Northern Cape, two are designated, A grade posts, Vioolsdrift and Nakop. This means that they are the main export and import ports in the region and are staffed by officers from customs and excise (SARS), immigration (Home Affairs) and the border police (SAPS). At these two border posts, there is a high level of co-operation between these three agencies and the infrastructure is good. There were facilities for the searching of vehicles and trucks. There were computers available for checks on people’s movements, and on vehicle registrations and firearm ownership of South African citizens. However, these two posts varied in the level of effectiveness of their operations. This was influenced by the lack of personnel, resources and motivation.

The situation at the Alexander Bay border post was bleak, not in terms of the level of motivation, but the disparity of resources. Since only border police and immigration officials are stationed at Alexander Bay, there is no daily contact with the other government departments. The border post is the main link between the diamond-rich areas of South Africa and Namibia. A great deal of mining equipment and other goods are regularly moved by truck from South Africa to Namibia. The arrangement at the border post is that the border police are responsible for executing SARS functions. With one permanent member responsible for all relevant documentation, it can easily take up to four hours per day.11 This is time that could have been better spent on border police functions. An estimated R50 million worth of goods are exported through Alexander Bay per month, of which 14% value added tax (VAT) can be reclaimed by the exporters.

Co-operation between the SAPS and the National Intelligence Agency

Staff of the National Intelligence Agency seemed to be more often present at the Vioolsdrift border post than at the other two posts.12

Information is available from the SAPS on organised diamond syndicates operating in the area, especially in Port Nolloth. However, there is little or no information on syndicates involved in firearms, drugs and other illegal goods.13 The main reason is the lack of communication flowing from intelligence sources in urban centres, such as Cape Town and Johannesburg. Since firearms are delivered and used in these urban centres, information needs to be fed back to border posts on the profile of the syndicates involved and the firearms used. As one police officer explained:

"We do not known who or what these syndicates are or the profile of the arms smuggler, for example, who are the smuggling syndicates taking firearms to the vigilante groups in Cape Town. We do not know whom to inform of this type of information if we come across such suspicious groups travelling through the border post and we are not informed of this type of information."14

The shortage of NIA operatives at these border posts is put down to the lack of personnel at provincial offices and nationally. The available NIA personnel are routed to identified ‘hotspots’. However, the gathering, interpretation and dissemination of information and the launch of a reaction to the information are usually time-consuming. Normally, when one ‘hotspot’ is under control, others have developed in the meantime.

There seems to be a new drive within the NIA to address the problem of border crimes and threats to South Africa’s national borders. Plans are under way to set up a ‘border desk’ within the NIA where all relevant information and statistics will be collected for interpretation and dissemination. This information will originate from all institutions and departments involved in border control. Planning will subsequently be done by those involved on the proper reaction to a problem identified by the ‘border desk’.15

Co-operation between the SAPS and the SANDF

At the Vioolsdrift border post, co-operation between the SAPS and the SANDF improved after the appointment of a new SANDF commander at Upington. Roadblocks jointly undertaken by the SAPS and SANDF occurred more frequently and, according to one border police officer, "the correct procedures concerning roadblocks are now followed by the SANDF personnel compared to the past."16

At the Alexander Bay border post, there was also a good relationship between the SAPS and the SANDF. Regular interaction took place between them and the broader spectrum of police personnel in the area.17

However, no defence force presence was observed at any of the border posts visited, nor were defence force patrols seen on the border with Namibia.

Co-operation between the South African border police and their Namibian counterparts

At each of the border posts visited, there was a sufficient level of co-operation between the SAPS border police and their Namibian counterparts. This was based on a mutual understanding of the problems that they faced, and was evident in the information exchanged.18 Namibian border police are not rotated on a regular basis and, as a result, a good relationship is formed with permanent SAPS border control officers.19

The long distance between Nakop and the Namibian border post does not impact on the level of interaction between South African border officials and their Namibian counterparts. The level of interaction is similar to that found at Alexander Bay or Vioolsdrift.20

Co-operation between the border police and the local communities

It is difficult to assess the level of co-operation between the border police and the local communities. The Northern Cape comprises a sparsely populated farming community. Interaction between the police and the local community police forums facilitates co-operation more at local police station level than at the level of the border police.

For the border police to recruit informants in these communities is extremely difficult as police officers are well known to the local population and interaction with any member in the community under abnormal circumstances would draw suspicion. The border police officers also indicated that they required better skills in the handling of informants.21

Interaction with farmers in the border area takes place on a regular basis and the farmers or their labourers often try to inform the police of any evidence of illegal crossings.22 The reaction by the police to this information often appears inadequate, because of the long distances and difficult terrain. As a result, both the farmers and labourers do not always bother to report suspected illegal activities.23

Co-operation between the border police and Illegal Firearms Investigation Units

Besides the Upington Illegal Firearms Investigation Unit24 which posts officers at the Nakop border post, officers of these units only visit the border posts when reacting to information concerning illegal firearms crossing at the border post.

The arrangement by the Illegal Firearms Investigation Unit and the border police at Nakop to send investigators with specific expertise on three-day rotational shifts to the border post is an effective good practice, as it allows for the transfer of skills specifically in terms of techniques to search for firearms. However, the system would work better if detached members from specialised units were on duty full-time and only responsible for border duties during their assignment.

Limitations undermining effective border controls

The border police felt that they were weak opponents in the face of illegal crossings of people and goods. As stated by a border police officer:

"The border posts and lines are seen by the criminals as a soft target. They cross the border with illegal firearms because they know we are understaffed and cannot search every vehicle entering South Africa, let alone also patrol the border at the same time."25

Due to the vast open landscape and the long distances between border posts, crossing points on this border are more difficult to pinpoint than on the KwaZulu-Natal-Mozambican border. In addition, it is only possible to identify the crossing points if the information on illegal crossings is reported by local residents, or when evidence is discovered during police patrols. There are usually no arrests after reports of illegal crossings as transgressors are mostly gone by the time the police investigate the scene. The majority of the illegal border crossings along the Orange River take place without the knowledge of the police or the local population.

Illegal crossings take place by boat or raft at places where it is impossible for the police to get close to the river due to the dense vegetation on the riverbanks. Neither do roads always lead up to the river, nor do they follow the river’s contours like on the Namibian side.26 The terrain is more difficult to patrol on the South African side of the border due to the mountains. This is compounded by the fact that roads are not maintained for use on a daily basis. The river has to be patrolled by a rubber dinghy in an attempt to find these illegal crossing points, which is often difficult due to the level of the river being too low and rocky to use the dinghy.27

The border police identified the Richtersveld National Park as an illegal crossing point for people with illegal firearms. It is an area frequently visited by tourists and roads in the park lead up to the river and are in a better condition than other roads in the area. According to police sources, some gun runners would enter this area disguised as tourists. Once within the park, they meet gun runners from the Namibian side to transfer firearms for use in South Africa.28 As stated by a border police officer, there are many "whites involved in smuggling syndicates making use of the Richtersveld National Park to smuggle in firearms."29

In the Vioolsdrift area, crossings also take place along the river with boats and rafts as in any other area of the Orange River. For the whole stretch of river from Alexander Bay to Vioolsdrift and beyond, there is only one police rubber dinghy available for patrols, stationed at Alexander Bay. If a need is identified by the border police at Vioolsdrift to use the rubber dinghy to patrol the river under its jurisdiction, it has to be brought up from Alexander Bay at night to avoid alerting criminals in the area that the boat would be used at Vioolsdrift.30

At the Nakop border post, the border police found it difficult to obtain information on illegal crossings. This was attributed to a number of factors, such as:

the lack of information exchange between the police and intelligence sources;

the vast, flat, open terrain between the South African and Namibian border posts; and

the lack of border patrols due to the shortage of personnel and vehicles.

Other illegal crossing areas identified in the Alexander Bay area are those at Sendelingsdrif, the Richtersveld National Park and the Grasdrift/Aussengehr areas.31

An uncontrolled crossing point of interest is the Grasdrift/Aussengehr area. On the Namibian side, development is under way for a new grape farm that would employ approximately 5 000 seasonal workers. This new development also includes a shopping centre with a liquor store. On the South African side, there is an existing diamond mine and nomadic sheep farmers. There is no doubt that miners and sheep farmers would most certainly cross into Namibia to make use of these new facilities.32 The border police are aware that they have insufficient infrastructure and capacity to handle the potential problem of illegal crossings.

Personnel and resource shortages

Similar to the rest of South Africa, the Northern Cape border police are understaffed and under-resourced. Compared to the rest of South Africa, however, the Northern Cape border control mechanisms are still functioning and do receive resources.

It is not surprising that the lack of personnel hampers the effective functioning of border control mechanisms. This merely reflects the personnel shortage in the SAPS as a whole. According to police officers interviewed, the Northern Cape is relatively well off in terms of resources and equipment when compared to other border units in South Africa. This was attributed to a strong SAPS provincial office that is responsible for the allocation of resources to border units. The Northern Cape SAPS provincial office appears determined to provide as much resources as possible from the different available police budgets.33

In the Northern Cape, it is not merely matter of increasing the number of staff, but also of improving the calibre of police officers. To strengthen the capacity of the Northern Cape border police, it requires an increase of only a few dedicated police officers who are willing to work in remote areas for long periods of time with limited resources and with somewhat unsuitable accommodation. It also requires specialised training in a range of search and seizure skills, as well as skills in working with informant and information-gathering.

Resources, such as computers, facsimile and x-ray machines are available in the Northern Cape in higher numbers than in some other parts of South Africa. However, training to operate the equipment is only available to a few select police officers. As a result, equipment is not used to its full potential.

The Northern Cape border police still lack proper and dedicated responses from other national police unit headquarters, such as the Central Firearm Register (CFR), Illegal Firearms Investigation Units, and others. In many cases, border posts require an immediate answer to an enquiry on a firearm’s status. An example to illustrate the lack of communication between the border police and the CFR was a handgun confiscated by the Namibian police from a South African entering Namibia without declaring it to either the South Africans or the Namibians. The Namibian police requested their counterparts on the South African side of the border to provide information on the status of the ownership of the firearm and were willing to hand over the suspect with the firearm to the South Africans if all was not in order. The South African border police sent an urgent message to the CFR and asked for a reply within the hour as the Namibians could not hold the person indefinitely. The request was answered by the CFR one week later.34

The issue of specialised equipment to improve the effective patrolling of the Northern Cape border was extensively discussed. The main problems of patrolling were linked to the scale of the border and the difficulty experienced in patrolling the Northern Cape border by motor vehicle. Some of the suggestions involved the use of off-road motorbikes, micro-light planes and hovercrafts. Any equipment provided for the purpose of border patrolling needs to be evaluated in terms of the following:

Purchase price and maintenance cost: The extremely long distance between the Northern Cape and urban centres where specialised mechanical skills are located needs to be taken into account in order to ensure that the equipment is sustainable.



Specialised training: The training investment in police officers to use specialised equipment would be significant.



Reaction time: The reaction time between reports of illegal crossings and identifying crossing points by the police is critical to prevent crossings from occurring.



Suitability to the geographic conditions and topography: The ability and suitability of the equipment to overcome the obstacles of the vast open space, mountains and the lack of river access are crucial.

There is inadequate accommodation and living quarters for detached police officers doing border duties at all three border posts. As one border police officer remarked:

"I can motivate policemen to be positive and to give that little extra when working at the border post but how do I keep them motivated if their sleeping quarters are rotting and they have to eat cold food every night."35

The lack of accommodation was problematic. Residential complexes were badly run down and poorly maintained as a result of neglect over the years. One reason may be the lack of financial commitment by government for this purpose. In some cases, the available accommodation had also been allocated to local police officers as a result of the smaller numbers of detached border police using the facilities.36 The same officer remarked that:

"The mere provision of additional police officers will not solve the problem, they must have suitable, clean living quarters with warm water and warm food. First get the accommodation in place before sending me more police officials."37

Given this largely negative critique of the infrastructure at the Northern Cape border posts, the physical infrastructure at the border posts had improved since 1994. At all three border posts there were proper working facilities such as sheltered structures with proper lighting for the inspection of vehicles and their cargo at night.

Corruption

In sharp contrast to the KwaZulu-Natal case study, there was no mention of border police or local police involvement in corruption. This could be attributed to the fact that few interviews were conducted with people from the local communities in the areas. Corruption will always be an issue in border areas where there are financial rewards to be reaped.

Conclusion

Overall, the Northern Cape border police are optimistic and working to the best of their ability, given their current resource and personnel constraints. In the past couple of years, the infrastructure at the border posts had increased, although it was still degraded. The living conditions of the border police and the lack of support from the NIA would enhance their effectiveness, as would prioritised support for requests sent to the CFR. The need for specialised training in search and seizure techniques, as well as the handling of informants was also identified.

Notes

Refer to chapter 7 for more information on the KwaZulu-Natal/Mozambique case study.



Interview with Illegal Firearm Investigation officer in Pretoria, 6 June 2000.



J Potgieter, The price of war and peace: A critical assessment of the disarmament component of United Nations operations in Southern Africa, in V Gamba, Governing Arms: The Southern African experience, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2000.



Interviews with border police officers, 3-5 April 2000.



Interview with border police officer, 3 April 2000.



Interview with the SANAB member at Nakop border post.



Interview with Vioolsdrift border police head, 3-4 April 2000.



Interview with border police officers, 3 April 2000.



Interview with border police officers, 4 April 2000.



Interview with border police officers, 3-5 April 2000.



Interview with border police officer, Northern Cape, 4 April 2000.



Interview with border police officers, Northern Cape, 3-4 April 2000.



Interviews with border police officer, Northern Cape, 3-5 April 2000.



Interview with border police officers, Northern Cape, 3 April 2000.



Interview with NIA representative, NIDS Secretariat, 31 June 2000.



Interview with border police officer, Northern Cape, 3 April 2000.



Interview with border police officer, Northern Cape, 4 April 2000.



Interviews with border police officer, Northern Cape, 3-5 April 2000.



Interview with border police officers, Northern Cape, 3 April 2000.



Interview with border police officers, Nakop border post, 4 April 2000.



Interview with border police official in Northern Cape, 3 April 2000.



Interview with border police officer, 3-5 April 2000.



Interviews with border police officer, Northern Cape, 3-5 April 2000.



At the time of the research, the Illegal Firearm Investigation Units were still operational. Thes units were integrated into the Serious and Violent Crime Unit, Detective Services, early in 2001.



Interview with border police officer, Northern Cape, 3 April 2000.



Interview with border police officer, 4 April 2000.



Researchers taken out on SAPS boat to experience difficulty of river patrolling.



Interviews with border police officers, Northern Cape, 4 April 2000.



Interview with border police officer, Northern Cape, 4 April 2000.



Interviews with border police officers, Northern Cape, 4 April 2000.



Interviews with border police officers, Northern Cape, 4 April 2000.



Interview with border police officer, 4 April 2000.



Interviews with border police officer, Northern Cape, 3-5 April 2000.



Interview with border police officer, 3 April 2000.



Interview with border police officer, 3 April 2000.



ISS Researchers shown living quarters of border police, 3-5 April 2000.



Interview with border police officer, 3 April 2000.