Chapter 3

CASE STUDY DEMOBILISATION IN UGANDA

Motivation for demobilisation

In the case of Uganda, the primary goal for demobilisation was to decrease defence and security expenditures and increase public expenditure on social and economic development. The defeat of the military opposition in 1991 by the National Resistance Army (NRA) brought stability to the country. There was therefore no need for a large army in this new Uganda, something which had been crucial during the earlier insurgency period. After the war, the large numbers of soldiers were no longer required and had become a severe burden on the national budget, as well as the management capacity of the NRA itself.14 Additionally, the bloated military was consuming a significant proportion of the national budget at the expense of other sectors of the economy, though this was previously viewed as a necessary expenditure meant to ensure permanent peace and security. Of particular concern was that the level of remuneration and the material conditions of service had to be substantially improved at all levels of the NRA. This was very difficult to implement on a sustained basis, given the large number of personnel. In order to take Uganda forward, the army council took a bold step and decided to reduce the number of military personal in the NRA. The demobilisation process and subsequent reintegration process took place between 1992 and 1995 and involved approximately 40 000 soldiers.

The first step undertaken by the Ugandan government was to gather personal socio-economic data about combatants in order to identify target groups and to design effective reintegration programmes.15 Three studies were completed. The first study compiled a socio-economic profile of soldiers to identify the capabilities, needs, and expectations of the target group. This included gathering data on demography, education, employment, land ownership and other characteristics of the army in order to identify the areas where policy intervention would be most supportive. The second study analysed the opportunities for veterans in product and factor markets in order to design a settling-in kit and long-term reintegration programme. The last study examined institutional requirements to determine the programme’s implementation structure.

The study revealed three principal categories of combatants to be affected by the reduction-in-force (RIF) plan:

the aged and the sick, whose children would require educational assistance;



the healthy and mature, who just wanted to go home and settle, and of whom the majority wanted to farm while the others wished to engage in various trades or skills, with some vocational training; and



the young, who did not have much to go back to and who wished either to continue formal education or to develop their skills and became artisans.

The donor community, with the World Bank as the lead donor, worked closely with the government to organise and mobilise resources for the demobilisation exercise. The Veterans Assistance Programme was established to assist the process. Its aims were to resettle veterans and to facilitate their smooth integration into civilian communities. A statutory autonomous body, the Uganda Veterans Assistance Board (UVAB), in the office of the prime minister, was constituted to manage the veterans’ programme (for example, carrying out demobilisation, resettlement and reintegration of veterans throughout the country). The programme included two packages: the settling-in kit, which covered the first six months after discharge, and the long-term package, which involved assistance that would be extended to veterans for a further period of at the most 30 months. The settling-in kit consisted of shelter, food, clothing, transport, medical care and education for veterans’ children. The long-term package constituted reintegration measures including vocational training, credit for income-generating activities to facilitate veterans’ reintegrating into civilian society.

The demobilisation process

The demobilisation process was managed and carried out by the UVAB as mandated, which worked in close co-operation with the army. The army decided who was to be demobilised - 38% were discharged because their services were no longer required, 25% of soldiers left the army voluntarily and 26% were discharged on medical grounds. There was an appeal committee, however, to which soldiers could apply if they felt they were not fairly treated. Demobilisation was implemented in three phases during which all 36 358 soldiers, accompanied by over 100 000 dependants were demobilised and helped to resettle in their home districts and among their communities.16 The UVAB, in collaboration with the army, developed a discharge certificate as the principal non-transferable, non-corruptible identification mechanism. It included general information about the bearer, an entitlement section on and a statement of the rights of inheritance vis-à-vis the next of kin, should the veteran pass away before the sixth month of the programme of entitlement ended. Its major security features was a photograph, its bound format, and the unambiguous identification of the bearer. Due to these features, the discharge certificate proved to be a highly effective tool in preventing leakages, facilitating administrative procedures and reducing costs.

The army decided to discharge the identified soldiers as quickly as possible to avoid potential disruptions, difficulties, and costs to sustain large numbers of soldiers and their dependants at the assembly points for any prolonged period. Therefore, soldiers were often given no more than one to two days’ prior notice of demobilisation. Many veterans resented the shortness of the demobilisation notice. To facilitate the veterans’ return to civilian life, a predischarge orientation programme was offered to them and their dependants in discharge centres. This provided the veterans and their spouses with details on civic duties and the community, family-planning and immunisation, information on how to start income-generating activities, environment protection, how to open a bank account, legal rights of women in civil society, AIDS awareness and protection, the district veterans’ programme office and district veterans’ councils and, finally, on the package itself. These briefings helped the veterans psychologically by explaining how to take initiatives towards self-reliance, and how to behave in civil society.

Transport was provided for each veteran and his or her family and belongings from the discharge centre to the district of destination. From district headquarters to their final destination, veterans had to arrange transport individually and pay for it with part of their transition allowance. The UVAB entered into contractual agreements and arrangements with private and public transport providers at rates that were fixed during each phase. In the final phase of the programme, post-discharge orientation meetings for information and counselling were organised in district capitals and were attended by veterans and their spouses. District administration representatives, especially those from agriculture, health and education departments participated.

The UVABs transitional safety net package was designed to address the immediate basic needs of demobilised former combatants. It included:

cash payments to assist veterans for a period of six months;



health care support in cases of severe need;



financial contributions for veterans’ children primary education; and



shelter for families to meet the most pressing short-term survival needs as they sought to secure a sustainable future.

The cash benefits were calculated to finance a package of basic needs and were designed to cover the veterans’ expenses for clothing, food, medical care and drugs, agricultural tools and the materials necessary for the construction of a simple building. The payments were effected in instalments, partly in cash and partly through bank transfers.

In the Ugandan case, the objective of reintegration was seen as permitting former combatants and their families to become productive, self-sustaining citizens who contribute to the community. This is a gradual process, which goes far beyond the process of resettling veterans into civilian life. At the planning level, the reintegration goal is to bring the majority of veterans to a socio-economic level on a par with civilians. Three types of integration emerged: economic, social and political. For successful reintegration of veterans into a civilian environment, it became imperative to create measures in support, for instance, of education, training, counselling, employment and self-employment. A pilot education and training support component was introduced in phase two. The fund enabled veterans to continue with formal education, attend a vocational training institution, or participate in a scheme that provided on-the-job-training advised by master craftsmen.17

During the second phase, the UVAB set up a directory of NGOs to advise veterans on non-UVAB financial reintegration support. To counter various incidences of discrimination, the UVAB sensitised project promoters, as well as local and central authorities to allow veterans to apply for loans on an equal basis with civilians. Counselling mainly addressed issues of health, programme procedures and local administration. Despite its extension to several reintegration initiatives, direct employment support to veterans and their spouses was beyond the scope of the UVAB. Hence, several parallel activities financed by government, multilateral and bilateral donors alike were initiated or extended to cater for veterans’ income-earning needs.

Programme managers designed and implemented several measures to facilitate social reintegration. Those who failed to achieve social reintegration were said to include some from dubious backgrounds, thieves and those who exhibited habitual anti-social behaviour.18 With social capital progressively weakened over years of civil strife, the Ugandan government clearly understood the potential problems of distrust and fear that could derail even a well-planned demobilisation exercise. Consequently, government officials and UVAB staff undertook community sensitisation tours at the initiation of each programme. Community awareness towards reintegration was also a central focus in phase three through a mass media campaign, which made use of radio and social drama or puppet theatre as alternatives to normal teaching methods. The UVAB conducted seminars after the first phase of discharge to educate community leaders not to view veterans as negative elements in society, but to help veterans by advising them on how to integrate themselves productively into civilian life.

Initially, in the earlier phases of demobilisation, political reintegration was weak. The veterans had not felt confident enough to join local council systems. They preferred to take their problems to the veterans’ programme office, instead of to local council officials. In some cases, the officials refused to handle veterans’ issues and, as a result, veterans lacked confidence in the local system. In subsequent phases, however, the participation of veterans in local politics improved substantially and some veterans were already holding leadership positions in local councils, school management committees and local development associations. In some areas, veterans joined local defence units and became involved in political education programmes. Two veterans were elected to parliament, while some have been elected as mayors in some districts. Community stability and the good discipline displayed by most veterans were positive contributing factors to their integration into local political systems.

The capacity of veterans to reintegrate socially and economically is determined by several factors. Among the characteristics that have eased reintegration are the following: having been stationed in settled military units rather than mobile combat units, having joined the army as a mature person with access to land, and having a family to return to. Many veterans lost their entire families, and had no homes to return to. For these effectively displaced veterans, as well as for child soldiers, reintegration was a major challenge. The Ugandan experience showed that access to land was a major factor facilitating economic reintegration.

Wives of former combatants faced particular problems where they did not belong to the same ethnic group as the husband, but followed him to his home after discharge. They were often rejected by the community and/or abandoned by their husbands bowing to community or family pressures. Many decided to leave (divorce or separation) their husbands and returned to their own place of origin at their own initiative. A significant divorce rate among returning veteran families (over 50% in phase one) bears testimony to this high level of social stress. At the same time, the Ugandan experience shows that communities often erect visible and invisible barriers to veteran reintegration especially in the early stages of the process. Both political leaders and community members had misconceptions regarding the returning veterans. As only very few veterans actually committed a crime or behaved unsociably, distrust slowly receded and often turned into advice and assistance.

Successes

The budgetary returns as a result of demobilisation were impressive. There was a decrease in defence spending and annual budget savings of 10% of recurrent expenditure.

To facilitate the administration of veterans’ affairs, the UVAB appointed district veterans’ programme officers in each district to handle veterans’ issues. These officers were very effective in assisting veterans, for example, to open bank accounts.

As part of the government’s preparations at local level, district veterans’ advisory committees assisted the district officer as and when required. Its main role was to oversee the implementation of the programme at the district level. This provision made the demobilisation process even smoother.

An external auditor scrutinised the UVAB’s monthly accounts for the first two phases and certified the final statements of accounts on completion of each phase. This prevented the misuse of funds.

The UVAB’s staff training activities to improve the skills and knowledge of staff and other concerned officials to enable them to contribute to the programme’s implementation proved to be of great importance.

Failures

Seminars and workshops often lacked adequate preparation and proper orientation.

Reporting by district staff was infrequent and incomplete in the first phase of the programme.

Cultural differences between veterans’ wives resulted in tensions and, for some, subsequently, in divorce or separation.

The reception of veterans by the community during the fist phase was negative, characterised by a mixture of apprehension, fear, prejudice and suspicion.

The Ugandan government did not take into account contingency factors like the drought, which resulted in food scarcity, and each arriving veteran was seen by the community as an additional mouth to feed.

There are still cases of veterans renting or residing in houses which belong to relatives.

Many veterans and their families suffered from a shortage of capital and had no marketable skills. Only between 10 and 20% of veterans were reintegrated economically over a short period and were able to support themselves with little help from the community.

Constraints

The majority of veterans had not been educated beyond the level of primary school. They possessed military skills, which did not have much relevance outside the army.

Some of the veterans were physically handicapped and therefore had difficulties earning a living on their own.

The absence of sufficient funds allocated to reintegration programmes by both the Ugandan government and the donor community adversely affected veterans’ economic reintegration.

The implementation schedule of the programme depended on the availability of funds from donors (delayed disbursement of funds by major donors).

Lessons for South Africa

The Ugandan demobilisation experience suggests some lessons for South Africa:

Demobilisation programmes must have clear but realistic objectives.



The gathering of precise socio-economic data to identify target groups and prepare suitable support programmes is crucial.



Soldiers clearly need time to adjust to the reality of demobilisation, and at least a month’s notice should be given.



Predischarge and post-discharge transitional safety net packages are important for immediate support.



Education and training support would be useful in the South African context, especially in the form of funding for formal education, vocational training and direct employment support.



Social and political reintegration need to be considered as separate issues and addressed differently.



Mass media campaigns to create public awareness about demobilisation and reintegration processes proved effective in Uganda and would be useful in informing the civilian population.



Small-scale business management and funding for business plans could be effective in supporting economic reintegration.