Chapter 2

AN OVERVIEW OF DEMOBILISATION IN AFRICA

---

Demobilisation processes

Since the beginning of the 1990s, a number of countries in sub-Saharan African have conducted demobilisation processes with different degrees of success. However, these efforts have been broadly welcomed as important contributions in building sustainable peace and human development. Events in a number of African countries indicate that the positive outcome of the demobilisation process depends to a large extent on whether soldiers are able to reintegrate successfully into society. The record suggests that many demobilised combatants experience enormous difficulties in the transition from military to civilian life. Unhappy, frustrated and unemployed former soldiers may jeopardise social stability and post-conflict peacebuilding. Past experiences confirm that demobilisation is a complex and risky process, which demands that a number of conditions are met if the exercise is to be a long-term success. However, at the workshop on demobilisation organised by the International Resource Group on Disarmament and Security in the Horn of Africa (IRG) during December 1994, participants agreed that relevant African demobilisation experiences exist, and that the wheel was not in need of reinvention.3

While the conditions under which demobilisation has taken place in a number of African countries are not identical to those of South Africa, these experiences provide numerous useful insights and experiences of relevance. During 1989, Namibia initiated a major downsizing programme, demobilising all of the approximately 30 000 troops who had served under the South African administration, as well as 13 000 combatants of the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN). A much smaller national force of less than 10 000 was afterwards established in the country. In Mozambique, 70 000 government forces and 20 000 Renamo combatants were demobilised between 1992 and 1994, to allow for a new much smaller national military force of approximately 30 000 soldiers. Between 1992 and 1995, the Ugandan government demobilised 36 000 soldiers in a three-phased process. Following the collapse of the Mengistu government in Ethiopia, Africa’s largest armed force was reduced by almost 500 000, while almost 50 000 soldiers in the newly independent Eritrea were demobilised along with 22 000 combatants of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). Besides post-conflict demobilisation, a number of African military forces have been reduced as a consequence of budgetary pressure, or altered government priorities. For example, during the mid-1990s Zimbabwe reduced the size of its armed forces from 55 000 to 43 000 due to financial constraints.

Since the initiation of large African demobilisation programmes, governments, international development agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have increasingly paid attention to and provided support for an activity considered extremely important for peacebuilding and sustainable development. Recognising the importance of military demobilisation, the United Nations has increasingly highlighted the issue. The UN’s 1994 Agenda for Development declared that "the reintegration of combatants is difficult, but is critically important to stability in the post-conflict period ... effective reintegration of combatants is also essential to the sustainability of peace."4

The general problems encountered by African demobilisation efforts include the following:

Former combatants have enormous difficulties in finding employment, or establishing small enterprises.



Demobilised soldiers usually have very poor prospects for successful integration because of a lack of skills, education, or as a result of serious health problems.



Psychological adjustment for former soldiers is usually a critical challenge, forcing major changes in attitudes and expectations.



The resulting availability of ‘uncontrolled’ light weapons, which are often linked to smuggling and banditry, pose serious risks.



The propensity of demobilised soldiers to join private armies is an issue of concern.

According to Kingma’s study of demobilisation in sub-Saharan Africa, a number of factors are crucial for success. These include a clear political will, a credible central authority to guide and secure the process, a broad process of national reconciliation to undergird demobilisation, a comprehensive management process and sufficient skilled resources to support the process as a whole. However, reintegration support remains the critical element in the entire process. Without comprehensive support for the reintegration of soldiers into civil society, the entire process is threatened. Kingma suggests that this

"support is costly, but the long-term costs for society could be even more if former combatants are unable to find livelihoods outside the armed forces ... It could lead to increasing unemployment and social depravation, that could again lead to increasing crime rates and political instability."5

The tools to facilitate successful reintegration include counselling, technical and managerial training, provision of equipment, credit facilities, construction of houses, improvement of social infrastructure and the creation of new employment opportunities. A positive outcome for demobilisation and reintegration requires detailed planning, extensive support and a clear linkage between all phases of the process.

A brief overview of African demobilisation efforts in several countries provides insight into the process and suggests lessons for South Africa.

Ethiopia

Following almost 30 years of conflict and prolonged insurgency warfare that severely undermined Ethiopia, the Ethiopian Popular Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) assumed power in May 1991 and established the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE). The TGE established the Commission for the Rehabilitation of Members of the Former Army and Disabled War Veterans to prepare and implement a demobilisation and reintegration programme for the defeated Derg army. The main objective of the commission was to restore security and stability by confining the movement of soldiers to designated assembly areas. The long-term goal was to facilitate the reintegration of former combatants into society. The commission was also tasked with the demobilisation and reintegration of the members of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) captured by the EPRDF.

Socio-economic data collected in the assembly camps enabled the categorisation of the 455 000 Derg soldiers into four groups: rural, urban, those who had served for fewer than 18 months and disabled former soldiers. Categorisation enabled the commission to provide specific assistance to former combatants in accordance with their stated needs. A high percentage of Derg and OLF combatants received an identification card, which included a photograph and the official seal of the commission. The identification card was the main instrument used by former combatants to apply for specific benefits. Ethiopia’s demobilisation programme showed some early successes but, regrettably the outbreak of war with Eritrea undermined the prospects for long-term reintegration.

Namibia

The demobilisation of forces in Namibia took place in terms of a United Nations supervised transitional period prior to March 1990. The demobilisation of former combatants commenced during the establishment of an independent Namibia. However, neither the UN nor the new Namibian government planned a reintegration programme. Following demobilisation, many former soldiers failed to reintegrate back into civil society. Consequently, and in response to growing protests, the government set up a number of ad hoc programmes. Observers thus described Namibian demobilisation and reintegration as ‘a patchwork of well-intended programmes’, rather than a well-planned and carefully conceived strategy. Six years after independence, the Namibian government began to redraft reintegration strategies to assist former combatants who were still unemployed. Approximately 32 000 combatants from the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) and 25 000 combatants from the South West African Territorial Force (SWATF), including the paramilitary units of the SWATF, were demobilised in 1989. Of this total, 7 500 were able to join the Namibian defence and police forces. The other 49 500 former combatants required assistance with reintegration. The group was divided into the unemployed, the disabled, and the San (Bushmen) fighters. At the time of demobilisation, there was no collection of socio-economic data from combatants, but later surveys suggested that many individuals joined the army in their twenties and stayed in the military for approximately ten years. Most were married with an average of four children. Their health was not different to that of the average citizen. However, the overall educational qualification of former combatants, especially PLAN members, was not significant. Based on socio-economic data, a number of specific targeting mechanisms were applied to PLAN and SWATF former combatants. The long-term impact of these strategies remain difficult to determine accurately given the lack of available data.

Uganda

After a 15-year period of civil war and prolonged insurgency warfare in Uganda, the National Resistance movement came to power in 1986. Low-level conflict and banditry continued in different parts of the country until 1991. Between 1986 and 1991, capital expenditure on defence increased. However, once the military opposition was finally defeated in 1991, the government decided to shift the burden of its public expenditure away from the military to the promotion of social and economic development. This shift in government expenditure required a phased demobilisation process and the subsequent reintegration into civilian life of 36 400 (accompanied by 135 250 dependants) of the estimated 90 000 soldiers in the National Resistance Army (NRA) between 1992 and 1995. Three key factors motivated Uganda’s demobilisation process. Firstly, the government’s desire to ensure a ‘peace dividend’ demanded a reduction in the defence budget and a resulting demobilisation process. Secondly, there were strong social pressures to resettle former combatants with their families in their original home districts. Lastly, military leaders demanded a smaller, more professional and better trained armed force.6

An important step in the design and preparation of the programme was the completion of three studies. These studies included;

a socio-economic profile of soldiers to identify their capabilities, needs, and expectations;

an analysis of the opportunities for veterans in the job market; and

an examination of institutional requirements to facilitate programme implementation.

A profile study of military personnel was undertaken in order to gather data on demography, education, employment, land ownership, marketable skills and asset ownership in order to identify areas where intervention would be the most beneficial. The study indicated that the majority of army personnel (66.5%) were below 30 years of age; few soldiers had any other skills besides military training (43.7% had only infantry skills) and the average family size was 3.17 members. Led by the World Bank, the donor community worked with the Ugandan government to implement the demobilisation programme. A Veterans Assistance Programme was developed to resettle former soldiers into civilian communities. The statutory autonomous agency, the Uganda Veterans Assistance Board (UVAB), under the direct control of the prime minister’s office, was set up to manage the assistance programme. The programme had two elements. Firstly, a ‘settling-in-kit’ was designed to cover the first six months after discharge. The package consisted of the provision of shelter, food, clothing, transport, medical care and education for veterans’ children. The second element, the ‘long-term package’ included reintegration measures such as vocational training and credit facilities. The UVAB worked with the military leadership to decide who was to be demobilised and to manage the entire process. Soldiers were demobilised under a number of categories: age, medical, voluntary, services no longer required (competence) and reduction in establishment (rationalisation).

Soldiers and their dependents went through pre-discharge orientation briefings, intended to provide them with information on how to open a bank account, how to start income-generating activities, environmental and legal issues, basic health and child immunisation, civic duties, legal rights of women in civil society, along with family planning and AIDS prevention. A ‘transitory safety net package’, in cash and/or kind, was provided to assist former soldiers in the initial stages of resettlement. These packages included food, civilian clothing, household utensils, building materials, seeds and agricultural implements. The package also included funds for the payment of school fees for children for a period of 12 months. The UVAB developed a discharge certificate, a non-transferable, non-corruptible identification mechanism. It included general information about the bearer, an entitlement section, and a statement of the rights of inheritance vis-à-vis the next of kin if the veteran passed away before the six-month programme of entitlement terminated. The discharge certificate proved to be a highly effective instrument in preventing leakages, facilitating administrative procedures and reducing costs.

Demobilisation was extremely traumatic for soldiers in Uganda, most of whom expected rewards from the government and the community for their participation in past military conflict. They did not expect to be "pushed to obscurity, while the rest of the country enjoyed the peace and fruits of their sweat."7 Political disputes regarding the wisdom of those who did participate in the conflict led after a time to veteran disaffiliation of civil society. The vast majority of demobilised soldiers lacked the ability to help themselves, as well as the necessary civic awareness and self-reliance to meet the new challenges in civilian life. In many cases, the total lack of readily marketable skills to facilitate quick entry into a competitive labour market was a major problem. The provision of marketable skills was made via training in micro-business management and apprenticeship in collaboration with a number of NGOs. Training for micro-business management included recordkeeping, group dynamics, bookkeeping, writing a project proposal, loans management and gender issues. Training was usually conducted on location in villages by NGO fieldworkers and Veterans Assistance Programme representatives. On occasion, specific training was provided at the beneficiaries’ workplace. Training was provided with the objective of enhancing the self-employment potential of veterans by providing new skills or upgrading existing skills.

The Ugandan demobilisation process suggested that economic integration was the most difficult part of the transition to civilian life. A lack of marketable skills and little or no access to capital severely hampered economic integration. The problem was partly addressed by foreign donors. The Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) provided assistance in the medical rehabilitation of veterans, while USAID supported the reintegration of veterans with agricultural technology and credit programmes. The German Technical Co-operation (GTZ) provided limited direct credit to a number of veterans and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) assisted in upgrading skills.8

Studies of the Ugandan experience suggest a number of lessons:

Both veterans and the civilian community need to be thoroughly prepared before the commencement of the demobilisation programme.



Former soldiers and their spouses need to be advised on how to adapt to civilian life.



Specific programmes are required to target the special needs of veterans for an extended period after demobilisation.



Economic reintegration efforts should be linked to existing development activities.9



The education of veterans is an essential part of the reintegration programme.



Effective participation of all parties is necessary for success.



Demobilisation and reintegration need to be seen as part of a continuum. There "can be no artificial separation between demobilisation and reintegration."10



Demobilisation and reintegration cannot be addressed with a purely military approach. The issues of vocational training and education are a vital element of ‘human reconversion’.



Training for a specific job in civilian life is only relevant in an environment where employment opportunities are available.

 Mozambique

A key element in the Mozambican peace process was the demobilisation in 1994 of 92 881 soldiers from both the government and opposing Renamo forces. Demobilised soldiers and their families were transported to their chosen destination and provided with a range of benefits to assist both their social and economic reintegration into civilian life. Assistance packages included civilian clothing, food for three months, vegetable seeds and a tool kit, cash payments for two years, and specific programmes to support reintegration such as occupational skills training and small grants for projects. The total cost of the reintegration programme over the period 1993 to 1997 was US $94.9 million, of which the Mozambican government contributed US $10.35 million with the balance provided by foreign donations.

During the assembly area registration of military forces in 1994, a socio-economic survey was conducted to determine the key characteristics of each soldier about to be demobilised. The survey covered age, marital status, district of origin, level of education, military rank and years of military service. The resulting database was used to assist in planning and monitoring reintegration programmes. In addition, surveys were carried out at different times during the reintegration programme to determine progress and the levels of success.

Rwanda

In 1998, Rwanda initiated a four-year demobilisation programme with the objective of reducing the size of its armed forces by 50%. During September 1997, 5 000 soldiers were demobilised and sent back to their villages to begin a process of reintegration into civilian life. In terms of the programme, each demobilised soldier was give a piece of land on which to settle and build a house, along with US $1 000 as a ‘departure allowance’. The government promised demobilised soldiers a bank loan if they were able to come up with a ‘viable’ project. Former soldiers were encouraged to acquire new skills suitable for employment in a civilian environment. The setting up of a Veterans Vocational Training Centre in Butare where former soldiers were able to develop new skills in masonry, carpentry, welding and tailoring was considered particularly helpful to many. The approximately 3 000 former child soldiers, or Kadogos as they are known in Rwanda, were either sent back to school, or back to their families. The Rwandan government provided 60% of the funding for demobilisation, while the rest was covered by donations from the Netherlands, Sweden, Britain, Switzerland, Austria and the UNDP.11

Sierra Leone

The 1996 Abidjan accord made provision for a comprehensive demobilisation, disarmament and rehabilitation programme in Sierra Leone. However, the programme was put on hold due to Revolutionary United Front (RUF) scepticism over UN involvement in mediating the conflict. Factors preventing a comprehensive demobilisation programme included a lack of political will among all parties; bureaucratic and financial problems; failure to reduce available weapons; difficulties surrounding the resettlement of chiefdom-based militias (possibility of victimisation); as well as an inadequate sensitisation and reconciliation programme. An escalation in the conflict indefinitely delayed the implementation of a demobilisation initiative.12 In July 1999, it was estimated that it would cost approximately US $35 million to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate the RUF, the Civil Defence Force (CDF), other paramilitary groups and the regular Sierra Leone Army (SLA). However, the Sierra Leone government disputed this figure, claiming that at least US $100 million was required to complete the process.13