Chapter 9

CONCLUSION

Through this research done by the FIRE project of the Arms Management Programme at the Institute for Security Studies, two case studies were undertaken to establish how effective border control mechanisms are in combating the illegal flow of firearms across South African borders. The conclusion can be drawn that the goals set out by the South African government in its quest to address poor border controls are still far from being reached.

Although no figures are available and an estimate cannot be made of the number of firearms crossing illegally into South Africa, the belief is that firearms and other illegal goods are flowing across the country’s borders without being controlled effectively or in a way that would be acceptable to the South African public. It is believed that South Africa’s international land borders are not in a healthy state and not controlled at a desirable level of effectiveness.

From all accounts, the permeability of South Africa’s natural borders is excessive. The assessment of South Africa’s land borders has shown that there is very little control over the flow of firearms, people and goods across borders. Even at border posts, there is insufficient capacity to undertake proper searches. Preventing the free flow of firearms is not a priority of the SAPS border police stationed at border posts, although the SAPS indicated that fighting firearm crimes has been the number one police priority for the last few years.

The problems on South Africa’s international land borders do not solely fall into the domain of the border police or of the other government involved at border posts. It is the result of a combination of factors as identified below.

Problem areas

Problem areas identified by the research in the two case studies and supported by the two opinion surveys include the following issues.

resources

facilities

training

corruption

communication

illegal crossings.

Resources

Human resources: Border posts are at least 50% understaffed.



Vehicles: Lack of available and suitable vehicles at border posts like 4x4 trucks and motor cycles (four wheelers).



Boats: Boats are shared between border posts, removing resources from one border post at a time when they may be needed more.



Communication: At some border posts, there is no communication between the SAPS and the SANDF on the ground. Sharing crime intelligence between the agencies involved does not occur.



Electricity: The frequent failure of electricity supplies at some border posts allows for stolen vehicles to pass through as the computer system cannot work during power failures. Power surges and failures also result in damage to computer equipment.



Search equipment: Lack of search equipment like mirrors, x-ray machines.



Office equipment: Lack of facsimile machines, computers, filling cabinets.



Specialised equipment: Night vision and surveillance equipment.



Tracing units: Specialised units as part of border policing are needed to trace illegal goods and contraband already inside the country, and to investigate crossborder crimes to improve the conviction rate of these criminals.

Facilities

Search facilities: Some border posts lack properly fenced and controlled searching facilities for vehicles and people.



Storage facilities: Border posts generally lack proper and controlled storage facilities for confiscated goods.



Holding cells: There is a lack of proper and decent holding cells for arrested suspects.



Interview facilities: There is a lack of proper and private interview facilities at some border posts.



Office space: Some border posts lack proper and decent office space for administrative functions, storing or housing of computers.



Accommodation: Some border posts lack proper, clean and decent accommodation for personnel. Some border posts do have the necessary accommodation for detached personnel, but it is in a poor and run-down condition. Permanent officers often have to live away from the border post while accommodation at the border post is taken up by police officers with no connection to the border post itself.

Training

The need was identified for ongoing training of border personnel. Particular training needs were the recruitment and handling of informants, search techniques, observation and information-gathering techniques, and the understanding and interpretation of crime trends and statistics.



The use of specialised equipment at border posts by all personnel should be possible.



Computer skills and access to all functions available on the police computer network by all personnel would make the testing of vehicles, firearms and other property easier.



Training is needed for other departments involved at borders on crossborder crimes other than those that are a priority to them, especially for SANDF personnel patrolling the borderlines.

Corruption

Urgent and ongoing attention must be given to corruption at border posts. All government and private personnel should be of the highest possible calibre. One way of addressing the problem is the creation of an internal anti-corruption unit within the border police structure.

Communication

There is a lack of co-ordinated communication at border posts on ground level between the different departments involved, especially between the SAPS and the SANDF. This results in distrust and cross-accusations of corruption especially on ground level and at the lower ranks.



There is a big gap in communication between the border police and local communities. Better interaction between them will result in better information on illegal crossborder activities, and trust and understanding in the work of the border police.



There is still a communication gap between the different police services and government departments of the countries stationed at different sides of the border posts or borderlines. It is clear that some interaction is taking place at the border posts, but once away from the actual border post, officers from the different countries do not communicate with one another, but are suspicious of actions taken on the other side of the borderline.

Illegal crossings

There are too many known informal or illegal crossings that are uncontrolled or not properly monitored.



Existing laws and regulations concerning special permits for students (school children) and families living on opposite sides of borderlines are not enforced.



It was also found that border control operations by the police and defence force tend to focus on the more obvious problems of illegal immigrants, stolen vehicles and drugs. Firearms and other crimes like smuggling endangered species products are not considered to be priority crimes. In the nine national operations held by the border police, three concentrated on vehicles, one on stock theft and the illegal smuggling of cannabis, one on identifying flashpoints in four provinces, one on the illegal movement of people and goods at sea borders, one on crime prevention duties on short notice at all border posts, one on the illegal smuggling of marine resources and one on the illegal movement of people and goods at airports. Most of these operations are ongoing but not one focused on the illegal movement of firearms across South Africa’s borders. Of the three international operations held in conjunction with neighbouring countries, one focused on drugs and stolen vehicles, one on the illegal smuggling of precious stones and gold and the last one on vehicles. Again, there was no focus on the illegal movement of firearms in the Southern African region.



Patrols along the border - between border posts - are irregular, of low intensity and under-resourced. The existing mechanisms provide inadequate opposition to the free movement of people, goods and firearms.



One of the biggest problems identified by most of the roleplayers interviewed and with whom the border control issue was discussed was the lack of sharing of intelligence on crossborder crimes among roleplayers. This was considered by all respondents as an issue that needs urgent attention. Not sharing crime intelligence on syndicates or organised crime groups among the different law enforcement agencies seems to be a disease plaguing the whole law enforcement environment. This seriously hampers the successful prosecution of members of these criminal organisations.

Case studies

During the research and the field trips, it was found that there was almost no control over the movement of people and goods across the Swaziland/Mozambique/South African border (chapter 6), while the Namibia/South African border (chapter 7) had better controls, even though in specific geographic concentrations. Although more case studies would have been valuable, the information collected from the assessment survey (chapter 8) confirmed that a combination of the factors raised in both case studies was prevalent along all South African land borders.

The future

This ISS project has not been the only to identify problems concerning the mechanisms in place to control crossborder crime. The studies by Business Against Crime and the UNODCCP office, as well as several other research papers identified the same problems of no resources, lack of communication between agencies and countries, and corruption at border posts and on borderlines. The involvement of private sector concerns like UNICODE in border policing is a positive sign. This needs to be encouraged and has to involve more than just the detection of stolen vehicles. It should also include the detection of stolen household goods and stolen firearms.

The South African border police has also identified these problems and are in the process of addressing them. They are unfortunately not always supported in their efforts to address border-related crimes. When a crime occurs, such as the illegal smuggling of drugs, vehicles or firearms across the international border into South Africa, the SAPS is mandated to investigate, gather information and arrest the criminals involved. The border police have the expertise in these fields to do a proper job. It would be a costly exercise and mistake to replace the border police with a variety of units in the different departments to fight crossborder crime. The different efforts should rather be concentrated and the results will speak for themselves.

Because of the personnel shortage in the SAPS, the regular recruitment of personnel for detached duties could not be carried out for the past few years. When police officers voluntarily sign up for detached duties, it is often to escape from their normal day-to-day tasks and not necessarily to become seriously involved in fighting crossborder crimes. It would be difficult to find police officers from specialised investigation units for detached duties. When they are found at border posts, it would be in positions related to their own unit’s functions. It was only at the Nakop border post where specialised detectives were found doing border duties for short periods at a time. This is an option that needs to be explored and put to the test to see how effective such specialised knowledge of specific crimes can assist other police officers to become more effective on the international borders of South Africa.

What is a positive sign for the future is that the SAPS and the SANDF, in collaboration with other government departments, are aware of these problems. A concentrated effort is under way to address these problems with the limited available resources.

Efforts by the SAPS include a new voluntary recruitment drive by the border police to recruit 138 existing police officers to do six-month voluntary border duties at an identified problem or hotspot area. This recruitment drive includes interviews with all applicants and possibly polygraph tests before being accepted. Once accepted, they will receive an extra allowance for the six-month period. Apparently, the number of applications were more than double the number of recruits required. This indicates that there are still motivated police officers in the SAPS, willing to address the problem of border crimes. There were even detectives who applied for these positions, who can clearly assist border police to acquire skills to gather information, investigate and understand what the available information reveals about crimes at border posts. This process will be evaluated to see where improvements need to be made, and to see if it has the desired effect of decreasing border crimes in identified areas.

The SANDF has acknowledged that it is mainly concentrating on illegal immigrants crossing the South African borderlines. It has admitted that this is not the only crime occurring across borders and that they need to understand all types of crossborder crimes. This will be very difficult, however, if reports are considered in the media on the status of the SANDF and its capability to keep its deterrent factor on the borders. The report in the Mail & Guardian of 6 October 2000 stated: "The SA Army cannot maintain its deterrent capabilities at an acceptable level and at the same time deploy the number of companies and platoons required for border control and support the SAPS." If this is the true state of affairs, it will place an even bigger burden on the SAPS border police, which are already understaffed and lack the proper resources to fight crimes on the borders.

The UNODCCP is also involved in continuing its programme to assist border posts in South Africa, Swaziland and Mozambique with capacity-building, training and the provision of resources.

A new initiative by the United States is also in place. It is co-ordinated by the Embassy in Pretoria and aims to assist identified border posts in the Southern African Development community with capacity-building, upgrading and training border police officers.

With these new initiatives under way, some supported by international agencies, the improvement of existing border control mechanisms to address crossborder arms-smuggling seems to get more attention than in the past. But whether this new approach and the different initiatives will assist in stemming the flow of illegal firearms into South Africa from the Southern African region will have to be seen. Further research needs to be done, including on airports and seaports and involving all roleplayers concerned with combating crimes that extend across South Africa’s international borders.